Richards, Thomas J. 1971. "The Two Doctrines of Distribution." Australasian Journal of Philosophy no. 49:290-302.

"Medieval logicians often defined a term T as distributed in a sentence f(T) iff there is a valid inference from f(T) to If(this T)]. Thus P is distributed in [Some S are not P]. Nineteenth-century traditional logicians presented an alternative definition of distribution of T in f(T) according to whether T refers to its whole extension. Thus S is not distributed in [Some S are not P]. This version is also medieval, and has been attacked, mainly by Geach, from the point of view of the incoherence of the theory of reference it prima facie presupposes. In this paper I shall make some remarks about the history of the two doctrines, then attempt to provide precise formulations of them.

These formulations will then be compared; and then precise formulations of the two traditional distribution laws of inference will be offered. These two laws are, informally and traditionally: a term distributed in a conclusion must be distributed in a premiss (Law of Valid Process); and, the middle term of a syllogism must be distributed in a premiss (Law of Distributed Middle). The latter is capable of generalisation to cases other than traditional syllogisms, otherwise it is trivial.

The tenor of the paper is that all these precise formulations are acceptable renderings of distribution theory generalised beyond simple S-P sentences.

Consequently the acceptability of these areas of traditional metatheory of traditional logic has as at least a necessary condition the proof of the two distribution laws and the demonstration of the equivalence of the two definitions of distribution. It will be shown that the two definitions are not equivalent, that the Law of Valid Process does not hold on one definition of distribution, and that neither law holds on the other definition." (p. 290)
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1962. Logica Modernorum: A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic. Vol. 1: On the Twelfth Century Theory of Fallacy. Assen: Van Gorcum.

Contents: Preface 11; 1. The specific character of the Logica Modernorum 13; 2. The theory of fallacy in the framework of the Logica Vetus 24; 3. The theory of fallacy in the great logical works of Peter Abailard 49; 4. The theory of fallacy in the School of the Parvipontani 62; 5. The earliest mediaeval commentaries on the Sophistici Elenchi 82; 6. The theory of fallacy in the later glosses on the Perihemeneias 113; 7. Two treatises on fallacy from the latter part of the twelfth century 127; 8. On the use of the doctrine of fallacy in twelfth century theology 153; Books and articles referred to 179; List of manuscripts used 181; Appendices: A. Glose in Arist. Sophisticos Elencos 187; B. Summa Sophistorum Elencorum 257; C. Tractatus de dissimilitudine argumentorum 459; D. Fallacie Vindobonenses 459; E. Fallacie Parvipontane 491; F. [Frustula Logicalia] 611; Indices: A. Index locorum 629; B. Index nominum 642; C. Index sophismatum et exemplorum 646; D. Index verborum et rerum 659-674.

"In this work the author tries to show how the Logica Modernorum, - which, as is known, exerted, from the thirteenth century onwards, such a profound influence on the development of Mediaeval Philosophy -, had its origin in the twelfth century logical and grammatical theories which arose in the Western centers of studies, especially in Paris.

The first volume deals with one of the two roots of this development: the twelfth century doctrine of fallacy; the second volume will treat of the Logica Modernorum in the grammatical theories of the twelfth century.

The author thought it of great importance to edit in full the main treatises on which his studies are based; they are found in the Appendices A-E. Appendix F contains three passages from twelfth century Perihermeneias-commentaries; in order to avoid the false suggestion that one has to do here with fragmentary remnants which have come down to us, I chose, despite its somewhat culinary sound, the term 'Frustula' instead of the more usual 'Fragmenta'. Some information on the manuscripts concerned is given in the course of this study; for the places, consult the List of manuscripts used.

As to the ratio edendi I >refer to the preface of my edition of the Dialectica of Garlandus Compotista, published as part III in the same series.

The Index nominum, the Index locorum and the Index sophismatum aim at completeness. The Index verborum et rerum is not exhaustive: it only tries to give a number of words and phrases considered as important for the understanding of the conceptual and doctrinal contents of the edited treatises and to facilitate the reader's orientation in this study." ("In this work the author tries to show how the Logica Modernorum, - which, as is known, exerted, from the thirteenth century onwards, such a profound influence on the development of Mediaeval Philosophy -, had its origin in the twelfth century logical and grammatical theories which arose in the Western centers of studies, especially in Paris.

The first volume deals with one of the two roots of this development: the twelfth century doctrine of fallacy; the second volume will treat of the Logica Modernorum in the grammatical theories of the twelfth century.

The author thought it of great importance to edit in full the main treatises on which his studies are based; they are found in the Appendices A-E. Appendix F contains three passages from twelfth century Perihermeneias-commentaries; in order to avoid the false suggestion that one has to do here with fragmentary remnants which have come down to us, I chose, despite its somewhat culinary sound, the term 'Frustula' instead of the more usual 'Fragmenta'. Some information on the manuscripts concerned is given in the course of this study; for the places, consult the List of manuscripts used.

As to the ratio edendi I refer to the preface of my edition of the Dialectica of Garlandus Compotista, published as part III in the same series.

The Index nominum, the Index locorum and the Index sophismatum aim at completeness. The Index verborum et rerum is not exhaustive: it only tries to give a number of words and phrases considered as important for the understanding of the conceptual and doctrinal contents of the edited treatises and to facilitate the reader's orientation in this study." (From the Preface)
———. 1967. Logica Modernorum. Vol 2. Part One: The Origin and Early Development of the Theory of Supposition. Assen: Van Gorcum.

"In this work it will be attempted to show how the Logica Modernorum had its origin, long before the thirteenth century, in the logical and grammatica! theories current in the Western centres of studies: Paris, Oxford and presumably a school in Northern ltaly.

The First volume dealt with what was considered as one of the two roots of this development: the twelfth century theories of fallacy. The present volume discusses the other source: the development of Mediaeval grammar from an elementary discussionof (Latin) grammar to a linguistic-semantic theory of (Latin) language. It was the latter contribution that was of extreme importance for the origin of the theory of supposition, and generally speaking, of terminist logic.

The purpose of this volume is to trace the details of the origin of the theory of supposition, including appellation and copulation, and to discuss the theory of the properties of terms as found about 1200.

Besides, some historical evidence will be given for the origins of the tracts dealing with the properties of syncategorematic terms and those discussing the other specific elementa of the Logica Modernorum.

The author has thought it of some importance for further investigation in this field to edit in full the main treatises on which the present study is based.They will be found in the second part of this book. They have been arranged chronologically, except for the Quaestiones Victorinae, which are to be considered as an extra.

The Index nominum, the Index locorum and the Index sophismatum aim at completeness. The Index verborum et rerum is not exhaustive: it only tries to give a number of words and phrases considered as important for our understanding of the conceptual and doctrinal contents of the edited tracts, and to facilitate the reader's orientation in this study." (From the Preface)
———. 1967. Logica Modernorum. Vol 2. Part Two: The Origin and Early Development of the Theory of Supposition. Texts and Indices. Assen: Van Gorcum.

Contents: I. Introductiones Montane minores 7-71; II. Abbreviatio Montana 73-107; III Excerpta Norimbergensia 109-141; 1. De arte dialetica 113-126; 2. De arte disserendi 127-133; 3. lntroductiones Norimbergenses 134-141; IV Ars Emmerana 143-174; V. Ars Burana 175-213; VI. Tractatus Anagnini 215-332; 1. De predicabilibus 217-232; 2. De argumentationum generibus 233-257; 3. De suppositionibus 258-282; 4. De propositionum generibus earumque probatione 283-296; 5. De quinque dictionum generibus 297-326; 6. De arte sophistica 327-332; VII Tractatus de univocatione Monacensis 333-351; VIII lntroductiones Parisienses 353-373; IX Logica "Ut dicit" 375-411; X. Logica "Cum sit nostra" 413-451; XI. Dialectica Monacensis 453-638; XII Fallacie Londinenses 639-678; XIII. Fallacie Magistri Willelmi 679-702; XIV Tractatus de proprietatibus sermonum 703-730; XV. Quaestiones Victorinae 731-769.
———. 1971. "The Development of Suppositio Naturalis in Medieval Logic. I. Natural supposition as non-contextual supposition." Vivarium no. 9:71-107.

Reprinted as chapter IX in: L. M. de Rijk, Through Language to Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics, edited by E. P. Bos, Northampton, Variorum reprints, 1989.

"I had already discussed this matter [naural supposition] in the second volume of Logica Modernorum (Assen 1967; pp. 571-578) and in the paper Significatio y suppositio en Pedro Hispano.

The aim of this paper is to elaborate and, partly, correct the view of natural supposition given there by a discussion of the most representative thirteenth century authors and of some fourteenth century logicians with whom natural supposition still played a rôle, such as John Buridan and Vincent Ferrer.

The thirteenth century authors are Peter of Spain, William of Sherwood, the anonymous author of the Tractatus de proprietatibus sermonum, and Lambert of Auxerre. It should be remarked at the outset that there is no interdependence between these thirteenth century authors, apart from the rather vague relation effected by their standing in a common tradition of logic." (pp. 71-72)
———. 1973. "The Development of Suppositio Naturalis in Medieval Logic. II. Fourteenth-Century Natural Supposition as Atemporal (Omnitemporal) Supposition." Vivarium no. 11:43-79.

Reprinted as chapter X in: L. M. de Rijk, Through Language to Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics, edited by E. P. Bos, Northampton, Variorum reprints, 1989.

"I - Status quaestionis.

From the investigations in the first part of this article the conclusion was drawn that in the thirteenth century doctrine of supposition natural (or habitual, or absolute) supposition was considered the natural capacity of a term to stand for something partaking in the essence (or: universal nature) signified by that term; accidental supposition was the term's actual being taken for something in virtue of the term's combination with some other term in either a phrase or a proposition, or of its having a special meaning in a special social context. Briefly stated : natural supposition was decidedly non-contextual, whereas all kinds of accidental supposition were of the contextual type.

Two characteristics of the thirteenth century doctrine of supposition are to be noticed

(a) accidental supposition, being contextual, does not always imply a propositional context

(b) natural supposition, being something midway significatio and suppositio (as opposed to significatio), seems to enervate the clear-cut

distinction all thirteenth century logicians made between suppositio and significatio.

ad a Thirteenth century logicians turn out to consider the proposition as just one of the possible contexts of a term, not as the only one required for a term's having supposition.

ad b The introduction of natural supposition was due to the peculiar fact that those logicians apparently held it to be indispensable to distinguish between a word's having signification (viz. its representing some universal nature) and its capacity to stand for individuals partaking in this universal nature (c.q. the universal nature participated, taken as such), which capacity was the direct, or natural, counterpart of its having signification. This natural capacity must be seen as a reference to a possible context, which supplies an adjunct to limit, or restrict, the term's original capacity (c.q. which causes its having an unrestricted exercise of its natural capacity). (...)

As is well known, when studying the problems of signification fourteenth century logicians showed an increasing interest in the contextual approach to language. Their investigations were focussed on the congruitas locutionis and the veritas propositionis as the basic requirements (exigentie) for stating the actual meaning of terms. Their theories of supposition may be taken as an attempt to specify the truth conditions for (mostly affirmative) categorical propositions. Thus, the various kinds of supposition were characterized by fourteenth century logicians by means of implications (consequentie)'. Consequently, they were bound to lay the most explicit stress on the proposition as the only possible context in which a term could have supposition.

The most obvious conclusion from the theoretical point of view would be that natural supposition, being of the non-contextual type, had to disappear in fourteenth century logic. To my mind, it certainly had - as certainly as it never should have appeared. However, it did occur in those days, not only in the Realist tradition but with a logician as John Buridan as well.

It is the aim of this article to discuss the reinterpretation of natural supposition and the controversies it provoked, and is still provoking up to the present days." (pp. 43-44)
———. 1982. "The origins of the theory of the properties of terms." In The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, edited by Kretzmann, Norman, Kenny, Anthony Patrick, Pinborg, Jan and Stump, Eleonore, 161-173. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"The first medieval scholars to have a professional interest in language as such were the grammarians. Their interest was focused on what we would call logico-semantical and syntactical questions; this is espedally true of the School of Chartres as early as the 1030s. No longer were words studied as separate units quite apart from their linguistic context; rather it was that context itself that attracted the most intense interest. I have labelled this concentration of attention the 'contextual approach' (De Rijk 1967, pp. 113-17; 123-5). The statement (propositio), not isolated words, was taken to be the fundamental unit of meaning. The meaning of a word in its actual use in a propositional context was considered so important, indeed, as to lead to the introduction of a special terminology, centred around terms (i.e., words as parts of actual propositions) and their properties.

The development of the doctrine of the properties of terms was in fact nothing but the growing dominance of just one of the properties of terms, suppositio, i.e., actually 'standing for'. On the other hand, throughout that development, there remained some basic presuppositions which not only established the framework of the development but were, unfortunately, to determine later developments as well. Among them the most obstinate was the doctrine of significatio." (pp. 161-162)

References

Rijk, L. M. de, (1962-7). Logica modernorum: A contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic. I: On the Twelfth Century Theories of Fallacy (1962); II, 1: The Origin and EarlyDevelopment of the Theory of Supposition; II, 2: Texts and Indices (1967), Van Gorcum
———. 2013. "Semantics and Ontology. An Assessment of Medieval Terminism." Vivarium no. 51:13-59.

Abstract: "This paper aims to assess medieval terminism, particularly supposition theory, in the development of Aristotelian thought in the Latin West. The focus is on what the present author considers the gist of Aristotle's strategy of argument, to wit conceptual focalization and categorization. This argumentative strategy is more interesting as it can be compared to the modern tool known as 'scope distinction'."

"A Summary

The following statements can summarize our findings:

[1] The medieval theories of the properties of terms, supposition in particular, and medieval terminism in general developed around 1100 from a doctrine concerning the unmasking of fallacious arguments through grammaticological analysis.

[2] Unlike fallacies, as a root of terminism, grammatico-logical analysis continued to play a prominent role in its later developments.

[3] Like any philosophical method, the methodology of terminism had everything to do with a philosopher’s basic attitude towards reality, and, accordingly, its diverse developmental directions mirrored diverse philosophical positions, varying from realism to nominalism/conceptualism, to each of which it was equally hospitable.

[4] The basic ancient and medieval philosophical positions were all governed by the paradigm of the parallellism (supposedly existing) between Reality and our cognitive faculties (for Aristotle and the Medievals, particularly the scheme of the ten categories).

[5] There are, consequently, unmistakable parallells between the Aristotelian and the medieval strategies of argument, which, however different they sometimes seemed, both served much the same philosophical positions.

[6] The nucleus of the Aristotelian strategy of argument, which consists in focalization and correct categorization, is also found in terminism, both of which are based on the conviction that any proper discussion requires highlighting the object’s (whether essential or coincidental) ontic features that are suited to the investigation or discussion at hand.

[7] Taking advantage of the ambivalent semantic area of the key focal terms of the discussion is one of the main characteristics of terminism.

[8] The medieval debates on metaphysical issues and on intentionality, as well as sophisticated disputes about the significative force of words occurring in special contexts, gave rise to many semantic refinements, such as the issues of semantic stratification and time connotation.

[9] The entire development of terminism can also be assessed in the broader context of the post-medieval rise of empiricism, including an ongoing critical attitude towards rational speculation. As far as the Middle Ages are concerned, this attitude came to the fore in reducing the number of the categories regarded as ontologically representative (with Ockham among others), or even in giving up the idea of ontological representativeness altogether (with Crathorn)." (pp. 55-56)
Roberts, Louise Nisbet. 1956. "Classification of Suppositions in Medieval Logic." Tulane Studies in Philosophy no. 5:79-86.

"Classifications of supposition are a characteristic portion of the terminist logic of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth centuries. The article contains a brief explanation of classifications to be found in the texts of such logicians as Peter of Spain, Albert of Saxony, and John Buridan."
———. 1960. "Supposition: A Modern Application." Journal of Philosophy no. 57:173-182.

"A few Twentieth Century issues found in the analysis of ordinary language are explored in terms of Fourteenth Century logic. The late medieval theory of supposition is applied to problems appearing in the work of such recent thinkers as W. V. O. Quine and P. F. Strawson."
Roques, Magali. 2019. "Vincent Ferrer on Natural Supposition." Medioevo no. 44:161-177.
Sagal, Paul Thomas. 1967. The Concept of Supposition and Its Place in the Development of Medieval Semantology, University of Pennsylvania.

Available at ProQuest Dissertation Express. Order number: 6809232.
———. 1973. "On Refuting and Defending Supposition Theory." The New Scholasticism no. 47:84-87.

Summary: "P. T. Geach's critique of medieval supposition theory has generated much controversy. Supposition theory is neither as guilty as Geach claims, nor as innocent as Scott, one of Geach's critics, claims. Geach takes a medieval account of supposition, the "Ockham-Buridan" account, and attempts to show that it provides us with unacceptable semantic analyses of certain propositions. According to him, supposition theory treats applicatives as associating with common nouns to form referring expressions. However, there is no way to render intelligible the referents of expressions like 'some dancers' and 'all dancers'. Geach sees this semantic foul-up as a consequence of supposition theory's failure to assign applicatival expressions to the proper grammatical category. T. K. Scott counters that the medieval treatment of applicatives parallels modern logic's treatment of quantifiers."
Sbordone, Luca. 2016. "Semantics and Pragmatics of Reference. Elements of a Contemporary Theory of Supposition." In Formal Approaches and Natural Language in Medieval Logic, edited by Cesalli, Laurent, Goubier, Frédéric and Libera, Alain de, 303-324. Barcelona - Roma: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales.

"In recent years, a number of important studies in medieval philosophy have convincingly shown that those we would call pragmatic considerations according to today’s trends in philosophy of language and linguistics, were also at the core of the concerns in medieval logic and semantics. The works of Irène Rosier-Catach(1), only to mention one remarkable example, have shown that medieval theories of language, far from being limited to strictly syntactic or semantic analyses, crucially involved elements of what we could call speech act theory as well as a notion of meaning which resorted to the identification of the intentions lying behind a speaker’s utterance." (p. 303)

(...)

"In the same spirit of the cited works, in the present paper I will argue in favour of the analogy between Ockham’s supposition theory and one very specific and peculiar approach in post-Gricean Pragmatics, that of so-called Default Semantics(6) (DS).

The purpose of this work will be very limited. I will restrict myself to a little portion of Ockham’s theory of supposition, i.e. his theory of supposition proper, and will leave aside the much more complex theory of the modes of personal supposition. Also, I will pursue my analogy only with respect to the treatment that DS proposes with respect to one important distinction in contemporary theories of reference, i.e. Donnellan’s distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions(7).

My aim is to show that the general strategy advocated in DS to cope with this kind of semantic issue comes very close to Ockham’s strategy to distinguish the readings of a proposition by the possible modes of supposition of its terms. My hope is that such an analogy could eventually be illuminating with respect to the general question of what medieval theories of supposition were aimed at." (pp. 304-305)

(1) I. Rosier-Catach, La parole comme acte: sur la grammaire et la sémantique au IIIe siècle, J. Vrin, Paris 1994.

6 K. Jaszczolt, Default Semantics, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005.

7 K. Donnelaln, «Reference and definite descriptions», Philosophical Review, 75 (1966) 281-304.
Schaeffer, Frans. 1987. "Syntax and Semantics in Supposition Theory." In Ockham and Ockhamists, edited by Bos, Egbert Peter and Krop, H. A., 63-69. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.

"Introduction

Of the many topics discussed by Ockham in his writings on logic, in recent rimes most attention has been paid to his theory of supposition. This is not surprising, since the theory of supposition is widely recognized to be the most original medieval contribution to logic, and in Ockham' s hands the theory became a strong weapon in the fight about the status of universals.

What is surprising, perhaps, is that this attention has been focused almost completely on personal supposition, to the exclusion of material and simple supposition. This can be explained in part by the fact that the notions of material and simple supposition can only be understood against the background of a comprehensive (medieval) philosophy of language, whereas personal supposition can be approached more directly from a modem logical point of view.

Indeed, it is clear that techniques and notions drawn from modem logical theory can play an important role in helping to understand personal supposition. But we must be careful not to divorce persona! supposition from the larger framework of which it is, after all, only a part." (p. 63)
Schoot, Henk J.M. 1993. "Aquinas and Supposition: the Possibilities and Limitations of Logic In Divinis." Vivarium no. 31:193-225.

)"Medieval theory of supposition, being a part of medieval theory of meaning, has been and remains a subject of particular interest of present-day philosophers. Ever since it was discovered that there are peculiar parallels between modern and medieval theory of meaning, considerable effort has been made to describe its origins and develop- ment. The parallel, in short, is a similar distinction between the signification of a word and its actuad meaning in use. Frege' s conceptual pair of Sinn (sense) and Bedeutung (reference), like Carnap' s pair of Intension and Extension ( Connotation and Denotation ), were discovered to echo the medieval distinctions between Significatio and Appellatio (around 1100), and between Significatio and Suppositio (end 12th and 13th century)." (p- 193)

(...)

"The first paragraph will elaborate the link between divine simplicity, mystérium and the (in)adequacy of talk about God, in order to make intelligible that in Aquinas all analysis of the human way of speaking provides both possibilities and limitations. In the second paragraph I will investigate Aquinas' use of the term modus significandi and show that it is linked with supposition. The third paragraph proceeds with a study of the distinction of supposition and signification, a study of the various modi supponendi that Aquinas distinguishes and with a comparison of it to three logical tracts from the thirteenth century (Peter of Spain, William of Sherwood and Lambert of Auxerre). Both paragraphs mention the word naturalis and so a fourth paragraph will be needed to explain the influence of modes of signification upon modes of supposition, and the double meaning of the term supponere naturaliter in Aquinas." (p. 197)
Scott, Theodore Kermit. 1966. "Geach on Supposition Theory." Mind no. 75:586-588.

"Ib his recent book, Reference and Generality,(1) P. T. Geach has made explicit some of his objections to a portion of Ockham's supposition theory, although there was some mention of its shortcomings in his earlier article on the doctrine of distribution.(2) I want to argue that most of Geach's objections are based on a misinterpretation of the doctrine. He criticizes in particular those types of supposition that are divisions of personal supposition and that constitute the portion of the theory having to do with the effect of quantifiers on propositions. It is important to recognise that the reference of terms falling under these types is already fixed by stating that they have personal supposition, meaning that they stand for their logical inferiors. And their reference is not altered by including them under these further types. There is just no mention of reference at all in connection with this portion of the theory. The sole reason for placing a term under one of these types is that the quantified proposition in which it occurs is equivalent to another proposition of a certain form.(3) For example, the term ' man ' in the proposition ' Every man is an animal ' is said to have suppositio confusa et distributiva, because that proposition is equivalent to the conjunctive proposition' This man is an animal and that man is an animal and ... and that man is an animal ', indicating each man in turn (Summa Logicae, i. 70). And the same term has suppositio determinata in the proposition ' Some man is an animal', because that proposition is equivalent to the disjunctive ' This man is an animal or that man is an animal or . . . or that man is an animal' (Summa Logicae, i. 71). Hence, this part of the theory has nothing to do with the reference of terms, but only with the role of quantifying words." (p. 586)

(1) Reference and Generality, Cornell University Press, 1962.

(2) [The doctrine of distribution,] Mind, 1956, pp. 67-74.

(3) In discussing these types (Summa Logicae, i. 70-74), Ockham actually says that it is " suitable to descend " (contingit descendere) from the original pro- position to the second one. However, I take every such pair to be equivalent, since in every case, ht says that either of the two may be inferred from the other.
Sirridge, Mary. 2013. "Supposition and the Fallacy of Figure of Speech in the Abstractiones." Vivarium no. 51:147-168.

Abstract: "I undertake to examine the practice of Richard, Master of Abstractions,[*] with respect to supposition in his dealing with the fallacy of figure of speech. His practice turns out to support the ‘single theory’ account of the theory of personal supposition, as does his treatment of a functional equivalent of simple supposition, but his practice of proposing additional solutions points to changing attitudes with respect to species as separate entities. Questions having to do with material supposition and the like are completely absent, even in discussions where we might expect to find them."

References

[*] Master Richard Sophista: Abstractiones, edited by Mary Sirridge and Sten Ebbesen with E. J. Ashworth, New York; Oxford University Press 2016.
Smithka, Paula J. 1991. "Ampliation and natural supposition in Albert of Saxony's Quaestiones super logicam." In Itinéraires d'Albert de Saxe, Paris-Vienne au XIV Siécle, edited by Biard, Joël, 137-148. Paris: Vrin.
Sørensen, Holger Steen. 1961. "An analysis of linguistic signs occurring in suppositio materialis or the meaning of quotation marks and their phonetic equivalents." Lingua no. 10:174-189.

Abstract: "n this paper I propose to discuss the time-honoured problem of linguistic signs occurring in suppositio materialis, a problem which has recently been given some attention. The problem may be stated as follows: What is the subject in a sentence like “Happily was spelt incorrectly”? And to what word-class does it belong? I shall show that the ordinary view of the suppositio materialis employment of signs — that e.g. ‘happily’ is a noun in this employment — is seriously fallacious. The notions of subject and subject of discourse have not been kept distinct. (The subject ( = grammatical subject) in ‘Anderson smokes cigars’ is ‘Anderson’, whereas the subject of discourse is Anderson) In other words, signs and what signs are signs for have not been kept distinct. This is a mistake the linguist often accuses the layman of committing. But unfortunately he often commits it himself. In connexion with my analysis I shall call attention to an important distinctive feature of the language (metalanguage) the linguist uses in describing languages."
Spade, Paul Vincent. 1974. "Ockham's Rule of Supposition: Two Conflicts in His Theory." Vivarium no. 12:63-67.

Reprinted as Chapter IX in P. V. Spade, Lies, Language and Logic in the Late Middle Ages, New York: Routledge 1988.

"In his thirteenth-century I ntroductiones in logicam, William of Sherwood enunciates the following principle: "Subjects are of such sorts as their predicates may have allowed."(1) That is, the kind of supposition(2) or referencs a term has in a given sentence depends at least in part on what kind of a term the predicate is. This principle I shall call the "rule of supposition". Thus, in 'A man is running' the subject 'man' has personal supposition, while in 'Man is a species' it has simple and in 'Man is a name' it has material.(3)" (p. 63)

(...)

"Ockham thus gives a complete version of the rule of supposition which we first saw in rudimentary form in William of Sherwood.

Nevertheless, I shall argue in sections II and III, below, that Ockham does not really want the rule he gives. It conflicts with the main body of his doctrine in two ways; there are pressures from two directions

to revise his version of the rule. In section IV. I shall examine how some later formulations of the rule relieved these pressures." (p. 67)

(1) William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic, Norman Kretzmann, tr., (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966), p. n3. (...).

(2) I am concerned in this paper only with that portion of supposition theory which T. K. Scott calls "the doctrine of supposition proper", as opposed to "the doctrine of modes of personal supposition". Cf. the introduction to his John Buridan: Sophisms on Meaning and Truth, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966), pp. 29-42. I assume a minimal familiarity with at least this portion of supposition theory. (...)

(3) Kretzmann, op. cit., [William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic, Norman Kretzmann, tr., (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1966),] p. 107; Grabmann, op. cit.,[Martin Grabmann, ed., Die Introductiones in logicam des Wilhelm von Shyreswood (d. after 1267) en: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1937) p. 75.
———. 1975. "Some Epistemological Implications of the Burley-Ockham Dispute." Franciscan Studies no. 35:212-222.

Reprinted as Chapter X in Lies, Language and Logic in the Late Middle Ages.

"The dispute between Walter Burley and William of Ockham over supposition and signification has been discussed often in the literature. For the most part, the philosophical - as distinguished from the textual - side of this discussion has centered on those aspects of the dispute which are based on the metaphysical disagreements between the two men. From this point of view, the main question in the debate is "For what does a common term stand when it stands in simple supposition?" Burley, the realist, maintained that such a term stands for what it signifies, namely, a common nature outside the mind. On the other hand, Ockham the conceptualist could not accept such a position; in his ontology there were simply no common natures outside the mind. For him, therefore, a common term in simple supposition stands for the universal concept in the mind.

This much of the dispute then is based on the metaphysical disagreement over whether there exist common natures outside themind. It is this metaphysical side of the dispute that is usually brought out in recent discussions.

But there is quite another question too at issue between Burley and Ockham, one the answer to which is restricted but not totally fixed by their respective metaphysical views. It is: "Disregarding the question what we are to posit at the one end of the relation of simple supposition, which kind of supposition is it in which a term stands for what it signifies?" For Burley it is simple supposition, for Ockham personal. As will be seen, this issue has epistemological implications.

It is this side of the dispute that I want to explore here." (pp. 213-214, notes omitted)
———. 1975. "Ockham's Distinctions Between Absolute and Connotative Terms." Vivarium no. 13:55-76.

Reprinted as Chapter XI in Spade, Lies, Language and Logic in the Late Middle Ages, New York: Routledge 1988.

"This paper is intended as an introduction to the theory of "connotation" as developed by William of Ockham, especially as in his Summa logicae. It is only an introduction to that theory, because it focusses on only the most rudimentary part of it, namely, the distinction between absolute and connotative terms. The paper does two things. First, it tries to clarify several crucial but obscure notions that arise in connection with this distinction, notions such as "signify the same things in the same way", "secondary signification", and "express the quid nominis". Second, the paper argues for the claim that connotation-theory, or at least that part of it presented here, requires no new primitive notions beyond those already required for the theory of absolute terms." (p. 55, a note omitted)
———. 1976. "Priority of Analysis and the Predicates of O-form Sentences." Franciscan Studies no. 36:263-270.

Reprinted as Chapter XII in Lies, Language and Logic in the Late Middle Ages.

"In 1970, John J. Swiniarski observed in this journal that there is something peculiar about Ockham's doctrine that the predicates of O-form sentences have confused and distributive supposition.(1)In 1973, Gareth Matthews made a similar point.(2) In brief, the problem is this: Ockham defines confused and distributive supposition in such a way that a given term in a sentence has confused and distributive supposition if and only if a descent to singulars under that term is possible by a conjunctive sentence, and the original sentence cannot be inferred from any one conjunct." (p. 263)

(...)

"I find neither of these views compelling. While Matthews is certainly right in saying that Ockham never claims equivalence explicitly, I for one find it hard to imagine that he means anything else. For if equivalence fails, the elaborate distinction of the various kinds of personal supposition cannot be used in an account of truth-conditions.

What then is the distinction for? Is it simply an idle decoration in the theory of supposition?

On the other hand, while Swiniarski's suggested "priority of analysis" rule would avoid the problem with the O-form sentences, it would not, as he claims it does, do away with the need for merely confused supposition entirely. Ockham, after all, uses merely confused supposition not only in his account of A-form sentences, but also in his account of such problem-sentences as •I promise you a horse.'

A "priority of analysis" rule would eliminate the need for merely confused supposition in the case of A-form sentences, but not in the other cases." (p. 265, a note omitted)

(1) John J. Swiniarski, "A New Presentation of Ockham's Theory of Supposition with an Evaluation of Some Contemporary Criticisms," f'ranciscan Studies, 30 (1970), 181-217.

(2) Gareth B. Matthews, "Suppositio and Quantification in Ockham," Nous, 7 (1973), 13-24.
———. 1982. "The Semantic of Terms." In The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, edited by Kretzmann, Norman, Kenny, Anthony Patrick and Pinborg, Jan, 188-196. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"Two senses of'term'

Medieval philosophers and logicians used the word 'term' (terminus) in several senses, two of which are especially pertinent to this discussion.

Strictly speaking, a term is what is subjected to the predicate or predicated of the subject in an ordinary categorical proposition - the subject term or the predicate term, the two ends (termini) of the proposition. In this sense whole phrases may be terms, but only certain sorts of words - nouns, adjectives, and verbs - can serve by themselves as terms. Less strictly, and in the later Middle Ages more prevalently, a term is any word at all, regardless of propositional context. In this discussion 'term' will be used in the less strict sense unless otherwise noted.

Signijication as a psychological and causal property of terms

There are two basic properties for the medieval semantics of terms: signification and supposition. Signification is a psychologico-causal property of terms - a fact responsible for many disagreements and tensions in medieval semantics. The main source for the notion of signification was Boethius' translation of De interpretatione 3, 16b 19: '[Verbs] spoken in isolation are names and signify something." (p. 188)

(...)

"Supposition-theory is best viewed as two theories: the theory of supposition proper and the theory of'descent to singulars'. (29)" (p. 192)

(...)

"The second main part of supposition theory is the theory of descent to singulars or 'modes of personal supposition'. The standard modes are: 'discrete', 'confused and distributive', 'determinate', and 'merely confused'.

Discrete supposition is the supposition of proper names, demonstratives, and demonstrative phrases. There was wide divergence regarding the definitions of the other modes." (p. 194)

(29) See Scott's introduction to Buridan 1966, [(1966). Sophisms on Meaning and Truth, tr. T. K. Scott, Appleton-Century-Crofts] pp. 29-42
———. 1984. "A Defense of a Burlean Dilemma." Franciscan Studies no. 44:193-196.

"Professor Fitzgerald's interesting paper "An Interpretative Dilemma in Burlean Semantics" argues against certain claims made in my "Some Epistemological Implications of the Burley-Ockham Dispute"."

(...)

"Fitzgerald and I remain in disagreement about the correct interpretation of Burley's semantics. I hold (1) that for Burley a common term (discrete terms are another matter(1) signifies a species or common nature, not individuals, and (2) that for Burley it is only in simple supposition that a common term supposits for its significate. Since (3) a term signifies just what it makes one think of, I conclude (4) that it is only when a common term is used in simple supposition for species or common natures that we are made to think of what the term supposits for, and so what we are talking about.

If I understand him correctly, Fitzgerald and I disagree about (4) because we disagree about both (1) and (2)." (pp- 193-194)

(...)

"The reader will have to decide for himself whether the texts really do provide sufficient evidence for my claims (1) and (2), and so whether the very interesting passages Fitzgerald quotes concerning direct intellectual cognition of particulars should be counted against my interpretation or, on the contrary, only aggravate the difficulties I see in Burley's theory." (p. 196)

(1) Burley's denial of any difference between simple and personal supposition for simple discrete terms may be taken as implying a denial of a distinction between individuals and their individual natures, between for example Socrates and his Socrateity.
———. 1988. "The Logic of the Categorical: The Medieval Theory of Descent and Ascent." In Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy: Studies in Memory of Jan Pinborg, edited by Kretzmann, Norman, 187-224. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

"The fact is, therefore, that we hear comparatively little about supposition-theory from either side of the English Channel during roughly the last quarter of the thirteenth century. This perhaps suspicious coincidence is all the more intriguing once it is realized that the theory of supposition, as it emerges from the shadows again in the early fourteenth century, is in important respects different from what it was earlier. These differences have not been sufficiently noticed or studied in the literature. I propose to examine some of them here.

The differences I have in mind all pertain to that well known part of supposition-theory called the doctrine of "descent to singulars", together with the correlative but perhaps not so well known notion of "ascent" (from singulars). This doctrine has been widely discussed in the secondary literature, mostly from the point of view of Ockham's presentation of it. Recently there has been some dispute over just what the doctrine of "descent to singulars" was intended to accomplish and over whether it does in fact accomplish it,u Another goal of this paper will be to shed some light on that dispute.

Section I below distinguishes two main parts of the theory of supposition. Section II gives a preliminary description of the part that is the main focus of this paper. Section III introduces some notions and notation. Section IV defines various "modes" of common personal supposition. Section V restricts our consideration to the kinds of sentences to which the theory was primarily intended to apply. Section VI proves three theorems. Section VII makes some observations based on the theorems. Section VIII considers two views about the purpose of this theory. Finally, in Section IX, I offer my own tentative suggestions." (p. 188)
———. 1997. "Walter Burley on the Simple Supposition of Singular Terms." Topoi. An International Review of Philosophy no. 16:7-13.

Abstract: "This paper argues that Burley's theory of simple supposition is not as it has usually been presented. The prevailing view is that Burley and other authors agreed that simple supposition was in every case supposition for a universal, and that the disagreement over simple supposition between, say, Ockham and Burley was merely a disagreement over what a universal was (a piece of the ontology? a concept?), combined with a separate disagreement over what terms signify (the speaker's thoughts? the objects the thoughts are about?).

In fact, however, Burley explicitly allows that some instances of simple supposition are for an individual, and that in certain cases personal supposition and simple supposition coincide. The present paper explores Burley's theory on this topic, and proposes a way of thinking about the metaphysics and the semantics that makes sense of what he says."
———. 1999. "Walter Burley on the Kinds of Simple Supposition." Vivarium no. 37:41-59.

"By the early-fourteenth century at the latest, the mediaeval theory of supposition could be divided in most authors into two main branches, which in recent literature have come to be called the theory of “supposition proper” and the theory of “modes of personal supposition,” respectively. While the relation between these two branches remains obscure, we can say to a first approximation that the theory of supposition proper was a theory of “reference,” designed to answer the question what entity or entities a term refers to or “supposits” for in a given occurrence in a given proposition, whereas the theory of modes of personal supposition, whatever its ultimate purpose, was the part of the theory that included the much discussed accounts of “descent to singulars” and “ascent from singulars”."(p.41, notes omitted)

(...)

"In the present paper, therefore, I shall explore in at least a preliminary way Burley’s account of the divisions and subdivisions of simple supposition, investigate how that account changed over time, and inquire into the motivation behind this part of his doctrine. The main texts I shall be concerned with are Burley’s early treatise De suppositionibus (dated 1302)(12) and his later De puritate artis logicae tractatus longior (before 1327).(13) I shall occasionally mention Burley’s late Expositio super artem veterem (1337), although the theory of simple supposition in that work remains to be studied more fully.(14)" (p. 43)

(12) Edited in Stephen F. Brown, Walter Burleigh’s Treatise De suppositionibus and Its Influence on William of Ockham, in: Franciscan Studies, 32 (1972), 15-64. On the date, see ibid., 16.

(13) Edited in Walter Burley (= Burleigh), De puritate artis logicae tractatus longior, With a Revised Edition of the Tractatus brevior, ed. Philotheus Boehner, St. Bonaventure, NY 1955. In the introduction to his edition (p. viii), Boehner dates this work 1325-1328. But Rega Wood, in an unpublished paper Walter Burley: Life and Works, suggests a slightly earlier date.

(14) Walter Burley, Burlei super artem veterem Porphirii et Aristotelis, Venice: Otinus [de Luna] Papiensis, 11 May 1497 (Copy in the Lilly Library at Indiana University). On the date, see the explicit quoted in James A. Weisheipl, Repertorium Mertonense, in: Mediaeval Studies, 31 (1969), 174-224, at p. 189.
Sweeney, Eileen C. 1995. "Supposition, Signification, and Universals: Metaphysical and Linguistic Complexity in Aquinas." Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie no. 42:267-290.

"This essay places Aquinas's use of supposition theory in its metaphysical and linguistic contexts, showing, first, how Aquinas's use of supposition in the problems surrounding terms said of God illustrates Aquinas's theological and metaphysical commitments. Second, I argue that Aquinas's supposition theory organizes but does not dissolve the ambiguities and complexities of language, taking the multiplicity of meanings and references as intrinsic rather than curable aspects of language. These complexities are, for Aquinas, reflections of our imperfect imitation of the immediate and complete understanding of the divine intellect, and the composite and fragmented metaphysics of created being."
Swiniarski, John J. 1970. "A New Presentation of Ockham's Theory of Supposition with an Evaluation of Some Contemporary Criticisms." Franciscan Studies no. 30:181-217.

"This is a critical evaluation of Ockham's theories of meaning and reference based on extensive primary source materials and especially concerned with Ockham's procedures for the extensional analysis of general propositions. The Kneales' contention that absurd conclusions follow from the application of Ockham's procedures is shown to be ill-founded. Geach's claim, that Ockham's notion of purely confused supposition is unnecessary, is supported. Some of Moody's views on supposition are upheld."
———. 1971. Theories of Supposition in Medieval Logic: Their Origin and their Development from Abelard to Ockham.

Available at ProQuest Dissertation Express. Order number: 7107229.

"All of the systematic treatises concerning supposition which we shall consider in this chapter date from about the middle of the thirteenth century. All of them appear as tracts in handbooks composed for the teaching of logic in the medieval universities. Four logicians whom we can name composed such texts: William of Sherwood, Peter of Spain, Roger Bacon, and Lambert of Auxerre. William's work is important because it appears to be the earliest of the four.

Peter of Spain's text is significant because it came to be the most popular of all the medieval handbooks on logic.

Bacon's work is important because it contains certain tendencies and insights not found in the works of either of his immediate predecessors.

Lambert's work is less significant than that of the others because it appears to be primarily an expansion upon and an explanation of the work of Peter of Spain, rather than an independent work in its own right." (Chaptet Two: Thirteeenth theories of supposition, p. 111)
Theron, Stephen. 1999. "The supposition of the predicate." The Modern Schoolman no. 77:73-78.

"Supposition theory (chiefly that of Aquinas) is contrasted with theories of reference. It is argued that the predicate "stands for" (supponit pro) what the subject stands for. It has the same supposition, that is, but according to its predicative mode. Supposition can be varied "ad placitum." The role of the copula is crucial, as is the principle that "only wholes can be predicated of wholes" (Aquinas: De ente et essentia). The context is a discussion of writings by Peter Geach."
Thomas, Ivo. 1952. "St. Vincent Ferrer's De Suppositionibus." Dominican Studies no. 5:88-102.
Trentman, John Allen. 1964. Simple Supposition and Ontology: A Study in Fourtenth-Century Logical Theory, University of Minnesota.

Available at ProQuest Dissertation Express. Order number: 6500162.
Uckelman, Sara L. 2013. "A Quantified Temporal Logic for Ampliation and Restriction." Vivarium no. 51:485-510.

Abstract: "Temporal logic as a modern discipline is separate from classical logic; it is seen as an addition or expansion of the more basic propositional and predicate logics. This approach is in contrast with logic in the Middle Ages, which was primarily intended as a tool for the analysis of natural language. Because all natural language sentences have tensed verbs, medieval logic is inherently a temporal logic. This fact is most clearly exemplified in medieval theories of supposition. As a case study, we look at the supposition theory of Lambert of Lagny (Auxerre), extracting from it a temporal logic and providing a formalization of that logic."
Valente, Luisa. 2011. "Praedicaturi supponimus. Is Gilbert of Poitiers’ approach to the problem of linguistic reference a pragmatic one?" Vivarium no. 49:50-74.

Abstract: "The article investigates how the problem of (linguistic) reference is treated in Gilbert of Poitiers’ Commentaries on Boethius’ Opuscula sacra. In this text the terms supponere, suppositus,-a,-um, and suppositio mainly concern the act of a speaker (or of the author of a written text) that consists of referring—by choosing a name as subject term in a proposition—to one or more subsistent things as what the speech act (or the written text) is about. Supposition is for Gilbert an action performed by a speaker, not a property of terms, and his ‘contextual approach’ has a pragmatic touch: “we do not predicate in order to supposit as much as we supposit in order to predicate”. Language is considered by Gilbert as a system for communication between human beings, key notions are the ‘sense in the author’s mind’ (sensus mentis eius qui loquitur) and the ‘interpreter’s understanding’ (intelligentia lectoris). The phenomenon of ‘disciplinal’ discourse (“man is a species of individuals”) is treated by means of these hermeneutic notions and not by means of a special kind of supposition."
———. 2013. "Supposition Theory and Porretan Theology: Summa Zwettlensis and Dialogus Ratii et Everardi." Vivarium no. 51:119-145.

Abstract: "The article investigates how the problem of (linguistic) reference is treated in the theology of two pupils of Gilbert of Poitiers by means of suppo* terms (supponere; suppositus,-a,-um; suppositio). Supposition is for Gilbert an action performed by a speaker, not a property of terms, and he considers language as a system for communication between human beings: key notions are the ‘sense in the author’s mind’ and the ‘interpreter’s understanding’. In contrast, the two Porretans tend to objectify language as a formal system of terms. Suppositio becomes in the Summa Zwettlensis the name itself as subject term in a proposition, and is divided into many kinds; formal rules are described which govern the influence of the predicate on the subject term’s denotation. In Everard of Ypres’ Dialogus Ratii et Everardi, supponere is a function (officium) of the name, and ‘human is a species of individuals’ is, as in some logical treatises and differently from Gilbert, a case of rhetorical transfer."
Wagner, Michael F. 1981. "Supposition Theory and the Problem of Universals." Franciscan Studies no. 41:385-414.

"I examine Burleigh's and Ockham's positions on universals through explaining their theories of signification and supposition. I argue for a representational analysis of these theories, which i distinguish from prevailing interpretations of these theories; and i argue, in particular, that when Burleigh's theory of the signification and supposition of general terms is properly understood, he is not an extreme realist (at least as this view is normally understood) and his disagreement with Ockham over universals is much more subtle than it is normally conceived by historians of philosophy."
Ward, Thomas M. 2018. "Logic and Ontological Commitment: Vincent Ferrer's Theory of Natural Supposition." In Modern Views of Medieval Logic, edited by Kann, Christoph, Loewe, Benedikt, Rode, Christian and Uckelman, Sara L., 233-244. Leuven: Peeters.

"This paper draws attention to one way in which Vincent Ferrer (1350–1419) developed a theory of supposition which was supposed to be amenable to certain metaphysical commitments of his fellow Dominican, Thomas Aquinas. Specifically, Ferrer held that from a proposition in which the subject term supposits naturally – for example, “Man is risible” – one can descend copulatively to everything falling under the subject term – every human – even when there is not universal quantification – for example, “Some man is risible”. And when there is nothing falling under the naturally suppositing subject term – supposing, for example, that there have been no humans, are no humans, and never will be any humans – a proposition like “Man is risible” is not only truth evaluable but true. While the bulk of this paper is concerned with explaining Ferrer’s theory of natural supposition, I close the paper by exploring some of the metaphysical issues that arise on Ferrer’s view that propositions with naturally suppositing subject terms can be true when there are no instances. I argue that Ferrer’s position actually commits him to a kind of realism about natures that is probably not Thomistic – despite Ferrer’s expressed loyalty to the Angelic Doctor.

I will proceed in the following way. After describing the way in which certain comments of Thomas Aquinas were influential on Ferrer with respect to his division of the kinds of supposition, I will give an account of Ferrer’s theory of natural supposition, focusing on the four ‘rules’ he lays down and drawing out some of the odd inferences one can make by following these rules. I will then discuss some of the metaphysical problems arising from Ferrer’s theory." (p. 233)
Wciórka, Wojciech. 2019. "Stephen Langton on common supposition." Przegląd Tomistyczny no. 25:319-367.

Summary: "This paper argues that the notion of the “common” supposition employed by Stephen Langton (fl. ca 1200, † 1228) does not involve ambiguity (duplicitas, multiplicitas) but should be explained in terms of generalized or disjunctive truth conditions. This means that a sentence such as “deus generat” (“God begets”) is true even if just one of the referents of the subject term has the property attributed by the predicate. The common supposition of “deus” in this context encompasses both the divine being (essentia) and a person, whereas the distinctive property attached by “generat” inheres only in the Father. And yet we are in no position to claim that on Langton’s model “deus generat” is true with regard to a divine person but false with regard to the divine being. The sentence “deus generat” is simply true, just because one of the elements of the common supposition happens to satisfy the predicate and make the sentence true. Some aspects of Langton’s views were developed by his student Geoffrey of Poitiers, whose unedited Summa ‘Ego novissimus’ sheds light on several tricky points, including the analogy between “deus generat” and the semantic statement “homo supponitur,” which is said to involve both simple and personal supposition."
Weidemann, Hermann. 1979. "William of Ockham on Particular Negative Propositions." Mind no. 88:270-275.

"In their recent attempt to formalize Ockham's theory of suppositio personalis in standard modern logic G. Priest and S. Read ('The Formalization of Ockham's Theory of Supposition', Mind lxxxvi [1977] 109-113)

have tried

'(a) to establish that Ockham was mistaken in his analysis of the suppositio of the predicate in the O form, and to put him right; and

(b) to correct the following claims that have recently been made about the theory: (i) that Ockham and the medieval logicians in general omitted some modes of suppositio; (ii) that Ockham lists too many modes [. . .]' (p. 109).

My aim in this paper is to show that the views of Priest and Read on these three points themselves need some correction.(1) Commenting on points (a) and (b)(i), which are focused on Ockham's treatment of particular negative propositions, I shall not follow the way Priest and Read have chosen to formalize Ockham's supposition theory. Instead I shall use, following R. Price, a 'sorted calculus of individuals with identity as its only predicate'.(2)" (p. 270)

(1) There is a fourth point (b)(iii), on which I don't need to comment, because the authors have indeed succeeded in rejecting the claim 'that supposition theory is incapable of dealing with multiple quantification' (p. 112).

(2) R. Price, 'William of Ockham and Suppositio Personalis', Franciscan Studies, xxx (1970), PP. 131-14°; cf. pp. 132 f., 138 f.
Yrjönsuuri, Mikko. 1997. "Supposition and Truth in Ockham's Mental Language." Topoi. An International Review of Philosophy no. 16:15-25.

Abstract: "In this paper, Ockham's theory of an ideal language of thought is used to illuminate problems of interpretation of his theory of truth. The twentieth century idea of logical form is used for finding out what kinds of atomic sentences there are in Ockham's mental language. It turns out that not only the theory of modes of supposition, but also the theory of supposition in general is insufficient as a full theory of truth. Rather, the theory of supposition is a theory of reference, which can help in the determination of truth values within the scope of simple predications. Outside this area, there are interesting types of sentences, whose truth does not depend on whether the terms supposit for the same things or not for the same things."
Zheng, Yiwei. 1998. "Metaphysical simplicity and semantical complexity of connotative terms in Ockham's mental language." The Modern Schoolman no. 75:253-264.

"In this paper I offer a formal presentation of Ockham's connotation theory, based upon a distinction between metaphysical simplicity and semantical complexity of connotative terms, that I argue render consistent Paul Spade's claim (1975) that Ockham needs and adopted a recursive semantics for his ontological elimination and Claude Panaccio's observation (1990) that there is no simple connotative term in Ockham's mental language."

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