Kann, Christoph. 2000. "Terminology and Etymology in Medieval Logic." In L'élaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au Moyen Age, edited by Hamesse, Jacqueline and Steel, Carlos, 489-509. Turnhout: Brepols.
———. 2006. "Medieval Logic as a Formal Science: A Survey." In Foundations of the Formal Sciences IV: The History of the Concept of the Formal Sciences, edited by Löwe, Benedikt, Peckhaus, Volker and Rasch, Thomas, 103--123. London: College Publications.
Kann, Christoph, Löewe, Benedikt, Rode, Christian, and Uckelman, Sara L., eds. 2018. Modern Views of Medieval Logic. Leuven: Peeters.

Contents: Preface & Introduction 3; Sara L. Uckelman, Jaap Maat, Katherina Rybalko: 1. The Art of Doubting in Obligationes Parisienses 11; 2. Laurent Cesalli, Frédéric Goubier: Anton Marty on Naming (Nennen) and Meaning (Bedeuten): a Comparison with Medieval Supposition Theory 29; 3. Sten Ebbesen: Modi Significandi in Logic and Grammar 55; 4. Simo Knuuttila: Three Medieval Theories of Modal Syllogistics 71; 5. Catarina Dutilh Novaes: Ockham's Supposition Theory as Formal Semantics 85; 6. Fabrizio Amerini, Massimo Mugnai: Franciscus de Prato on Reduplication 111; 7. Stephen Read: Bradwardine and Epistemic Paradox 125; 8. Greg Restall: Truth-Tellers in Bradwardine's Theory of Truth 143; 9. Elia Zardini: The Role of Utterances in Bradwardine's Theory of Truth 155; 10. Calvin Normore, Terence Parsons: Billingham and Buridan on the Foundations of Syllogistic Reasoning 195; 11.Peter Øhrstrøm: Richard of Lavenham's Analysis of the Future Contingency Problem Represented in Terms of Modern Tempo-Modal Logic 219; 12. Thomas M. Ward: Logic and Ontological Commitment: Vincent Ferrer's Theory of Natural Supposition 233; 13. Petr Dvořák: Divine Predetermination in Alvarez: Infallibility and Necessity 245-263.
Klibansky, Raymond. 1943. "The Rock of Parmenides. Mediaeval Accounts of the Origins of Dialectic." Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies no. 1:171-186.
Klima, Gyula. 1988. Ars Artium: Essays in Philosophical Semantics, Mediaeval and Modern. Budapest: Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Contents: Essay I: Why "Ars Artium"? 2; Essay II: The Square Of Opposition, Common Personal Supposition And The Identity Theory Of Predication Within Quantification Theory 9; Essay III: General Terms In Their Referring Function 20; Essay IV: Existence, Quantification And The Medieval Theory Of Ampliation 40; Essay V: Understanding Matters From A Logical Angle: Logical Aspects of Understanding 53; Essay VI: On Being And Essence In Saint Thomas Aquinas's Metaphysics And Philosophy Of Science 70; Essay VII: 'Socrates Est Species': Logic, Metaphysics and Psychology in Saint Thomas Aquinas's Treatment of a Paralogism 76-97.
———. 1988. "The Square of Opposition, common personal supposition and the identity theory of predication within quantification theory." In Ars Artium: Essays in Philosophical Semantics, 249-267. Budapest.
———. 1990. "Approaching Natural Language Via Mediaeval Logic." In Zeichen, Denken, Praxis, edited by Bernard, J. and Kelemen, J., 249-267. Vienna: Institut fur Sozio-Semiotische Studien.
———. 1991. "Ontological Alternatives Vs. Alternative Semantics in Medieval Philosophy." Logical Semiotics, S - European Journal for Semiotic Studies no. 3:587-618.
———. 1995. "Existence and Reference in Mediaeval Logic." In New Essays in Free Logic, edited by Morscher, Edgar and Hieke, Alexander, 197-226. Dodrecht: Kluwer.
———. 2002. "Contemporary Essentialism vs. Aristotelian Essentialism." In Mind, Metaphysics, and Value in the Thomistic and Analytical Traditions, edited by Haldane, John, 175-194. University of Notre Dame Press.
———. 2014. "Geach's Three Most Inspiring Errors Concerning Medieval Logic." Philosophical Investigations no. 38:34-51.

Abstract: "This paper analyses the import of three claims extracted from Geach’s works concerning (i) theories of predication and the reference of common terms, (ii) the notions of being or existence, and (iii) the

force/content distinction and theories of valid inference, respectively. The paper highlights the theoretical and historical errors involved in these claims as well as their enormous influence and inspiration in the field of the philosophical study of medieval logic and metaphysics."
———, ed. 2015. Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy. New York: Fordham University Press.

Contents: Acknowledgments XI; Gyula Klima: Introduction: Intentionality, Cognition, and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy 1; Stephen Read: Concepts and Meaning in Medieval Philosophy 9; Joshua P. Hochsschild: Mental Language in Aquinas? 29; Martin Pickavé: Causality and Cognition: An Interpretation of Henry of Ghent's Quodlibet V, q. 14 46; Giorgio Pini: Two Models of Thinking: Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus on Occurrent Thoughts 81: Peter King: Thinking About Things: Singular Thought in the Middle Ages 104; Henrik Lagerlund: Singular Terms and Vague Concepts in Late Medieval Mental Language Theory: Or, the Decline and Fall of Mental Language 122; Russell L. Friedman: Act, Species, and Appearance: Peter Auriol on Intellectual Cognition and Consciousness 141; Claude Panaccio: Ockham's Externalism 166; Elizabeth Karger: Was Adam Wodeham an Internalist or an Externalist? 186; Susan Brower-Toland: How Chatton Changed Ockham's Mind: William Ockham and Walter Chatton on Objects and Acts of Judgment 204; Christophe Grellard: The Nature of Intentional Objects in Nicholas of Autrecourt's Theory of Knowledge 235; Jack Zupko: On the Several Senses of "Intentio" in Buridan 251; Olaf Pluta: Mental Representation in Animals and Humans: Some Late Medieval Discussions 273; Stephan Meier-Oeser: The Intersubjective Sameness of Mental Concepts in Late Scholastic Thought 287; Gyula Klima: Mental Representations and Concepts in Medieval Philosophy 323; Bibliography 339; List of Contributors 355; Index 357-359.
Kneale, William Calvert, and Kneale, Martha. 1962. The Development of Logic. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Reprinted 1975 with corrections.

Chapter IV. Roman and Medieval Logic, pp 177-297.
Knuuttila, Simo. 1989. "Modalities in obligational disputations." In Atti del convegno internazionale di storia della logica. Le teorie della modalità. San Gimignano, 5-8 dicembre 1987, edited by Corsi, Giovanna, Mangione, Corrado and Mugnai, Massimo, 79-92. Bologna: CLUEB.
———. 1993. Modalities in Medieval Philosophy. New York: Routledge.
———. 2001. "On the History of Theory of Modality as Alternativeness." In Potentialität und Possibilität. Modalaussagen in der Geschichte der Metaphysik, edited by Buchheim, Thomas, Kneepkens, Corneille Henri and Lorenz, Kuno, 219-236. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog.
———. 2003. "The question of the validity of logic in late medieval thought." In The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400-1700, edited by Friedman, Russell and Nielsen, Lauge, 121-142. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
———. 2006. "How theological problems infuenced the development of medieval logic?" In "Ad Ingenii Acuitionem". Studies in honour of Alfonso Maierù, edited by Caroti, Stefano, Imbach, Ruedi, Kaluza, Zénon, Stabile, Giorgio and Sturlese, Loris, 183-198. Louvain-la-Neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales.
———. 2008. "Medieval Modal Theories and Modal Logic." In Handbook of the History of Logic, Vol. 2: Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic, edited by Gabbay, Dov and Woods, John, 505-578. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
———. 2009. "New Ideas on Subject and Identity in Medieval Logic." In Unity and Time in Metaphysics, edited by Honnefelder, Ludger, Runggaldier, Edmund and Schick, Benedikt, 183-197. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
———. 2018. "Three medieval theories of modal syllogistics." In Modern Views of Medieval Logic, edited by Kann, Christoph, Löewe, Benedikt, Rode, Christian and Uckelman, Sara L. Leuven: Peeters.
Kretzmann, Norman. 1970. "Medieval Logicians on the Meaning of the Propositio." Journal of Philosophy no. 67 (20):767-787.

"When the medievals spoke of a propositio they were speaking not of a propositional content but of a propositional sign, written or spoken or mental. I shall use the word `proposition' in this paper in order to speak of written or spoken propositional signs-type-sentences or token-sentences in the indicative mood. Mental propositional signs I shall call mental propositions. I shall simplify the topic by considering only completely general, nonindexical propositions, those whose meaning and truth value remain the same regardless of who utters them or the circumstances of their utterance.

I am taking it for granted that a complete theory of linguistic meaning must include accounts of what signs stand for and of what signs convey-broadly speaking, a theory of reference and a theory of sense. I believe that medieval logicians produced a theory of reference and a theory of sense for propositions, but in two separate developments, without recognizing that the theories were complementary. One of these was terminism, the semantic theory characteristic of terminist logic. Briefly, terminism is an elaborate analysis of the ways in which all the words making up the proposition affect one another's reference or logical status. The other development consists in a family of semantic, logical, epistemological, and ontological doctrines centering around the notion of the significatum, or enuntiabile, or dictum of the proposition. I shall speak of this development, and especially of its semantic component, as dictism.

In this paper I want to give some idea of the nature of these two developments and to suggest that we can piece together the most complete theory of propositional meaning medieval logic has to offer if we take terminism as a theory of propositional reference and dictism as a theory of propositional sense. I shall begin by considering terminism from that point of view." (pp. 767-768)
———. 1981. "'Sensus compositus, sensus divisus', and propositional attitudes." Medioevo.Rivista di Storia della Filosofia Medievale no. 7:195-230.
———, ed. 1988. Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy: Studies in Memory of Jan Pinborg. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Contents: Norman Kretzmann: Introduction IX-XII; L. M. de Rijk: On Boethius's Notion of Being: A Chapter of Boethian Semantics 1; Eleonore Stump: Logic in the Early Twelfth Century 31; Gabriel Nuchelmans: The Distinction Actus Exercitus/Actus Significatus in Medieval Semantics 57; Robert Andrews: Denomination in Peter of Auvergne 91; Sten Ebbesen: Concrete Accidental Terms: Late Thirteenth-Century Debates About Problems Relating to Such Terms as 'Album' 107; Reinhard Huelsen: Concrete Accidental Terms and the Fallacy of Figure of Speech 175; Paul Vincent Spade: The Logic of the Categorical: The Medieval Theory of Descent and Ascent 187; Norman Kretzmann: Tit Scis Hoc Esse Omne Quod Est Hoc: Richard Kilvington and the Logic of Knowledge 225; Alfonso Maierù: Logic and Trinitarian Theology: De Modo Predicandi ac Sylogizandi in Divinis 247; Lauge Olaf Nielsen: A Seventeenth-Century Physician on God and Atoms: Sebastian Basso 297; Bibliography 371; Index of Persons 395-400.

"The ten contributors to this volume hope to honor Jan Pinborg's memory by presenting studies and texts relevant to his own scholarly interests in medieval philosophy, particularly in logic and semantic theory. Though not every one of the ten studied or worked with Jan Pinborg, all of us learned a great deal from his writings. One or two of the contributors, having studied with a student of Jan's, can lay claim to being his academic grandchildren; but those of us who were born before Jan are also deeply in his debt. The ten contributions are arranged approximately in the chronological order of their subject matter.

L. M. de Rijk, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Leiden, ranging over Boethius's Aristotelian commentaries and theological treatises with his well-respected authority, finds new material for Boethius's semantic theory in his metaphysics and theology and, in the process, sheds light on Boethius's difficult and historically important conception of being.

Eleonore Stump, Professor of Philosophy at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, well-known for her own work on Boethius, here describes a critical development in the history of the dialectical Topics and shows how it can be used to help explain the new direction taken by the terminist logicians of the first half of the thirteenth century.

Gabriel Nuchelmans, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at the University of Leiden and author of an important series of volumes on the development of theories regarding propositions, analyzes the medieval distinction between doing something linguistically and merely talking about it, bringing out the remarkable power and range of medieval logicians' applications of the distinction.

The fourth, fifth, and sixth contributions form a connected series, all focusing on semantic issues associated with the treatment of concrete accidental terms (such as 'white') by medieval logicians, and all stemming from a seminar conducted at the University of Copenhagen. The first of these three pieces is by Robert Andrews, a PhD candidate at Cornell University who studied for a year at the Copenhagen Institute; he focuses on problems of denomination - the sort of relationship that obtains between 'literacy' and 'literate' - and presents an edition of a relevant text by Peter of Auvergne. The centerpiece of this set of three contributions is the one contributed by the professor who conducted the seminar, Sten Ebbesen, whose three-volume study of Greek and Latin commentaries on Aristotle's Sophistici elenchi is truly monumental. Here he considers the elaborate medieval analysis of the way in which a concrete accidental term manages to have a conceptually unitary meaning despite both signifying a quality and indicating that the quality has a bearer. He concludes his contribution with an edition of Peter of Auvergne's sophisma Album potest esse nigrum. Reinhard Hülsen, a PhD candidate of the Philosophisches Institut of the University of Hamburg, who also studied at Copenhagen with Ebbesen, is the third of this trio of contributors. He uses the medieval treatment of concrete accidental terms to illuminate the notoriously perplexing Aristotelian fallacy of "figure of speech".

Paul Vincent Spade, Professor of Philosophy at Indiana University, editor or translator of several medieval logical treatises and author of many valuable articles, focuses on a peculiar logical doctrine attached to the medieval semantic theory of suppositio in order to explain certain philosophical and historical developments in the latter half of the thirteenth century.

Norman Kretzmann, Susan Linn Sage Professor of Philosophy at Cornell University and principal editor of The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, presents a critical analysis of one of Richard Kilvington's sophismata in order to illustrate the achievements of later medieval epistemic logic. He provides an edition and translation of Kilvington's Sophisma 45.

Alfonso Maierù, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Rome, to whom all students of medieval logic are grateful for his Terminologia logica, here carries on his study of medieval attempts to develop a logical account of the intricacies of the divine Trinity, primarily by presenting an edition and study of an anonymous treatise of this sort from the late fourteenth century.

Lange Olaf Nielsen, a Danish theologian and church historian who studied at the Copenhagen Institute with Jan Pinborg and who is doing important work on the connections between philosophy and theology in the later Middle Ages, here extends his study chronologically into the seventeenth century with a remarkably rich paper on the hitherto neglected atomist Sebastian Basso." (from the Introduction, pp. X-XII)
Kretzmann, Norman, Kenny, Anthony P., and Pinborg, Jan, eds. 1982. The Cambridge History of Later Medieval philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100-1600. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Section III. The old logic

4. Sten Ebbesen: Ancient scholastic logic as the source of medieval scholastic logic 101; 5. D. P. Henry: Predicables and categories 128; 6. Martin Tweedale: Abelard and the culmination of the old logic 143;

Section IV. Logic in the high middle ages: semantic theory

7. L. M. de Rijk: The origins of the theory of the properties of terms 161; 8. Alain de Libera: The Oxford and Paris traditions in logic 174; 9. Paul Vincent Spade: The semantics of terms 188; 10. Gabriel Nuchelmans: The semantics of propositions 197; 11. Norman Kretzmann: Syncategoremata, exponibilia, sophismata 211; 12. Paul Vincent Spade: Insolubilia 246; 13. Jan Pinborg: Speculative grammar 254;

V. Logic in the high middle ages: propositions and modalities

14. Eleonore Stump: Topics: their development and absorption into consequences 273; 15. Ivan Boh: Consequences 300; 16. 16 Obligations. A. Eleonote Stump: From the beginning to the early fourteenth century 315; Paul Vincent Spade: Developments in the fourteenth century 335; 17. Simo Knuuttila: Modal logic 342; 18. Calvin Normore: Future contingents 358-381.
Lagerlund, Henrik. 2000. Modal Syllogistics in the Middle Ages. Leiden: Brill.
———. 2008. "The Assimilation of Aristotelian and Arabic Logic up to the Later Thirteenth Century." In Handbook of the History of Logic, Vol. 2: Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic, edited by Gabbay, Dov and Woods, John, 281-346. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
———, ed. 2020. Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy Between 500 and 1500. Second Edition. Dordrecht: Springer.

First edition 2011.
Langermann, Y. Tzvi. 2021. "Logic in a Pre-Tibbonian Hebrew Philosophical Dialogue." Studia graeco-arabica no. 11:67-80.

Abstract: "A dialogue between “Intellect” and “Soul”, preserved uniquely and incompletely in a manuscript now held by the University of Pennsylvania, is a rare and precious specimen of pre-Maimonidean Hebrew philosophical literature. The author repurposes some terms drawn from rabbinic legal texts, innovates some terms on his owns, and occasionally must resort to writing out Arabic terms in Hebrew letters.

In one passage, which clearly draws upon Galen’s Institutio Logica, he displays relational syllogisms which prove the superiority of the soul over the body."
Laughlin, Burgess. 1995. The Aristotle Adventure: A Guide to the Greek, Arabic, and Latin Scholars who Transmitted Aristotle's Logic to the Renaissance. Flagstaff: Albert Hale Publishing.
Lenz, Martin. 2007. "Are Thoughts and Sentences Compositional? A Controversy between Abelard and a Pupil of Alberic on the Reconciliation of Ancient Theses on Mind and Language." In The Many Roots of Medieval Logic: The Aristotelian and the Non-Aristotelian Traditions, edited by Marenbon, John, 169-188. Leiden: Brill.
Lenzen, Wolfgang. 2021. "What Follows from the Impossible: Everything or Nothing? (An Interpretation of the ‘Avranches Text’ and the Ars Meliduna)." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 43:309-331.

Abstract: "One of the main controversies of the Logic Schools of the 12th century centered on the question: What follows from the impossible? In this paper arguments for two diametrically opposed positions are examined. The author of the ‘Avranches Text’ who probably belonged to the school of the Parvipontani defended the view that from an impossible proposition everything follows (‘Ex impossibili quodlibet’). In particular he developed a proof to show that by means of so-called ‘disjunctive syllogism’ any arbitrary proposition B can be logically derived from a pair of contradictory propositions A and Not-A. The author of the Ars Meliduna instead argued that nothing follows from an impossible proposition (‘ex falso nihil sequitur’). This view is supported by various counterexamples which aimed to show that the admission of impossible premises would give rise to inconsistent conclusions. Upon closer analysis these inconsistencies do not, however, have the formal structure of a real contradiction like A and Not-A, but rather the structure of two rivalling conditionals like ‘If B then A’ and ‘If B then Not-A’. Hence these counterexamples rather have to be considered as refutations of the basic principles of ‘connexive logic’."
Manekin, Charles H. 1996. "Some Aspects of the Assertoric Syllogism in Medieval Hebrew Logic." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 17:49-71.

Abstract: "This paper introduces the reader to the medieval Hebrew tradition of logic by considering its treatment of Aristotelian syllogistic. Starting in the thirteenth century European Jews translated Arabic and Latin texts into Hebrew and produced commentaries and original compendia. Because they stood culturally and geographically at the cross-roads of two great traditions they were influenced by both. This is clearly seen in the development of syllogistic theory, where the Latin tradition ultimately replaces, though never entirely, its Arabic counterpart. Specific attention is devoted to the debate about the so-called Galenian fourth figure.

In medieval Hebrew logic one finds both defenders and detractors of the figure, the former appearing towards the beginning of the period in question. With the ascendancy of scholastic logic the fourth figure virtually disappears from Hebrew texts."
———. 1999. "Scholastic Logic and the Jews." Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale no. 43:123-147.
———. 2011. "Logic in Medieval Jewish Culture." In Science in Medieval Jewish Cultures, edited by Freudenthal, Gad, 113-135. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

" “Logic,” to paraphrase the medievals, is an ambiguous term. Broadly speaking, it refers to the study, construction, and appraisal of argument, and in this sense it is similar to “reasoning.” More specifically, “logic” refers to a body of doctrines stemming from the Greek logical tradition, and, even more specifically, to those doctrines found in the nine books of the medieval Organon (Porphyry’s Isagoge; and Aristotle’s Categories, De interpretatione, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, Sophistical Refutations, Rhetoric, and Poetics).

A comprehensive survey of the place of logic in medieval Jewish intellectual life, in the broad sense of the term, would require nothing less than an analysis of the varieties of reasoning in the various disciplines studied by Jews, nonphilosophical as well as philosophical.

Even the less ambitious task of tracing the influence of the Greek logic on medieval Jewish philosophy would call for a survey of the entire literature, because what philosophical work could be excluded? The present essay has more modest aims: first and foremost, to present a comprehensive survey of Jewish writings on logic in the Middle Ages; then, to make some general observations about the study of logic among medieval Jews; and, as an afterword, to sketch how some Jewish intellectuals applied the doctrines of logic to the fields of biblical exegesis and rabbinic jurisprudence."
Marenbon, John, ed. 2007. The Many Roots of Medieval Logic: The Aristotelian and the Non-Aristotelian Traditions. Leiden: Brill.

Special Offprint of Vivarium 45, 2-3 (2007).

Acts of the 15th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Cambridge, 2004.

Also published in Vivarium, 45, 2007.

Contents: John Marenbon , Introduction 1;

I. Roots, Traditions and the Multiplicity of Medieval Logic

Sten Ebbesen: The Traditions of Ancient Logic-cum-Grammar in the Middle Ages — What’s the Problem? 6

II. Stoic Logic and Linguistics

Christopher J. Martin: Denying Conditionals: Abaelard and the Failure of Boethius’ Account of the Hypothetical Syllogism 23; Martin Lenz , Are Toughts and Sentences Compositional? A Controversy between Abelard and a Pupil of Alberic on the Reconciliation of Ancient Teses on Mind and Language 39; Anne Grondeux: Res Meaning a Thing Thought: The Influence of the Ars donati 59;

III. Platonism in Logic and Semantics

Christophe E rismann: The Logic of Being: Eriugena’s Dialectical Ontology 73; Irène Rosier-Catach: Priscian on Divine Ideas and Mental Conceptions: The Discussions in the Glosulae in Priscianum, the Notae Dunelmenses, William of Champeaux and Abelard 89; Stefania Bonfiglioli and Costantino Marmo: Symbolism and Linguistic Semantics. Some Questions (and Confusions) from Late Antique Neoplatonism up to Eriugena 108;

IV. Aristotle, Augustine and Stoicism

Mary Sirridge: “Utrum idem sint dicere et intelligere sive videre in mente”: Robert Kilwardby, Quaestiones in librum primum Sententiarum 123; Claude Panaccio: Mental Language and Tradition Encounters in Medieval Philosophy: Anselm, Albert and Ockham 139; Laurent Cesalli: Intentionality and Truth-Making: Augustine’s Influence on Burley and Wyclif’s Propositional Semantics 153;

V. Aristotelian Traditions in Medieval Logic

Luisa Valente: Names That Can Be Said of Everything: Porphyrian Tradition and ‘Transcendental’ Terms in Twelfth-Century Logic 168; E. Jennifer Ashworth: Metaphor and the Logicians from Aristotle to Cajetan 181; Christophe Grellard: Scepticism, Demonstration and the Infinite Regress Argument (Nicholas of Autrecourt and John Buridan) 198; Catarina Dutilh Novaes: Theory of Supposition vs. Theory of Fallacies in Ockham 213; Egbert P. Bos , Richard Billingham’s Speculum puerorum, Some Medieval Commentaries and Aristotle 230;

Bibliography 244-262.
———. 2007. Medieval Philosophy: An historical and philosophical introduction. New York: Routledge.
———, ed. 2012. The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.

Part II: Issues in Medieval Philoosphy. Logic and Philosophy of Language; 12. Paul Thom: Logical Form 271; 13. Christopher J. Martin: Logical Consequence 289; 14. Simo Knuuttila: Modality 312; 15. Margaret Cameron: Meaning: Foundational and Semantic Theories 342; 16. Martin Lenz: Mental Language 363-382.
———. 2021. "Towards a Social History of Medieval Logic." Studia graeco-arabica no. 11:183-194.

Abstract: "This paper explains how a social history of medieval logic might be written. After contrasting it with the Standard Approach, centred on great logicians, problems and debates, it suggests a series of questions which social historians of logic might ask: when, where, by whom, how and why was logic studied in the Middle Ages? There follows a discussion of pathways to the social history of medieval logic: enhanced doxology, institutional history, logic in relation to other disciplines and cultural comparison. Finally, an objection is considered: logic is discovered, not invented, and so social explanations are inappropriate for its history. The objection is rejected because, whether logic is discovered or invented, historians of it must explain how individual logicians came to think and write as they did, and such explanations include social factors among others."
Martin, Christopher J. 1990. "Research in Early Medieval Logic." In Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey. Vol. 6/2, edited by Fløistad, Guttorm and Klibansky, Raymond, 821-828. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
———. 1999. Theories of Inference and Entailment in the Middle Ages.

Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, available at UMI Dissertation Express, ref. n. 9948627.
———. 2006. "Medieval (European) Logic." In Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Second Edition, edited by Borchert, Donald M., 421-437. New York: Thomson Gale.

The first edition of the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Paul Edwards, was published in 1967.

The editor of the article Logic, history of in the first edition was Arthur Norman Prior.

With an Addendum by Tony Street, p. 421.
———. 2009. "The Logical Textbooks and their Influence." In The Cambridge Companion to Boethius, edited by Marenbon, John, 56-84. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Meier-Oeser, Stephan. 1999. "The meaning of 'significatio' in Scholastic logic." In Signs and Signification. Vol. II, edited by Gill, Harjeet Singh and Manetti, Giovanni, 89-107. New Delhi: Bahri Publications.
Meixner, Uwe. 1998. "Negative Theology, Coincidentia Oppositorum, and Boolean Algebra." History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis no. 1:75-89.

Abstract: "In Plato's Parmenides we find on the one hand that the One is denied every property , and on the other hand that the One is attributed every property. In the course of the history of Platonism, these assertions - probably meant by Plato as ontological statements of an entirely formal nature - were repeatedly made the starting points of metaphysical speculations. In the Mystical Theology of the Pseudo-Dionysius they became principles of Christian mysticism and negative theology. I shall show that the two assertions can each be interpreted within the ontological framework of ancient and medieval logic in such a manner that it becomes true, and I shall make plausible that they were understood, with regard to their logical core, by pagan and Christian Platonic metaphysicians just as is indicated by that interpretation. The mentioned ontological framework is basically the Boolean algebra of first-order properties. The main points of the interpretation are on the one hand the identification of the One with the maximal element of the algebra of properties, and on the other hand two alternative intuitively prominent mereological definitions of ontic predication."
Michael, Emily. 1979. " Some considerations in medieval tense logic." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 20:794-800.
Miriam, Joseph Sister. 2002. The Trivium. The Liberal Arts of Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric. Understanding the Nature and Function of Language. Philadelphia: Paul Dry Books.

New edition edited by Marguerite McGlinn (First edition 1937, second 1940, third 1948).
Moody, Ernest. 1953. Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Reprint Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976.

"Aim and scope of the present study

The purpose of our present study is to investigate two basic branches of logical analysis which were developed by the logicians of the 13th and 14th centuries, and which appear to be of more than antiquarian interest in relation to contemporary research in the field of logic. These two branches of logical theory were known, in the mediaeval terminology, as the theory of Supposition and the theory of Consequence. In contemporary language we would describe them as the theory of truth-conditions and the theory of inference-conditions or of deduction: those logicians who differentiate between syntactical and semantical inquiries and systems would consider that these two theories belong to semantics.

The mediaeval development of these two theories took place within the context of mediaeval formal logic and found its expression in the terminology of that logic. The logic was substantially Aristotelian, with accretions from later Greek logic transmittted through Boethius; as such, it attempted to formulate the logical structure of ordinary language as used by the "scIentists" (and philosophers) of the mediaeval universities. Distinctive of such "natural" language is the fact that statements are made with verbs of present, past, or future time, in subjunctive as weIl as indicative mood, and with numerous syntactical constructions whose logical analysis is of extreme subtlety or complexity." (pp. 10-11, a note omitted)
———. 1966. "The Medieval Contribution to Logic." Studium Generale no. 19:443-452.

Reprinted in: E. A. Moody, Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Science, and Logic. Collected Papers 1933-1969, pp. 371-392.
———. 1975. Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Science, and Logic: Collected Papers 1933-1969. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Mora-Marquez, Ana María. 2015. The Thirteenth-Century Notion of Signification: The Discussions and their Origin and Development. Leiden: Brill.
Mugnai, Massimo. 2010. "Logic and Mathematics in the Seventeenth Century." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 31:297-314.
Murdoch, John E. 1974. "Logic." In A Source Book in Medieval Science, edited by Grant, Edward, 77-89. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Nadler, Steven, and Rudavsky, T. M., eds. 2009. The Cambridge History of Jewish Philosophy from Antiquity through theSeventeenth Century. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Section II. Logic and Language

6. Charles H. Manekin: Propositions and Propositional Inference 167; 7. Norbert M. Samuelson: Reasoning and Demonstration 188; 8. Josef Stern: Meaning and Language 230-266.
Normore, Calvin G. 2008. "Validity Now and Then." Canadian Journal of Philosophy no. Supplementary Volume 34:19-30.
———. 2015. "Ex impossibili quodlibet sequitur (Angel d’Ors)." Vivarium no. 53:353-371.

Abstract: "While agreeing with Professor D’Ors’ thesis that the notion of logical consequence cannot be exhaustively characterized (though not with his grounds for it), I depart from Professor d’Ors’ conclusion that the very notion of good consequence is primitive and can only be identified with the (incompletable) set of acceptable rules of inference, and from his conviction that modal notions such as necessity and impossibility are equivocal and gain such clarity as they have by their interaction with rules

of inference. Inspired by this picture, Professor d’Ors undertook an examination of a number of medieval attempts to analyze the notion of consequence and tried to show how certain developments in the medieval history of logic made sense in the light of

debate over such analyses. This paper examines a small fragment of Professor d’Ors programme and its relation to some aspects of Jean Buridan’s account of the consequence relation."

Reference

Angel d’Ors, ‘Ex impossibili quodlibet sequitur (Jean Buridan)’, in Argumentationstheorie: Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln korrecten Folgerns, ed. K. Jacobi (Leiden, 1993), 195-212.
Novaes, Catarina Dutilh. 2007. Formalizing Medieval Logical Theories: Suppositio, Consequentiae and Obligationes. New York: Springer.

Contents: Introduction 1; Part 1: Supposition Theory: Algorithmic Hermeneutics 7; Part 2: Buridan's Notion of Consequentia 79; Part 3: Obligationes as Logical Games 145; Part 4: The Philosophy of Formalization 215; Conclusion 293; References 301; Index of Names and Topics 311-314.

"This book presents novel formalizations of three of the most important medieval logical theories: supposition, consequence and obligations. In an additional fourth part, an in-depth analysis of the concept of formalization is presented - a crucial concept in the current logical panorama, which as such receives surprisingly little attention.

Although formalizations of medieval logical theories have been proposed earlier in the literature, the formalizations presented here are all based on innovative vantage points: supposition theories as algorithmic hermeneutics, theories of consequence analyzed with tools borrowed from model-theory and two-dimensional semantics, and obligations as logical games. For this reason, this is perhaps the first time that these medieval logical theories are made fully accessible to the modern philosopher and logician who wishes to obtain a better grasp of them, but who has always been held back by the lack of appropriate 'translations' into modern terms.

Moreover, the book offers a reflection on the very nature of logic, a reflection that is prompted by the comparisons between medieval and modern logic, their similarities and dissimilarities. It is thus a contribution not only to the history of logic, but also to the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of language and semantics.

The analysis of medieval logic is also relevant for the modern philosopher and logician in that, being the unifying methodology used across all disciplines at that time, logic really provided unity to science. It thus presents a unified model of scientific investigation, where logic plays the aggregating role."
———. 2012. "Lessons in Philosophy of Logic from Medieval Obligationes." In New Waves in Philosophical Logic, edited by Restall, Greg and Russell, Guillian, 142-168. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
———. 2012. "Form and Matter in Later Latin Medieval Logic: The Cases of Suppositio and Consequentia." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 50:339-364.
Novaes, Catarina Dutilh, and Read, Stephen, eds. 2016. The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Contents: List of Contributors IX-XII; Catarina Dutilh Novaes and Stephen Read: Introduction 1;

Part I: Periods and traditions

1. Julie Brumberg-Chaumont: The Legacy of Ancient Logic in the Middle Ages 19; 2. Ahmad Hasnawi and Wilfrid Hodges: Arabic Logic up to Avicenna 45; 3. Khaled El-Rouayheb: Arabic Logic after Avicenna 67; 4. Ian Wilks: Latin Logic up to 1200 94; 5. Sara L. Uckelman and Henrik Lagerlund: Logic in the Latin Thirteenth Century 119; 6. Stephen Read: Logic in the Latin West in the Fourteenth Century 142; 7. E. Jennifer Ashworth: The Post-Medieval Period 166;

Part II: Themes

8. Margaret Cameron: Logica Vetus 195; 9. Christoph Kann: Supposition and Properties of Terms 220; 10. Laurent Cesalli: Propositions: Their Meaning and Truth 245; 11. Mikko Yrjönsuuri and Elizabeth Coppock: Sophisms and Insolubles 265; 12. Paul Thom: The Syllogism and its Transformations 290; 13. Gyula Klima: Consequence 316; 14. Riccardo Strobino and Paul Thom: The Logic of Modality 342; 15. Catarina Dutilh Novaes and Sara L. Uckelman: Obligationes 370; Bibliography: 396; Index 437-450.
Novak, Joseph. 1980. "Some recent work on the assertoric syllogistic." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 21:229-242.
Nuchelmans, Gabriel. 1973. Theories of Proposition: Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Contents: Preface V; 1. Introduction 1; 2. Plato 13; 3. Aristotle 23; 4. The Stoic lekton 45; 5. The Stoic axioma 75; 6. Later developments in Greek antiquity 89; 7. The transition to the Latin West 105; 8. Boethius and the beginning of the Middle Ages 123; 9. Abelard 139; 10. The doctrine of the dictum in the century after Abelard 165; 11. Preliminaries to the fourteenth century debate 177; 12. The complexum theory of Ockham and Holkot 195; 13. Some reist opponents of Ockham and Holkot 209; 14. The theory of the complexe significabile 227; 15. The oppositions against the theory of the complexe significabile 243; 16. The significate of a true propositio 273; Selective bibliography 281; Indices 289-309.

"This book is intended as the first part of a history of those problems and theories in the domain of philosophical semantics which nowadays are commonly referred to as problems and theories about the nature and the status of propositions. [*]

Although the conceptual apparatus and the terminology by means of which questions concerning propositions were asked and answered have considerably varied from period to period, the main types of disputes and solutions have remained remarkably constant. One of the aims of this study is precisely to trace the vicissitudes of the vocabulary in which this refractory topic was treated in the remote past. As is evident from the Bibliography, many parts of the field have been explored by predecessors. Guided by their results, I have tried to fill in more details and to design a provisional map of the area as a whole." (from the Preface)

[*] The two other volumes are: Late-Scholastic and Humanist Theories of the Proposition (1980) and Judgment and Proposition. From Descartes to Kant (1983).
———. 1980. Late-Scholastic and Humanist Theories of the Proposition. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

Contents: Part One: Late-Scholastic theories of the proposition. 1. Introduction 3; 2. Different kinds of propositions and their ways of signifying 9; 3. The tie between the principal parts of a proposition 27; 4. The adequate signification and the adequate significate of a proposition 45; 5. Disguised propositions 74; 6. Judgment 90; 7. The object of judgment 103; 8. Propositions as bearer of truth-values 114; Part Two: Humanist theories of proposition. 9. Introduction 143; 10. The first attempt at reorientation 146; 11. The Melanchtonian treatment of a theme 159; 12. Peter Ramus 168; 13. The diffusion of Ramist terminology 180; 14. Eclectics 189; Epilogue 204; Bibliography 209; Indices 224-237.

"After publishing, more than six years ago, my Theories of the Proposition. Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity, I initially intended to cover the remaining phases of the history of the semantics of declarative sentences in one volume. As the material proved more abundant and unwieldy than I had anticipated, I decided to limit the next instalment to the period between 1450 and 1650. Accordingly, the present book treats the theories of the proposition put forward by late-scholastic and humanist philosophers. It will be followed, in the not too distant future, I hope, by a third volume which will continue the account until the first decades of the nineteenth century.

In making my way through the intricate mass of sources, which are often works that are completely forgotten and extremely hard to obtain, I was greatly assisted by Professor Ashworth's pioneering book on Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period. Moreover, when I had practically finished my manuscript, she was kind enough to send me the draft of an article entitled 'Theories of the Proposition: Some Early Sixteenth Century Discussions'. As this article is based on a corpus of texts which is slightly different from mine, it enabled me to check some of my results against the findings of a very competent collaborator in this lonely field of research. I can only advise the reader to do the same when the article will have been published (in Franciscan Studies [38, 1978 pp. 81-121])."
———. 1982. "The Semantics of Propositions." In The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy from the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100-1600, edited by Kretzmann, Norman, Jenny, Anthony P. and Pinborg, Jan, 197-212. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Reprinted as Chapter II in: G. Nuchelmans, Studies on the History of Logic and Semantics, 12th-17th Centuries, Aldershot: Variorum, 1996.
———. 1992. Secundum/Tertium Adiacens. Vicissitudes of a Logical Distinction. Amsterdam: Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen.

Contents: 1. The origin of the distinction in Aristotle's De interpretatione 7; 2. Boethius' treatment of the pertinent Aristotelian passages 10; 3. Continuations of the Aristotelian-Boethian line 14; 4. The emergence of secundum adiacens 19; 5. Fourteenth-century developments 23; 6. The issue of existential import 29; 7. The three-part analysis of categorical propositions 31; 8. The two-part analysis of categorical propositions 35; 9. The decline of the distinction 41; 10. Propositions called de primo adiacente 45; 11 . Another type of proposition called de primo adiacente 50-56.
———. 1996. Studies on the History of Logic and Semantics, 12th-17th Centuries. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Edited by Egbert P. Bos.
Oesterle, J.A. 1944. "Another Approach to the Problem of Meaning." The Thomist no. 7:233-263.
Øhrstrøm, Peter. 1982. "'Temporalis' in Medieval Logic." Franciscan Studies no. 42:166-179.
Parsons, Terence. 2006. "The Doctrine of Distribution." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 27:59-74.

"Peter Geach describes the 'doctrine of distribution' as the view that a term is distributed if it refers to everything that it denotes, and undistributed if it refers to only some of the things that it denotes. He argues that the notion, so explained, is incoherent. He claims that the doctrine of distribution originates from a degenerate use of the notion of 'distributive supposition' in medieval supposition theory sometime in the 16th century. This paper proposes instead that the doctrine of distribution occurs at least as early as the 12th century, and that it originates from a study of Aristotle's notion of a term's being 'taken universally', and not from the much later theory of distributive supposition. A detailed version of the doctrine found in the Port Royal Logic is articulated, and compared with a slightly different modern version. Finally, Geach's arguments for the incoherence of the doctrine are discussed and rejected."

"1. Introduction

This paper is about the 'doctrine of distribution' as described and criticized by Peter Geach. My goal is to provide an alternative to Geach's account of the history of the doctrine and to defend the doctrine against his claims that it is incoherent. This paper discusses:

(1) what the 'doctrine of distribution' is;

(2) some of Peter Geach's criticisms of the doctrine;

(3) Geach's story of the history of the doctrine;

(4) an alternative account of the history of the doctrine;

(5) the version of the doctrine as it occurs in the Port Royal Logic;

(6) a defence of the coherence of the doctrine."
———. 2013. "The Expressive Power of Medieval Logic." Vivarium no. 51:511-521.
———. 2013. "The Power of Medieval Logic." In Later Medieval Metaphysics: Ontology, Language, and Logic edited by Bolyard, Charles and Keele, Rondo, 188-205. New York: Fordham University Press.
———. 2014. Articulating Medieval Logic. New York: Oxford University Press.
Pasnau, Robert, ed. 2010. The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Part II. II Logic and language

10. Christopher J. Martin: The development of logic in the Twelfth century 129; 11. E. Jennifer Ashworth: Terminist logic 146; 12. Gyula Klima: Nominalist semantics 159; 13. Stephen Read: Inferences 173; 14. Paul Vincent Spade: Sophismata 185; 15. Irène Rosier-Catach: Grammar 196-216.
Pérez-Ilzarbe, Paloma. 2011. "Disputation and Logic in the Medieval Treatises De Modo Opponendi et Respondendi." Vivarium no. 49:127-149.

Abstract: "In 1980 L. M. de Rijk edited some texts connected with medieval disputation (Die mittelaterlichen Traktate De modo opponendi et respondendi), towards which he showed a strikingly contemptuous attitude. The reason for his contempt was that the treatises did not fit the obligationes and sophismata tradition. In this article I focus on the original version, the Thesaurus Philosophorum, to highlight the distinction of this family of treatises with respect to the “modern” tradition. First, I study the features of the disputation that can be recognised through the collection of fallacious arguments contained in the Thesaurus. Second, I briefly examine the contents of the treatise and their arrangement, showing that they are closely related to the kind of disputation in question.

I hope to support the idea that neither the technique of disputation nor the contents and their arrangement deserve a straightforward rejection."
Pérez-Ilzarbe, Paloma, and Cerezo, María, eds. 2015. History of Logic and Semantics: Studies on the Aristotelian and Terminist Traditions. Leiden: Brill.

Originally published as Volume 53, No. 2-4 (2015) of Brill’s journal Vivarium.

Contents: María Cerezo: In Memoriam VII; Complete Bibliography of Angel d’Ors XI; Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe, María Cerezo: Introduction 1; Allan Bäck: How the Fallacy of Accident Got Its Name (and Lost It) 4; José Miguel Gambra: To Be in a Subject and Accident 32; María Cerezo: Anselm of Canterbury’s Theory of Meaning: Analysis of Some Semantic Distinctions in De Grammatico 56; Luisa Valente: Aliquid amplius audire desiderat: Desire in Abelard’s Theory of Incomplete and Non-Assertive Complete Sentences 82; Joke Spruyt: The Introductiones Montanae maiores: A Student’s Guide to Logic 109; Angel d’Ors: Tu scis an de mentiente sit falsum Sortem esse illum: On the Syncategorem ‘an’ 128; C.H. Kneepkens: The Collection of Grammatical Sophismata in MS London, BL, Burney 330: An Exploratory Study 152; Mikko Yrjönsuuri: Obligations and Conditionals 179; Sten Ebbesen: Si tantum pater est non tantum pater est: An English Sophisma from the Late Thirteenth Century 192; Calvin G. Normore: Ex impossibili quodlibet sequitur (Angel d’Ors) 209; E. Jennifer Ashworth: Richard Billingham and the Oxford Obligationes Texts: Restrictions on positio 227; Stephen Read: Richard Kilvington and the Theory of Obligations 246; Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe: The Signification of the Copula in Fernando de Enzinas’ Syncategoremata 260; Bibliography 279; Index of Concepts 297; Index of Manuscripts 301; Index of Names 302-304.
Pinborg, Jan. 1975. "A Note on Some Theoretical Concepts of Logic and Grammar." Revue Internationale de Philosophie no. 21:286-296.
———. 1976. "Some Problems of Semantic Representations in Medieval Logic." In History of Linguistic Thought and Contemporary Linguistics, edited by Parret, Herman, 254-278. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"One main subject of medieval logic was the problem of semantic representations of natural languages. If it is true that linguistic theory must account for both the form and meaning of language, then medieval logic or some parts of it belongs to the history of linguistics; and it might perhaps even contribute to linguistics as such. E. A. Moody (The Medieval Contribution to Logic, 1966) has argued that the interest and value of medieval logic is not merely historical; it is also attached to "its attempt to formulate the semantical presuppositions of ordinary language ... What medieval logic has to contribute, to the further development and enrichment of modern logic, is this semantical bridge between the abstract, axiomatically derived, formal system of modern mathematical logic, and the concrete, empirically oriented forms in which natural languages exhibit the rational structure of experience on its phenomenological level"." (p. 254)
———. 1979. "The English contribution to logic before Ockham." Synthese no. 40:19-42.
———. 1984. Medieval Semantics: Selected Studies on Medieval Logic and Grammar. London: Variorum Reprints.

Edited by Sten Ebbesen.
———. 1990. "Grammar." In Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey. Vol. 6/2, edited by Fløistad, Guttorm and Klibansky, Raymond, 789-782. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Rahman, Shahid, Tulenheimo, Tero, and Genot, Emmanuel, eds. 2008. Unity, Truth and the Liar: The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox. Dordrecht: Springer.

Contents: Preface V; Acknowledgments XIX; Contributing Authors XXIII;

Part I Disputatio

1. Stephen Read: The Truth Schema and the Liar 3; 2. Bradley Armour-Garb: Read and Indirect Revenge 19; 3. Catarina Dutilh Novaes: Tarski’s Hidden Theory of Meaning: Sentences Say Exactly One Thing 41; 4. Laurence Goldstein: Doubting Thomas: From Bradwardine Back to Anon 65; 5. Gyula Klima: Logic Without Truth 87; 6. Eugene Mills: Scheming and Lying 113; 7. Terence Parsons: Comments on Stephen Read’s “The Truth-schema and the Liar” 129; 8. Greg Restall: Models for Liars in Bradwardine’s Theory of Truth 135; Acknowledgments 147; 9. José M. Sagüillo: On a New Account of the Liar 149; Acknowledgments 157; 10. György Serény: The Liar Cannot be Solved 159; Acknowledgments 185; 11. B. Hartley Slater: Out of the Liar Tangle 187; 12. Jan Woleński: Read About T-Scheme 199; Acknowledgments 203; 13. Stephen Read: Further Thoughts on Tarski’s T-Scheme and the Liar 205;

Part II Historical Background: Restrictionism versus the Manifold Theory of Meaning

14. Claude Panaccio: Restrictionism: A Medieval Approach Revisited 229; Acknowledgments 250; 15. Fabienne Pironet: William Heytesbury and the Treatment of Insolubilia in Fourteenth-Century England Followed by a Critical Edition of Three Anonymous Treatises De insolubilibus Inspired by Heytesbury 255;

Index Nominum 335; Index Rerum 337-338.
Read, Stephen. 2010. "Inferences." In The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy. Vol I, edited by Pasnau, Robert and Dyke, Christina van, 173-184. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
———. 2010. "Field’s Paradox and Its Medieval Solution." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 31:161-176.

Abstract: "Hartry Field’s revised logic for the theory of truth in his new book, Saving Truth from Paradox, seeking to preserve Tarski’s T-scheme, does not admit a full theory of negation. In response, Crispin Wright proposed that the negation of a proposition is the proposition saying that some proposition inconsistent with the first is true. For this to work, we have to show that this proposition is entailed by any proposition incompatible with the first, that is, that it is the weakest proposition incompatible with the proposition whose negation it should be. To show that his proposal gave a full intuitionist theory of negation, Wright appealed to two principles, about incompatibility and entailment, and using them Field formulated a paradox of validity (or more precisely, of inconsistency).

The medieval mathematician, theologian and logician, Thomas Bradwardine, writing in the fourteenth century, proposed a solution to the paradoxes of truth which does not require any revision of logic. The key principle behind Bradwardine’s solution is a pluralist doctrine of meaning, or signification, that propositions can mean more than they explicitly say. In particular, he proposed that signification is closed under entailment. In light of this, Bradwardine revised the truth-rules, in particular, refining the T-scheme, so that a proposition is true only if everything that it signifies obtains. Thereby, he was able to show that any proposition which signifies that it itself is false, also signifies that it is true, and consequently is false and not true. I show that Bradwardine’s solution is also able to deal with Field’s paradox and others of a similar nature. Hence Field’s logical revisions are unnecessary to save truth from paradox."
———. 2012. "The medieval theory of consequence." Synthese no. 187:899-912.

Abstract: "The recovery of Aristotle’s logic during the twelfth century was a great stimulus to medieval thinkers. Among their own theories developed to explain Aristotle’s theories of valid and invalid reasoning was a theory of consequence, of what arguments were valid, and why. By the fourteenth century, two main lines of thought had developed, one at Oxford, the other at Paris. Both schools distinguished formal from material consequence, but in very different ways. In Buridan and his followers in Paris, formal consequence was that preserved under uniform substitution. In Oxford, in contrast, formal consequence included analytic consequences such as ‘If it’s a man, then it’s an animal’. Aristotle’s notion of syllogistic consequence was subsumed under the treatment of formal consequence. Buridan developed a general theory embracing the assertoric syllogism, the modal syllogism and syllogisms with oblique terms. The result was a thoroughly systematic and extensive treatment of logical theory and logical consequence which repays investigation."
———. 2013. Obligations, Sophisms and Insolubles. Moscow: Higher School of Economics.
Riejen, Jeroen van. 1993. "Somer Medieval analyses of the Logic of "Qua"." In Argumentationstheorie. Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln korrekten Folgerns, edited by Jacobi, Klaus, 465-482. Leiden: Brill.
Roberts, Louise Nisbet. 1960. "A Chimera is a Chimera: A Medieval Tautology." Journal of the History of Ideas no. 21:273-278.
Rohbacher, Berhard. 2015. " Jewish law and medieval logic: wy eating horse meat is a punishable offense." Journal of Law and Religion no. 30:295-319.

Abstract: "This article presents a case study of the inuence of Muslim and Christian logicians on medieval Jewish law. The case in question is why it is a punishable offense for Jews to eat mammals that do not have either sign of purity—that is, neither have split hooves nor chew their cud—and the article examines the answers given by three medieval Jewish sages: Rashi, Maimonides, and Naḥmanides. The Written Law of the Torah explicitly allows the consumption of mammals, such as cattle, with both signs of purity. It also explicitly prohibits the eating of mammals, such as camels or pigs, with one sign but not the other. It does not, however, appear to explicitly prohibit the consumption of mammals, such as horses, with neither sign. Using a fortiori logic, Rashi derives a punishable prohibition against eating horses from the prohibition against eating camels and pigs. Maimonides ascribes this prohibition to the Oral Law of the Talmud. Naḥmanides, by contrast, attributes it directly to the Written Law without relying on either a fortiori logic or the Oral Law. This article argues that this solution was available to Naḥmanides because he adopted inclusive disjunction from Christian logicians, but it was not available to Maimonides because he adopted exclusive disjunction from Muslim logicians. The choice between inclusive and exclusive disjunction is shown to continue to be of importance in modern American law."
Rosier-Catach, Irène. 2007. "Priscian on Divine Ideas and Mental Conceptions: The Discussions in the Glosulae in Priscianum, the Notae Dunelmenses, William of Champeaux and Abelard." In The Many Roots of Medieval Logic: The Aristotelian and the Non-Aristotelian Traditions, edited by Marenbon, John, 219-237. Leiden: Brill.

Abstract: "Priscian’s Institutiones Grammaticae, which rely on Stoic and Neoplatonic sources, constituted an important, although quite neglected, link in the chain of transmission of ancient philosophy in the Middle Ages. There is, in particular, a passage where Priscian discusses the vexed claim that common names can be proper names of the universal species and where he talks about the ideas existing in the divine mind. At the beginning of the 12th century, the anonymous Glosulae super Priscianum and the Notae Dunelmenses, which heavily quote William of Champeaux (as master G.), interpret the passage in the context of a growing interest in the problem of universals, raising semantic as well as ontological questions, and introducing a Platonic view on universals in the discussions on the signification of the noun. Moreover, this same passage will be used by Abelard to elaborate one of his opinions about the signification of universal or common names—that they signify “mental conceptions”."
Salamucha, Jan. 2003. "The Appearance of Antinomial Problems within Medieval Logic." In Knowldge and Faith, edited by Swietorzecka, Kordula and Jadacki, Jacek Juliusz, 169-210. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Original edition in Polish: Przegląd Filozoficzny 40 (1937) (1) 68-89; (3). 320-343.
———. 2003. "From the History of Medieval Nominalism." In Knowldge and Faith, edited by Swietorzecka, Kordula and Jadacki, Jacek Juliusz, 139-167. Amsterdam: Rodopi.

Original edition in Polish: in Tadeusz Czezowski (ed ).}, Charisteria, Warsaw (1960), pp. 207-238.
Schupp, Franz. 1988. Logical Problems of the Medieval Theory of Consequences: With the Edition of the Liber consequentiarum. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
Simmons, Keith. 1987. "On a medieval solution to the Liar Paradox." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 8:121-140.
Spade, Paul Vincent. 1979. "Recent Research on Medieval Logic." Synthese no. 40:3-18.

Reprinted as Chapter I in: P. V. Spade, Lies, Language and Logic in the Late Middle Ages (1988).

"In this paper I shall survey some of the main areas of recent research on the logic of the Middle Ages. A large and flourishing body of scholars is now actively at work in this field; interest in the topic is no longer by any means confined to a relatively small group of specialists. Perhaps the most characteristic feature of this recent research is the symbiotic relationship between pure historical and textual scholarship of the highest quality - the edition of texts, the identification of authors and their sources, the establishment of their interrelations - and the critically exegetical work of scholars familiar with the results and techniques of modern logic and analytic philosophy. This fruitful relationship has begun to make the immense field of medieval logic accessible not only to specialized medievalists but also to the philosophical profession at large.

Although it is impossible to date the beginning of this collaboration with any precision, it had taken hold firmly by about 1960. At that time, thanks to the work of Bochenski, Boehner and Moody, among others, medieval logic had been established as a rich and sophisticated field worthy of serious study. But this claim was not established without resistance. For many years, students of medieval philosophy had concentrated mainly on issues in metaphysics and epistemology. There were perhaps several reasons for this - the sociology of the revival of medieval studies in Europe and America, the preeminence of Thomas Aquinas until recently in the intellectual life of the Catholic Church, and so on. Whatever the reasons, historians of medieval philosophy tended to focus on the great metaphysical and epistemological questions, and largely overlooked medieval work in other areas of philosophy.

(...)

I cannot of course do justice to all the facets of recent research in the field. I shall mention only a few points, and hope thereby to convey some idea of its extent. For the most part, although not exclusively, I shall confine myself to work done since 1960. My discussion will be organized in two parts. The first part will be a general review of some of the major trends and results in the area. Space does not permit extended critical and evaluative comments, although I will insert remarks on particular points here and there, and suggest areas where future research might profitably be directed. The second part will be a selective bibliographical essay designed to inform the interested layman of a few central studies and translations, and of where he may go to find out more." (pp. 3-4)
———. 1988. Lies, Language and Logic in the Late Middle Ages. London: Variorum Reprints.

Contents: Preface IX-X; I. Recent Research on Medieval Logic 3-18; INSOLUBILIA. II. The Origins of the Mediaeval Insolubilia-Literature 292-309; III. Ockham on Self-Reference 298-300; IV. Insolubilia and Bradwardine's Theory of Signification 115-134; V. William Heytesbury's Position on "Insolubles": One Possible Source 114-120; VI. John Buridan on the Liar: A Study and reconstruction 579-590; VII. Roger Swyneshed's Insolubilia: 177-220; VIII. Roger Swyneshed's Theory of Insolubilia. A Study of Some Preliminary Semantic Notions 105-113; OCKHAM'S SEMANTICS. IX. Ockham's Rule of Supposition: Two Conflicts in his Theory 63-73; X. Some Epistemological Implications of the Burley-Ockham Dispute 212-222; XI. Ockham's Distinction between Absolute and Connotative Terms 55-76; XII. Priority of Analysis and the Predicates of "O"-Form Sentences 263-270; XIII. Synonymy and Equivocation in Ockham's Mental Language 9-22; XIV. Ockham on Terms of First and Second Imposition and Intention, with remarks on the Liar Paradox 47-55; XV. Les modalités aléthiques selon Ockham 29-34; THE OBLIGATIONES LITERATURE. XVI. Roger Swyneshed's Obligationes: Edition and Comments 243-285; XVII. Three theories of Obligationes: Burley, Kilvington, and Swyneshed on Counterfactual Reasoning 1-32; Addenda et Corrigenda 1-6; Index 1-6.

"The seventeen papers reproduced in this collection were all originally published between 1973 and 1983. They are devoted to topics in mediaeval logic and semantic theory. Within that general area, my work has been concentrated in three main subfields, represented here by the three main divisions of this volume: (1) The mediaeval treatments of antinomies such as the "Liar" paradox (papers II-VIII); (2) mediaeval semantic theory, particularly the logical doctrine of "supposition" and the theory of the relation between language and thought (papers IX-XV); and (3) the peculiar genre of disputation known as "obligationes" (papers XVI-XVII). Paper I is a general overview of research in the field, and may serve as an introduction to the volume as a whole.

The three main parts of this collection correspond to the three chapters I contributed to The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, Norman Kretzmann, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982): Chs. 9 (pp. 188-96), 12 (pp. 246-53), and 13B (pp. 335-41). I refer the reader to those chapters for further information on the topics covered in the present volume.

With the exception of the first two, all the papers collected here deal exclusively with the first half of the fourteenth century. Except for papers I-II and VI, they are all focussed on Oxford University. If there is one name that dominates these pages, it is that of William of Ockham. All the papers in the second part of the collection (IX-XV) are studies of Ockham, as is paper III. The results of these studies are often negative; they find fault with this or that aspect of Ockham's theory. Nevertheless, I hasten to add that I have never thought of my task as one of "debunking" Ockham. On the contrary, I find Ockham an extraordinarily appealing thinker, one with whom I am in considerable philosophical sympathy. I hope that, through the papers reproduced here, the reader will perhaps come to appreciate the depth and richness of this part of Ockham's thought, and of mediaeval logic and semantic theory more generally." (From the Preface)
———. 1988. "The Logic of the Categorical: the Medieval Theory of Descent and Ascent." In Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy. Studies in Memory of Jan Pinborg, edited by Kretzmann, Norman, 187-224. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
———. 1996. Thoughts, Words and Things: An Introduction to Late Mediaeval Logic and Semantic Theory.

Available on the Internet at the site "Mediaeval Logic and Philosophy".
———. 1998. "Late Medieval Logic." In Routledge History of Philosophy. Volume III: Medieval Philosophy, edited by Marenbon, John, 402-425. New York: Routledge.
———. 2010. "Sophismata." In The Cambridge History of Medieval Philosophy. Vol I, edited by Pasnau, Robert and Dyke, Christina van, 185-195. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Strobach, Niko. 2017. "Indivisible Temporal Boundaries from Aristophanes until Today." Vivarium no. 55:9-21.
Stump, Eleonore. 1989. Dialectic and Its Place in the Development of Medieval Logic. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction 1; 1. Dialectic and Aristotle's Topics 11; 2. Dialectic and Boethius's De topicis differentiis 31; 3. Between Aristotle and Boethius 57; 4. Topics and Hypothetical Syllogisms in Garlandus Compotista 67; 5. Abelard on the Topics 89; 6. Logic in the Early Twelfth Century 111; 7. Terminist Logicians on the Topics 135; 8. Consequences and the Decline of Aristotelianism in Formal Logic 157; 9. William of Sherwood's Treatise on Obligations 177; 10. Walter Burley on Obligations 195; 11. Roger Swyneshed's Theory of Obligations 215; 12. Topics, Consequences, and Obligations in Ockham's Summa logicae 251; Index 271-274.
Styazkhin, N. I. 1969. History of Mathematical Logic from Leibniz to Peano. Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press.

Chapter One. The Development of Mathematical Logic During the Middle Ages in Europe 1-55.
Sullivan, Mark. 1970. "What Was True or False in the Old Logic?" Journal of Philosophy no. 67:788-800.
Tarlazzi, Caterina. 2017. "Individuals as Universals: Audacious Views in Early Twelfth-Century Realism." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 55:557-581.

Abstract: "This article investigates a twelfth-century realist view on universals, the individuum-theory. The individuum-theory is criticized by Peter Abelard and Joscelin of Soissons, and endorsed by ‘Quoniam de generali’ as well as by the unpublished Isagoge commentary found in MS Paris, BnF, lat. 3237, which is here taken into account for the first time. The individuum-theory blurs traditional distinctions between nominalism and realism by claiming that the universal is the individual thing itself. In this paper, I present the main strategies for such a claim; namely, putting forward identity “by indifference,” distinguishing status and attentiones, and neutralizing opposite predicates. I argue that these strategies have parallels in Abelard’s own views. The individuum-theory’s paradoxical realism seems to defend universal res after criticisms were advanced against more traditional material essence realism, and it seems to have been using some of the nominalists’ tools (particularly Abelardian tools) in its endeavor."
Thom, Paul. 1977. "Termini Obliqui and the Logic of Relations." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 59:143-155.
———. 2003. Medieval Modal Systems: Problems and Concepts. Aldershot: Ashgate.

"The major medieval systems of modal logic were developed during a period flanked by Pierre Abelard in the twelfth century and Jean Buridan in the fourteenth. Little of great significance pre-dates Abelard or post-dates Buridan; and these two Frenchmen are major figures indeed. In between their work lies that of the well-known Avicenna, Averröes and Ockham, as well as that of the comparatively unknown Robert Kilwardby in the thirteenth century and Richard Campsall in the early fourteenth. The work of these seven thinkers in the field of modal syllogistic will be my focus in this book.

These thinkers were motivated by two forces. First of all, there are the interpretive puzzles posed by Aristotle's modal logic as expounded in the Prior Analytics and De Interpretatione. These two texts appear not always to be in accord with one another, and the modal syllogistic as presented in the Prior Analytics not only lacks a semantic foundation but appears to be internally inconsistent. All this is grist to the mill of the interpreting mind. Then there is the inherent fascination of modal logic as a field of theoretical enquiry. An uneasy relationship exists between the desire to interpret Aristotle and the desire to theorize modality. The latter, of course, is a philosophical desire, autonomous but also intimately connected with broader metaphysical and theological ways of thinking. The former force is, at first sight, a philological rather than a philosophical one. But in reality matters are not so simple, since the philosophical interpretation of any text - let alone one that increasingly carried such authority as that of Aristotle -is always partially governed by philosophical rather than philological imperatives.

There are two key theoretical questions stirring the minds of medieval modal logicians. The first question concerns the doctrine that I shall call actualism. According to this doctrine, modal propositions are about the actual things that ordinary non-modal propositions are about. Contrasted with actualism is the view that modal propositions are about what possibly falls under the subject-terms of the corresponding non-modal propositions. This doctrine I will call ampliationism. The leading actualists in the medieval period are Abelard, Ockham, and to a certain extent Campsall; the ampliationists are Avicenna and Buridan. A second question concerns the extent to which essentialist notions are assumed in the modal theories of our seven thinkers. All seven make use of the notion of an essential property. In addition, Averroes, Kilwardby and Campsall make use of the notion of a kind, i.e. a class whose members necessarily share their essential properties. (Preface, XI-XII)
Thomas, Ivo. 2006. "Interregnum (Between Medieval and Modern)." In Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Second Edition, edited by Borchert, Donald M., 437-440. New York: Thomson Gale.

The first edition of the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Paul Edwards, was published in 1967.

The editor of the article Logic, history of in the first edition was Arthur Norman Prior.

With an Addendum by Tony Street, p. 421.
Trentman, John A. 1966. "Lesniewski's Ontology and Some Medieval Logicians." Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic no. 7:361-364.
———. 1968. "Extraordinary Language and Medieval Logic." Dialogue no. 7:286-291.
———. 1976. "On interpretation, Leśniewski's ontology, and the study of medieval logic." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 14:217-222.
———. 1990. "Logic." In Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey. Vol. 6/2, edited by Fløistad, Guttorm and Klibansky, Raymond, 805-819. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

"Rather than attempt a necessarily over-sketchy account of the diversity of this material, I would refer the reader to what is already only a sample, the studies, texts and translations listed in the bibliography. The rest of this survey will be taken up with a brief account of the point of view of medieval logicians, a consideration of the recent attempts to compare medieval supposition theory and modern quantification theory, and a very short notice of the sort of contribution professional logicians have made to the study of medieval logic. I should like to think that some such selection might have pleased the medieval logicians themselves in that it emphasizes the consideration of their work, not as museum pieces, but as logic, which can be reasonably compared with contemporary contributions to the discipline. It must also be added that the subject of this article must, unfortunately, be limited to the logic of the Latin West." (p. 806)
Turner, William. 1907. "Mnemonic Verses in a Ninth Century MS.: A Contribution to the History of Logic." The Philosophical Review no. 16:519-526.
Uckelman, Sara L. 2009. Modalities in Medieval Logic. Amsterdam: Faculteit der Natuurwetenschappen, Wiskunde en Informatica.
———. 2012. "Arthur Prior and Medieval Logic." Synthese no. 188:349-366.
———. 2013. "A Quantified Temporal Logic for Ampliation and Restriction." Vivarium no. 51:485-510.
Uckelman, Sara L., Maat, Jaap, and Rybalko, Katherina. 2018. "The art of doubting in obligationes parisienses." In Modern Views of Medieval Logic, edited by Kann, Christoph, Löewe, Benedikt, Rode, Christian and Uckelman, Sara L. Leuven: Peeters.
Valente, Luisa. 2007. "Names That Can Be Said of Everything: Porphyrian Tradition and ‘Transcendental’ Terms in Twelfth-Century Logic." In The Many Roots of Medieval Logic: The Aristotelian and the Non-Aristotelian Traditions, edited by Marenbon, John, 298-310. Leiden: Brill.

Abstract: "In an article published in 2003 [*], Klaus Jacobi—using texts partially edited in De Rijk’s Logica Modernorum—demonstrated that twelfth-century logic contains a tradition of reflecting about some of the transcendental names (nomina transcendentia). In addition to reinforcing Jacobi’s thesis with other texts, this contribution aims to demonstrate two points: 1) That twelfth-century logical reflection about transcendental terms has its origin in the logica vetus, and especially in a passage from Porphyry Isagoge and in Boethius’s commentary on it. In spite of the loss of the major part of the Aristotelian corpus, the twelfth-century masters in logic still received some Aristotelian theses concerning the notions of one and being via Porphyry and Boethius; on the basis of such theses, they were able to elaborate a sort of proto-theory of the transcendentals as trans-categorical terms. 2) Th at this theory is centred on the idea that there exists a particular group of names which have the property that they can be said of everything; this group includes “being”, “one”, “thing” and “something” (ens, unum, res, aliquid).

Twelfth-century masters in logic try to question the (originally Aristotelian) thesis that these terms are equivocal, although they do not deny it completely."

[*] Jacobi, K. (2003) ‘Nomina transcendentia. Untersuchungen von Logikern des 12. Jahrhunderts über transkategoriale Terme’ in Pickavé (2003) 23–36.

Pickavé, M. (ed) (2003) Die Logik des Transzendentalen, Berlin and New York.
Verboon, Annemieke Rosalinde. 2014. "The Medieval Tree of Porphyry: An Organic Structure of Logic." In The Tree: Symbol, Allegory, and Mnemonic Device in Medieval Art and Thought, edited by Salnius, Pippa and Worm, Andrea, 95-116. Turnhout: Brepols.
Vineis, Edoardo, and Maierù, Alfonso. 1994. "Medieval Linguistics." In History of Linguistics. Volume II, edited by Lepschy, Giulio C. London: Longman.

English translation of: E. Vineis, A. Maierù (eds.), La linguistica medievale, Vol. II of: Giulio C. Lepschy (ed.), Storia della linguistica, Bologna: Il Mulino, 1990.
Weinberg, Julius. 1965. Abstraction, Relation, and Induction: Three Essays in the History of Thought. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Yrjönsuuri, Mikko. 1993. "Aristotle's Topics and Medieval Obligational Disputations." Synthese:59-82.
———. 2001. Medieval Formal Logic: Obligations, Insolubles and Consequences. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Contents: Preface VII--XII; PART I. OBLIGATIONS AND INSOLUBLES 1; Mikko Yrjönsuuri: Duties, Rules and Interpretations in Obligational Disputations 3; Henrik Lagerlund and Erik J. Olsson: Disputation and Change of Belief -- Burley's Theory of Obligationes as a Theory of Belief Revision 35; Chrisopher J. Martin: Obligations and Liars 63; Fabienne Pironet: The Relations between Insolubles and Obligations in Medieval Disputations 95; PART II. CONSEQUENCES 115; Peter King: Consequence as Inference: Mediaeval Proof Theory 1300-1350 117; Ivan Boh: Consequence and Rules of Consequence in the Post-Ockham Period 147; Stephen Read: Self-reference and Validity Revisited 183; PART III. TRANSLATIONS 197; Anonymous: The Emmeran Treatise on False Positio 199; Anonymous: The Emmeran Treatise on Impossible Positio 217; Psudo-Scotus: Questions on Aristotle's Prior Analytics. Question X: Whether in every valid consequence the opposite of the antecedent can be inferred from the opposite of the consequent? 225; Index of names 235-237.
———. 2008. "Treatments of the Paradoxes of Self-reference." In Handbook of the History of Logic, Vol. 2: Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic, edited by Gabbay, Dov and Woods, John, 579-608. Amsterdam: Elsevier

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