

History of Logic from Aristotle to Gödel

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Annotated Bibliography of the Medieval Theories of Supposition and Mental Language: M - Z

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"Italian universities of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries took part in the scholastic debate concerning mental language, which first arose at the universities in Oxford and Paris in the early fourteenth century. Peter of Mantua (d. 1400) and Paul of Venice (d. 1429) were the prominent Italian masters in this respect; their opinions continued to be cited at the European universities of the early modern period. Two main conclusions are reached here: that there is an obvious continuity between medieval and modern ideas concerning mental language; and that further research is needed in order to establish the respective roles of Paris and Oxford in the development of the debate at the beginning of the fourteenth century."
6. Malcolm, John. 1977. "On the Disappearance of *Copulatio* as a Property of a Term." *Franciscan Studies* no. 37:120-138.
7. Markosian, Ned. 1988. "On Ockham's Supposition Theory and Karger's Rule of Inference." *Franciscan Studies* no. 48:40-52.
"Elizabeth Karger has suggested an interpretation of Ockham's theory of the modes of common personal supposition ("TM") according to which the purpose of TM is to provide certain distinctions that Ockham will use in formulating a unified theory of immediate inference among certain kinds of sentences. Karger presents a single, powerful rule of inference that incorporates TM distinctions and that is meant to codify Ockham's theory of immediate inference. I raise an objection to Karger's rule, thereby calling into doubt the interpretation of Ockham that is based on attributing that rule to him."
8. Matthews, Gareth. 1964. "Ockham's Supposition Theory and Modern Logic." *Philosophical Review* no. 73:91-99.
Reprinted in *Inquires into medieval philosophy. A collection in honor of Francis P. Clarke*. Edited by J. F. Ross, Wespport, Greenwood 1971 pp. 131-140.
"Philotheus Boehner's "Medieval logic" gives the impression that medieval supposition theory and modern quantification theory agree on their interpretation of particular propositions but differ on their interpretation of universal propositions. Matthews shows that this impression is mistaken: they differ on both particular and universal propositions, and the basic reason is that the medievals quantify over terms while modern logicians quantify over variables."
9. ———. 1973. "*Suppositio* and Quantification in Ockham." *Noûs* no. 7:13-24.

"This paper is a discussion of the idea that the doctrine of "descent to singulars" in the supposition theory of William of Ockham constitutes a rudimentary theory of quantification. It is here argued that the doctrine applies to propositions of the logical forms, 'no S is P' and 'some S is not P', only in case each of their terms is nonempty. It is urged in conclusion that a doctrine whose application is restricted in this way is not a quantification theory at all, not even a rudimentary one."

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11. ———. 1997. "Two Theories of Supposition?" *Topoi* no. 16 (1):35-40.
 "In a recent paper Paul Vincent Spade suggests that, although the medieval doctrine of the modes of personal supposition originally had something to do with the rest of the theory of supposition, it became, by the 14th century, an unrelated theory with no question to answer. By contrast, I argue that the theory of the modes of personal supposition was meant to provide a way of making understandable the idea that a general term in a categorical proposition can be used to refer to the individual things that fall under it. Once that idea had been made acceptable, truth conditions for the various forms of categorical proposition could be given without any specific appeal to the ideas of descent and ascent in terms of which the modes had been defined."
12. Maurer, Armand. 1981. "William of Ockham on Language and Reality." In *Miscellanea Mediaevalia*, edited by Beckmann, Jan P., 795-802. New York: de Gruyter.
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13. Meier-Oeser, Stephan. 1999. "Thinking as Internal Speaking: Some Remarks on the Conceptual Changes in the Relation between Language and Thinking from Middle Ages to Condillac." In *Signs and Signification. Vol. I*, edited by Gill, Harjeet Singh and Manetti, Giovanni, 175-194. New Delhi: Bahri Publications.
14. ———. 2000. "The Meaning of 'Significatio' in Scholastic Logic." In *Signs and Signification. Vol. II*, edited by Gill, Harjeet Singh and Manetti, Giovanni, 89-107. New Delhi: Bahri Publications.
 "Studies in scholastic theories of signification usually focus on what Roger Bacon (*De signis*: 132) has called the "difficilis dubitatio utrum vox significet species apud animam an res" (the difficult question, whether spoken words signify mental concepts or things), or, in Scotus' words (*Ordinatio*, vol. 6: 97), the "magna altercatio... de voce, utrum sit signum rei vel conceptus" (the great altercation, whether the spoken word is a sign of the thing or of the concept). But as interesting and important this question may be, it covers just one aspect of the numerous and complex problems linked with the scholastic concept of 'significatio'. For since scholastic terminology generally made a clear cut distinction between 'significatio' and 'significatum', the two questions, what words signify (or what their significatum is), and what signification itself may be, lead in different directions. By leaving aside the former question, I shall concentrate on the latter.
 The question about meaning or signification is deemed, especially since the 'linguistic turn', to be one of the most fundamental questions, philosophy has to account for. Of course, it is by no means a recent question. And yet it is, in a specific sense, not as old as one might suggest. It may be controversial, whether the problem of meaning ('Bedeutungsproblem'), as Weisbergerer (1930:17f) has stated, did not matter in classical Greek philosophy, or, as Cassirer (1925: 86) has claimed, already for Plato made up the "starting point of philosophy", whether Aristotle in the first chapter of his *Peri hermeneias* had offered "not even a sketch of a general theory of meaning" (Kretzmann 1974:5), or at least the "rudiments of a semantic theory" (Weidemann 1982). What has to be noticed, is, that the very term and concept of signification had not yet become a problem in classical Greek philosophy -- and could not even have been as such, due to the simple fact, that a concept of meaning or signification in a terminological sense did not exist. Indeed, the word or linguistic sign (*semainon*) was said to signify or mean something (*semainei ti*) and speech (*logos*) was characterised as significative (*semantikós*). But whereas in modern translations this is usually expressed in terms of words having meaning, there is, as far as I can see, at least in classical Greek no equivalent noun for 'meaning' or 'Bedeutung'. The history of terminology shows, that the corresponding Greek noun of the latin '*significatio*' was *semasia*'. But the earliest evidence for the use of '*semasia*' in the sense of meaning (of a word) seems to be a passage in the *De signis*, written by the Epicurean Philodemus of Gadara around the middle of the first century. In all earlier occurrences this term means 'sign' or 'signal' or an act of signalling (cf Ebert 1987:108sq.).
 So it seems as if semantics is not necessarily in need of the concept of signification or meaning. Because for quite a long time philosophy did not even have a word for it. But once introduced, it could give rise to such problems, as, referring to the concept of meaning, Charles Morris (1971:95) has pointed out by noticing that " 'meaning' signifies any and all phases, of sign-processes (the status of being a sign, the interpretant, the fact of denoting, the significatum)".
 By considering the meaning of 'significatio' in scholastic logic, I do not intend to give a comprehensive outline of the various theories of signification that have been worked out by that tradition, but rather want

to confine myself to the more modest purpose of giving an account of the use of that term in scholastic logic. So, even if the title of my paper seems to offend the Wittgenstein's prominent advice "don't ask for meaning, ask for use", I will observe it insofar, as I am going to *take a look at the concrete use of 'meaning' or rather 'signification' in scholastic logic, which however, as we shall see, not quite the same. By so doing, I do not intend to establish something like the scholastic meaning of signification.* For if we are told by Wittgenstein and many others, that "the meaning of a word is its use in language", we will be confronted here with the fact, that the usage of '*significatio*' -- and thus its 'meaning' -- is highly divergent in itself."

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"Traditionally the two main paradigms for describing and explaining processes of thought and mental representation have been thought as image and thought as language. Whereas in present-day debates these paradigms are treated as mutually exclusive, in scholastic theories of cognition and mental language they were often amalgamated in various ways. By tracing pertinent discussions from the fourteenth to the seventeenth centuries, the article points to some consequences of this amalgamation both for the notions of image and of likeness and for approaches to thought as language."
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"The question is whether a proper name (e.g., "Tom") may be used in a way that parallels that of "man" in "man is a species". "Tom is an individual" is the answer proposed, with "individual" functioning as a second order term. A number of difficulties are resolved by showing that "Tom is an individual" may be rendered as "a man is (in English) called 'Tom' and is so constituted that only he may without ambiguity be called 'Tom'. This shows that "Tom" in "Tom is an individual" is neither purely a first order nor purely a second order term."
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"This essay approaches two of the main contributions of medieval logic to the history of logic and the philosophy of language: the doctrine of *suppositio* and that of *consequentiae*. The aim here is to demonstrate that although medieval logic depended on the syntactical structure of Latin, authors managed to reach a high level of understanding regarding strictly logical problems, not only anticipating some theories from modern semantics, but also predicate calculus and sentential calculus. This research, especially after the 13th century, developed in complete isolation from Aristotelian logic, particularly its doctrines of syllogism and declarative sentence. It also revealed enormous originality and creativity regardless of the contribution that stoic logic known from the works of Cicero and Boethius may have had.
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 "Thanks largely to the work of Noam Chomsky, we have witnessed over the last thirty years a revival of interest in two closely related ideas: that there is a universal grammar, a set of structural features common to every human language, and that the exploration of this grammar is, in part, an exploration of the structure of thought.
 Fourteenth century grammarians and philosophers were also interested in this complex of questions, and debate about them raged as vigorously then as now. One tradition in this debate grew out of thirteenth century terminist logic and seems to have been given a distinctive shape by William Ockham This tradition posited a fully-fledged language of thought common to all rational beings and prior to al linguistic convention. In this essay I will attempt to outline Ockham's account of this mental language, to consider some fourteenth century objections which lead to the refinement of the account by others in the fourteenth century, and finally to suggest that Ockham's approach has something to contribute to current debate about the relationship between the theory of meaning and any language of thought.
 At the very beginning of his *Summa Logicae* Ockham claims that there are three distinct types of language: written, spoken, and mental. He insists that written and spoken language are distinct in kind and that there is a type of language whose terms are concepts and which exists only in the mind. (1) Ockham's mental language plays several distinct roles within his philosophy. On the one hand, mental language figures crucially in the semantics of spoken and written language. On the other hand, mental language is a fully articulated language which is suited to be spoken by natural telepaths and is spoken by the angels. These two kinds of role require very different features of mental language, features which, as we shall see, sometimes pull its structure in opposite directions."
 (1) Cf. W. Ockham, *Summa Logicae* I. C. 1 in P. Boehner, G. Gal, S. Brown (eds.), *Opera Philosophica* (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1974).
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27. ———. 2003. *A Teoria Da Suposição De Guilherme De Ockham. Uma Reconstrução*.
 Master's thesis defended at the University of São Paulo, for the obtention of the MA degree in April 2003.
 "This work is the result of my attempts to combine my Philosophy background with the Mathematical Logic inclinations of the institution within which this research was developed. In fact, this twofold character is noticeable in many features thereof; I shall now outline some of them. The project has two main purposes: the less risky one is to provide an account of William of Ockham's logical thinking, with focus on its aspects which bear a relation with the contemporary issues of intensional logics and possible-world semantics. The more risky one consists of investigating the possibilities of developing a purely extensional treatment of intensional contexts, such as tense and modalities. For the latter, some other extensional/nominalistic systems could have played the role of `experimental sample', but there seemed to be something intriguing about Ockham, as one wonders whether a philosopher from the XIVth century would have something relevant to add to our present logical issues. Moreover, he is considered to be the founder of nominalism, so the historical interest of such enterprise was self-evident - therefore, the legitimacy of the first purpose. I shall try to comply with two very distinct kinds of expectations: those which are the desiderata for a History of Philosophy work, and those of logicians, who are interested in the formal correctness of the system hereby presented. The criteria of excellence of these two lines are almost incompatible, and one wonders if it is not a suicidal enterprise to try to combine them. On the one hand, an Ockham scholar may be discontent with the absence of a few important aspects of Ockham's logic, since I deliberately prioritize those related to contemporary logic. On the other hand, a logician may be bothered by the presence of too many `antiquities', perhaps hindering logical clarity. So, at the risk of displeasing everybody, I nevertheless maintain that such a combination may turn out to be fruitful and informative to both sides. Chapter 1 will display some fundamental aspects of Ockham's logic and semantics, in a rather historical approach. However, even this part is developed taking into account what I later shall want to establish as my version of an `ockhamist system'. I consider it to be the flaw of many such reconstructions that they do not undertake a serious analysis of the underlying concepts; alternatively, some which did rely on such an analysis have reached very interesting results. Chapter 2 relates some apparently less central (when compared to supposition theory, for example) issues of Ockham's theory to relevant topics of Contemporary Philosophy, such as possible worlds, designation, demonstratives etc... In this chapter I also introduce conceptual tools which I will make use of for the reconstruction undertaken in chapter 3. Finally, Chapter 3 is an attempt to provide truth conditions for quantified, modal and tense propositions, based on the truth of singular propositions. I hereby hope to reach a rather broad account of Ockham's thinking, even though my main target is to build a coherent and correctly structured reconstruction of his theory of propositions."
28. ———. 2007. "Theory of Supposition Vs. Theory of Fallacies in Ockham." *Vivarium* no. 45:343-359.

- "I propose to examine the issue of whether the ancient tradition in logic continued to be developed in the later medieval period from the vantage point of the relations between two specific groups of theories, namely the medieval theories of supposition and the (originally) ancient theories of fallacies. More specifically, I examine whether supposition theories absorbed and replaced theories of fallacies, or whether the latter continued to exist, with respect to one particular author, William of Ockham. I compare different parts of Ockham's *Summa Logicae*, namely III-4 (on fallacies), and the final chapters of part I and first chapters of part II (on supposition). I conclude that there is overlap of conceptual apparatus and of goals (concerning propositions that must be distinguished) in Ockham's theories of supposition and of fallacies, but that the respective conceptual apparatuses also present substantial dissimilarities. Hence, theories of supposition are better seen as an addition to the general logical framework that medieval authors had inherited from ancient times, rather than the replacement of an ancient tradition by a medieval one. Indeed, supposition theories and fallacy theories had different tasks to fulfil, and in this sense both had their place in fourteenth century logic."
29. ———. 2007. *Formalizing Medieval Logical Theories. Suppositio, Consequentiae and Obligationes*. New York: Springer.
Contents: Introduction I-XII; 1. Supposition theory: algorithmic hermeneutics 7; 2. Buridan's notion of *Consequentia* 79; 3. *Obligationes* as logical games 145; 4. The philosophy of formalization 215; Conclusion 293; References 301; Index of names and topics 310.
"This book presents novel formalizations of three of the most important medieval logical theories: supposition, consequence and obligations. In an additional fourth part, an in-depth analysis of the concept of formalization is presented - a crucial concept in the current logical panorama, which as such receives surprisingly little attention. Although formalizations of medieval logical theories have been proposed earlier in the literature, the formalizations presented here are all based on innovative vantage points: supposition theories as algorithmic hermeneutics, theories of consequence analyzed with tools borrowed from model-theory and two-dimensional semantics, and obligations as logical games. For this reason, this is perhaps the first time that these medieval logical theories are made fully accessible to the modern philosopher and logician who wishes to obtain a better grasp of them, but who has always been held back by the lack of appropriate 'translations' into modern terms. Moreover, the book offers a reflection on the very nature of logic, a reflection that is prompted by the comparisons between medieval and modern logic, their similarities and dissimilarities. It is thus a contribution not only to the history of logic, but also to the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of language and semantics. The analysis of medieval logic is also relevant for the modern philosopher and logician in that, being the unifying methodology used across all disciplines at that time, logic really provided unity to science. It thus presents a unified model of scientific investigation, where logic plays the aggregating role."
30. ———. 2008. "An Intensional Interpretation of Ockham's Theory of Supposition." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 46:365-394.
"According to a widespread view in medieval scholarship, theories of supposition are the medieval counterparts of theories of reference, and are thus essentially extensional theories. The author proposes an alternative interpretation: theories of supposition are theories of properties of terms, but whose aim is to allow for the interpretation of sentences. This holds especially of Ockham's supposition theory, which is the main object of analysis in this paper. In particular, she argues for my intensional interpretation of his theory on the basis of two key-phrases in his *Summa Logicae*: 'denotatur' and 'propositio est distinguenda'. Finally, she offers a reconstruction of his theory as a set of instructions to be carried out in order to generate the possible readings of (certain) sentences."
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32. ———. 1992. "Some Remarks on the Role of Mental Sentences in Medieval Semantics." *Histoire, Épistémologie, Langage* no. 14:47-59.
"After introducing the notion of mental language as it was developed especially by William of Ockham this article focuses on the role of mental sentences in the logical interpretation of belief-ascriptions. First, the divergent positions advocated by Frege and Searle are outlined. Next, it is asked how the fourteenth-century Parisian logician Jean Buridan might have handled such statements as 'The sheriff believes that Mr. Howard is an honest man'. It is concluded that in spite of many superficial differences, at bottom Buridan's view is rather similar to Searle's account. In particular, both authors hold that in reported speech the words 'Mr. Howard is an honest man' keep their usual meaning as far as reference and predication are concerned."
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Table: Avant-propos 13; Introduction 17; Première Partie: Les Sources; 1. Platon et Aristote 29; 2. *Logos endiathetos* 53; 3. *Verbum in corde* 94; 4. *Oratio mentalis* 120; Deuxième Partie: Les controverses du XIII siècle; 5. Triple est le verbe 153; 6. L'acte contre l'idole 177; 7. Le concept et le signe 202; 8. De quoi la logique parle-t-elle? 228; Troisième Partie: La *Via moderna*; 9. L'intervention d'Ockham 253; 10. Réactions 279; Conclusion 305; Bibliographie 321; Index des noms 335-342.
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"In his commentary on the Priscianus Major, the author known as the Pseudo-Kilwardby proposed inner speech as the proper object for scientific grammar. It is shown here that this sermo in mente is something quite different from William of Ockham's later oratio mentalis it is a mental representation of words and not of things in general. The Pseudo-Kilwardby, in effect, delineates a purely intellectual level of linguistic representation, with a universal deep structure richly furnished. This doctrinal development is situated in its context, against the background of the increasing popularity of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics at the mid thirteenth-century university."
 44. ———. 1999. "Semantics and Mental Language." In *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*, edited by Spade, Paul Vincent, 53-75. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"At the outset of *Summa Logicae*, Ockham endorses Boethius's old distinction between three sorts of discourse: written, spoken, and mental. The first two, he explains, are physically perceptible, whether by the eye or by the ear, and are made up of conventional signs. The units of mental language, by contrast, are concepts. They are internal to thinking minds, and their signification is natural rather than conventional. Being mental, they are not directly perceptible - at least not in this world - to anybody but the person who internally produces them in the course of his or her private thinking. But being originally acquired as the result of a natural process, they are nevertheless strongly similar - and identically organized - from one human being to another. Although it is not a public medium of communication, mental language is potentially common to all. Mental language is prior to, and underlies, every reasonable speech utterance and provides it with meaning. Ockham's semantical theory, as presented in *Summa Logicae* and elsewhere, is primarily an explication of the various ways in which the natural conceptual signs that constitute the language of thought are linked with their external referents; and secondarily, of the ways in which conventional discourse is derived from this mental language."
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 46. ———. 2001. "Réponses De L'auteur. De Quelques Variations Sur Un Thème Séculaire." *Laval Théologique et Philosophique* no. 57:261-276.
"This paper replies to questions raised by Claude Lafleur, Martin Achard, Paul-Hubert Poirier, David Piché and Marie-Andrée Ricard about the author's book, *Le discours intérieur* (1999). The following points are discussed: the methods of historical work in philosophy (with reference to Alain de Libera's ideas on the subject), the treatment of the notion of *logos endiathetos* in Stoic thought, in Philo of

- Alexandria and in Irenaeus of Lyon, the relations between philosophy and theology in medieval Scholasticism, and those of hermeneutics with Augustine's understanding of the inner word."
47. ———. 2003. "Debates on Mental Language in the Early Fourteenth Century." In *Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages Essays on the Commentary Tradition*, edited by Braakhuis, Henk A.G. and Kneepkens, Corneille Henry, 85-101. Groningen: Ingenium Publishers.
 48. ———. 2003. "Ockham and Locke on Mental Language." In *The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400-1700*, edited by Friedman, Russell and Nielsen, Lauge, 37-52. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
 "For both Ockham and Locke, the objects of knowledge and belief are mental propositions really composed of simpler mental units called 'concepts' in Ockham and 'ideas' in Locke. These units are, for both philosophers, natural signs of external things and the primary repositories of generality. Despite these striking similarities, the paper argues that these two theories belong in fact to different and incompatible families. This is shown by focusing on two crucial differences between them concerning (a) signification, and (b) reference (or 'suppositio')."
 49. ———. 2003. "Connotative Concepts and Their Definitions in Ockham's Nominalism." In *La Tradition Médiévale Des Catégories (Xii-Xve Siècles)*, edited by Biard, Joël and Rosier-Catach, Irène, 141-155. Louvain: Peeters.
 50. ———. 2004. *Ockham on Concepts*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
 51. ———. 2004. "Tarski Et La Suppositio Materialis." *Philosophiques* no. 31:295-309.
 "In his 1944 paper *The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics*, Alfred Tarski refers in so many words to the medieval idea of "suppositio materialis". The interpretation he suggests for it, however, is historically misleading, and this historical inaccuracy yields in this case what can be taken to be an unfortunate philosophical mistake. In " 'snow is white' is true ", Tarski sees the phrase "snow is white" (between quotation marks) as the name of a certain sentence, while the medieval philosophers would have seen it rather as an occurrence of that very sentence, but taken in a special use, the suppositio materialis . The paper shows how these two approaches differ exactly and argues that the medieval theory is philosophically preferable in that (1) it is descriptively more adequate with respect to natural languages, (2) it is more appropriate even for artificial languages, which it renders both more effective and more intelligible, and (3) it rests upon the identification of an important phenomenon, the generality of which is missed by the Tarskian type semantics, namely the duality of principle between the extension of a term in itself and the extension it receives within a given propositional context."
 52. ———. 2005. "Le Paradoxe Du menteur Et Le Langage Mental: Réflexions Sur L'approche Restrictionniste." In *Logique Et Ontologie: Perspectives Diachroniques Et Synchroniques*, edited by François, Beets and Gavray, Marc-Antoine, 55-71. Liège: Éditions Université de Liège.
 "Restrictionism is an approach to the Liar paradox and related puzzles that was quite popular in the thirteenth and early fourteenth century.
 The idea is to resort to a rule restricting the reference of certain terms (their 'suppositio') in certain propositional contexts. But how are such apparently *ad hoc* rules supposed to govern thought itself, or mental language? This objection was raised against restrictionism by Thomas Bradwardine and John Buridan (around 1330), and was considered decisive. The present paper re-examines this discussion and re-evaluates in consequence the prospects that remain for a defensible form of restrictionism."
 53. ———. 2007. "Guillaume D'ockham Et Les Syncatégorèmes Mentaux: La Première Théorie." *Histoire, Épistémologie, Langage* no. 25:145-160.
 54. ———. 2007. "Mental Language and Tradition Encounters in Medieval Philosophy: Anselm, Albert and Ockham." *Vivarium* no. 45:269-282.
 "Medieval philosophy is often presented as the outcome of a large scale encounter between the Christian tradition and the Greek philosophical one. This picture, however, inappropriately tends to leave out the active role played by the medieval authors themselves and their institutional contexts. The theme of the mental language provides us with an interesting case study in such matters. The paper first introduces a few technical notions-'theme', 'tradition', 'textual chain' and 'textual borrowing'-, and then focuses on precise passages about mental language from Anselm of Canterbury, Albert the Great and William of Ockham. All three authors in effect identify some relevant Augustinian idea (that of 'mental word', most saliently) with some traditional philosophical one (such as that of 'concept' or that of 'logos endiathetos'). But the gist of the operation widely varies along the line and the tradition encounter is staged in each case with specific goals and interests in view. The use of ancient authoritative texts with respect to mental language is thus shown to be radically transformed from the eleventh to the fourteenth century."
 55. ———. 2007. "Ockham and Locke on Mental Language." In *The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory, 1400-1700*, edited by Friedman, Russell and Nielsen, Lauge, 37-52. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

56. Panaccio, Claude, and Perini-Santos, Ernesto. 2004. "Guillaume D'ockham Et La *Suppositio Materialis*." *Vivarium* no. 42:202-224.
"The paper aims at showing how William of Ockham's theory of material supposition can cope with certain interesting difficulties recently raised about it by various commentators. The theory is first broken down into five main theses. We then explain how the resulting cluster is consistent with Ockham's general approach to signification, how it accounts for the grammaticality of the relevant sentences, and how it determines which spoken or written expressions a given word or phrase stands for when taken in material supposition."
57. Parsons, Terence. 1994. "Anaphoric Pronouns in Very Late Medieval Supposition Theory." *Linguistics and Philosophy* no. 17:429-445.
"This paper arose from an attempt to determine how the very late medieval (1) supposition theorists treated anaphoric pronouns, pronouns whose significance is derivative from their antecedents. Modern researches into pronouns were stimulated in part by the problem of "donkey sentences" discussed by Geach (1962) in a section explaining what is wrong with medieval supposition theory. So there is some interest in seeing exactly what the medieval account comes to, especially if it turns out, as I suspect, to work as well as contemporary ones. Besides, finding a good analysis of pronouns has proved to be very difficult, and so we might possibly find some insight in a historically different kind of approach. I discuss a version of supposition theory that aims at producing *analyses* of sentences containing quantified terms, (2) as articulated around 1400 by Paul of Venice, and as further developed by certain logicians such as de Soto and Celaya in the 1400's and early 1500's, (3) Much of what I will say also applies indirectly to earlier versions of supposition theory (before 1400)."
(1) I say 'very late medieval' because the period in question (1400-1600) would normally be classified as Renaissance. I am individuating the period by its themes, not solely by its dates.
(2) This was not obviously the intent of the great developers of supposition theory from 1250 to the late 1300's: Peter of Spain, William Sherwood. Roger Bacon, William Ockham, Walter Burleigh, John Buridan. For them suppositional "descended forms" follow logically from the sentences under discussion, but they do not *analyze* those sentences because they are not generally equivalent to those sentences. (This is important in Geach's (1962) criticisms of supposition theory.) A burning issue in scholarship on supposition theory is: what was it supposed to be *for*? One popular answer is that it is supposed to yield an analysis of quantification. This answer accords well with later accounts, but poorly with earlier ones, because the earlier "analyses" are often obviously not equivalent in truth value to the sentences being "analyzed." (See e.g. Matthews, 1964.) I assume equivalence in the theories under discussion.
(3) For details of the mature theory see Ashworth (1974).
58. ———. 1997. "Supposition as Quantification *Versus* Supposition as Global Quantificational Effect." *Topoi* no. 16 (1):41-63.
"This paper follows up a suggestion by Paul Vincent Spade that there were two medieval theories of the modes of personal supposition. I suggest that early work by Sherwood and others was a study of quantifiers: their semantics and the effects of context on inferences that can be made from quantified terms. Later, in the hands of Burley and others, it changed into a study of something else, a study of what I call "global quantificational effect."
59. ———. 1997. Missing Modes of Supposition. In *Canadian Journal of Philosophy Meaning and reference*, edited by Kazmi, Ali: University of Calgary Press.
60. ———. 2006. "The Doctrine of Distribution." *History and Philosophy of Logic* no. 27:59-74.
"Peter Geach describes the 'doctrine of distribution' as the view that a term is distributed if it refers to everything that it denotes, and undistributed if it refers to only some of the things that it denotes. He argues that the notion, so explained, is incoherent. He claims that the doctrine of distribution originates from a degenerate use of the notion of 'distributive supposition' in medieval supposition theory sometime in the 16th century. This paper proposes instead that the doctrine of distribution occurs at least as early as the 12th century, and that it originates from a study of Aristotle's notion of a term's being 'taken universally', and not from the much later theory of distributive supposition. A detailed version of the doctrine found in the *Port Royal Logic* is articulated, and compared with a slightly different modern version. Finally, Geach's arguments for the incoherence of the doctrine are discussed and rejected."
61. ———. 2008. "The Development of Supposition Theory in the Later 12th through 14th Centuries." In *Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic*, edited by Gabbay, Dov and Woods, John, 157-280. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Handbook of the history of logic: Vol. 2.
62. Perini-Santos, Ernesto. 2000. "Linguagem E Interpretação: O Recurso À Linguagem Mental Em Ockham." *Veritas.Revista de Filosofia* no. 45:339-348.
"According to William Ockham's semantics it is crucial to resort to mental language. In this article, having recourse to mental language is examined so as to show one arrives at composed sentences which signify without any commitment to the psychic reality of the attained acts."

63. ———. 2005. "A Composição Real Da Proposição Mental Ockhamiana." *Analytica.Revista de Filosofia* no. 9:67-92.
 "Mental language explains the significative character of written and spoken languages; its elements and structures are identified by criteria that belong to a theory serving this purpose. It seems that these criteria allow a certain indeterminacy, if we expect to choose among different possible canonical presentations of mental language.
 But such a choice is not necessary at all for mental language to serve its theoretical purposes. There is a kind of indeterminacy, concerning tokens of mental propositions, that can really be found in Ockham's texts: a mental proposition can be a simple mental act, and have a compositional semantics. This astonishing thesis reminds us that although semantical analysis that identify structures of mental language describes a psychological reality, the psychological description itself must also take account of other domains of Ockham's philosophy, in particular his theory of mental acts"
64. ———. 2007. "La Structure De L'acte Intellectif Dans Les Théories Ockhamiennes Du Concept." *Vivarium*:93-112.
 "William of Ockham held in his career two different theories about the nature of concepts. According to the first theory, concepts are forged by the mind and "terminate" the mental acts which produce them. This so called "fictum"-theory was abandoned, and Ockham held another theory, according to which concepts are identified with the mental acts themselves. While I think this is a correct description of the evolution of his philosophy, there is one aspect that has gone so far (almost) unnoticed : in his later theory, not only concepts do not terminate mental acts, but nothing seems fit to play this role. Mental acts are no longer "terminated" by anything. Therefore, as the theory of concepts changes, there is also a change in the theory of mental acts. This last change explains the disappearance of the vocabulary associated with the verb "terminare" in the exposition of the mental act theory."
65. Perler, Dominik. 1997. "Crathorn on Mental Language." In *Vestigia, Imagines, Verba. Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (Xiiith-Xivth Century). Acts of the Xith Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics. San Marino, 24-28 May 1994*, edited by Marmo, Costantino, 337-354. Brepols.
66. Perreiah, Alan Richard. 1967. *Is There a Doctrine of Supposition in the Logica Magna?*, Indiana University.
 UMI Dissertation Express. Order number: 6715146
67. ———. 1971. "Approaches to Supposition Theory." *New Scholasticism* no. 45:381-408.
 "The past 25 years have seen an increasing interest in later medieval logic and in the theory of supposition. A review of literature reveals, however, wide differences of interpretation of supposition-theory. Taking the theory in the widest sense as a contribution to semiotic or the theory of signs, this study shows how supposition has been variously treated as a syntactical, semantical and even pragmatological theory. The main views of P. Boehner, E. Moody, P. Geach, D. P. Henry, W. C. Kneale and L. M. De Rijk are examined, compared and appraised with respect to overall progress in the elucidation of supposition theory."
68. ———. 1986. "Supposition Theory: A New Approach." *New Scholasticism* no. 60:213-231.
69. Piché, David. 2001. "Philosophie Médiévale. Anselme De Cantorbéry, Thomas D'aquin Et Guillaume D'ockham Sur Le Thème Du Discours Intérieur: Quel Est Le Problème?" *Laval Théologique et Philosophique* no. 57:243-249.
 "The notion of internal discourse (*locutio mentis, verbum mentis* or *oratio mentalis*), as it was worked out in the Latin Middle Ages, fulfilled different theoretical functions and aims, depending on the authors who had recourse to it. The following text asks Claude Panaccio a simple question: what problem(s) exactly do Anselm of Canterbury, Thomas Aquinas and William Ockham attempt respectively to solve by appealing to this notion?"
70. Poveda, E. 1963. "El Tratado "De Suppositionibus Dialecticis" De San Vicente Ferrer Y Su Significación Historica En La Cuestión De Los Universales." *Anales del Seminario de Valencia* no. 3:5-88.
71. Price, Robert. 1970. "William of Ockham and *Suppositio Personalis*." *Franciscan Studies* no. 30:131-140.
72. Priest, Graham, and Read, Stephen. 1977. "The Formalization of Ockham's Theory of Supposition." *Mind* no. 86:109-113.
 "The point of the paper is to show that the medieval theory of personal supposition can be formalised using the standard tools of modern logic. A formal account of the modes of supposition is given and it is shown how these can be used to obtain the descensus in standard cases. The formalisation is used to show that Ockham's views on the supposition of the predicate in the "o" form are mistaken, and to refute the following claims: (a) the medievals omitted some modes of supposition; (b) they had too many modes of supposition; and, (c) their theory is incapable of handling multiple quantification."
73. ———. 1980. "Merely Confused Supposition. A Theoretical Advance or a Mere Confusion?"

- Franciscan Studies* no. 40:265-297.
 "Our task is an extended defence of the notion of merely confused supposition in medieval semantic theory. For the nominalist it provided a complete apparatus for detailing truth-conditions. A formalisation of the mature theory is given and used to relate the notion to modern philosophy of language. The lack of need for further modes of supposition is detailed both theoretically and historically. The extension of the notion to intensional contexts is discussed briefly."
74. ———. 1981. "Ockham's Rejection of Ampliation." *Mind* no. 90:274-279.
 "The standard mediaeval account of the truth-conditions of modal and tensed sentences used a notion of "ampliation", whereby the class of objects for which a term suppositis could be extended beyond the class of things of which it could be truly predicated. Ockham did not use the notion in his account. We examine why this was, explain Ockham's account, and argue that it is preferable to the ampliative one. In particular, the authors show the ambiguities found in modal and tensed sentences to be, contrary to popular opinion, different, and support Ockham's contention that the ambiguity in the tensed case is not one of sense (signification) but of reference (supposition)."
75. Prieto del Rey, Maurilio. 1963. "Significación Y Sentido Ultimado. La Noción De "Suppositio" En La Logica De Juan De Santo Tomás (First Part)." *Convivium (Barcelona)* no. 15-16:33-73.
76. ———. 1963. "Significación Y Sentido Ultimado. La Noción De "Suppositio" En La Logica De Juan De Santo Tomás (Second Part)." *Convivium (Barcelona)* no. 19-20:45-72.
77. Read, Stephen. 1991. "Thomas of Cleves and Collective Supposition." *Vivarium* no. 29:50-84.
 "In the nominalist theories of language in the first half of the fourteenth century, it was common practice to distinguish three modes of common personal supposition. Considerations of symmetry lead one naturally to consider the possibility of a fourth mode, corresponding to a nominal conjunction. Investigation of little known writings of the late fourteenth century and later reveal that two schools of thought developed, one originating from a Parisian logician Thomas of Cleves, who supported the addition of a fourth mode, the other vigorously rejecting it."
78. ———. 1999. "How Is Material Supposition Possible?" *Medieval philosophy and theology* no. 8:1-20.
 "In the early fourteenth century, material supposition was characterized as nonsignificative, when a term suppositis for itself or other terms contrary to its normal signification. But this characterization is in tension with the doctrine of signification, which picks out the concept uniting the things for which the term suppositis. This tension was appreciated by Thomas Maulfelt and others so that by the end of the century, in John Dorp for example, a further concept was associated with each term, the concept of the term itself and its equiforms. Material supposition can then be subsumed under the theory of signification."
79. Rearden, Myles. 1982. "On Teaching Students Logic." *Philosophy* no. 57:130-132.
 "Is Peter Geach right to dismiss the medieval theory of distribution? Arguably, the distinction between "suppositio distributiva et confusa" and "suppositio confusa tantum" is more durable than all the rest of supposition theory. There is still valid point about how general terms stand for individuals. "some man runs" and "every man runs" both stand for everyone. The difference is that the former does so disjunctively, the latter, conjunctively. That seems enough to salvage the essence of distribution theory. Geach's rejection of distribution stems from his view that it involves assimilating nouns to proper names as regards their manner of signification. Quite the contrary, medieval distribution theory accepted the difference between a name-like referring and a more general standing-for. Distribution theory continues to make sense, and so consequently does much of the logic of categorical propositions."
80. ———. 1984. "The Distribution of Terms." *Modern Schoolman* no. 61:187-195.
 "The traditional doctrine of distribution retains some validity, contrary to the view of Geach in reference and generality. The history of the doctrine is outlined. The medieval distinction between descensus copulativus and descensus disiunctivus is the core of distribution. The class interpretation of categoricals obscures the doctrine. Contemporary quantifier theory reveals it again. Geach's arguments against it are analysed and criticised."
81. Richards, T.J. 1971. "The Two Doctrines of Distribution." *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* no. 49:290-302.
82. Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1967. *Logica Modernorum. Vol 1. A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic*. Assen: Van Gorcum.
 "This book deals with some doctrines in the work of mediaeval logicians which cannot be traced back to Aristotle. This 'modern logic' deals with the "proprietates terminorum". De Rijk studies its origination in the period between Abailard and Petrus Hispanus. In this first volume he concentrates upon the theory of fallacy as preserved in Abailard, the School of Parvipontani, commentaries and glosses on "Sophistici Elenchi" and "Perihermeneias" and several anonymous Twelfth Century treatises. A separate chapter is devoted to applications of this doctrine in Twelfth Century theology. In most theories, fallacies enumerated by Aristotle and Boethius are reconciled, original cases are classed under traditional headings

- or original interpretations are inserted."
83. ———. 1967. *Logica Modernorum. Vol 2. Part One: The Origin and Early Development of the Theory of Supposition*. Assen: Van Gorcum.
 84. ———. 1967. *Logica Modernorum. Vol 2. Part Two: The Origin and Early Development of the Theory of Supposition. Texts and Indices*. Assen: Van Gorcum.
"This book deals with some doctrines in the work of mediaeval logicians which cannot be traced back to Aristotle. This 'modern logic' deals with the "proprietates terminorum". De Rijk studies its origination in the period between Abailard and Petrus Hispanus. In this first volume he concentrates upon the theory of fallacy as preserved in Abailard, the School of Parvipontani, commentaries and glosses on "Sophistici Elenchi" and "Perihermeneias" and several anonymous Twelfth Century treatises. A separate chapter is devoted to applications of this doctrine in Twelfth Century theology. In most theories, fallacies enumerated by Aristotle and Boethius are reconciled, original cases are classed under traditional headings or original interpretations are inserted."
 85. ———. 1969. "Significatio Y Suppositio En Pedro Hispano." *Pensamiento* no. 25:225-234.
 86. ———. 1971. "The Development of *Suppositio Naturalis* in Medieval Logic (First Part)." *Vivarium* no. 9:71-107.
 87. ———. 1973. "The Development of *Suppositio Naturalis* in Medieval Logic (Second Part)." *Vivarium* no. 11:43-79.
 88. ———. 1982. "The Origins of the Theory of the Properties of Terms." In *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, edited by Kretzmann, Norman, Kenny, Anthony Patrick and Pinborg, Jan, 161-173. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 89. ———. 1985. "La Supposition Naturelle: Une Pierre De Touche Pour Les Points De Vue Philosophiques." In *La Philosophie Au Moyen Âge, 183-203*. Leiden: Brill.
Translated in Italian in: *Logica e linguaggio nel medioevo* - Edited by Fedriga Riccardo and Puggioni Sara
 90. Roberts, Louise Nisbet. 1956. "Classification of Suppositions in Medieval Logic." *Tulane Studies in Philosophy* no. 5:79-86.
"Classifications of supposition are a characteristic portion of the terminist logic of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth centuries. The article contains a brief explanation of classifications to be found in the texts of such logicians as Peter of Spain, Albert of Saxony, and John Buridan."
 91. ———. 1960. "Supposition: A Modern Application." *Journal of Philosophy* no. 57:173-182.
"A few Twentieth Century issues found in the analysis of ordinary language are explored in terms of Fourteenth Century logic. The late medieval theory of supposition is applied to problems appearing in the work of such recent thinkers as W. V. O. Quine and P. F. Strawson."
 92. Roncaglia, Gino. 2000. "Mesino De Codronchi's Discussion on Syncategoremata and Mental Language in His *Quaestiones on De Interpretatione*." In *Ob Rogatum Meorum Sociorum. Studi in Memoria Di Lorenzo Pozzi*, edited by Caroti, Steano and Pinzani, Roberto. Milano: Franco Angeli.
 93. Ross, James, ed. 1971. *Inquiries into Medieval Philosophy. A Collection in Honor of Francis P. Clarke*. Westport: Greenwood.
 94. Sagal, Paul Thomas. 1967. *The Concept of Supposition and Its Place in the Development of Medieval Semantology*, Ph. D. University of Pennsylvania.
UMI Dissertaion Express reference number 6809232
 95. ———. 1973. "On Refuting and Defending Supposition Theory." *New Scholasticism* no. 47:84-87.
"P. T. Geach's critique of medieval supposition theory has generated much controversy. Supposition theory is neither as guilty as Geach claims, nor as innocent as Scott, one of Geach's critics, claims. Geach takes a medieval account of supposition, the "Ockham-Buridan" account, and attempts to show that it provides us with unacceptable semantic analyses of certain propositions. According to him, supposition theory treats applicatives as associating with common nouns to form referring expressions. However, there is no way to render intelligible the referents of expressions like 'some dancers' and 'all dancers'. Geach sees this semantic foul-up as a consequence of supposition theory's failure to assign applicational expressions to the proper grammatical category. T. K. Scott counters that the medieval treatment of applicatives parallels modern logic's treatment of quantifiers."
 96. Schaeffer, F. 1987. "Syntax and Semantics in Supposition Theory." In *Ockham and Ockhamists.*, edited by Bos, Egbert Peter and Krop, H.A., 63-69. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
Acts of the Ockham-Symposium at the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum (10-12 September 1986)
 97. Schoot, Henk J.M. 1993. "Aquinas and Supposition. The Possibilities and Limitations of Logic in

- Divinis.* *Vivarium* no. 31 (2):193-225.
 "A study of "(modes of) signification" and "supposition", key terms in 13th century semantics, in the work of Thomas Aquinas, with special focus on "suppositio naturalis". It is argued that in Aquinas the distinction between signification (connotation) and supposition (denotation) is maintained, even though the terms "supponere pro" and "suppositio naturalis" are used to indicate sometimes the one and sometimes the other semantical function. This feature is explained from the theological purposes that semantics serves. The study forms part of an investigation of Aquinas' use of semantics in theology, published in "Christ the Name' of God. Thomas Aquinas on Naming Christ," Louvain 1993"
98. Scott, Theodore Kermit. 1966. "Geach on Supposition Theory." *Mind* no. 75:586-588.
99. Seung-Chan, Park. 1999. *Die Rezeption Der Mittelalterlichen Sprachphilosophie in Der Theologie Des Thomas Von Aquin. Mit Besonderer Berücksichtigung Der Analogie*. Leiden: Brill.
 "One of Thomas Aquinas's central ideas is his attempt to show how it is possible to speak about the incomprehensible God. To reach a better understanding of this project, it is necessary to gain some insight into how he used the theories he acquired during his time in the faculty of arts in his philosophical-theological works.
 Park's book deals with the question which, despite the current flourishing of the studies of the medieval philosophy of language, has not received much attention. The application of the theories of signification and supposition as well as the doctrine of the modi significandi is reconstructed systematically. Consequently, the traditional doctrine of analogy appears in a new light.
 The interpretations of the texts in question are exemplary for the work of philosophical interpretations. The reader is guided by overviews, schematical drawings and references."
100. Smithka, Paula J. 1991. "Ampliation and Natural Supposition in Albert of Saxony's *Quaestiones Super Logicam*." In *Itinéraires D'albert De Saxe, Paris-Vienne Au Xiv Siècle*, edited by Biard, Joël, 137-148. Paris: Vrin.
101. Spade, Paul Vincent. 1974. "Ockham's Rule of Supposition: Two Conflicts in His Theory." *Vivarium* no. 12:63-67.
 Reprinted in *Lies, language and logic in the late Middle Ages* - chapter IX
102. ———. 1974. "Five Logical Tracts by Richard Lavenham." In *Essays in Honour of Anton Charles Pegis*, edited by O'Donnell, Reginald, 70-124. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.
 "This article is an edition of Richard Lavenham's *Suppositiones, Consequentiae, Tractatus exclusivarum, Exceptivae, and Tractatus qui Differt et Aliud Nuncupatur*, based on the British Museum Sloane ms. 3899."
103. ———. 1975. "Some Epistemological Implications of the Burley-Ockham Dispute." *Franciscan Studies* no. 35:212-222.
 Reprinted in *Lies, language and logic in the late Middle Ages* - chapter XIII
 "The Fourteenth century debate between Walter Burley and William of Ockham is usually viewed as a metaphysical dispute between a realist and a nominalist. But there are epistemological questions at stake too. I argue that Burley's and Ockham's answers to the question "what kind of supposition is it in which a term supposits for what it signifies" are independent of their metaphysical views, and have epistemological consequences. I explore some of these consequences, and argue that Ockham's position allows us in principle to have knowledge of anything in his ontology, whereas Burley's does not."
104. ———. 1975. "Ockham's Distinctions between Absolute and Connotative Terms." *Vivarium* no. 13:55-76.
 Reprinted in Spade *Lies, language and logic* - chapter XI
 "A philosophical analysis of the distinction between absolute and connotative terms, drawn mainly from Ockham's "summa logicae". The article explores the implications of this distinction on Ockham's theory of mental language."
105. ———. 1976. "Priority of Analysis and the Predicates of O-Form Sentences." *Franciscan Studies* no. 36:263-270.
 Reprinted in *Lies, language and logic in the late Middle Ages* - chapter XII
 "Ockham claims that the predicates of particular negative (0-form) sentences have confused and distributive supposition. This view conflicts with the view that the modes of personal supposition are meant to provide analyses. I argue that the same problem emerges whenever a term in merely confused term is put within the scope of a negation, and that a "priority of analysis" rule (Swiniarski) will not avoid this general problem."
106. ———. 1980. "Synonymy and Equivocation in Ockham's Mental Language." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 18:9-22.
 Reprinted in *Lies, language and logic in the late Middle Ages* - chapter XIII
 "A textual and philosophical study of the claim that according to Ockham there is no synonymy or equivocation in mental language. It is argued that Ockham is committed to both claims, either explicitly

- or in virtue of other features of his doctrine. Nevertheless, both claims lead to difficulties for Ockham's theory."
107. ———. 1982. "The Semantic of Terms." In *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, edited by Kretzmann, Norman, Kenny, Anthony Patrick and Pinborg, Jan, 188-196. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 108. ———. 1988. "The Logic of the Categorical: The Medieval Theory of Descent and Ascent." In *Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy*, edited by Kretzmann, Norman, 187-224. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
 109. ———. 1990. "Ockham, Adams and Connotation: A Critical Notice of Marilyn Adams *William Ockham*." *Philosophical Review* no. 99:593-612.
 110. ———. 1997. "Walter Burley on the Simple Supposition of Singular Terms." *Topoi* no. 16 (1):7-13.
 "This paper argues that Burley's theory of simple supposition is not as it has usually been presented. The prevailing view is that Burley and other authors agreed that simple supposition was in every case supposition for a universal, and that the disagreement over simple supposition between, say, Ockham and Burley was merely a disagreement over what a universal was (a piece of the ontology? a concept?), combined with a separate disagreement over what terms signify (the speaker's thoughts? the objects the thoughts are about?).
 In fact, however, Burley explicitly allows that some instances of simple supposition are for an individual, and that in certain cases personal supposition and simple supposition coincide. The present paper explores Burley's theory on this topic, and proposes a way of thinking about the metaphysics and the semantics that makes sense of what he says."
 111. ———. 1997. "Walter Burley, from the Beginning of His *Treatise on the Kinds of Supposition (De Suppositionibus)*." *Topoi* no. 16 (1):95-102.
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