

History of Logic from Aristotle to Gödel

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Annotated Bibliography of the Medieval Theories of Supposition and Mental Language: A - L

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Adams, Marilyn McCord. 1976. "What Does Ockham Means by *Supposition*?" *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 17:5-37.
"I focus on William Ockham's general account in "Summa Logicae" I, chapter 63, of what it is for a term to supposit for something in a proposition, and consider two interpretations of it. I first construe Ockham as offering the following nominal definition of 'supposition': (I) "Z" supposits for "X" in "P", if and only if "Z" is a term of "p" and 'this is "a"' (where 'this' indicates "x") is true, where general terms are substituted for "a"; names of substitutions for "A", for "Z"; names of propositions for "P"; and proper names for "X". I argue that (I) is inadequate both as a definition of suppositing-in-some-way-or-other for something or of any particular kind of supposition. An alternative interpretation is to take Ockham as giving his general account of supposition when he says it is being posited for something in a proposition. On this interpretation, less problematic definitions of material and simple supposition are available. But the notion of being posited for, which is at least as obscure as the notion of supposition, is left unanalysed. On the first interpretation, this is the analysis that (I) is taken to provide."
2. Amerini, Fabrizio. 1999. "Il Tractatus *De Suppositionibus Terminorum* Di Francesco Da Prato O.P. Una Rilettura Della Dottrina Ockhamista Del Linguaggio." *Medioevo* no. 25:441-550.
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4. Arens, Hans. 1980. "*Verbum Cordis*. Zur Sprachphilosophie Des Mittelalters." *Historiographia Linguistica* no. 7:13-25.
5. Arnold, Erwin. 1952. "Zur Geschichte Der Suppositionstheorie. Die Wurzeln Des Modernen Europäischen Subjektivismus." *Symposion.Jahrbuch für Philosophie* no. 3:1-134.
6. Ashworth, Earline Jennifer. 1969. "The Doctrine of Supposition in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries." *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* no. 51:260-285.
"It is often assumed that the logic of terms, including supposition theory, was despised and ignored by the logicians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in spite of the sophistication with which it had been developed during the later middle ages.
(...)
It is perhaps not surprising that when I looked at some eighty textbooks written during the period in question, I discovered that as many as twenty authors not only referred to the doctrine of supposition sympathetically, but usually went on to offer a detailed analysis which is neither a slavish nor an inept echo of what the mediaeval logicians had said." pp. 260-271
7. ———. 1973. "Priority of Analysis and Merely Confused Supposition." *Franciscan Studies* no. 33:38-41.
Discussion of: Swiniarski "*A new presentation of Ockham's theory of supposition with an evaluation of some contemporary criticism*".
"In this paper I criticize the argument put forward by Swiniarski that Ockham should have adopted the priority of analysis rule whereby the subject is analysed before the predicate, and that had he adopted such a rule, merely confused supposition would have become unnecessary. I point out that in later medieval logic explicit priority of analysis rules were adopted, whereby terms with determinate supposition were analysed first, whether they were subject or predicate. I also discuss the use made of merely confused supposition, particularly in the analysis of the relationship between "all A is B" and "only B is A"."
8. ———. 1978. "Multiple Quantification and the Use of Special Quantifiers in Early Sixteenth Century Logic." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 19:599-613.

"In this paper I discuss two interrelated topics to do with supposition theory and the extensionalist analysis of propositions: 1) the use of 'A' and 'B' as special signs to produce respectively merely confused and determinate supposition in the terms following them; 2) the analysis of such non-standard propositions as 'there are some men all of whose donkeys are running.' In addition, I show how logicians in the medieval tradition handled such invalid inferences as 'every man has a head, therefore there is a head that every man has'."

9. ———. 1981. "Mental Language and the Unity of Propositions: A Semantic Problem Discussed by Early Sixteenth Century Logicians." *Franciscan Studies* no. 41:61-96.
"In the 14th century Gregory of Rimini argued that (1) there is a mental language separate from spoken language and (2) mental propositions are unified wholes with no discernible parts. This article examines the reactions of later logicians, showing that they accepted the doctrine of mental language; but argued that mental propositions must have a discernible structure, which involves parts."
10. ———. 1982. "The Structure of Mental Language: Some Problems Discussed by Early Sixteenth Century Logicians." *Vivarium* no. 20:59-83.
Reprinted in: *Studies in post-medieval semantics*.
"Given their belief in mental language, late medieval logicians felt the need to give some account of its structure. I explore their different views on the part played by syncategorematic terms, impersonal and other verbs, demonstratives, pronouns, case, number and gender. I show that Ockham's views were not universally followed; and I argue that mental language was not necessarily thought of as an ideal logical language."
11. Baccin, Nadia Anna. 1977. "Supposizione Confusa Tantum E Descensus." *Medioevo* no. 3:285-300.
12. Bazán, Bernardo Carlos. 1979. "La Signification Des Termes Communs Et La Doctrine De La Supposition Chez Maître Siger De Brabant." *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* no. 35:345-372.
"Having as his principle objective the study of declarative propositions, of the predicative structure, Siger showed that the meaning of the general term is constant because it refers to changing things signified by the intermediary of the consigned concept. The "intelligible unity" of the essence grasped in the concept is the basis for the unity of the meaning relative to the "existential diversity" of things. The analysis of meaning appears insufficient when one takes into consideration the concrete symbolic function of the term at the centre of a given proposition. It is here that the doctrine of the "suppositio" comes into play. Essentially this doctrine distinguishes between the signifying function of the term and its completing function relative to the diversity of the predicates."
13. Berger, Harald. 1991. "Simple Supposition in William of Ockham, John Buridan and Albert of Saxony." In *Itinéraires D'Albert De Saxe.*, edited by Biard, Joël, 31-43. Paris: Vrin.
14. Beuchot, Mauricio. 1988. "La Teoría Semántica Medieval De La Suppositio." In *Filosofía Y Cultura Medievales*, edited by González, Ruiz E., 42-51. México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
15. ———. 1991. "Albert De Saxe: La Supposition Sémantique Et Les Noms Vides." In *Itinéraires D'Albert De Saxe*, edited by Biard, Joël, 111-124. Paris: Vrin.
16. ———. 1994. "La Suposición Semántica Y Su Actualidad. Desarrollo Histórico Y Actualidad De La Teoría Escólastica De La Suposición Semántica." In *Metafísica, Lógica Y Lenguaje En La Filosofía Medieval*, 137-143. Barcelona: Promociones y Publicaciones Universitaria, S.A.
17. Biard, Joël. 1997. "Intention Et Signification Chez Guillaume D'ockham. La Critique De L'être Intentionnel." In *Langages Et Philosophie. Hommage À Jean Jolivet*, edited by Libera, Alain de, Elamrani-Jamal, Abdelali and Galonnier, Alain, 201-220. Paris: Vrin.
18. ———, ed. 2009. *Le Langage Mental Du Moyen Âge À L'âge Classique*. Paris: Vrin.
"La connaissance du monde s'exprime en propositions, que celles-ci soient considérées, selon les théories, comme objets ou comme moyens de la science. Le problème de la relation entre ces entités linguistiques et les représentations mental (intellections, intentions, concepts...) a une longue histoire qui remonte au traité *De l'interprétation* d'Aristote et aux commentaires de Boèce. Après Guillaume d'Ockham, en effet, l'idée de langage mental est certes une hypothèse qui a acquis force et consistance, mais tous les problèmes liés à la structuration de la pensée et au rapport entre le langage parlé et la pensée ne sont pas résolus. Des questions surgissent sur la structuration même de ce langage.
Le colloque organisé à Tours du 1er au 3 décembre 2005 sous les auspices de la Fondation européenne de la science (European Science Foundation) avait l'ambition de parcourir ces questions en repartant d'Augustin qui est l'initiale médiévale du problème, et en suivant cette histoire jusqu'à l'aube des Temps modernes. Ce parcours historique donc fait une part importante au Moyen Âge tardif, à la Renaissance et au XVIIe siècle. En même temps, notre ambition était aussi d'approfondir certains enjeux proprement philosophiques de ce parcours. L'horizon général est la question: est-il possible de considérer le domaine de la pensée comme étant structuré à la manière d'un langage, et par quels moyens conceptuels penser cela?"

- Table des Matières: Joël Biard: Présentation V; Isabelle Koch: *Le verbum in corde* chez Augustin 1; Béangère Hurand: *La locutio mentis*: une version anselmienne du verbe intérieur 29; Cyrille Michon: Les représentations rendent-elles indirecte la connaissance des choses? 45; Irène Rosier-Catach: Une forme particulière de langage mental: la *locutio angelica* selon Gilles de Rome et ses contemporains 61; Russell Friedman: Mental Propositions before Mental Language 95; Claude Panaccio: Le jugement comme acte mental selon Guillaume d' Ockham 117; Simo Knuuttila: Ockham on Fallacies and Mental Language 135; Aurélien Robert: Les deux langages de la pensée. A propos de quelques réflexions médiévales 145; Joël Biard: Pierre d'Ailly: langage, concept, représentation 169; Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe: Jeronimo Pardo on the unity of mental propositions 185; Henrik Lagerlind: John Mair on Concepts 205; Fosca Mariani Zini: Topique et argumentation dans le premier humanisme italien 221; Marie-Luce Demonet: Que reste-t-il du langage mental dans les textes philosophiques français à la fin de la Renaissance? 241; Martine Pécharman: De quel langage intérieur Hobbes est-il le théoricien? 265; Calvin Normore: The End of Mental Language 293; Jacob Schmutz: Quand le langage a-t-il cessé d'être mental? Remarques sur les sources scolastiques de Bolzano 307; Bibliographie 339; Index Nominum 359 - 364
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 20. ———. 1958. "A Medieval Theory of Supposition." *Franciscan Studies* no. 18:240-289.
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Text, translation and commentary
 22. ———. 1966. "Propositional Connectives, Supposition and Consequence in Paul of Pergola." *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* no. 7:109-128.
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 25. ———. 1987. "La Théorie De La Signification De La Vox Significativa Ad Placitum (Nomen, Verbum, Oratio) Dans Les *Introductiones Montane Miores*." In *Gilbert De Poitiers Et Ses Contemporains Aux Origines De La Logica Modernorum.*, edited by Jolivet, Jean and Libera, Alain de, 73-90. Napoli: Bibliopolis.
Actes du septième symposium européen d'histoire de la logique et de la sémantique médiévales. Centre d'études supérieures de civilisation médiévale de Poitiers 17 22 Juin 1985.
 26. ———. 1997. "Speaking About Signs. Fourteenth-Century Views on Suppositio Materialis." *Amsterdamer Beiträge zur älteren Germanistik* no. 48:71-86.
"The principal questions in my paper are the following: How did the medieval semanticists indicate the autonomous use of words? Does the subject term in such a proposition express a linguistic item (itself, or its likes) because of the determination by the predicate? Or is it dependent on the will or intention of man, the *voluntas utentium*, as Ockham calls it?
Or is it a convention that determines the use of terms? Is a *signum materialitatis* (a sign, or mark, indicating material supposition) necessary? To what extent do the Medievals distinguish the autonomous use of language from other uses? Or is this kind of language meaningless?
There is hardly any secondary literature on this subject. (*)" p. 75
(*) M. Bochenski, *Formale Logik* (München 1970 (1956). 188-193; CA. Dufour, *Die Lehre der Proprietates Terrrunorum. Sinn und Referenz in mittelalterlicher Logik* (München/Hamden/Vv'ien 1989). 172-188. (Dufour tries to reconstruct the medieval theory of the properties of terms with the help of modern formal logic. This very interesting study did not obtain the attention it deserves, I feel). E. Karger, *'La supposition matérielle comme supposition significative: Paul de Venise, Paul de Pergola'*, in *English Logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th Centuries. Acts of the 5th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics*, Rome, 10-14 november 1980, ed. by A. Maierù (Napoli). 331-342. In a penetrating analysis, Karger discusses the difficulties arising from the 'mentioning' of terms in relation to the general semantical theory of a philosopher.
 27. ———. 2000. "Die Rezeption Der Suppositiones Des Marsilius Von Inghen in Paris (Johannes Dorp) Und Prag (Ein Anonymer Sophistriatraktat) Um 1400." In *Philosophie Und Theologie Des Ausgehenden Mittelalters. Marsilius Von Inghen Und Das Denken Seiner Zeit*, edited by Hoenen, Marten and Bakker, Paul J.J.M., 213-238. Leiden: Brill.
 28. ———, ed. 2013. *Medieval Supposition Theory Revisited. Studies in Memory of L. M. De Rijk*. Leiden: Brill.
Also published as Volume 51, 1-4 (2013) of *Vivarium*.
Acts of the XVIIth European Symposium for Medieval Logic and Semantics, held the University of Leiden, 2nd, 7th June. 2008.

29. ———. 2077. "Richard Billingham's *Speculum Puerorum*, Some Medieval Commentaries and Aristotle." *Vivarium* no. 45:360-373.
 "In the history of medieval semantics, supposition theory is important especially in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. In this theory the emphasis is on the term, whose properties one tries to determine. In the fourteenth century the focus is on the proposition, of which a term having supposition is a part. The idea is to analyse propositions in order to determine their truth (probare). The *Speculum puerorum* written by Richard Billingham was the standard textbook for this approach. It was very influential in Europe. The theory of the probatio propositionis was meant to solve problems both in (empirically oriented) scientific propositions such as used by the Oxford Calculators, and theological propositions, especially those about the Trinity. The book is original, concise, but not clear in every respect. Studying medieval commentaries may help us to understand Richard's book. In the present paper three commentaries are presented. The commentators discussed problems about the status of Richard's book, and about its doctrine: what is the relation between probatio and truth, what is the relation between probatio and supposition, what exactly are mediate and immediate terms (e.g. is the pronoun 'this' mediate or immediate?). The commentators sometimes criticize Richard. For example, one of them argues, against Billingham, that the verb 'can' ampliates its subject term and is therefore mediate."
30. Bottin, Francesco. 2000. "Linguaggio Mentale E Atti Di Pensiero in Guglielmo Di Ockham." *Veritas. Revista de Filosofia* no. 45:349-359.
 "William Ockham developed themes of epistemology which place him in position which can easily be compared to that of modern thinkers. Such is notably the case of his works on mental language, for instance, which bring him closer to certain theories elaborated by Hilary Putnam, especially his theory of representation."
31. ———. 2005. *Filosofia Medievale Della Mente*. Padova: Il Poligrafo.
32. Brands, H. 1990. "Die Zweifache Einleitung Der Formalen Supposition Bei William of Sherwood." In *Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy*, edited by Knuuttila, Simo, Tyorinoja, R. and Ebbesen, Sten, 445-454.
 Proceedings of the Eighth International Congress of medieval philosophy. Helsinki 24-29 August 1987. vol. II
33. Brown, Deborah J. 1996. "The Puzzle of Names in Ockham's Theory of Mental Language." *Review of Metaphysics* no. 50:79-99.
 "In his writings on semantics and logic, William of Ockham combines two very strong claims about mental language: that mental terms are naturally prior to and determinative of the signification of conventional signs and that mental language contains neither synonymous nor equivocal terms. (1) The first claim represents the role mental language has in explaining the origins, structure, and content of thought and language. Ockham was, as many commentators have observed, a conceptual empiricist but it would be a mistake to think that he was primarily concerned with the psychological processes that underlie our representational system. The second claim indicates that the theory of mental language is primarily a theory of signification or a semantics. The notion of a redundancy-free mental language is an idealization crafted for its explanatory role in Ockham's semantics.
 The notion of a mental language devoid of synonymous and ambiguous terms raises puzzles which threaten the internal coherence of the project. These puzzles concern a species of categorematic terms in mental language, Ockham's absolute terms, and are not unlike the puzzles about proper names in Kripkean semantics. Although I am skeptical that Ockham's theory is adequate to the dual tasks of being a semantics as well as a psychological thesis, I shall argue that the wrong response to these puzzles is to forfeit the theory's status as a semantic theory by giving up the commitment to parsimony."
 (1) Ockham's most sustained development of the theory of mental language is in *Summa Logicae* I, in *Opera Philosophica* I, ed. Philotheus Boehner, Gedeon Gal, Stephen S. Brown (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1974).
34. Brown, Stephen F. 1972. "Walter Burleigh's Treatise *De Suppositionibus* and Its Influence on William of Ockham." *Franciscan Studies* no. 32:15-64.
 "This early work of Walter Burleigh (written circa 1302), here edited, is one of the sources of Ockham's "Summa logicae". At times it supplies Ockham with material he adopts; at times it shares with the works of others the role of opposition. Also it is one of the sources which Ockham opposes in his 'commentary on the sentences'. In relation to earlier works of the 12th and 13th centuries it shows some technical advances while essentially holding onto the traditional teaching. Burleigh's later treatment of supposition in the 'de puritate' is a restatement of this early treatise in light of Ockham's 'Summa logicae' critique of the 'realist' position."
35. ———. 1975. "Gerard Odon's *De Suppositionibus*." *Franciscan Studies* no. 35:5-44.
 New edition by L. M. De Rijk as: *Liber Secundum: De suppositionibus* (pp. 231-292) in: Giraldus Odonis O. F. M. *Opera Philosophica* - volume one: *Logica* - Critical editions from the manuscripts - Leiden, Brill, 1997

36. ———. 1993. "Medieval Supposition Theory in Its Theological Context." *Medieval philosophy and theology* (3):121-157.
In appendix: Walter Chatton: Lectura in I Sent. 4.1.1-2.
37. ———. 2009. "Gerald Odonis' *Tractatus De Suppositionibus*: What Is *Suppositio Communicabilis*?" *Vivarium* no. 47:205-220.
"The *Tractatus de suppositionibus*, which is cited by Gerald Odonis in his commentary on the *Sentences*, probably dates from ca. 1315-25. In the *Sentences* commentary he refers to his treatment of 'suppositio communicabilis' and its species, indicating a type of supposition whose language seems new. This article attempts to find a source for it in contemporary authors and arrives at the conclusion that 'communicabilis' is simply a synonym for 'personalis', the most common form of supposition according to Odonis."
38. Bubacz, Bruce S. 1985. "La Teoría De Lenguaje Interior En San Augustin Y En Guillermo De Occam." *Augustinus.Revista trimestral publicada por los Agustinos recoletos* no. 30:383-391.
39. Burton, Patricia Shelby. 1990. "*Suppositio Naturalis*" and the Truth Conditions of the Propositions of Demonstrative Science, The University of Texas at Austin.
UMI Dissertation Express reference number 9105524.
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42. Chiesa, Curzio. 1991. "Le Problème Du Langage Intérieur Chez Les Stoiciens." *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* no. 178:301-321.
43. ———. 1992. "Le Problème Du Langage Intérieur Dans La Philosophie Antique De Platon À Porphyre." *Histoire, Épistémologie, Langage* no. 14:15-30.
44. Cocchiarella, Nino. 2001. "A Logical Reconstruction of Medieval Terminist Logic in Conceptual Realism." *Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy* no. 4:35-72.
"The framework of conceptual realism provides a logically ideal language within which to reconstruct the medieval terminist logic of the 14th century. The terminist notion of a concept, which shifted from Ockham's early view of a concept as an intentional object (the *fictum* theory) to his later view of a concept as a mental act (the *intellectio* theory), is reconstructed in this framework in terms of the idea of concepts as unsaturated cognitive structures.
Intentional objects (*ficta*) are not rejected but are reconstructed as the objectified intentional contents of concepts.
Their reconstruction as intentional objects is an essential part of the theory of predication of conceptual realism. It is by means of this theory that we are able to explain how the identity theory of the copula, which was basic to terminist logic, applies to categorical propositions. Reference in conceptual realism is not the same as supposition in terminist logic. Nevertheless, the various "modes" of personal supposition of terminist logic can be explained and justified in terms of this conceptualist theory of reference."
45. Corcoran, John, and Swiniarski, John J. 1978. "Logical Structures of Ockham's Theory of Supposition." *Franciscan Studies* no. 38:161-183.
"This exposition of Ockham's theory of (common, personal) supposition involves the logical form of the four descent/ascent conditions and the logical relations of these with the three main modes of supposition. Central theses: each condition is a one-way entailment, each mode is a truth-functional combination of conditions, two of the three modes are not even coextensive with the two-way entailments commonly taken as their definitions. Ockham's idea of "the singulars" of a general proposition is vague and problematic and the entailment used in the descent/ascent conditions probably cannot be taken to be logical consequence in any strict sense."
46. Corti, Enrique C. 1981. "Significación, Suposición Y Verdad En La *Summa Logicae* De Guillermo De Ockham." *Cuadernos del Sur* (14):141-155.
47. Courtenay, William. 1984. "Force of Words and Figures of Speech. The Crisis over *Virtus Sermonis* in the Fourteenth Century." *Franciscan Studies* no. 44:107-128.
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See Chapter VI. A teoria da "suppositio" pp. 201-241.
49. ———. 1989. "Las Doctrinas De La *Significatio* Y De La *Suppositio* En Pedro Hispano." *Pensamiento* no. 45:227-238.
50. ———. 2001. "Pedro Da Fonseca. A Teoria Da Suposição E O Seu Contexto Excolástico." *Revista*

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51. Dinneen, Francis P. 1990. "Suppositio in Petrus Hispanus. Linguistic Theories and Models." In *De Ortu Grammaticae. Studies in Medieval Grammar and Linguistics Theory in Memory of Jan Pinborg*, edited by Bursill-Hall, Geoffrey L., Ebbesen, Sten and Koerner, Konrad, 69-85. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
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54. Dufour, Carlos A. 1989. *Die Lehre Der Proprietates Terminorum. Sinn Und Referenz in Mittelalterlicher Logik, Analytica*. Munchen, Hamden, Wien: Philosophia Verlag.
 "The present volume is a detailed and original study of the traditional, doctrine of terms. It can be regarded as an attempt to tackle the question: „How would the scholastic philosophers have conceived and defended their doctrine had they had at their disposal the methods and techniques of contemporary logic and semantics? The answer provided, a systematic reconstruction of a number of important ideas in the history of logic, is both formally illuminating and entirely faithful to the relevant text. The work begins with a general exposition of the doctrine of terms oriented around the basic semantic opposition between significatio and suppositio, analogues of the more familiar notions of sense and reference. As a means of providing a precise and coherent reconstruction of the doctrine the author does not simply provide the predictable translation of the more amenable passages into the language of predicate logic. Rather he develops, on the basis of a careful systematization of the texts themselves, a formalization of his own, incorporating an ontology of substance and accident. The advantages of this approach are revealed in its capacity to provide both a simple reconstruction of syllogistic logic by means of a sequent-calculus and a natural extension of this logic to a theory of supposition. Taking into consideration the categories of substance and accident in place of the more usual apparatus of set and element allows the author to develop a formalized theory of objects in which the two categories are allowed to yield composite objects of various sorts. This makes possible an illuminating application of the theory of concreta and abstracta (square of permutations) both to the theory of ampliatio and appellatio and to modal syllogistics. The work concludes with a sketch of possible further developments and an attempted demonstration of the philosophical relevance of the theory in the light of a critical consideration of the relevant secondary literature."
55. Ebbesen, Sten. 1979. "The Dead Man Is Alive." *Synthese* no. 40:43-70.
 "English late 13th century logicians paid greater attention to the reference (suppositio) of terms than contemporary Parisian logicians ('modistae'), who concentrated on the unchangeable meaning (significatio) allotted to terms by 'impositio'. Discussions of the sophism 'this is a dead man, therefore this is a man' revealed weaknesses in modism and contributed to the 14th century acceptance of ockham-style suppositio semantics at Paris (Buridan & al.). Appendix contains texts by Radulphus Brito and two anonymi."
56. ———. 1981. "Early Supposition Theory (12th-13th Century)." *Histoire, Épistémologie, Langage* no. 3/1:35-48.
 Reprinted in: S. Ebbesen, *Topics in Latin Philosophy from the 12th-14th centuries. Collected Essays Volume 2*, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2009, pp. 1-14.
 "The theory of supposition with the associated theories of *copulatio* (sign-capacity of adjectival terms), *ampliatio* (widening of referential domain), and *distributio* constitute one of the most original achievements of Western medieval logic. There is nothing really similar in any ancient text the medievals knew -though surely some Stoic writings once contained investigations of the problems these theories deal with -- nor had contemporary Byzantium anything similar. The twelfth century produced a considerable harvest of rules about the referential range of terms in various contexts. When the 13th century arrived, a standard terminology had prevailed with such names as *suppositio confusa* and *suppositio determinata* for some particularly important types of referential range and a chapter on supposition had become a standard feature of Introductions to Logic (*summulae*). But then the development of the theory stopped. It appears that at least on the Continent, the chapter on supposition in the *summulae* became one that young students would be taught very early in their career, perhaps before entering university; and then forget all about through the rest of their student career. In this paper I shall refrain from listing treatises 'de suppositionibus'; I shall on the whole refrain from following the developments of terminology and systematics. The spade-work in those fields has been done by De Rijk in his *Logica Modernorum*.

- I >will try to point to and explain some characteristic features of 12th and early 13th speculation about supposition without going into details and without paying much attention to the opinions of individual authors, not even when they protest they disagree with something I say they thought. I am not looking for the particular, but for general attitudes and patterns of thought underlying their investigation of *suppositio*."
57. Enders, Heinz Werner. 1975. *Sprachlogische Traktate Des Mittelalters Und Die Semantikbegriff: Ein Historisch-Systematischer Beitrag Zur Frage Der Semantischen Grundlegung Formaler Systeme, Veröffentlichungen Des Grabmann-Institutes Zur Erforschung Der Mittelalterlichen Theologie Und Philosophie*. Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh.
 58. Ferrer, Vincent. 1909. "De Supposicionibus Dialectices." In *Oeuvres De Saint Vincent Ferrer. (First Volume)*. Paris.
See now the critical edition edited by John Allen Trentam 1977 (listed below)
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