

"This volume of Rutgers University Studies in Classical Humanities, no. XI in the series, is the third devoted to Theophrastus' colleagues, pupils and successors, i.e., those Peripatetic philosophers, whom Fritz Wehrli brought together under the label *die Schule des Aristoteles*. Volume IX focuses on Demetrius of Phalerum, who was Theophrastus' pupil and for ten years the ruler of Athens. Volume X has Dicaearchus of Messana, Theophrastus' fellow-pupil within the Aristotelian Peripatos, as its subject. The present Volume, no. XI, concentrates on Eudemus of Rhodes, who, like Dicaearchus, studied under Aristotle and alongside Theophrastus. This concern with *die Schule des Aristoteles* will continue with the next two volumes: Lyco of Troas and Hieronymus of Rhodes will be the subjects of Volume XII, and Aristo of Ceos will be featured in Volume XIII. All three belong to the post-Theophrastean Peripatos. Like Volumes IX and X, so Volumes XII and XIII will present the ancient sources with translation as well as discussion by various scholars. Volume XI is different in that it is entirely composed of articles which discuss Eudemus from differing points of view." (from the Preface by the Editors)

"Eudemus of Rhodes wrote a work entitled *On Expression, Peri lexeos*. It was at least two books or rolls long and was the subject of a lost treatise by Galen. Apparently the work was not only substantial but also full of interesting material. It is therefore regrettable that we have only a few fragments from which to judge the content of the work. Five fragments, nos. 25-9, are assigned to the work by Wehrli, but that may
be too generous. In what follows, I intend first to consider Wehrli's five fragments and then to ask what we can conclude concerning the content of On Expression." p. 59


"The information on Eudemus of Rhodes that can be recovered in Arabic sources falls into three categories: there is a full collection of sayings (Section II below and Appendix), some incidental biographical notices that mainly state his relation to Aristotle and Theophrastus (Section III), and a number of references to his views on logic which lie held in common with Theophrastus (Section IV). No work of his is reported to have been translated into Arabic or is known to be extant. Apart from the sayings, therefore, Eudemus has no independent persona or presence in Arabic but rides on the coattails primarily of Theophrastus. This is hardly surprising, given the little information on Eudemus that was available even in Greek at the time of the rise of Islam." p. 1


SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON THE LOGIC OF THEOPHRASTUS


"In APr 1.44 Aristotle considers "arguments on the basis of a hypothesis." He deals first with arguments that are "agreed to by way of a compact," and then with those that "reach their conclusion by way of the impossible." The chapter ends with a promise: "Many other arguments reach their conclusion on the basis of a hypothesis. We should consider them and mark them out clearly. We shall say later what varieties of them there are and in how many ways arguments can rest on a hypothesis" (APr 50 a 39-b2). Alexander of Aphrodisias (In APr 389, 31-390.9) (1) comments on that passage as follows: "Having talked about arguments on the basis of an agreement and arguments by reductio ad impossible, he says that "many others reach their conclusion on the basis of a hypothesis." He postpones discussion of them, as though intending to deal with them more carefully; but no book of his on the subject is in circulation. Theophrastus, however, refers to them in his own Analytics -- and so do Eudemus and some others of Aristotle's associates. Aristotle presumably has in mind those arguments which proceed by way of a continuous proposition (or a connected proposition, as it is also called) together with the additional assumption, and those which proceed by way of a separative or disjunctive proposition -- and perhaps also those which proceed by way of a negated conjunction, if they are indeed different from the ones already mentioned. (2) In addition to those we have mentioned, there will also be arguments on the basis of proportion and those which they call "qualitative" (i.e., arguments from what is more so or less so or equally so) and whatever other varieties of arguments based on a hypothesis (3) there are (they have been discussed elsewhere). In addition to those we have mentioned, there will also be arguments on the basis of proportion and those which they call "qualitative" (i.e., arguments from what is more so or less so or equally so) and whatever other varieties of arguments basal on a hypothesis' there are (they have been discussed elsewhere). Those paragraphs are of some importance for the history of logic: the present paper is a commentary on them."

1. The passage is F 29 in A. Graeser, Die logischen Fragmente des Theophrast (Berlin / New York 1973), and frag. 33c in L. Repici, La logica di Teofrasto (Bologna 1977).

2. Wallies, in the CIAG edition, punctuates so as to begin a new sentence with the clause "if they-already mentioned." The result is unargually and obscure. In my translation I gratefully adopt a suggestion made by David Sedley: his punctuation gives perfect sense and makes better Greek. (It leaves an unpleasant asyndeton. Perhaps we should insert a particle and begin the new sentence at 390.6 with para de tous.)
3. I excise protaseon (390.9): the phrase "propositions based on a hypothesis" is strange, and even if it may be allowed as a variant on "hypothetical proposition," it is out of place; Alexander is enumerating types of hypothetical arguments, not types of hypothetical propositions.


Traces the history in Aristotelian commentators of the type of syllogisms called "wholly hypothetical" -- that is, those consisting in two conditionals as premisses, with a third as the conclusion -- and sets forth the deductive system on which the logic of this syllogism was grounded. There was no unique prevalent understanding of the logical form of these arguments, but rather a complex development in their understanding, starting from a term-logical conception and leading to a propositional-logical one. The roles of Theophrastus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Porphyry (via Boethius) in the transmission and transformation of this problematic are investigated.


"To appreciate Theophrastus' contributions to the study of rhetorical argument, we should consider his accomplishments in the field of logic, for it is Theophrastus and other members of the second generation of the Peripatetikos who developed hypothetical syllogistic. Many of the illustrative arguments in Aristotle's Rhetoric (esp. in chapters on the enthymeme, the koiné and topics) take the form of a mixed hypothetical syllogism. Aristotle promised to discuss such syllogisms, but he never did. That task fell to his successors, among Theophrastus will have made the connection with rhetoric."


As a rule modern textbooks of traditional logic distinguish only two kinds of syllogism: the categorical syllogism, which has originated with Aristotle, and the hypothetical syllogism, which goes back to the early Peripatetics and to the Stoics. Rarely, if ever, is mention made of the third kind of syllogism namely the prosleptic syllogism. Yet, the prosleptic syllogism, for which we seem to be indebted to Theophrastus,
appears to have been regarded at least by some logicians in later ages of antiquity as a legitimate part of logical theory.

Like the expressions 'categorical' and 'hypothetical' the expression 'prosleptic' is a technical term and its full significance can only emerge at a later stage of our enquiry. At this stage suffice it to say that 'prosleptic' is meant to render the Greek expression kata proslepsin in its adjectival use.

Although the prosleptic syllogism has not played as important a role in the development of logic as the other two kinds of syllogism, it deserves our attention particularly for the following two reasons. First, the validity of prosleptic syllogisms is based, as we shall see, on certain logical notions which in modern logic find their expression in the use of the universal quantifier. Secondly, the theory of prosleptic syllogism bears witness to the resourcefulness of Theophrastus as a logician.

In what follows I propose to reconstruct the theory of prosleptic syllogisms to the extent to which the scarcity of textual evidence permits, and to examine it from the point of view of modern logic.


Galen claimed that prosleptic premises, used for the first time by Aristotle and treated systematically by Theophrastus, were equivalent to appropriate categorical premises. This claim can only be sustained with substantial qualifications. The paper carries out a detailed examination of equivalence relationship between the two kinds of premises within the framework of axiomatized Aristotelian syllogistic, which had to be suitably extended for the purpose by additional assumptions. The results of the enquiry differ from those obtained by William and Martha kneale in their paper on "Prosleptic propositions and arguments" in "Islamic philosophy and the Classical tradition", edited by S. M. Stern and others, Cassirer 1972.


Étude des syllogismes chez Aristote, dans l'école péripatéticienne (Théophraste) et dans le stoïcisme. Malgré de nombreux éléments individuels, Galien s'insère plutôt dans le courant péripatéticien. C'est également de ce dernier, et non de la théorie stoïcienne, que s'inspire la logique arabe.


Les innovations de Théophraste correspondent à une conception de la nature et de la fonction de la logique, qui n'a plus dignité de science autonome et indépendante, visant à l'analyse des connexions formelles du réel, mais qui devient de plus en plus instrument de la recherche scientifique.


"This is the second collection of Theophrastus' logical fragments to appear within four years and it is very similar to that of Andreas Graeser, published with a German commentary in 5973. The similarity is not surprising, for the majority of passages which can be attributed to Theophrastus with confidence can also be assigned with confidence to one of his commentaries, if we may so call them, on Aristotle's works, the On Affirmation and Denial, which, according to Boethius, followed the lines of Aristotle's De Interpretatione, the Prior and the Posterior Analytics, and the Topics. Since, further, most of these passages occur in later commentaries on Aristotle, and are linked with particular sections of his work, there is not even much doubt their order, and with only three exceptions, of minor importance, the order given here is the same as that of Graeser.

Since so much is well established, these two editions are likely to remain the only ones for many years. Graeser's is marred by many inaccuracies, and this one is much better on that score. Miss Repici has also taken the trouble to translate every passage into Italian, which is sometimes very helpful, and she gives a survey of much earlier work on Theophrastus' logic." (Pamela M. Huby - Review of the book - Mind, 1979, pp. 448-450)


Contents: I. Plato's dialectic and Aristotle's syllogistic 3; II. The varieties of predication 13; III: The three
"Traditional "Aristotelian" logic recognizes four figures of the syllogism, including five "indirect" moods of the first figure. The usual account of the origin of these is that Aristotle himself developed the first, second, and third figures, that Theophrastus added the indirect moods of the first figure, and that the fourth figure was added later on by someone else, probably Galen. (3)

I shall attempt to show that the five argument forms added to the first figure by Theophrastus were in fact not the indirect moods of the first figure that became part of the traditional "Aristotelian" logic. They were, rather, argument forms corresponding both to the later indirect first and to the later fourth figure moods, but not recognizing any distinction between the two. From the modern (i.e., traditional) point of view, it is just as accurate, and just as wrong, to say that Theophrastus added the fourth figure as to say that he added the indirect first. In a sense he did both; in a sense he did neither. For in the later logic the indirect first moods are carefully distinguished from the fourth figure moods. But Aristotle and Theophrastus had no formal basis for distinguishing the indirect first form the fourth. They attached no significance to premise order. (4)” pp. 109-110


(4) For Aristotle on premise order, see Chapter X above. We shall see in this Appendix that there seems to be no reason to suppose that Theophrastus had nay conventions regarding premise order either.
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