History of Logic from Aristotle to Gödel

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Annotated Bibliography of Lambertus Marie de Rijk. Fourth Part: from 1991 to 2012

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1.   Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1991. "Two Short Questions on Proclean Metaphysics in Paris B. N. Lat. 16.096." *Vivarium* no. 29:1-12.

" The collectaneous manuscript Paris, B.N. lat. 16.096 (formerly belonging to the codices Sorbonnenses) contains (ff. 172va-177vb, which part dates, it seems, from the second half of the 13th century) some anonymous questions referred to by the catalogue (*) as Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum. This description, however, is incorrect as these questions have no bearing whatsoever on the doctrine of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. Actually, they are two short metaphysical questions (called expositiones by the author) on the key notions of 'beingness' and 'oneness' respectively, followed by a longer, incomplete treatise on the nature of the components of a definition (or rather a diffinitum).

(...)

Only two of the five questions announced in the beginning of this third treatise are preserved. One of them deals with the problem of whether the definition consisting of genus and differentia requires a real composition of the components of the diffinitum, the other examines whether immaterial substances are composite in some respects. Unlike the first two tracts, the third does not show any influence of Neoplatonic doctrine.

To my knowledge, the expositions on Ens and Unum have only come down to us in the Paris manuscript. They are interesting in that the author makes a successful effort to penetrate some of the basic views of Proclean metaphysics." pp. 1-2 (notes omitted)

(*) L. Delisle, Inventaire des manuscrits latins de la Sorbonne, conservés à la Bibliothèque Impériale sous les nos. 15.176-16.718 du fonds latin, in: Bibliothèque de l'École des chartes, 31 (1870), 135 ff.

2.   Peter, of Spain. 1992. *Peter of Spain. Syncategoreumata*. Leiden: Brill.

First critical edition with an introduction, critical apparatus, indexes and an English translation by Joke Spruyt.

Peter of Spain (ca 1205-77) who, in 1276, became Pope under the name of John XXI, was the author of an impressive number of scholarly works, inter alia the Tractatus (a textbook of logic, widely known afterwards under the title Summule logicales) and the Syncategoreumata. The latter work, which deals with syncategorematic terms, is here critically edited for the first time, together with an English translation.

Peter's authorship of the Syncategoreumata is beyond all doubt: it is confirmed again and again by nearly all our manuscripts. As to the date and place of origin of the Syncategoreumata: they were surely written after the Tractatus (which were written not later than the 1230's, see my Introduction to the edition of this work, p. LV-LVII).

There is no reason at all to assume a connection between the Syncategoreumata and Peter's stay at the University of Paris, which he left in 1229, before the composition of the Tractatus. Clearly, Paris does not play any role in the early diffusion of the Syncategoreumata. It seems highly probable, therefore, that the Syncategoreumata were written by Peter in the same region where he wrote the Tractatus, i.e. Northern Spain or Southern France. The work's most likely date is between 1235-1245 (cf. my Introduction to the Tractatus, pp. XXXIV-LXI). From Peter's use of lectio (see X, cap. 8) it may be concluded that the Syncategoreumata were meant as a piece of school-teaching.

Content of the English translation: Introduction 39; Chapter 1. On composition 45; Chapter 2. On negation 73; Chapter 3. On exclusive words 105; Chapter 4. On exceptive words; Chapter 5. On consecutive words 197; Chapter 6. On the verbs 'begins' and 'ceases' 249; Chapter 7. On the words 'necessarily' (*necessario*) and 'contingently' (*contingenter*) 283; Chapter 8. On conjunctions 307; Chapter 9. On '*Quanto*', '*Quam*' and '*Quicquid*'; Chapter 10. On answers 425; Critical apparatus 434; Index locorum 572; Index rerum notabilium 574; Index sophismatum 613.

3.   Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1992. "Causation and Participation in Proclus. The Pivotal Role of Scope Distinction." In *On Proclus and His Influence in Medieval Philosophy*, edited by Meijer, Pieter Ane and Bos, Egbert Peter, 1-34. Leiden: Brill.
1. Status questionis; 2. Causation and participation in Plato; 3. Procession and participation in Plotinus and Jamblichus; 4. Proclus' refined metaphysics; 4.1 Preliminary; 4.2 The Proclean universe from the viewpoint of causation; 4.3 The Proclean universe from the viewpoint of participation; 5. The meaning of *amethekton* and *metekomenon* in Proclus; 5.1 *Méthexis* c.a. in the *Elementatio*; 5.2 *Méthexis* c.a. in the *Platonic Theology*; The basic role of the *metexomenon* for continuity and reversion; Scope distinction in Neoplatonic doctrine and procedure; 7.1 Two famous cases of scope distinction in Proclus; 7.2 Scope distinction deliberately applied and recommended; 7.3 The philosophical impact of scope distinction in Neoplatonism.
"The present paper aims to investigate in some more detail the transcendence-immanence antinomy. First an outline of its historical background will be presented from Plato onward through Plotinus and Jamblichus up to Proclus. Next I shall discuss Proclus' doctrine on these matters in the larger perspective of his philosophy, and focus on the intriguing notion of *amethekton*. Finally a few remarks will be added on the important role of what we might call 'scope distinction' in Proclus' doctrines and dialectical arguments." p. 2.

4.   ———. 1992. "John Buridan on Universals." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* no. 97:35-59.
"It is common knowledge that Plato strongly believed that, in order to explain the nature of whatever is (either things or states of affairs, including Man and his environment), the assumption of Transcendent Universal Forms is indispensable. In his view, these universal Forms are the ontic causes of each and every sublunary entity, which all owe their being to their sharing in these Forms. Consequently, everyone who is in want of firm knowledge *(episteme)* about, the things of the outside world is bound to direct his attention to the transcendent domain of the universal Forms'.
However, Plato was the first to recognise, and seriously deal with, the objections that can be raised to this doctrine. These objections mainly concern the status (and the dignity, however modest) of our transient world and, above all, the possibility to obtain, true knowledge of this world as *it stands,* in its ever-changing nature, that is." p. 35
(...)
"To be sure, the Medievals all rejected the Platonic Ideas taken as separate substances and they adhered to the Aristotelian common sense principle that only individuals have independent existence. Nevertheless, they were still under the spell of the status of «universal being» as the indispensable basis of true knowledge.
Marylin McCord Adams has analysed some early fourteenth century solutions to the problem of universals (Scotus, Ockham, Burley and Harclay) (*). In McCord's article Buridan's view of the matter is left out of consideration. Quite understandably so, since Buridan's solution to the problem differs considerably from the sophisticated arguments given by his contemporaries. Buridan seeks.for a solution in analysing the several ways of human understanding. In directing his attention to the propositional attitude involved in the cognitive procedure Buridan is remarkably close to the ingenious solution Peter Abelard had come up with two centuries earlier. In the next *sections* I shall give an outline of Abelard's treatment of the question of universals followed by an analysis of Buridan's discussion of the matter (as found in his commentary on the *Metaphysics* and elsewhere)." p. 37
(...)
"We may conclude, then, that two bright logicians of the Parisian tradition have come up with quite an ingenious solution to the problem of universals. Both of them started out from the firm conviction that nothing exists but particulars. Nevertheless, they apparently were not satisfied with purely extensional solutions as brought forward by Oxford logicians such as Heytesbury and Ockham. Maybe extensionalists are out to show how people *ought* to think. Abelard and Buridan, however, were especially interested in the various ways of conceiving we *actually* use in daily life, in our attempts to conceptually deal with the outside world." p. 59
(*) "Universals in the early Fourteenth century" in *Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, from the rediscovery of Aristotle to the desintegration of Scholasticism 1100-1600* pp. 411-439.

5.   ———. 1992. "Peter Abelard (1079-1142)." In *Philosophy of Language/Sprachphilosophie/La Philosophie Du Langage. Eine Internationales Handbuch Zeitgenössicher Forschung*, edited by Dascal, Marcelo, Gerhardus, Dietfried, Lorenz, KUno and Meggle, Georg, 290-296. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. First volume

6.   ———. 1993. "Der Streit Über Das *Medium Demonstrationis*: Die Frucht Eines Misverständnisses?" In *Argumentationstheorie. Scholastische Forschungen Zu Den Logischen Und Semantischen Regeln Korrekten Folgerns*, edited by Jacobi, Klaus, 451-463. Leiden: Brill.
"In der alten Ausgabe des Kommentars zu den *Zweiten Analytiken* von Aegidius Romanus' findet sich nach dem Kommentar eine kurze Abhandlung aus der Feder des Augustiner-Eremiten Augustinus de Biella. Sie wurde zur Verteidigung der Auffassung des Aegidius über das *medium demonstrationis*

geschrieben. Aegidius hatte gelehrt, daß bei einer *demonstratio potissima* (also bei der aristotelischen Apodeixis im strengsten Sinne) das *medium* sich aus der Definition des Attributs *(passio)* ergebe, und nicht, wie die communis opinio lautete, aus der Definition des Subjekts. Wie üblich, fängt Biella damit an, Argumente gegen die Auffassung Aegidius' anzuführen, um dieselben anschließend zu widerlegen. Biella hat aber augenscheinlich den Text von Aegidius nicht zur Hand gehabt, denn er fährt fort, *dominus* Aegidius sei wohl dieser Auffassung über (las *rnedium demonstrationis* gewesen, "wie ich von den *doctores ordinis (Tatrum heremitarum* gehört habe" (oder: "wie ich es deren Schriften entnommen habe")." p.451

7.   ———. 1993. "La Supposizione Naturale: Una Pietra Di Paragone Per I Punti Di Vista Filosofici." In *Logica E Linguaggio Nel Medioevo*, edited by Fedriga, Riccardo and Poggioni, Sara, 185-220. Milano: LED, Edizioni universitarie di lettere, economia, diritto.
Italian translation of: "La philosophie au moyen âge" chapter 8, pp. 184-203

8.   ———. 1993. "On Buridan's View of Accidental Being." In *John Buridan: A Master of Arts. Some Aspects of His Philosophy. Acts of the Second Symposium Organized by the Dutch Society for Medieval Philosophy Medium Aevum on the Occasion of Its 15th Anniversary*.
Leiden-Amsterdam (Vrije Universiteit), 20-21 June, 1991., edited by Bos, Egbert Peter and Krop, Henri, 41-51. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
"One of the most striking characteristics of late medieval metaphysics is the upgrading of 'accidental being'. The strict opposition between *'esse per se'* and *'esse per accidens',* which had been of paramount importance ever since Aristotle, has lost its relevance in the ontological discussions of the fourteenth century. The status of 'accidental being' came rather close to that of 'substantial being'. In the views of philosophers such as Ockham and Buridan (not to mention thinkers like Crathorn) the nature of 'accidental being' (or rather 'quantitative and qualitative being') can no longer be properly defined in terms of ontological dependency upon substance. In other words, '*per se* subsistence' is assigned not only to substance but to 'accidental being' as well.
In the present contribution I will illustrate this development by discussing some of Buridan's expositions in his *Questiones* commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics (IV,* q. 6 and VII, q. 3-4)." p. 41

9.   ———. 1993. "Works by Gerald Ot (*Gerardus Odonis*) on Logic, Metaphysics and Natural Philosophy Rediscovered in Madrid, Bibl. Nac. 4229." *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* no. 60:173-193; 378.
"Some twenty years ago I discovered in the Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid a very interesting manuscript with works (all of them anonymous, to be sure) on logic, metaphysics and natural philosophy. In fact, my discovery turned out to be a rediscovery, for the manuscript contained a note written by the famous historian of Franciscan philosophy and theology, Father Ephrem Longpré OFM, which said that, with the exception of the writings occurring from fol. 204r onwards, all tracts found in this codex are by a Franciscan master, Gerardus Odonis. (...)
Gerard Odon OFM (who as Patriarch of Antiochia died in 1349 of the plague, at Catania, Sicily, where he was gifted with the benefices of a wealthy church) is especially known as the much troubled successor of the deposed Michael of Cesena as Master General of the Franciscan Order and a close adherent of Pope John XXII in the debate on the beatific vision." p. 173
"The Ms Madrid, Bibl. Nac. 4229 appears to be of the utmost importance for our knowledge of Gerard Odon's doctrine on several subjects in the fields of logic, metaphysics and natural philosophy. To establish his authorship of all the works as occurring in the present Ms with certainty requires more research. The results of the present investigations can be summarised in the following survey:
I LOGIC:
1.1 *Quid est subiectum in logica (69va-74rb)*
1.2 *De sillogismis (1ra-19va)*
1.3 *De tribus dubiis circa naturam dictionum exclusivarum et suppositionis simpliciter simplicis (37rb-43ra)*
1.4 *De principiis scientiarum (45ra-69va)*
II METAPHYSICS:
2.1 *De intentionibus (incomplete; 74va-122vb)*
2.2 *De esse et essentia (125ra-132vb)*
2.3 *De principiis nature (156ra-174vb, together with 19va-28vb)*
2.4 *De natura universalis (incomplete; 204ra-207vb)*
III NATURAL PHILOSOPHY:
3.1 *De augmento forme (132vb-150rb)*
3.2 *De intensione et remissione formarum (175ra-179ra)*
3.3 *De continuo (179rb-186vb)*
3.4 *De loco (187ra-192va)*
3.5 *De tempore (192vb-199va)*
3.6 *De motu (199vb-203vb)*" p. 193

10.   ———. 1994. "John Buridan on Man's Capability of Grasping the Truth." In *Scientia Et Ars Im Hoch-Und Spätmmittelalter*, edited by Craemer-Rügenberg, Ingrid and Speer, Andreas, 282-303. Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter.
Miscellanea Mediaevalia, vol. 22/1.
"As is well-known, two subjects are distinctive of the fourteenth century theory of cognition, namely *'certitudo'* and *'evidentia'.* It is true, thirteenth century philosophers, such as Thomas Aquinas, were also concerned with certitude and evidentness as indispensable requisites for 'true knowledge' *('scientia').* However, until the end of the thirteenth century certitude and evidentness were not prominent in the discussions about the cognitive procedure nor were they treated as separate matters, requiring separate attention. In Thomas Aquinas for example, the conviction that man is really capable of grasping the truth with certainty is really constitutive of his philosophical (and theological) thought and praxis (*)', or to speak with J. A. Aertsen, of 'Thomas' way of thought'.(**) This, however, does not alter the fact that in Aquinas' philosophy 'certitudo' is not highlighted as such, and the specific role of 'evidentia' is even virtually ignored.
Buridan's theory of cognition, on the contrary, clearly focusses on the ingredients *'certitudo'* and *'evidentia',* and, within this framework, on the notion of *'assensus'.* In the present paper I aim to elucidate the role of this key notion of John Buridan's theory of cognition."
(*) See the excellent paper by Gerard Verbeke, "Certitude et incertitude de la recherche philosophique selon saint Thomas d'Aquin", in: Rivista di Filosofia neo-scolastica 66 (1974), 740-57.
(**) Jan Aertsen, Nature and Creature. Thomas Aquinas' Way of Thought. Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters herausgegeben von Albert Zimmermann, Band XXI, Leiden etc. 1988, passim.

11.   ———. 1994. *Nicholas of Autrecourt. His Correspondence with Master Giles and Bernard of Arezzo*. Leiden: Brill.
A critical edition from the two Parisian manuscripts with an introduction, English translation, explanatory notes and indexes.
Contents: Acknowledgements IX; Introduction 1; 1. Nicholas of Autrecourt. Life and works 1; 2. Nicholas' correspondence with Bernard and Giles 5; 3. The extant letters. Their tradition and structure 24; 4. Principles of the present edition and translation 37; Conspectus siglorum 45; Text and translation 46; Explanatory notes 113; Appendices 139; Indices 209; Bibliography 238.
"The present edition is based on the two Mss hitherto known, Paris, *BN lat.* 16408 (A) and 16409 (B). They are far from being perfect as they derive from exemplars that were themselves not quite reliable witnesses of the letters. However, they provide sufficient support for constituting a critical edition.
(...)
A translation is provided in order to make the letters accessible to all those who are not well-acquainted with Latin grammar and idiom. For that matter, Nicholas writes in a fairly clear and occasionally vivid Latin, but he is not a talented stylist. At times, he is not very particular about contaminated constructions. I have tried to smooth away some of these solecisms." pp 37-38.

12.   ———. 1994. "A Special Use of *Ratio* in 13th and 14th Century Metaphysics." In *Ratio. Vii Colloquio Del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo. Roma, 9-11 Gennaio 1992*, edited by Fattori, Marta and Bianchi, Massimo Luigi, 197-218. Firenze: L. S. Olschki.
"In the opening lines of the fifth tract of his Summulae Peter of Spain deals with six different meanings of the terminus technicus 'ratio'. (a)
Three of them are relevant to the present discussion:
'Ratio' is used in more than one way. In one way it is the same as definition or description, as in «univocal things are those which have a name in common and whose 'ratio substantie' corresponding to that name is the same» (b) [...]. In another way 'ratio' is the same as the form imposed on matter (forma materie), e.g. in a knife iron is the matter and the arrangement imposed on the iron is the form. In yet another way 'ratio' is the same as a common essence that is predicable of many things, e.g. the essence of a genus, a species or a differentia. [...].
The aim of the present paper is to elucidate the important role of the term 'ratio' in metaphysical discussions from the thirteenth century onwards. The three above mentioned senses all refer to (what belongs to) a thing's essential nature. The first sense, however, is the one that comes most close to the subject matter of our discussion. (c) The opening lines of Aristotle's Categoriae, which are referred to by Peter may serve as the starting point of our investigation." p. 197
(...)
"7. *Conclusion*.
We may summarise the foregoing observations as follows:
(1) As early as in Boethius (Aristotle) *ratio* (Greek 'logos') was used to stand for one specific (ontic or logical) characteristic that a thing has in common with other things, notwithstanding the dissimilarity of their respective 'complete natures'. Thus 'man' and 'cow' have the *ratio animalis* in common and a white wall and a white statue have whiteness in common.
(2) Ratio may also be used to refer to a thing's 'complete nature' as distinct from either the nature of other

things (e.g. the *ratio hominis* vs the *ratio lapidis*) or from the thing's individuality (*ratio singularitatis*).
(3) Distinguishing several *rationes* in one and the same thing is a procedure which is typical of man's intellectual capability. This procedure forms the backbone of many philosophical and theological arguments concerning God and the entities occurring in the outside world.
(4) Possible translations of *ratio* as used in the special sense discussed in this paper are:
- *logically*: 'logical aspect', 'logical characteristic'; 'concept', 'notion' (bearing on some aspect characteristic or feature); 'meaning', 'descriptive account', 'definition'.
- *ontologically*:'ontic aspect', 'characteristic', 'feature' (including formal ones)." p. 218
(a) Peter of Spain, Tractatus called afterwards Summule logicales. First Critical Edition from the Manuscripts with an Introduction by L. M. de Rijk, Assen, 1972, p. 55, 4-14. Cf. the English translation in The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts, Vol. I: Logic and the Philosophy of Language, edited by Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, Cambridge etc., 1988, p. 226.
(b) ARISTOTLE, Categoriae, 1, 1 a 8-9.
(c) For that matter, the distinction between the three senses as given by Peter of Spain is not entirely clear-cut: they are, at least partially, overlapping.

13. John, Buridan. 1995. *Johannes Buridanus Summulae De Praedicabilibus*. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
Introduction, critical edition and indexes by L.M. De Rijk.
"The present edition contains the second tract [of Buridan's *Summulae*], *De praedicabilibus,* which deals with the five 'predicables', introduced by the Neoplatonist commentator of Aristotle, Porphyry (c. 233-c. 304 A.D.) in his introductory book (*Isagoge*) to the Stagirite's *Categories, viz.* 'genus', 'species', 'differentia', 'proprium', and 'accidens'. From as early as the eleventh century, medieval authors commented upon Boethius' (480-524) translation of, and commentary upon, this work.
Buridan's discussion of the predicables is mainly based on the corresponding tract of Peter of Spain's manual. His comments are preceded by the complete text of the lemma from Peter to be discussed. It should be no surprise that Buridan's quotations should go back to an adapted version of Peter's text. (...) Buridan's work consists of elementary exegesis as well as extensive objections and *dubitationes* in which specific questions are dealt with, mostly in an original fashion." pp. XVII and XXI.

14. Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1995. "Teaching and Inquiry in 13th and 14th Century Logic and Metaphysics." In *Vocabulary of Teaching and Research between Middle Ages and Renaissance. Proceedings of the Colloquium London, Warburg Institute, 11-12 March 1994*, edited by Weijers, Olga, 83-95. Turnhout: Brepols.

15. ———. 1995. "Ockham as the Commentator of *His* Aristotle. His Treatment of *Posterior Analytics*." In *Aristotelica Et Lulliana: Magistro Doctissimo Charles H. Lohr Septuagesimum Annum Feliciter Agenti Dedicata*, edited by Domínguez Reboiras, Fernando, Imbach, Ruedi, Pindl, Theodor and Walter, Peter, 77-127. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
1. Introduction; 2. Preliminary: Aristotle on demonstrative or epistemonic proof; 2.1 On the three requrements *'kata pantos', kath' 'hauto', 'kath' holou'*, 2.2 On the notion of necessity; 2.3 On the four types of questions. On 'Middle' and 'Definiens'; 2.3.1 Subject and attribute. The Middle; 2.3.2. On definition and the four question-types; 2.3.3 The role of definitions in epistemonic proof; 2.3.4 Recipes for the discovery of definitions; 2.4 The '*kath' holou*' requirement revisited; 2.5 Particulars and the proper objects of Aristotle's epistemonic proof; 3. Ockham as a Commentator of *Posterior Analytics*; 3.1 Ockham's treatment of the four basic question-types; 3.2 Ockham's view of the '*kath' holou'* requirement; 3.3 The impact of Ockham's ontology upon his theory of demonstration; 3.3.1 Ockham's problem concerning the First Subject; 3.3.2 Ockham's introduction of 'Non-First Subject'; 3.3.3 '*Demonstratio particularis'* in Ockham; 3.3.4 Ockham's view of necessity; 3.5 '*Dici per se'* and '*propositio per se vera*' in Ockham; 3.5.1 Two kinds of '*per se'* assignment; 3.5.2 The '*propositio per se (vera)'* in Ockham; 3.5.3 The strict and strictest senses of '*per se'*; 4. Comclusion.
"The present paper aims to clarify the attitude towards Aristotle adopted by one of the leading lights of fourteenth century philosophical and theological thought, William of Ockham, by investigating (a) how in some of the vital subjects of Aristotelian doctrine, the Venerable Inceptor understood and interpreted the Master, (b) how and why on specific occasions, he deliberately took the liberty to stray from Aristotle's teachings. It goes without saying that in such an undertaking, one has to confine oneself to certain doctrinal themes the choice of which might seem quite arbitrary. The present author has picked out the Aristotelian doctrine of demonstrative proof as interpreted by Ockham." p. 78

16. ———. 1995. "Ockham's Horror of the Universal. An Assessment of His View of Individuality." *Mediaevalia.Textos e Estudos* no. 7-8:473-497.
Quodlibetaria: miscellanea studiorum in honorem prof. J. M. da Cruz Pontes anno iubilationis suae, Conimbrigae MCMXCV

17. ———. 1996. "The Key Role of the Latin Language in Medieval Philosophical Thought." In *Media Latinitas. A Collection of Essays to Mark the Occasion of the Retirement of L. J. Engels*, edited by Nip,

R.I.A., 129-145. Turnhout: Brepols.

"Everyone embarking on the theme 'Medieval Latin and Philosophy' should realise that this theme involves more than just a juxtaposition of two separate items which are quite interesting in themselves. On the contrary, Medieval Latin and philosophy had a great mutual impact and thus were most closely related. To put it differently, in Medieval philosophical teaching and inquiry linguistic analysis was considered by the Medievals themselves really indispensable. (*)

Like the Ancients, the Medieval thinkers firmly believed that, ultimately, the outside world is not-chaotic. In their view it has a 'logical' or intelligible structure, which, as such, is accessible to the human mind, insofar as the latter has the same 'logical' structure'. In other words, in the view of the Medievals there is an isomorphic relationship between the realms of thought and of being. (**)

(...)

The Medievals have largely expanded the logico-semantical approach they had inherited from the Ancients, especially in their so-called 'logica modernorum', which has its root in the logico-grammatical discussions found as early as in the eleventh century.

Coming now to the proper subject of my contribution I should like to discuss three extremely important themes that featured in Medieval philosophy, viz. [1] the 'Object-Thought' issue, [2] the problem of the Universals, and [3] the metaphysics of 'Accidental Being'. Our discussion will focus on the linguistic aspects of the solutions to each one of these problems. Three things in particular will be considered: [a] the semantical development of a terminology which was already common usage (e.g. 'idea', 'ratio'), [b] the introduction of new philosophical tools (e.g. 'suppositio', 'appellatio', 'connotatio'), and [c] the role of (artificial) word-order. I shall argue that for the Medievals, the Latin language was not only the vehicle of philosophical thought, but also an inspiring source of pioneering philosophical insight." pp. 129-130.

(*) For a broader discussion see L.M. de Rijk, 'Teaching and Inquiry in 13th-14th Century Logic and Metaphysics'

(**) In this connection the word 'logical' should be associated with the Greek 'logos', rather than the discipline of logic.

18.   ———. 1996. "On Aristotle's Semantics in *De Interpretatione* 1-4." In *Polyhistor. Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy Presented to Jaap Mansfeld on His Sixtieth Birthday*, edited by Algra, Keimpe, Van der Horst, Pieter and Runia, David, 115-134. Leiden: Brill.

"By and large, in *De interpretatione* Aristotle is concerned with our capability to speak about all that presents itself to our mind. From chapter 4 onwards, he deals with the statement-making expressions (affirmation and negation), which are the main tools for conveying our thoughts about things. This discussion is prepared (chapters 1-3) by some important observations concerning the basic elements of such expressions, viz. *onoma* and *rhema*. The present contribution contains some comments on Aristotle's view of the proper nature of statement-making as put forward in *De interpretatione.* First, I would like to highlight Aristotle's, what Sir David Ross has called 'frankly 'representative' view of knowledge' by discussing the terms *omoioma* and *pragma*. Next, I will discuss what is meant by a term's 'time-connotation', and finally I will examine the semantics of *onoma, rhema* and *logos.*" p. 115

19.   ———. 1996. "Burley's So-Called *Tractatus Primus,* with an Edition of the Additional Quaestio '*Utrum Contradictio Sit Maxima Oppositio*'." *Vivarium* no. 34:161-191.

"The extensive list of works by Walter Burley contains a collection of some eagerly disputed questions concerning natural philosophy, which in most of the manuscript catalogues goes under the blank title *Tractatus primus.* (...)

In the shorter version of his *Expositio super librum Sex principiorum,* written after he had left Paris in 1327, he deals with the position concerning the specific sameness of whiteness and blackness he had argued for ín the fourth *quaestio,* and refers to his '*primus tractatus de formis accidcntalibus"* (...)

This reference seems to imply that the title '*De formis accidentalibus'* covers both the *Tractatus primus* and the *Tractatus secundus,* which was afterwards called '*De intensione et remission formarum.'* I think it would be better to call the first treatise *'De formis accidentalibus,* pars prima,' with the subtitle *'De quattuor conclusionibus circa formas accidentales'.* The second treatise, then, which contains a discussion of a closely related subject matter, should go under the title *'De formis accidentalibus,* pars secunda,' with the subtitle *'De causa intrinseca susceptionis magis et minus'.* Later on, its current tide became *De intensione et remissione formarum.*" pp. 161-162

20.   Giraldus, Odonis. 1997. *Giraldus Odonis O.F.M. Opera Philosophica. Vol I. Logica*. Leiden: Brill.

Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction 1; List of manuscripts 63; Bibliography 65; TEXT 69; Argumentum 71; Liber Primus: De sillogismis 85; Annexum I: De natura oppositionis contradictorie 186; Liber secundus: De suppositionibus 231; Annexum II: De tribus dubiis 293; Liber tertius: De principiis scientiarum 325; Annexum III: De primo subiecto in logica 467; Index locorum 493; Index nominum 498; Index verborum et rerum notabilium 500-543.

From the Introduction: "It may be useful to say something about the general nature of Girald's *Logica,* Libri I-III, which now appear in print for the first time as a whole. Generally speaking, the work is well-composed and written in a lucid style. The *Addenda* even contain rather passionate passages, when

Girald is rejecting opponent views, especially in those cases where Walter Burley is (anonymously) under attack. The characteristic given by Brown (1) of *De suppositionibus* seems to be well to the point for the entire *Logica:* Girald's treatise is structured in his own individual way, but all with its personal stamp, especially emerging in *De suppositionibus*." p. 25

(1) Stephen F. Brown "Gerard Odon's *De suppositionibus*" in: *Franciscan Studies* 35 (1975), 5-44 cfr. p. 10

"As we have remarked before, Girald's tract on "the two most common and well-founded principles of knowledge" is the most original part of his *Logica.* To assess its place in Girald's thought requires an investigation into the proper nature of the two principles and what the Medieval commentators used to call the 'conditions' ('specific properties') of these principles, as well as what to Girald's mind plays the key role in such an inquiry, the proper subject of logic. I shall deal with these themes here briefly; they will be extensively discussed in our *Introduction* to the edition of Girald's metaphysical works." p. 37

21.   Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1997. "Le "*Guide De L'étudiant"* Et Les Exigences Particulières De La Preuve Demonstrative Selon Aristote." In *L'enseignement De La Philosophie Au Xiii Siècle. Autour Du 'Guide De L'étudiant' Du Ms. Ripoll 109.*, edited by Lafleur, Claude and Carrier, Joanne, 353-366. Turnhout: Brepols.

"Les *Seconds Analytiques,* qui constituent sans doute la pièce maîtresse de l'oeuvre logique d'Aristote et dont l'importance philosophique surpasse de beaucoup le domaine de la logique proprement dite, étaient considérés dès le Moyen Âge comme un texte extrêmement difficile. On y traite de la théorie de la démonstration poursuivant la connaissance certaine, stable et nécessaire, fondée sur des prémisses elles-mêmes nécessaires.

Après quelques remarques générales sur la nécessité de connaissances préexistantes', sur la nature de la science et de la démonstration, suivies par une énumération des opinions erronées à ce propos, le Stagirite aborde la question des conditions requises pour construire des prémisses nécessaires, qui s'appellent *condiciones principiorum* dans le vocabulaire médiéval." p. 353

22.   ———. 1997. "Guiral Ott (Giraldus Odonis) O.F.M. (1273-1349): His View of Statemental Being in His Commentary on the Sentences." In *Vestigia, Imagines, Verba. Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (Xiiith-Xivth Century)*, edited by Marmo, Costantino, 355-369. Turnhout: Brepols. Acts of the 11th Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, San Marino, 24-28 May 1994.

"The fourteenth-century Franciscan master Giraldus Odonis (Guiral Ot) who at the time he was Patriarch of Antiochia died of the plague in 1349, in Catania, Sicily, is mainly known as the unfortunate successor of the deposed Michael of Cesena as Master General of his Order and a faithful adherent of Pope John XXII in the debate on the beatific vision" p. 355

It is the intention of the present contribution to discuss the author's second question [in his commentary on the *Sentences*] which deals with *esse tertio adiacens*, or what is nowadays mostly called 'copulative being', but I would prefere to label it 'statemental being' ". p. 356

(...)

"7. Conclusion. To Odonis' mind, statemental being is a kind of being *sui generis*, so to speak, which, no doubt, is something more than a kind of being that entirely owes its existence to the soul's activity. Rather Odonois' statemental being should be regarded as the metaphysical indivision (in as far as, on the statemental level, affirmative sentences are concerned), or division (in the case of negative sentences) which exist in the realm of the *natura communis.* Thus, statemental being is the basic precondition for the existence of both real being and conceptual being, to the extent that within the domain of the *natures communis* it specifically concerns the ontological (whether essential or incidental) relationships of indivision and division that exist between the common natures. When defending against his numerous opponents the real character of statemental being, Odonis has the metaphysical reality of the realm of the common natures in mind, rather than the reality of the actual world. To put it briefly, like his doctrine of the nature of the universal, Odonis' view of statemental being clearly betrays a Platonic flavour, which makes him join the camp of the extreme realists." p. 364

23.   ———. 1997. "Gerardus Odonis O.F.M. On the Principle of Non-Contradiction and the Proper Nature of Demonstration." *Franciscan Studies* no. 54:51-67.

"One of the most original works by the Franciscan Master Gerardus Odonis (Guiralt Ot) is the third part of his *Logica, De principiis scientiarum.* This treatise is not just a commentary on Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics,* nor is it a specialized treatment of its subject matter, which is demonstrative (or rather epistemonic) knowledge, as is found in Ockham's *Sum of Logic.* Rather, Odonis took his treatise to be a supplement to the Aristotelian work, where the demonstrative principles proper to the different 'sciences' *(principia propria)* as well as those they all have in common *(principia communia)* are extensively discussed by Aristotle, but less attention is paid to the most common principles of the intellect *(principia communissima intellectus),* such as the twofold principle of noncontradiction. What Odonis means to do, then, is to discuss the well-known seven requirements concerning the proper and the common principles insofar as they apply to the principle of non contradiction (henceforth *PNC*).

(...)

Accordingly, the author has divided his treatise into ten chapters, the first of which deals with the subject matter of *PNC* and its constituents or terms. This chapter presents first ten basic assumptions *(suppositiones),* next twelve theses *(conclusiones)* together with the discussion of a number of notable statements *(notabilia)* and corollaries, and finally the refutation of objections *(dubia).*
In the present paper the *conclusiones* 6-11 concerning the nature of being as involved in *PNC* will be discussed." pp. 51-53 (Notes omitted).

24.   ———. 1997. "Foi Chrétienne Et Savoir Humain. La Lutte De Buridan Contre Les *Theologizantes*." In *Langages Et Philosophie. Hommage À Jean Jolivet*, edited by Libera, Alain de, Elamrani-Jamal, Abdelali and Galonnier, Alain, 393-409. Paris: Vrin.
"Introduction. Pendant tout le Moyen Age, comme durant la période patristique, les penseurs chrétiens se sont beaucoup intéressés aux rapports entre la raison et la foi. On sait que le principal thème de recherche et de discussion, en ce domaine, était l'harmonisation de la foi et de la raison, ce qui revenait au début à faire une apologie du le caractère rationnel de la foi, mais ce qui, chez des géants comme Anselme ou Abélard, a conduit à une élaboration de la théologie grâce à l'emploi de ce que notre collègue, Jean Jolivet, dans son étude de pionnier sur la théologie d'Abélard, a si heureusement appelé les « arts du langage (1) ». D'autre part, les penseurs médiévaux ont toujours reconnu l'importance du « dépôt de la foi » en tant que collection des vérités garanties, si bien que l'on prenait ces vérités pour des renseignements supplémentaires sur les phénomènes terrestres. Le simple « Soleil, arrête-toi » de Josué *(Livre de Josué 10, 12)* a suffi pour maintenir le système géocentrique.
A partir de la deuxième moitié du XIIIe siècle, c'est surtout la toutepuissance divine et la contingence radicale de tout le créé qui conduisent certains penseurs à regarder le monde d'un point de vue tout différent. La nouvelle attitude a dû stimuler, d'une manière générale, l'intérêt des philosophes pour les implications épistémologiques de la toute-puissance divine, en particulier pour celles qui concernent les limites de la connaissance humaine.
Jean Buridan (né en Picardie, peut-être à Béthune, vers l'an 1300, mort vers 1361) a bien fait face à ces problèmes épistémologiques. En rendant à César ce qui est à César, et à Dieu ce qui est à Dieu, il a pu déterminer sa propre attitude devant la foi et la théologie. Le philosophe picard a trouvé les *theologizantes* sur sa route. La lutte de Buridan contre leur point de vue n'était qu'un corollaire de ses idées optimistes (et bien fondées) sur les possibilités et la validité du savoir humain." p. 393
(1) J. Jolivet, *Arts du langage et théologie chez Abélard,* Paris, Vrin (Études de philosophie médiévale, LVII), 1969.

25.   ———. 1997. "The Commentaries on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*." In *L'enseignement Des Disciplines À La Faculté Des Arts (Paris Et Oxford, Xiiie-Xve Siècles). Actes Du Colloque International*, edited by Weijers, Olga and Holz, Louis, 303-312. Turnhout: Brepols.
"Considering the rich survey Professor Lohr has presented this afternoon of Medieval commentaries on Aristotle's philosophical works including *Metaphysics*, there is no point in discussing in general terms the vicissitudes of this Aristotelian work at the Parisian Faculty of Arts. On top of that, in *the lettre d'invitation* of the organizers we were asked to say something about our own recent research in the field under discussion. Therefore I shall confine myself to John Buridan's (c. 1290-c. 1360) commentaries on *Metaphysics.* Fortunately, Buridan's activity as a commentator on *Metaphysics* may to a large degree be regarded as representative of the period. As we learn from Lohr's survey, from the fourteenth century only some five commentaries on this important Aristotelian writing are extant, quite unlike the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, from which a considerable amount of such works have survived. (*)" p. 303
(*) For the reception of the *Metaphysics* into the curriculum of the Parisian Faculty of Arts see A. L. Gabriel, *Metaphysics in the Curriculum of Studies of the Mediaeval Universities*. in P. Wilpert ed., *Die Melaphysik im Mittelalter. lhr Ursprung and Ihre Bedeutung* (Miscellanea Mediuevalia 2) Berlin, 1963, pp. 92-102 ; G. Leff, *Paris and Oxford Universities in the XIIIth and XIVth Centuries*, New York, 1988, p. 189 sqq.

26.   Johannes, Venator. 1999. *Johannes Venator Anglicus. Logica*. Stuttgart, Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
First critical edition from the manuscripts.
Vol. I: *Tractatus* I-II, Vol. II: *Tractatus* III-IV. *Grammatica speculativa.*
"Properly speaking, nothing is known about our author's life with all due certainty. In recent times, he is commonly identified with the English logician John Hunt(e)man listed by Emden, who was from York diocese and a master in Oxford still in the 1390's, when Paul of Venice stayed there. He is reported as a fellow of Oriel College as early as in 1373 and still being there in January 1383. He was Robert Rygge's Junior Proctor of Oxford University in 1382-3, and, like Rygge, he was delated in 1382 for sympathising with the heretic views held by John Wyclif. In 1390, he was Chancelor of Lincoln, and on June 14, 1414, he was appointed Vicar General of the Bishop of Durham. These dates of the John Huntman are all well compatible with his identification with the author Johannes Venator. It is interesting in this connection that the Vatican manuscript does ascribe the *Logica* to an English author ("Johannes Venator doctor anglicus"). Unfortunately, there is no other positive evidence so far for this plausible identification." p. 7.

27.   Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 2000. "*Logica Morelli*. Some Notes on the Semantics of a Fifteenth Century Spanish Logic." In *Medieval and Renaissance Logic in Spain. Acts of the 12th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Held at the University of Navarre (Pamplona, 26-30 May 1997)*, edited by Angelelli, Ignacio and Pérez-Ilzarbe, Paloma, 209-224. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag.

"The present paper, which is presented as a modest contribution to the general theme of our Symposium on the History of Spanish Logic, intends to highlight some interesting topics discussed in a fifteenth century introductory *Sum of Logic* which is extant in (at least) two Spanish manuscripts.

When visiting Spanish libraries in the Autumn of 1971 I came across a copy of a *Sum of Logic* in the Biblioteca Capitular Colombina at Sevilla (cod. 7-3-13). This work attracted my attention because of its clear design and lucid execution. Another copy of this work turned up in the Biblioteca del Cabildo Metropolitano at Zaragoza (cod. 15-57), under the name "Logica Morelli", and was dated 1476.

(...)

The work consists of five parts:

(1) the logic of terms, including the well-known properties of terms, supposition, ampliation, and appellation.

(2) the logic of propositions, including their various "probationes" (in the wake of Richard Billingham, *Speculum,* and the widespread adaptations of this work)

(3) the theory of argumentation

(4) the doctine of the predicables and the categories

(5) the doctrine of the so-called "obligations".

(...)

This treatise seems to nicely testify to fifteenth-century logical education in Spain. We owe a survey of the contents of this work together with a description of the two manuscripts to our colleague Joke Spruyt." pp. 209-210-

[A printed edition of the work is now available: *Logica Morelli* - Edited from the manuscripts with an introduction, notes and indices by Joke Spruyt - Turnhout, Brepols, 2003]

28.   John, Buridan. 2001. *Johannes Buridanus. Summulae Viii: De Demonstrationibus*. Groningen: Ingenium Publishers.

29.   Nicolas, d'Autrecourt. 2001. *Nicolas D'autrecourt. Correspondance, Articles Condamnés*. Paris: Vrin.

Texte latin établi par L. M. de Rijk; introduction, traduction et notes par Christophe Grellard.

French translation of: *Nicholas of Autrecourt. His correspondence with Master Giles and Bernard of Arezzo*.

30.   Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 2002. *Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology. Volume I: General Introduction. The Works on Logic*. Leiden: Brill.

From the Preface: "In this book I intend to show that the ascription of many shortcomings or obscurities to Aristotle resulted from persistent misinterpretation of key notions in his work. The idea underlying this study is that commentators have wrongfully attributed anachronistic perceptions of 'predication', and statement-making in general to Aristotle. In Volume I, what I consider to be the genuine semantics underlying Aristotle's expositions of his philosophy are culled from the *Organon*. Determining what the basic components of Aristotle's semantics are is extremely important for our understanding of his view of the task of logic -- his strategy of argument in particular.

In chapter 1, after some preliminary considerations I argue that when analyzed at deep structure level, Aristotelian statement-making does not allow for the dyadic 'S is P' formula. An examination of the basic function of 'be' and its cognates in Aristotle's philosophical investigations shows that in his analysis statement-making is copula-less. Following traditional linguistics I take the 'existential' or hyparctic use of 'be' to be the central one in Greek *(pace* Kahn), on the understanding that in Aristotle hyparxis is found not only in the stronger form of 'actual occurrence' but also in a weaker form of what I term 'connotative (or intensional) be' (1.3-1.6). Since Aristotle's 'semantic behaviour', in spite of his skilful manipulation of the diverse semantic levels of expressions, is in fact not explicitly organized in a well-thought-out system of formal semantics, I have, in order to fill this void, formulated some semantic rules of thumb (1.7).

In chapter 2 I provide ample evidence for my exegesis of Aristotle's statement-making, in which the opposition between 'assertible' and 'assertion' is predominant and in which 'is' functions as an assertoric operator rather than as a copula (2.1-2.2). Next, I demonstrate that Aristotle's doctrine of the categories fits in well with his view of copula-less statement-making, arguing that the ten categories are 'appellations' ('nominations') rather than sentence predicates featuring in an 'S is P' formation (2.3-2.4). Finally, categorization is assessed in the wider context of Aristotle's general strategy of argument (2.5-2.7).

In the remaining chapters of the first volume (3-6) I present more evidence for my previous findings concerning Aristotle's 'semantic behaviour' by enquiring into the role of his semantic views as we find them in the several tracts of the *Organon,* in particular the *Categories De interpretatione* and *Posterior Analytics.* These tracts are dealt with *in extenso,* in order to avoid the temptation to quote selectively to suit my purposes."

31.   ———. 2002. *Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology. Volume Ii: The Metaphysics, Semantics in Aristotle's Strategy of Argument*. Leiden: Brill.

From the Preface to the first volume: "The lion's part of volume two (chapters 7-11) is taken up by a discussion of the introductory books of the *Metaphysics* (A-E) and a thorough analysis of its central books (Z-H-O). I emphasize the significance of Aristotle's semantic views for his metaphysical investigations, particularly for his search for the true *ousia.* By focusing on Aristotle's semantic strategy I hope to offer a clearer and more coherent view of his philosophical position, in particular in those passages which are often deemed obscure or downright ambiguous.

In chapter 12 1 show that a keen awareness of Aristotle's semantic modus operandi is not merely useful for the interpretation of his metaphysics, but is equally helpful in gaining a clearer insight into many other areas of the Stagirite's sublunar ontology (such as his teaching about Time and Prime matter in *Physics*). In the Epilogue (chapter 13), the balance is drawn up. The unity of Aristotelian thought is argued for and the basic semantic tools of localization and categorization are pinpointed as the backbone of Aristotle's strategy of philosophic argument.

My working method is to expound Aristotle's semantic views by presenting a running commentary on the main lines found in the *Organon* with the aid of quotation and paraphrase. My findings are first tested (mainly in Volume II) by looking at the way these views are applied in Aristotle's presentation of his ontology of the sublunar world as set out in the *Metaphysics,* particularly in the central books (ZHO). As for the remaining works, I have dealt with them in a rather selective manner, only to illustrate that they display a similar way of philosophizing and a similar strategy of argument. In the second volume, too, the exposition is in the form of quotation and paraphrase modelled of Aristotle's own comprehensive manner of treating doctrinally related subjects: he seldom discussed isolated problems in the way modern philosophers in their academic papers, like to deal with special issues tailored to their own contemporary philosophic interest."

32.   ———. 2003. "Boethius on *De Interpretatione* (Ch. 3): Is He a Reliable Guide?" In *Boèce Ou La Chaîne Des Savoirs. Actes Du Colloque International De La Fondation Singer Polignac (Paris, 8-12 Juin 1999)*, edited by Galonnier, Alain, 207-227. Paris: Peeters Publishers.

"There can be no doubt whatsoever about Boethius's exceptional merits for transmitting Aristotle's logic to us. But while 'Aristotelian' logic is in many respects synonymous with 'Aristotelico-Boethian' logic, the question can be raised whether Aristotle himself was an 'Aristotelian'. To give just one example: from Lukasiewicz onwards there has been much debate among scholars about the telling differences between traditional syllogistic and that of the *Prior Analytics*. (1)

In this paper I intend to deal with two specimens of Boethius's way of commenting upon Aristotle's text. They are found in his discussion of *De interpretatione*, chapters 2 and 3, which present Aristotle's views of *ónoma* and *rhema*. (2) One concerns the semantics of indefinite names, the other that of isolated names and verbs." p. 227

(1) Jan Lukasiewicz, *Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic*, Oxford, 1951.
G. Patzig, *Aristotle's Theory of the Syllogism. A logico-philological study of Book A of the Prior Analytics*, Dordrecht, 1969.

(2) *Rhema* properly stands for 'what is said of', including not only our 'verb' but also adjectives, when used in attributive position. One should realise, however, that 'verb' refers to a word class, rather than a semantic or syntactical category, as *rhema* does.

(...)

"Conclusion. Returning now to Boethius' manner of commenting upon Aristotle's texts, the following points can be made:

[1] In the wake of Ammonius, (3) Boethius explains [De int.] 16b22-25 on the apophantic level, i.e. in terms of statement-making, instead of framing significative concepts, i.e. on the onomastic level.

[2] Whereas in Ammonius' report of the predecessors, Alexander and Porphyry, as well as his own exposition of the issue, there are many clues to the previous alternative reading and interpretation on the onomastic level, Boethius does not even refrain from cleansing the text (including his 'quotations'), by changing, at any occurrence, '*ens*' into '*est*'.

[3] In doing so, Boethius decisively influenced the commentary tradition on account of the purport of De int. 3, 16b19-25. He effectively contributed to the common verdict on this paragraph in terms of 'a curious medley'.

[4] As far as the semantics of the indefinite verb (3, 16b14-15) is concerned, Boethius' apparently adhering to the so-called 'Ammonii recensio' was far less desastrous for the common understanding of Aristotle on this score, and, in effect, merely provided us with some stimulating Medieval discussions of the semantics of term infinitation.

[5] Finally by way of speculative surmise, it might be suggested that both the fact that Boethius dealt with the 'Ammonii recognise' without reading it in his lemma of 16b14-15, as well as his rather ruthlessly interfering in the quotations of the pre-Ammonian sources, should make it more plausible that Boethius had extensive, but incomplete marginal notes to his Greek text of Aristotle at his disposal, rather than a full copy of Ammonius' commentary (or those of other Greek commentators).

To comment upon Aristotle's work naturally includes developing his lore. But nothing can ever guarantee that this will happen *ad mentem auctoris*. (4)"
(3) It is unmistakably plain that in *De int.* ch. 3, Boethius is strongly influenced by what he read in Ammonius (or in marginal notes on Ammonius' view).
(4) Cf. the interesting paper on this subject by Frans A.J. de Haas, "Survival of the Fittest? Mutations of Aristotle's Method of Inquiry in Late Antiquity" (forthcoming). [Conference: *The Dynamics of Natural Philosophy in the Aristotelian Tradition (and beyond)*, Nijmegen, 16-20 August 1999.]

33. ———. 2003. "The Logic of Indefinite Names in Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, and Radulphus Brito."
In *Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages. Essays on the Commentary Tradition*, edited by Braakhuis, Henk A.G. and Kneepkens, Corneli Henri, 207-233. Groningen: Ingenium Publishers.
"Aristotle's doctrine of indefinite names (nouns) was handed down to the Middle Ages together with Boethius' comments and explanations. Boethius' view of the matter has two characteristic features. For one thing, there is a certain ambiguity on his part concerning the precise semantic value of such terms; for another, Boethius deviates considerably from Aristotle in that he explicitly assigns the property of 'holding indifferently of existents and non-existents' not only to the indefinite *rhéma* (as it is found in Aristotle, De interpr. 3, 16b15) but to the indefinite name (*onoma*) as well.
Until the end of the 12th century the logic and grammar (1) of indefinite terms (nouns and verbs) was a much debated issue. Although assiduously echoing the well-known *auctoritates* Medieval thinkers did not always go the whole way with their predecessors. For example, Abelard and Scotus, starting from their own philosophical tenets, more or less inconspicuously corrected some dubious elements in Boethius' interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of the indefinite name. Peter Abelard, especially, took great pains to precisely define the meaning of indefinite terms. He focussed his attention on the proper meaning of indefinite terms rather than on the question whether they are 'holding indifferently of existents and non-existens'. In contrast, 13th-century scholars like Duns Scotus and Radulphus Brito based their discussion of the proper meaning of the indefinite name upon the question '*Utrum nomen infinitum aliquid ponat*' ("Whether an infinite name posits something"), which calls to mind Boethius' claim that indefinite names 'hold indifferently of existent and non-existents'.
Abelard's discussion of the proper meaning of the indefinite name is also interesting in that it helps us to gain a good understandiiip of what Boethius had in mind in claiming that the indefinite name 'siginifes an infinite number of things' ('*significat infinita*'). For, thanks to Äbelard's expositions, it becomes clear that the phrase '*significare infinita*', which, on the face of it, may be taken as referring to the extensional of the indefinite name, on closer inspection proves to concern its intension, because the controversy between Abelard and Boethius turns out to be about two different views of the indefinite name's intension rather that about any opposition of intension as against extension." pp. 207-208.

34. ———. 2003. "The Aristotelian Background of Medieval *Transcendentia*: A Semantic Approach." In *Die Logik Des Transzendentalen. Festschrift Für Jan A. Aertsen Zum 65. Geburstag*, edited by Pickavé, Martin, 3-22. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
1. Aristotle's notion of 'connotative' or 'intensional be'; 2. The so-called 'termini transcendentes' in the Middle Ages; 2.1. How to bring the general notions 'be' and 'one' into focus; 2.2. On the peculiar use of the label 'transcendens' in prioristic syllogistic; 3. On the use of 'transcendens' to bring general, extra-categorial ontic notions in focus; 3.1. The commonness of the general ontic notions; 3.2. The epistemological aspect: the emergence of the idea of conceptual primacy 3.3. On the contaminative shift to Platonic transcendence; 4. The (Aristotelian) semantic sense underlying 'transcendentia' retained; 5. Concluding remarks."
"1. As I have argued for elsewhere, the Greek notion 'ES-' or 'be' as coming to the fore in its several grammatical appearances - the infinitive *einai*, the articular participle *to on*, and the verbal noun ousia - not only refers to what is actually there ('exists') or actually is the case, but can also represent a form of 'be' that does not, as such, include actual existence, and indeed indicates the general ontic condition that underlies, and is in fact connoted by, any categorial designations. To Aristotle in particular, each and every noun includes what I have termed 'connotative' or 'intensional' be-ing. (...)" The semantic view that every nominal or verbal sememe by connotation contains the fundamental notion of be-ing is at the basis of Aristotle's argument against Plato. To Plato, transcendent Being is the fullness of Forms (later called 'plenitude formarum'), whereas particular forms existing in the outside world are merely as many shares of such-and-such be-ing in virtue of which the outside things share in the transcendent Source of Beingness. In Aristotle, things are quite different: there is no being-ness other that what is found in particular beings. It is their immanent forms which are constitutive of their (modes of) be-ing, rather than some putative transcendent Source (on the contrary, as it is worded later on: 'forma dat esse'). By itself, 'be' even is a categorially empty notion The fact that to Aristotle, 'be-ing' is a categorially empty notion by no means implies that Aristotle should be unaware of the fundamental importance of the notion of be-ing when it comes to metaphysical investigation. It need not come as a surprise that it is in his "Metaphysics" that the notion of 'be-ingness' (ousia) is the very nucleus of the metaphysical search for the quiddity of things: this search concerns true 'ousia' or true 'being-ness'. All things considered, despite his obstinately arguing for the (categorial!) emptiness of the notion 'be', Aristotle recognizes the basic sememe of 'be-ing'

present in each and every categorial notion, and at the same time he is, to some extent, aware that there are also some other general ontic notions, which are equally fundamental to metaphysics." pp. 3-4

35. Giraldus, Odonis. 2005. *Giraldus Odonis O.F.M. Opera Philosophica. Vol Ii. De Intentionibus*. Leiden: Brill.
Contents: Acknowledgements XIII; Introduction 1;
A study on the medieval intentionality debate up to ca. 1350 (pp. 19-371) by L. M. de Rijk.
Chapter I. Preliminary matters p. 19; Chapter II. The common doctrine of Cognition ca 1260 p. 41; Chapter III. The "epistemological turn" around 1270 p. 79; Chapter IV. The intentionality issue before Faversham and Radulphus Brito p. 113; Chapter V. Simon Faversham on Second Intentions p. 165; Chapter VI. Radulphus Brito on intentionality p. 191; Chapter VII. Hervaeus Natalis's Treatise *De secundis intentionibus* p. 251 Chapter VIII. Giraldus Odonis's Treatise *De intentionibus* p. 303; Chapter IX. Conclusion p. 333; Bibliography p. 359; List of manuscripta referred to p. 373; Text of *De intentionibus* p. 377-596;
Appendices p. 597; A. William of Ware (Guillelmus Guarro) p. 607; B. James of Metz (Jacobus Mettensis) p. 619; C. Hervé Nédellec (Hervaeus Natalis) p. 625; D. Durand of St. Pourçain (Durandus de S. Porciano) p. 635; E. Raoul le Breton (Radulphus Brito) p. 643; F. Pierre d'Auriole (Petrus Aureolus) p. 695; G. Franciscus de Prato p. 749; H. Stephan of Rieti (Stephanus de Reate) p. 777
Indices p. 823; A. Indices locorum p. 825; B. Index nominum p. 839; C. Index verborum rerumque notabilium p. 845-894.
"This volume contains the first critical edition of Girald Odonis (d. 1349), *De intentionibus*, in which the author deals with the multifarious problems around conceptualization with which philosophers and theologians from around 1300 were faced when attempting to bridge the gap between thought and reality. Girald appears to have been an unyielding defender of the 'realistic' position, holding that our variously articulated concepts (*intentiones*) are representative of as many distinctions in Reality. The main target of his severe criticism upon contemporaneous views of the matter is Hervé de Nédellec, who was the first to write a monograph *De intentionibus*, which betrays his adherence to a moderate realism. The editor's extensive study of the intentionality debate of those years focusses on the development of the cognition theory in the period between Thomas Aquinas and Peter Auriol (d. 1322)."

36. Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 2005. "Girald Odonis on the Real Status of Some Second Intentions." *Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale* no. 16:515-551.

37. ———. 2006. "Giraldus Odonis, Godfrey Fontaines, and Peter Auriol on the Principle of Individuation." In *"Ad Ingenii Acuitionem". Studies in Honour of Alfonso Maierù*, edited by Caroti, Stefano, Imbach, Ruedi, Kaluza, Zénon, Stabile, Giorgio and Sturlese, Loris, 403-436. Louvain-la-Neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales.
"Everyone interested in the history of philosophy knows that the problem of the universal has played a predominant role. Ockham may indeed have tried to highlight the importance of this problem by nullifying its counterpart, the problem of individuation, to the great majority of Medieval thinkers, however, the problem area surrounding the principle of individuation remained of serious interest. Against the background of the phenomenon of universality as strictly required for obtaining genuine knowledge, they kept regarding the individuality issue as a source of philosophic and theological perplexity which could not be underestimated with impunity. The purport of this paper is to evaluate Girald Odonis's treatment of the individuation issue (In II Sent., dist. 6, q. 4, and, in addition, In III Sent., dist. 1, qq. 1-3) in the context of what others brought forward on the subject, particularly Godfrey of Fontaines and Peter Auriol.
As Russel Friedman has rightly observed, from the beginnings of 14th century onwards, the *Sentences* commentary came into its own as a preferred medium of scholastic theological and philosophical discourse, certainly rivaling in this respect, and often outshining, other vehicles of theological expression (e. g. *Quodlibetal questions, Summae*, Biblical commentaries). The Ftanciscan Master, Giraldus Odonis (c. 1280-1349) was among the numerous scholars who were beginning to use the *Sentences* commentary as a vehicle for mature thought about a gamut of controversial philosophic as well as theological issues. Therefore the occurrence of this philosophically hotly debated item in his *Sentences* commentary cannot come as a surprise.
In the sixth *Distinctio* of the Second Book, Gerald comes (in the fourth question) to speak about the individuation problem, asking what it is in virtue of which there is a multiplication of individuals within one species. He proposes to deal with this question by firstly summing up a number of previous or current opinions, then to advance his own position, and thirdly to reply to the ins and outs, including the backgrounds of the rival positions." pp. 403-404 (notes omitted).

38. Johannes, Buridanus. 2008. *Johannes Buridanus Lectura Erfordiensis in I-Vi Metaphysicam, Together with the 15th-Century Abbreviatio Caminensis*. Turnhout: Brepols.
Introduction, critical edition and indexes by L. M. de Rijk.
"The aim of the present edition is to make two texts available which can throw some more light on the role of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* in 14th-15th academic teaching. One of them contains part of an early

(hitherto unknown) version of John Buridan's *Questions on Metaphysics*, the other is a 15th century abbreviation of precisely this early version. Remarkably, both texts belong to the East European tradition of Buridan's works, which is the more interesting as they testify to the master's earlier activities as a Parisian teacher on the subject of metaphysics. In particular, they elucidate Buridan's ongoing semantic approach to matters of metaphysics and ontology as well as his attitude to Aristotle's authority."

39. Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 2011. *Hervaeus Natalis. De Quattuor Materiis, Sive Determinationes Contra Magistrum Henricum De Gandavo. Vol. I*. Turnhout: Brepols.
De formis (together with his *De unitate formae substantialis in eodem suppositio*).
"The aim of the present edition of Harvey Nedellec's D*e quattuor materiis* is to make a collection of texts available that can throw some more light upon the ongoing debates around 1300 about some highly controversial issues, including the plurality of forms, the relationship between being and essence, the significance (or superfluity) of the intelligible species, and the intellect's priority to the will. Harvey's polemic interventions, which are explicitly directed against the ontological positions held by Henry of Ghent, are the more interesting as they are coloured by a manifest animosity against his opponent and the Ghentian way of doing philosophy in general. The author's attitude is most prominent in the first tract of the collection presented in the first volume, *De formis*. In order to put the impact of this tract into a larger perspective, Harvey's extensive treatise *De unitate formae substantialis in eodem supposito* has been added."

40. De Rijk, Lambertus Marie. 2013. "Semantics and Ontology. An Assessment of Medieval Terminism." In *Medieval Supposition Theory Revisited. Studies in Memory of L. M. De Rijk*, edited by Bos, Egbert Peter, 13-59. Leiden: Brill.
Also published as Volume 51, 1-4 (2013) of *Vivarium*.
Acts of the XVIIth European Symposium for Medieval Logic and Semantics, held the University of Leiden, 2nd, 7th June. 2008.
"This paper aims to assess medieval terminism, particularly supposition theory, in the development of Aristotelian thought in the Latin West. The focus is on what the present author considers the gist of Aristotle's strategy of argument, to wit conceptual focalization and categorization. This argumentative strategy is more interesting as it can be compared to the modern tool known as 'scope distinction'."

41. Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 2013. *Hervaeus Natalis. De Quattuor Materiis, Sive Determinationes Contra Magistrum Henricum De Gandavo. Vol. Ii*. Turnhout: Brepols.
De esse et essentia. De materia et forma. A Critical Edition from Selected Manuscripts.
"This second volume presents a critical study of Hervaeus Natalis's *De quattuor materiis*, and compares it with the rival systems of the metaphysics of creation that were upheld by Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent.
This second volume of Hervaeus Natalis's polemical work, *De quattuor materiis* contains his *De esse et essentia*. In this work the author criticizes the rival systems of the metaphysics of creation that were upheld by Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent, and presents an exposition of his own notion of being. To explain Harvey's antagonistic attitude to Henry of Ghent and his simultaneous rejection of Giles's positions (the rigid Aegidian real distinction between essence and existence in particular) it was necessary to provide a thorough investigation of the ontological positions of both Henry and Giles. Hence the lion's part of the Introduction is devoted to these two rivals of Harvey's.
The selection of the manuscripts used for the present edition of *De esse et essentia* as well as the *ratio edendi,* orthography, punctuation and headings employed, are explained in the General Introduction to volume one, *De formis*.
This second volume had been finished by the editor, L. M. de Rijk, just before his sudden death on July 30, 2012. The final version has been read by Joke Spruyt and Olga Weijers.
The third and last volume of the edition of Hervaeus' work, already well advanced by the editor, will be finished by two of his main disciples: Henk Braakhuis and Onno Kneepkens. Thus we will have kept our promise, in respect and friendship for our master."

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