
"Two camps of scholars interpreting Parmenides' poem have recently been distinguished and labeled as the Majority and the Minority. The former holds that, unlike the Alêtheia part, the Doxa part presents an altogether untrue account of things that properly speaking have no real existence. According to the Minority, however, the Doxa was put forward as possessing some kind or degree of cognitive validity. I shall try to show that both these two positions are ambiguous and accordingly fail in giving a clear insight into what Parmenides intends to tell us. They both seem to need correction to the extent that Parmenides does distinguish the Alêtheia route from the Doxa route(s), but there is nothing in the text to tell us that he makes a distinction between two separate domains, one true and the other untrue. As any genuine philosopher he was concerned about the sensible world, our world and it was that which he wanted to truly understand." pp. 29-30

(...)

One cannot deny that Heraclitus faced the primitive approach of the physicists in a radical way. So Parmenides in defending another steady inner nature ('Be-ing') sees in him his most dangerous rival. No wonder that his offences against Heraclitus are the most bitter. And indeed he tries to bring Heraclitus into the company of those who, two-headed as they are, are not able to make the great decision. Subsequent thinkers had to take into account Parmenides' doctrine and in fact could not help digesting its rigidity. Plato was the first to take the big decision so seriously that he left the idea of one world as approached by mortals along two different Routes and settled on the assumption of two separate worlds, one of Unshakable Being, the other of Unreliable Becoming. Aristotle, for his part, thought it possible to dispose of Plato's *chorismos* and find the inner nature of things right in themselves. No doubt it is Parmenides, cited by Fr. Owens as 'one of the truly great philosophic geniuses in the history of Western thought,' (*) who was the catalyst of all subsequent metaphysics" p. 53


"Some years ago the late Jan Pinborg drew our attention to Burley's early work on propositions which contains some syncategorematic terms effecting an exclusion ('tantum'; 'solus'; 'only'). (...) The treatise is found in only three manuscripts, and one of these contains only its beginning. It belongs to the oldest group of logical writings which may be assigned to this famous English logician whose great renown is mainly due to his sagacious tract *De puritate artis logicae*. The earlier corpus comprises six tracts which in fact form a course of logic in general use in those days:


(2) *De exclusivis*, which will be edited here

(3) *De exceptivis*, which will be edited in the next issue of this journal


See also: "Reply to Professor de Rijk's 'Martin M. Tweedale on Abailard: some criticisms of a fascinating venture' by Martin M. Tweedale in: Vivarium (25), 1987 pp. 3-22 and the postscript by L.M. de Rijk. id. p. 23.

"Some years ago Martin M. Tweedale wrote a book on a quite fascinating subject: Abailard on Universals (North Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, New York, Oxford, 1976). (...) Mr. Tweedale's study is bound to give any of his readers the firm impression that, as logician, Peter Abailard has accomplished a tremendous achievement. Unfortunately, however, Tweedale, (....) is on the wrong track in claiming-throughout his study-that the modern interpreter has to 'ferret' Abailard's answers out of 'rather obscure passages' (p. 7), and that he is inconsistent (p. X and passim). Tweedale has failed to appreciate Abailard's lucidity and clear language. He has missed the point several times and more than once this is due to his defective knowledge of Latin. However, let me not move too hurriedly to my conclusion.

In writing this book, the author had two main objectives in mind, as we learn from the Preface. First, 'to present in a form easily accessible to professional philosophers, theologians and historians those scattered portions of Abailard's logical writings which seem to record a very original scrutiny of the foundations of logic and in particular the problem of universals'. Secondly, 'to interpret the texts in a way that would connect them with the ancient tradition and also make them intelligible to contemporary philosophers.' So chapters I and II try to give an insight into the classical and post-classical background. The core of the essay is to be found in Chapters III-V; Chapter VI contains a comparison between Abailard and Frege.

Without doubt, the author has succeeded in enlarging the modern scholar's acquaintance with, and admiration of, Abailard as a logician and early Medieval philosopher and theologian. Even someone who has had only a glimpse of the contents of this rich essay, cannot help experiencing a kind of thrill on realising that he is meeting in Peter Abailard a remarkable and original thinker.

However, to write a successful book something more is needed. To my mind the author was heavily hampered in realising the two objectives he had set himself, as a result of his poor knowledge of (both classical and Medieval) Latin grammar and syntax. Sometimes his judgment of Abailard's achievements is incorrect, for no other reason than his inability to correctly read Abailard's concise language." 81-82


Translation from Dutch by Pierre Swiggers of: Middeleeuwse wijsbegeerte. Traditie en vernieuwing, Assen, 1981

"Le présent ouvrage rassemble un nombre de cours préparatoires, tous consacrés à la philosophie médiévale. L'auteur y insiste sur le problème du caractère spécifique de cette philosophie. Il cherche à préciser son propre point de vue, e.a. par la mise-en-caus des problèmes posés par la philosophie de l'histoire. Son classement de la philosophie au Moyen Age part de la même trame. Le chapitre IV traite de la méthode scolastique et fournit des renseignements sur les points de départ des penseurs médiévaux dans le domaine des différentes disciplines.

Dans le chapitre sur la croyance et la connaissance au Moyen Age l'auteur commence par donner un exposé général du problème et ensuite il trace son évolution au moyen des preuves de l'existence de Dieu, d'Anselme (11e s.) jusqu'à Guillaume d'Ockham (14e s.). Une analyse de l'ontologie de Thomas d'Aquin donne lieu à l'auteur d'étudier la confrontation des pensées néoplatonicienne et aristotélicienne de l'époque. Le chapitre sur la logique et la sémantique médiévales permet au lecteur de s'initier à la relation entre la sémantique et le point de vue philosophique d'un auteur du Moyen Age.

Le dernier chapitre traite de la différence profonde entre le classicisme médiéval et le scepticisme de penseurs comme Montaigne. L'auteur montre que Descartes a été profondément influencé par la pensée médiévale en ce qui concerne sa victoire du scepticisme."

TABLE DES MATIÈRES. Avant-propos de l'édition française XI; 1. Le Moyen Age: période 'typiquement médiévale'? 1; 2. Périodisation, critique des sciences et philosophie de l'histoire 25; 3. La division de la philosophie médiévale 65; 4. La méthode scolastique 82; 5. Croire et savoir: les arguments pour l'existence de dieu d'Anselme à Occam 106; 6. La métaphysique de l'être chez saint Thomas d'Aquin (1) 142; 7. La métaphysique de l'être chez saint Thomas d'Aquin (2) 164; 8. Lasupposition naturelle: une pierre de touche pour les points de vue philosophiques 183; 9. Scepticisme antique et critique médiéval 204; Notes 219; Index 235.


"Here is the edition of Walther Burley's early tract on the so-called 'exceptive propositions.' For some information on it, see the Introduction preceding my edition of Burley's De exclusivis, in this journal, vol. 23 (1985), pp. 23-54. Contents
Chapters

1-3 Introductio

4 Regula 1a: omnis propositio in parte vera et in parte falsa potest verificari per exceptionem

5-15 Dubitatio

16 Regula 2a: exceptiva est priaecenti instantia

17-23 Instantiae

24 Regula 3a: si tot excipiuntur quot supponuntur, exceptiva est impropria

25-34 Instantiae

35-69 DE SUPPOSITIONE IN EXCEPTIVA

36-40 De suppositione subiecti

41-61 De suppositione partis extracapte

42-45 De prima opinione

46-54 De secunda opinione

55-62 De tertia opinione

63-69 De suppositione predicati

70-84 DE HABITUDINE INTER EXCEPTIVAM ET EXCLUSIVAM

70-77 An omnis exclusiva inferat exceptivam et econverso

78-82 An exceptiva inferatur ex negativa exponente exclusive

83-84 An exceptiva inferatur ex affirmativa exponente exclusive

85-91 UTRUM EXCEPTIVA POSSIT ESSE FALSA, UTRAQUE EXPONENTE EXISTENTE VERA

92-99 AN POST EXCEPTIONEM FIAT DISTRIBUTIO

100-109 QUID DETERMINET PREPOSITIO CUM SUO CASUALI


Contents. Preface 9; Preliminary: Plato's Sophist to be reconsidered? 11; Introduction 13; Chapter 1. The dispute about interpreting Plato 22; Chapter 2. The evolution of the doctrine of Eidos 30; Reconsidering Plato's Sophist 69; Chapter 3. The dialogue's main theme and procedure 71; Chapter 4. On current views about 'what is not' 82; Chapter 5. On current views about 'what is' 93; Chapter 6. Plato's novel metaphysical position 103; Chapter 7. The variety of names and the communion of kinds 110; Chapter 8. An important digression on dialectic 126; Chapter 9. The communion of kinds; Chapter 10. How the five kinds combine 159; Chapter 11. The reinstatement of 'what is not' (256d-259d) 164; Chapter 12. On philosophic and sophistic discourse 186; The framework: semantics and philosophy in Plato; Chapter 13. Plato's semantics in the Cratylus 217; Chapter 14. Naming and representing 254; Chapter 15. Language and knowing 277; Chapter 16. Semantics and metaphysics 327; Bibliography 355; Index of passages quoted or referred to 365; Index of proper names 377; Index of terms and topics 383-394.

From the Preface: "The way in which Plato announces (Sophist, 249c-d) his novel metaphysics has been puzzling modern scholars for a long time: 'What is and the All consist of what is changeless and what is in change, both together'. Did Plato really introduce Change into the Transcendent World and thus abandon his theory of Unchangeable Forms?

Many of Plato's commentators have claimed that the use of modern techniques of logico-semantical analysis can be a valuable aid in unravelling this problem and other difficulties Plato raised and attempted to solve. However, not all modern distinctions and tools can be applied without reservation; for many of these are entirely alien to Plato's thought. Interpreters of Plato must also resist the temptation of applying methods as disjointing the dialogue and selecting specific passages only, in their eagerness to prove that Plato was explicitly interested in (their own favourite) problems of 'identity and predication' (not to mention such oddities as the 'self-predication of Forms'), or the distinctions between different senses (or applications) of 'is'.

The present author has tried to understand Plato by a close reading of the complete dialogue and to relate the doctrinal outcome of the Sophist to Plato's general development. Close reading Plato involves following him in his own logico-scientific approach to the metaphysical problems, an approach which shows his deep interest in the manifold ways to 'name' (or to 'introduce into the universe of discourse') 'what is' (or the 'things there are').

The reader may be sure that my indebtedness to other authors on this subject is far greater than it may appear from my text. Also many of those who have gone in quite different directions than mine have been of great importance to me in sharpening my own views and formulations. Two authors should be mentioned nominativum: Gerold Prauss and the late Richard Bluck; two scholars, whose invaluable works deserve far more attention than they have received so far.

I owe my translations of the Greek to predecessors. Where I have not followed them, my rendering is no doubt often painfully (and perhaps barbarously) literal: I do not wish to incur the suspicion of trying to improve Plato by modernising him."


problem of being.
First, Abelard makes us recognize the peculiar nature of the substantive verb 'to be' ('esse'), peculiar indeed, since it is the only verb that is capable of conjoining but, at the same time, when serving, thus, as a device for predication, conveys, due to its proper invention, the notion of 'substantiality' ('essentia'). As was said before (above, p. 109), Abelard's entire discussion of the problem is ostensibly concerned with mastering the antagonism between coupling and predication. First, he considers the vicissitudes the predicate noun cannot escape undergoing as the very result of this antagonism and finds a remedy in splitting up the different strata present in nouns such as 'album' ('the or a white thing'). In this endeavour, the chimera and the like (the 'non-existent') turn out to be a real spoil-sports.
In the Dialectica, then, Abelard maintains, a a whole, his previous position (which is found in two parts of the Logica Ingredientibus, viz. the Perihermeneias commentary and the one on Boethius De topicis differentis), but sets on to refine it in that he gives the coupling of 'substantiality' a predominant position over and against the predication of a (substantial or accidental) form. However, he aptly combines this move (quite unavoidably, it may seem) with a subtle emptying of the notion of 'essentia' ('substantiality'), with the result that, from now on, 'est' ('is') has developed into a mere container (meaning 'undetermined substantiality') for a 're-al' ('thing-like') content (or sememe) conveyed by a predicate noun (which also may be a participle of an ordinary verb). An additional result is that, on this interpretation, the existential import seems to come from the predicate noun, so that our chimera is no longer a spoil-sports. Finally, the empty-container view of the copula is completed by Abelard's suggestion to take the 'is' plus the predicate noun as merely one linguistic construct.
(....)
However this may be, Abelard's achievements in semantics are astonishingly great and even remain unparalleled for centuries." pp. 123-124 and 125.
Note: This paper is meant as a continuation to the series 'On ancient and mediaeval semantics and metaphysics' published in this Journal [Vivarium] from 1977-82. For bibliographical reasons the original title has been dropped and the studies will be continued under separate titles.

"When speaking of ethics in this connection, we are not referring to a 'doctrine on human behaviour'; rather it is to be understood as the philosophical (or theological) pursuit concerning the justification of such a theory. Beforehand it must be said that Abelard's Ethica seu Scito te ipsum can be regarded as a theological work in being part of the curriculum presented in theological training. The central question this work deals with can be expressed as follows: what are the exact standards by which human behaviour is judged good or evil?
One should not ask whether Abelard's Ethics is a theological or philosophical work, for that is not the point. As we have already mentioned, ethics was part of theological enquiry and teaching. This answer is not a final one, however. For Abelard's conception of theology was such that philosophy, as an ultimate rational justification, was certainly admitted to theology, but, moreover, it even implied that philosophy was an essential constituent of fundamental theological enquiry. We must examine his Ethics in detail in order to see how Abelard in fact discusses the issue." p. 1

"Introductory
This study is written in honour of a scholar who, among many other things, has laid the solid basis for the study of what may be considered the kernel of the semantics of the statement-making utterance, viz. the definition of the bearers of truth and falsity.
In the first section I present a survey of Plato's semantics of the statement-making expression and a number of key notions involved. Next, I explore Aristotle's views of the matter, starting with a discussion of Aristotle's notion of pragma including that of being qua truth and not-being qua falsehood. In search for the nature of Aristotle's logos, I discuss this notion as it occurs on the onomazein level as well as the way in which it acts on the legein level. Next, I investigate the important notions of synthesis and dihaeresis and the role of einai as a monadic functor and qua syncategorematic container of categorial being. Finally, I attempt to present a characterization of Aristotle's statement-making utterance.
(...)
"Epilogue
We may summarize what we have found as follows:
1 For Plato,
1.1 A **logos** is a composite expression consisting of a name (onomata) and an attribute (rhēmata) which as such is not yet a statement-making utterance.

1.2 A logos represents a state of affairs (pragma), i.e. an actual combination of some participata (dynameis) in the outside world.

1.3 A **logos eirêmenos** is a statement-making utterance; it asserts that the pragma represented by the logos is actually the case.

2 For Aristotle,

1.1 A **logos** is a composite expression consisting of an onoma and a rhêma which represents both a notional and an ontological state of affairs. It may be characterized as a 'statable complex'.

1.2 A **pragma** is a state of affairs either ontologically: state of affairs being part of the outside world or semantically: state of affairs conceived of and expressed by a logos.

1.3 A **logos apophantikos** ('statement-making utterance') is a logos actually stated (either asserted or denied).

2.4 A logos may as such be used either on the onomazein level or on the legein level (qua logos apophantikos). Similarly, **phasis** (kataphasis, apophasis) may be used on either of these levels.

2.5 **Synthesis** is either synthesis1 = the act of uniting an onoma and a rhêma into a logos (on the onomazein level) or synthesis2 = the assertion of such a union accomplished in a logos apophantikos, (on the legein level), while **dihairesis** is always the denial of such a union (on the legein level).

2.6 The **esit** forming part of a logos apophantikos is not a copula, properly speaking. Rather, it is a sign of (it consignifies, to speak with **De interp.** 3,16b24-5) synthesis2. The onoma and rhêma are already united to make up a logos ('statable complex') by synthesis, and, then, the esit rather than acting as a dyadic copulative functor, is merely a monadic sign of the 'statable complex' being actually stated.

2.7 The propositional structure found in the logos apophantikos may be described as follows:

**Linguistically**: A logos expressing categorial being (i.e. syncategorematic being implemented by one or more of the ten categories of being) is stated (either affirmatively or negatively) by means of the monadic functor 'be' or 'not be'.

**Semantically**: The pragma represented by the logos is said to be (or not to be, respectively) part of the outside world (or: 'be (not) the case'). pp. 53-54 (notes omitted).


"Conclusion. There is no single reason, I think, to ascribe to Ockham any feelings of hostility towards metaphysics on this account. God created 'true and real being', but He created it in shaping 'what is truly and really being', individual beings, that is. As created, it is radically changeable and contingent as well. Uncreated, unchangeable being is not to be created, not even as some mysterious constituent present in creational being. Human beings are not entitled to sublimate their (indispensable) conceptual tools (e.g. universal terms) so that they represent unchangeable ontic standards. Whenever we are inclined to do so, Ockham's razor comes in, not however, to make us say that the metaphysical domain is void. Rather logic (and human thought in general) should make us recognize our own limitations, and refrain from speaking about the unspeakable when, and inasmuch as, our linguistic tools are bound to lead us astray. The same applies to Ockham's view of proofs of God's existence. He only admits the proof of God as first preserver of these actual things in this actual world and rejects all atemporal proofs. However, his faith is unshakeable and not involved in any philosophical thinking either. Likewise it is Ockham's ontology (doctrine of being) which is modest, the onta 'beings') are as abundant as they are. For that matter, Ockham let them really be (ontós einai Plato would say). Well, in order to let them be, human thinking should be prudent in cautiously managing its homemade conceptual apparatus." pp. 38-39.
nous échappe, à moins qu'elles ne soient replacées dans leur contexte sémantique. C'est bien dans le domaine de la sémantique que Gilbert est digne du vif intérêt de l'historien de la logique médiévale. Non pas seulement parce que ses expositions sont bien imprégnées de la pensée logico-grammaticale de son temps; cela n'a rien d'étonnant étant donné qu'il s'agit d'un savant de son envergure. Mais ce qui est d'un plus grand intérêt pour nous, ce sont les contributions que Gilbert a lui-même faites à l'évolution de la pensée sémantique au douzième siècle.

L'étude des œuvres théologiques de Gilbert nous permet d'avancer les deux thèses suivantes:

(1) C'est par l'étude sémantique qu'est favorisée au plus haut point notre compréhension des pensées théologiques et philosophiques du Porretain; je considère comme essentielles la manière et la mesure dont Gilbert a habillé, pour ainsi dire, sa pensée théologique et philosophique du vêtement de ses pensées grammatico-logicales.

(2) En expliquant les difficultés assez pénibles dans les opuscula sacra de Boèce, Gilbert a formulé ses propres vues sémantiques. Celles-ci, aussi empreintes de la tradition platonicienne qu'elles soient, ne témoignent pourtant pas moins d'une profondeur vraiment originale." p. 171


"IV. Schlußbetrachtung. Ockham anerkennt ohne Einschränkung den transzendentalen Bezirk, d. h. das Metaphysische oder Übersinnliche als Bezirk; in diesem Sinne ist er also gewiß kein Antimetaphysiker. Aber verwirrt er denn die Metaphysik als Wissenschaft, oder höhlt er sie zumindest aus? Zuerst muß anerkannt werden, daß Ockham im Prinzip der Metaphysik das Weisungsrecht über die Seienden (d. h., für Ockham, den individuellen Seienden) keineswegs abspricht. Zugleich kann nicht gelegen werden, daß bei ihm der Metaphysik eine auffällige Fehllage zukommt. Wie läßt sich das unter Berücksichtigung von Ockhams unzweifelhafter Ehrfurcht vor dem Übersinnlichen erklären?

Der Schlüssel zur Lösung dieser Frage liegt nicht bloß in Ockhams Ontologie des individuellen Seins, sondern auch in seinen anthropologischen Auffassungen. Der Mensch ist nach ihm in seinen Denken und Sprechen nicht imstande, das Erhabene wesentlich zu durchforschen. Dessen soll sich der Mensch fortwährend eingedenken. Dies ist für Ockham in zwei deutliche Strategien übersetzbar:

a) nicht jedem modus significandi oder loquendi entspricht ein modus essendi in der Wirklichkeit
b) viele maßgebende Aussagen, sowohl sakrale wie profane, soll man nicht de virtute sermonis (dazu reicht unser Sprechen zuwenig aus), sondern auch in seinen anthropologischen Auffassungen. Der Mensch ist nach ihm in seinen Denken und Sprechen nicht imstande, das Erhabene wesentlich zu durchforschen. Dessen soll sich der Mensch fortwährend eingedenken. Dies ist für Ockham in zwei deutliche Strategien übersetzbar:


"On sait que, comme ceux de l'Antiquité, les philosophes du moyen âge ont fait aussi leur propre vocabulaire technique.

Le but de cette courte communication est de mettre en lumière quelques difficultés spéciales du vocabulaire philosophique et théologique de Gilbert de Poitiers, auteur bien connu de la première moitié du XIIe siècle.

D'abord, il faut remarquer que ces difficultés ressortent de l'usage très personnel et très original que fait Gilbert des termes courants de la langue philosophique du XIIe siècle.

Il va de soi que ces difficultés sont délicates une fois de plus pour les philologues, en général pour les
non-initiés en ce qui concerne l'histoire de la philosophie, parce que la confusion terminologique se présente déjà dans le domaine philosophique lui-même. Aussi va-t-on commencer par quelques termes connus, c'est-à-dire les termes *substantia, subsistentia* et *subsistens* et, dans ce contexte, la différence entre *esse* et *esse aliquid*. On va essayer de placer la terminologie dans le contexte des vues philosophiques de Gilbert, en particulier de la doctrine porrétaire sur le statut ontique de la chose concrète.* p. 19.

"The aim of this paper is to argue for a twofold thesis: (a) for Aristotle the verb 'katêgorein' does not as such stand for statemental predication, let alone of the well-known 'S is P' category, and (b) 'non-statemental predication' or 'categorization' plays an important role in Ancient and Medieval philosophical procedure. 1. *Katêgorein* and *katêgoria* in Aristotle

Aristotle was the first to use the word 'category' (*katêgoria*) as a technical term in logic and philosophy. It is commonly taken to mean 'highest predicate' and explained in terms of statement-making. From the logical point of view categories are thus considered 'potential predicates'.(*)

(....

1.3 Name giving ('categorization') as the key tool in the search for 'true substance

What Aristotle actually intends in his metaphysical discussions in the central books of his *Metaphysics* (Z-Th) is to discover the proper predicate for the name 'ousia'. According to Aristotle, the primary kind of 'being' or 'being as such' (to *on hêi* on) can only be found in 'being-ness' (*ousia*; see esp. *Metaph.* 1028b2). Unlike Plato, however, Aristotle is sure to find 'being as such' in the domain of things belonging to the everyday world. Aristotle's most pressing problem is to grasp the things' proper nature qua beings. In the search for an answer name-giving plays a decisive role: the solution to the problem consists in finding the most appropriate ('essential') name so as to bring everyday being into the discourse in such a way that precisely its 'beingness' is focussed upon.

(....

2. The use of 'praedicare' in Boethius

The Greek phrase *katêgorein* ti kata tinos is usually rendered in Latin as *praedicare aliquid de aliquo*. The Latin formula primarily means 'to say something of something else' (more precisely 'of somebody'). Of course, the most common meaning of the Latin phrase is 'to predicate something of something else in making a statement of the form S = P'. However, the verb *praedicare*, just as its Greek counterpart *katêgorein*, is used more than once merely in the sense of 'naming' or 'designating by means of a certain name', regardless of the syntactic role that name performs in a statement. In such cases *praedicare* stands for the act of calling up something under a certain name (designation), a procedure that we have labelled 'categorization'.(...)

Boethius' use of *praedicare* is quite in line with what is found in other authors. Along with the familiar use of the verb for statemental predication, Boethius also frequently uses *praedicare* in the sense of 'naming' or 'designating something under a certain name' whereby the use of the designating word in predicate position is, sometimes even explicitly, ruled out." pp. 1, 4, 9-10.


Edited with introduction and indexes.
Content: I. Tractatus Vaticanus De multiplicitatibus circa orationes accidentibus -- II. Tractatus Florianus De solutionibus sophismatum -- III. Tractatus Vaticanus De communiis distinctionibus.

"1 The Ontic Constituents of Natural Bodies

There is one distinction that is of paramount importance in order for us to understand Gilbert's ontology, viz. the Boethian contradistinction of *id quod* and *id quo*. We have to start with this pair of key notions.

1.1 Preliminary: 'id quod' and 'id quo'

According to Gilbert, our world consists of a number of individual 'things'. This world and its inhabitants appear to have the following characteristics:
(a) each and every 'thing' is in fact to be considered as one self-contained entity, (a 'subsistens') whose identity and ontological unity are due to the singularity of what is proper to it (see *proprietatis singularitas*; *Eut.* 30, 88; *Trin.* 144, 58-62),
(b) however, every 'subsistent' (henceforth my rendering of Latin 'subsistens') itself consists of a plurality of forms; in addition, there are 'circumstantial features' (rather than 'forms' properly speaking) that determine its actual state or condition ('status'); *Trin.* 137, 55; cf. Nielsen(*), 56-8 and below, our nrs 1.2 and 1.72.

In fact, Gilbert's ontology is one continuous attempt to establish two basic relationships, one between a
natural thing and its Creator and the other between the thing's diverse actual constituents, which while being totally different from each other grant it its intrinsic unity at the same time.

(....)

1.9 Summary

Each inhabitant of our world Gilbert calls (following Boethius) an id quod est or subsistens. Its main constituents are the subsistentiae (or the subsistent's id quo which is sometimes taken collectively to stand for ea quibus) and these are accompanied by the 'accidents', quantity and quality. The subsistent owes its status (or transitory condition) to a collection of inferior members of the Aristotelian class of accidents, which to Gilbert's mind are rather 'accessories' or 'attachments from without' (extrinsecus affixa).

The term 'substantialia' is used both to stand for substance and substantial form (subsistentia), i.e., that by which something is subsistent (or 'is a substance').

The collection of subsistentiae (substantial forms) or the forma totius is called natura. However, 'natura' is also used to stand for either just one subsistentia or all the forms found in a subsistens even including its 'accidental' forms (quantity and quality). The inclusion of all kinds of accidents (including those inferior ones that make up a thing's status) is seldom found in the intension of the word 'natura'.

One of the key notions featuring in Gilbert's ontology is esse aliquid. 'To be a-something' has a threefold import. First, it means 'to be only some thing', and to miss perfection. Second, it has the positive sense of 'being a something', i.e. 'being determinate and well-delineated', not indefinite, not formless that is. Third, 'to be a something' implies concreteness, corporeality and singularity.' pp. 74, 111-112


Reprinted as chapter I in: Through Language to Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics. "From Parmenides onwards, ancient and medieval thought had a special liking for metaphysical speculation. No doubt, speculative thought was most influentially outlined by Plato and Aristotle. However, what the Christian thinkers achieved in metaphysics was definitely more than just applying and adapting what was handed down to them. No student of medieval speculative thought can help being struck by the peculiar fact that whenever fundamental progress was made, it was theological problems which initiated the development. This applies to St Augustine and Boethius, and to the great medieval masters as well (such as Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus). Their speculation was, time and again, focused on how the notion of being and the whole range of our linguistic tools can be applied to God's Nature (Being).

It is no wonder, then, that an inquiry into Boethius's notion of being should be concerned, first and foremost, with his theological treatises, especially De hebdomadibus.

(....)

My final section aims at showing how Boethius's notion of being is clearly articulated in accordance with his semantic distinctions. This is most clearly seen in the main argument of De hebdomadibus where they may be actually seen at work.

As is well known, the proper aim of De hebdomadibus is to point out the formal difference between esse and esse bonum, or in Boethius's words: 'the manner in which substances are good in virtue of their being, while not yet being substantially good' (38.2-4). Its method consists in a careful application of certain formal distinctions, viz.:

(a) The distinction between an object 'when taken as a subsistent whole and id quod est = the constitutive element which causes the object's actually' being: it is made in Axiom II and used in Axiom IV.

(b) The distinction (closely related to the preceding one) obtaining between the constitutive element effecting the object's actual being (forma essendi, or ipsum esse) and the object's actuality as such (id quod est or ipsum est); it is made in Axioms VII and VIII.

(c) The distinction between esse as 'pure being' (= nihil aliud praeter se habens admixtum), which belongs to any form, whether substantial or incidental, and id quod est admitting of some admixture (lit. 'something besides what it is itself'); it is made in Axiom IV and in fact implies the distinction between esse simpliciter and esse aliquid.

(d) The distinction between 'just being some thing', tantum esse aliquid, and 'being something qua mode of being'. It is made in Axiom V and used in Axiom VI and is in fact concerned with a further distinction made within the notion of id quod est. It points out the differences between the effect caused by some form as constitutive of being some thing and that caused by the main constituent (forma essendi) which causes an object's being simpliciter.

(e) The distinction between two different modes of participation, one effecting an object's being subsistent, the other its being some thing, where the 'some thing' (aliquid) refers to some (non-subsistent) quality such as 'being white', 'being wise', 'being good', etc.

The application of these distinctions enables Boethius to present a solution to the main problem: although
the objects (ea quae sunt, plural of id quod est) are (are good) through their own constitutive element, being (being good), nevertheless they are not identical with their constitutive element nor (a fortiori) with the IPSUM ESSE (BONUM ESSE) of which their constituent is only a participation." pp. 1 and 22-23.


"Gilbert's View of Transcendent Reality.

Gilbert's world consists of quite a lot of singular subsistent objects which owe their being and 'being-a-something' to a collection of forms, both subsistent and accidental. Well, God has created this world after what in the Platonic tradition was called the 'exemplary Forms'. For Gilbert, creation and concretion are two complementary notions which play an important role in his ontology. Creation is the reception of a total form or collection of subsistentiae; it is also called generation. As a natural process it amounts to 'beginning to be-of-acertain-kind'.

(...) POSTSCRIPT. In his short study on Gilbert of Poitiers (in A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy, ed. Peter Dronke, Cambridge 1988, 328-52) John Marenbon rightly argues that when presenting an account of Gilbert's thought one should not separate his philosophy from his theology. However, I fully disagree with his suggestion (p. 351) that as a metaphysician Gilbert proves to have been a thinker whose 'treatment is inadequate and confused'. On the contrary, when dealing with really intricate theological problems Gilbert of Poitiers, like many other Medieval thinkers (e.g. Thomas Aquinas), develops his (NeoPlatonic) metaphysics as a 'clear-minded and subtle writer', and so there seems to be no reason at all to oppose Gilbert against people like Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham and others. They were all real philosophers, albeit in a theological context, which as such confronted them with a series of genuinely philosophical issues. In fact, why should any historian of philosophy approach only Gilbert of Poitiers 'as a thinker who tackled a set of changeless (sic!) metaphysical problems-identical (sic!) to those which faced, for instance, Plato and Aristotle, or Kant and Hegel'?

pp. 1, 34-35.


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The volume is dedicated to L. M. De Rijk on the occasion of his 65th birthday.

Contents


On the basis of the critical edition established by L. M. De Rijk


"Far from being a sceptic William of Ockham made every effort to corroborate the basis of philosophical and theological thought by purifying it of all sorts of untenable presuppositions. His main contribution to fourteenth century philosophical and theological development lies in systematically rethinking scholastic doctrines, and especially their assumptions, on the firm basis of his own favourite leading principles: the
strictly individual nature of all that really is and the radical contingency of all creatural being.

These two principles also play a major part in Ockham's way of dealing with the Aristotelian theory of demonstration. The present paper aims at investigating Ockham's doctrine of demonstrative proof, focusing on the way in which he felt forced to adapt or rephrase the special requirements Aristotle had laid down for propositions to enter into syllogistic proof, especially strict proof (the so-called 'demonstratio potissima'). Our main argument will concern Aristotle's rather peculiar 'kath holou' requirement and Ockham's appliance of the 'kath haute' (Latin: 'per se') notion which is also involved in framing correct premisses for demonstrative proofs. A few preliminary remarks will be made about the essentials of Aristotle's theory of demonstration." p. 232

(....)

"Conclusions.

To sum up our findings: Ockham's adaptations and manipulations of Aristotle's requirements for genuine demonstrative propositions are as many demands imposed by his own metaphysical views. He comments on Aristotle, always starting from his own favourite views. Though Aristotle is the Master, Ockham is the one to say what the Master meant, or what he should have meant. On the other hand, his introducing the 'per se strictissimo modo' rather seems to be a matter of technicality. Whereas in Posterior Analytics Aristotle deals with the scientific procedure of apodeixis in general, in which the apodeictic syllogism is merely a vehicle for correctly framing an apodeixis, the Medievalists, and Ockham in particular, were apt to reduce Aristotle's theory of demonstrative proof to a theory of demonstrative syllogism. That is why the 'demonstratio potissima' (including its specific demands) so heavily influenced Ockham's theory of demonstration." p. 239


"Unlike in our days logical doctrine was very influential in the Middle Ages. Logic was indeed considered then the vehicle par excellence both in matters of teaching and scientific inquiry in any field of knowledge. When embarking upon a discussion of the specific terminology concerning logical education, some preliminary remarks seem to be indispensable.

The reader should be warned, first. Logical theory taken as such, which comprises a great mass of specifically logical terms (such as 'praedicamentum', 'predicable', 'syllogism', 'fallacy', 'supposition', 'appellation', 'ampliation', 'distribution', 'synccategorema', and so on) is out of scope now; those terms and like will be mentioned only in passing, insofar namely as they occur in educational practice.

Another remark better starts from the well-known Medieval distinction between logica docens and logica utens, the former of which being logical doctrine as developed, expounded and taught for its own sake, whereas the latter is rather logic practically applied in any sort of logical analysis or argumentation. To be sure, logica utens does not merely coincide with the more or less explicit occurrence of logical argumentation in whatever context. Even qua logica utens the art of logic displayed a high degree of technicality. In other words: medieval logica utens rather than being practical argumentation as loosely accomplished by somebody who exhibited a remarkable natural ability for logical reasoning consisted in the performance of somebody being really well-versed in all those logical techniques he had been taught in his youth in class room. So, whoever is interested in specific terms of logical teaching and learning should surely not leave exhibitions of logica utens out of consideration (*).

Our third remark which is in the line of the previous one, concerns the remarkably wide scope of logica utens. Of course, logica docens played a very important part in Medieval education, as may be also gathered from its predominant position in Medieval curricula. However, according to a good Peripatetic tradition, logic was taken to serve as the organon or instrument of all other branches of learning and science, which means that logic, and logic alone, provided other disciplines with the correct art of thinking and reasoning. Thus logic proves to have been effectually present, for example, in theological disputations, a fact that every student of Medieval theology is fully aware of. But it had an equally prevailing position in other fields of learning, too, such as Natural science ("Physics"), Ethics and even Political philosophy.

A final preliminary remark aims at elucidating the large scope of Medieval logic from still another point of view, viz. the close relationship between scientific inquiry and exposition as well as scientific education in the Middle Ages. That is to say that scientific inquiry and exposition as well as education and learning were controlled by the same didactics of exposition and argumentation. Indeed, nearly all Medieval writings that contain scholarly investigations in any field of learning whatsoever display didactic approaches which are quite similar to those used by works mainly intended for instruction, no matter for the benefit of beginners or advanced people." pp. 62-63

(*) For the contradistinction of dialectica docens and dialectica utens both of them especially concerned with the use of logical topics (loci), see Eleonore Stump, Topics: their development and absorption into consequences in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, 1982, p. 281, n. 41.

It is common knowledge that Aristotle had the conviction that all reality was to be found within our world of sensible experience and that Plato's assumption of another, Transcendent World of Perfect Being was merely 'empty talk and poetic metaphor' (Metaph. A9, 991a20). Indeed, Aristotle took Plato's Forms to be quite useless for explaining the possibility of true knowledge about our world. However, like his master, Plato, Aristotle stuck to the Parmenidean conviction about the real existence of unchanging formal principles of being. As is well-known, his formal principles are in things as their immanent dynamic natures (eîde).

For Aristotle, true knowledge concerns the essential natures immanent in things (see e.g. Metaph., 991a12-3; 999a24-9; 1018b36; 1032b1 ff. et alibi). To be sure, all being is individual being and so Aristotle is compelled to answer the quite intriguing question: if the proper object of true knowledge is universal nature and everything real is a particular, how, then, are we able to gain genuine knowledge about the things in their own right? In his Posterior Analytics Aristotle explains what he understands by truly knowing things. Well, quite in line with his philosophical stand, Aristotle claims that all scientific knowledge is concerned with discerning a universal nature as immanent in a particular. In I 2, 72a75-7 e.g., it is explicitly said that the elements of the deduction are such and such in concreto (cf. 73a29-31).

For Aristotle, demonstration in fact concerns some phenomenal state of affairs of which the investigation aims to clarify the essential structures." p. 102

"Aristotle's description of induction and its role in the scientific process fits in remarkably well with what he has earlier remarked about the process of proper categorization. Referring to the well-known battle simile - how a general retreat comes to an end after one man makes a stand, and then another etc., the author argues that 'as soon as one of the undifferentiated percepts makes a stand, there is a primitive universal in the mind ... until the highest genera have been reached' (II 19, 100a14-b4).

The faculty, or rather cognitive attitude, by which we become familiar with the first principles is the Nous or intellective apprehension. Well, just as the Nous precedes all principles (such as axioms etc.), in the same way scientific knowledge covers the whole domain of states of affairs (pragmata), Aristotle concludes (100b16-17).

Let us try, now, in the next sections, to discover the Medievals' doctrinal reception of the Posterior Analytics by discussing their views of some themes characteristic of Aristotle's scientific method. It would be useful, to that end, to single out the following items: the Medievals' discussion of the well-known four questions, their views of the three requirements for 'hunting essential attributes', their (different) views of necessity, and, finally, the Medieval conceptions of induction and our knowledge of the First Principles." p. 110


"1. Introduction. On sait que le terme 'idée' était un mot-clé dans la métaphysique de Platon. Les exposés importants de ce matin ont rendu entièrement superflu de rappeler le rôle du mot idea chez Platon ainsi que dans la tradition platonicienne et dans la patristique.

Les communications que nous venons d'écouter cet après-midi nous ont fait comprendre l'importance du mot latin idea, ou plutôt la valeur de la notion d'idée, dont le mot idea n'était que l'un des véhicules à côté de forma, species, notio, conceptus, intentio, etc.

Il n'est pas nécessaire d'être spécialiste de l'histoire de la philosophie médiévale pour bien savoir que, quelle que soit la dote des auteurs méditeaux envers des sources antiques, et quel que fût le respect qu'ils ont ressenti envers toute autorité -- les sources ne les ont cependant jamais empêchés de suivre leur propre voie au fur et à mesure que cela s'imposait dans l'intérêt de leur réflexions philosophiques.

C'est pourquoi l'étude de l'usage des termes philosophiques et leur développement au cours du moyen-âge n'est pas seulement d'intérêt linguistique. Au contraire, l'analyse de ce développement est tout à fait indispensable pour bien comprendre les doctrines philosophiques elles-mêmes de la période médiévale.

Je me propose dans cette communication de mettre en relief le tournant important qu'a subi l'usage du mot idea chez certains auteurs de la seconde moitié du 13e siècle, usage, bien entendu, qui s'est prolongé au 14e siècle. La figure centrale sera celle du philosophe flamand Henri de Gand (mort en 1293). Comme je viens de vous suggérer, ce tournant est significatif d'un développement doctrinal chez ces auteurs. Aussi ce développement doctrinal s'impose comme le cadre adapté aux exigences d'un exposé sémantique à propos de l'usage du mot idea, disons après saint Thomas d'Aquin (mort en 1277)." p. 89
Annotated Bibliography of L. M. de Rijk:

1950 - 1974

1975 - 1982

1991 - 2012

Index of the Pages with Annotated Bibliographies of Contemporary Historians of Logic

Abelard: Logic, Semantics, Ontology and Theories of the Copula

Medieval Theories of Supposition (Reference) and Mental Language (with an annotated bibliography on the medieval theory of supposition)