
   "In his description of the Oxford manuscript Canon. misc. 281 Coxe only mentions (*) anonymous glosses on Priscian's De constructione (Priscianus minor). However this manuscript contains also a tract of logic.

   (...) The treatise as a whole has the following parts (the subdivisions printed in minuscules are mine)

   Prologus

   De obligatione einsque speciebus

   I DE POSITIONE

   De positione determinata

   De quibusdam regulis circa ponibile positum

   Sophisma

   Consimile sophisma

   Idem sophisma

   Aliud sophisma

   Aliud sophisma

   Aliud sophisma

   De positione indeterminata

   De indeterminate positionis duplici modo

   II DE DUBITATUR

   Utrum 'dubitatur' sit obligatio annon

   De quibusdam regulis

   Sophisma

   III DE DEPOSITIONE

   De eius diffinitione et regulis

   De speciali depositione

   Utrum non debeat esse obligatio

   Sophisma."

   pp. 22 and 25.

   (*) H. O. Coxe - Catalogi codicum manuscriptorum Bibliothecae Bodleianae pars tertia codices graecos et latinos canonicos complectens, Oxford 1854, col. 646.


   Special number in memory of Martin Grabmann.

   "The manuscript 182/215 of the important manuscript collection of the Library of Gonville and Caius College at Cambridge contains a number of tracts on logic which were probably written at Cambridge as notes of lectures. Part of them are also found in other manuscripts all over Europe. It seems rather difficult to discern the exact extent of this work, since in nearly all manuscripts the number and arrangement of the tracts is different and other logical works are mixed up with those treatises which doubtless belong to the Cambridge Logic." p. 297


   "The opponents of Platonism as well as its adherents have to agree that there is a lot of truth in
Whitehead's famous statement that the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato (*).

I think one of the everlasting items of that tradition is what has been termed since St. Augustine the quaedstio de Ideis. Indeed, the status (either ontic or merely mental) of the Ideas has fascinated many philosophers, especially the Christian, who could not dispense with a statement concerning the relationship of the eternal and immutable Ideas to God. In this short contribution to the dedicatory volume for our academic teacher C. J. de Vogel, I shall confine myself to roughly sketch the development of the problem of that relationship from Plato's days down to some fourteenth century Franciscan thinkers.”  p. 204


4. ———. 1975. "The Place of Billingham's Speculum Puerorum in Fourteenth and Fifteenth Century Logical Tradition, with the Edition of Some Alternative Tracts." Studia Mediewistyczne no. 16:97-151. "From the second half of the fourteenth century onwards the Speculum puerorum (or iuvenum) compiled by the English logician Richard Billingham was very popular, especially in Southern and Central Europe. However, this popularity does not extend to his other works. The Speculum, which together with works such as those of Thomas Manlevelt, William of Heytesbury and Marsilius of Inghen, was a formidable competitor of Peter of Spain's Tractatus, is an introduction to what from about the 1330's onwards has been one of the cardinal items, if not the most characteristic one, of fourteenth century logic, rather than a Summule of the type of Peter of Spain's Tractatus, which contains all the topics of the Logica antiqua and moderna favoured in Peter's days. Generally speaking, fourteenth century philosophy focussed its attention on the search for certainty (certitudo and evidentia). That fourteenth century logic paid special attention to the procedures of proving a sentence, is evidenced by the numerous tracts entitled De probationibus propositionum or De veritate ac falsitate propositionum which have been handed down to us in fourteenth and fifteenth century manuscripts.

Billingham's Speculum is one of them." pp. 99-100 (Notes omitted).


"Cette communication se borne a un bref examen de la signification de la phrase complète (propositio) dans la logique de Pierre Abélard.

Il paraît utile de commencer par la définition du verbe signifier (signicare) chez ce logicien. 'signifier' dit des mots (dictiones) c'est produire une intellection dans l'âme de l'auditeur (Logica ingredientibus 307, 30 ss.), tandis que le même verbe est également appliqué à la dénotation des choses extérieures (ibid.); dans ce dernier sens, le verbe est synonyme de appellare, nominare, demonstrare, designare.

'signifier' dit des phrases complètes (propositiones) c'est produire une intellection laquelle est formée par la liaison des intellections de ses parties (dictiones)." p. 547

"On peut conclure que selon Abélard le dictum n'est pas un objet qui serait indépendant de la pensée, mais plutôt le contenu de la pensée, c'est-à-dire une intellection objectivée, qui correspond soit à un état de choses réel, soit à un état de choses seulement possible (Dial. II, 205, 28-30: id dicimus quod id quod dicit hec propositio 'Socrates es homo', est unum de his que natura patitur esse), soit un état de choses tout à fait impossible (Dial. II, 158, 7-9: la proposition 'Socrates est lapis' ne reflète pas une inherentia de Socrate et de pierre, ni 'Socrates non est lapis' leur rémption.

(…)

Ainsi, l'existence qu'établit la proposition en parlant, n'est pas une existence réelle, mais, pourrait-on dire, une existence parlée, ou plutôt, une existence pensée ou logique. Employant la distinction bien connue du XIV siècles (présentée notamment par Jacques d'Ascoli, Thomas d'York, Pierre Thomae):

res: 1) extra animam (chose extérieure); 2) in anima: a) subiective ( = acte de l'intellection comme tel) b) objective (contenu de l'intellection).

On peut dire qu'Abélard a essayé, à sa façon, de montrer que le dictum, de la proposition, loin d'être une chose extérieure (res extra animam) est une chose qui doit son existence à l'âme ou à l'intellection (res in anima), mais qu'il faut en même temps bien le distinguer de l'acte de l'intellection pris comme tel (res in anima subjective), et reconnaître, sa propre identité dans le contenu objectif de l'intellection. Par là, le dictum du grand logicien du XII siècle semble être d'une nature logique par excellence." pp. 554-555. (notes omitted)


"Every student of Mediaeval logic knows the tract on the truth and falsity of the propositions by the hand of Richard Billingham. It goes under the titles Speculum puerorum, Speculum iuvenum, and also Terminus est in quern, after the well known incipit borrowed from Aristotle's Prior Analytics (I I, 24b16-18) Terminus est in quern resolvitur propositio ut predicatum et de quo predicator, apposito vel diviso esse vel non esse. In 1970 Dr. Alfonso Maierü published a very useful school edition of the work, (*) to the effect that the scholarly world has now at its disposition which exerted a tremendous influence in fourteenth and fifteenth century logic, especially in the universities of Eastern and Southern Europe.

The text has come down to us in two different redactions, an English and a Central European one.(**) Elsewhere (***) I tried to show that Billingham's work is the most famous specimen of quite a number of similar tracts De veritate et falsitate propositionum, but certainly not the oldest of them. It is the aim of this article to introduce and edit another treatise of this type, which like the well known treatise edited by Maierü goes under the title Speculum puerorum and is likewise attributed to Billingham. It is found in a late fourteenth century manuscript of the Archivo General de la Corona de Aragon at Barcelona, Spain, viz. Ripoll 141."
p. 203


(**) See Maierü, Introd. 318 sqq. Maierü seems to be wrong in distinguishing a third class of manuscripts; in fact at least two of this class contain quite a different tract which also goes under the name Terminus est in quern. See L. M. de Rijk, The Place of Billingham's Speculum puerorum in 14th and 15th Century Logical Tradition, with the edition of some alternative tracts, (1975).

(***) Study quoted in the previous note.


"William of Sherwood (born between 1200-10 died between 1266-71) (*) is commonly (****) considered the author of not only a tract De obligationibus but also a short tract called in the only manuscript (Paris, B. N. Lat. 16.617, f. 64v) Petitiones contraorium. This small work deals with the solution of logical puzzles (sophismata) that arise from hidden contrariety in the premises of an argumentation.

The aim of this paper is to publish the shorter tract from the Paris manuscript and to investigate its attribution to Sherwood.

(*) The most extensive biography of Sherwood is found in Norman Kretzmann, William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic translated with an introduction and notes. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1966, Introd. pp. 3-12.

(**) See Kretzmann, op. cit., p. 15.

Bibliography of L. M. de Rijk from 1975 to 1982


"Medieval Terminist logic was concerned with the so-called properties of terms (proprietates terminorum), to the extent that it not only studied the formal structures of Latin language, its logical syntax, and all kinds of specifications within this scope, but also interpreted the linguistic elements and structures. This interpretation mainly focussed on what the moderns would call semantics rather than on formal logic as such. The properties of terms (significatio, appellatio, suppositio and its various forms: ampliatio, restrictio, distributio) were investigated in their relation to the so-called res extra animam (extra-mental reality).

Two statements can be made. First: Who wants to detect a Medieval thinker's implicit ontological points of view, finds a wealth of firm evidence in his doctrine of the properties of terms. Secondly: Within the domain of these properties it is Buridan's appellatio that has a very interesting role because of its affinity with the modern concept of connotation. So Buridan's appellatio is entitled to have the attention of both the historians of Medieval thought and learning as of those modern logicians who do not want to seclude themselves from the historical background of modern doctrines.

My approach to the matter concerned now is to compare Buridan's appellatio with modern connotation, more specifically to put the translation 'connotation' for Buridan's appellatio to the test." p. 91


"Since Professor Alfonso Maieri published (*) his most useful work-edition (strumento di lavoro) of Richard Billingham's Speculum puerorum every student of Medieval logic has been acquainted with that famous work which exerted such a great influence in the fourteenth and fifteenth century logic curriculum, especially in the schools of Eastern and Southern Europe. Elsewhere (**) I have tried to show that Billingham's work is part of a certain tradition of similar works on the truth and falsity of propositions and certainly not unique in the genre nor at its origin. (...) The aim of this paper is to recollect all manuscript evidence for Billingham's logical works." pp. 121 and 123.


"In a recent paper (*) I have attempted to show that the study of logic at Cambridge University during the fifteenth century led to the compilation of an own textbook. It seems rather obvious that the rival school of Oxford had also its specific textbook in usum delphini. However, our manuscript tradition is less clear at this point; whereas the Cambridge logic seems to be handed down as a whole, its Oxford counterpart presents itself in a rather scattered form, to the extent, indeed, that, to my knowledge at least, no manuscript contains all (presumable) parts of this work. This paper attempts to reconstruct the (supposed) Oxford textbook." p. 121

(...) "Conclusions. It is quite clear from the previous investigations that about 1400 the study of logic in the Oxford schools led to a remarkable production of tracts. There seems to have existed a more or less established set of tracts on the different logical topics of those days. Far from having one specific author this "Oxford Logic" seems to consist of adaptations of famous fourteenth century tracts. This holds also good for other famous Oxford treatises. So is Bradwardine's well-known tract on proportion frequently found in various anonymous adaptations in our fifteenth century manuscripts (see also some of the manuscripts analysed above). (...) Much work is still to be done about the exact affiliations and interdependency of the tracts of the "Oxford Logic" and eponymous works of the 14th and 15th centuries. Again, as with the Cambridge Logic, the Southern Europe (especially Italian tradition, will turn out to be of the utmost importance. The only aim of this paper is to give a survey of the manuscript evidence. Most of the conclusions drawn can only be accepted with all proper reserves." p. 163-164.

(*) 'Logica Cantabrigiensis' A fifteenth century manual of logic


"1. Introduction. The aim of this study is, rather than to give a contribution to the history of semantics as such, to show (i) the interdependence of Ancient (and Mediaeval) semantic views and metaphysical doctrines, and (2) how some Mediaeval semantic points of view may be clarified when traced back to the corresponding Ancient views. As far as Antiquity is concerned, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics as well as Neoplatonism and Peripatetics are discussed. However, it should be noticed at the outset that in many
cases it is practically impossible to discern exactly what precisely in the different views found in Late Antiquity came from what School, let alone to attribute the various views to specific authors. To my mind, in his inspiring paper on the logical doctrines in the Neoplatonic and the Peripatetic schools (*) A. C. Lloyd made the correct approach to the subject matter. When discussing the question how much of the Neoplatonic views is borrowed from Stoic logicians his answer is that substantially it is nothing but the fact that the forms of Neoplatonism are sometimes conditioned by Stoic logical doctrine and terminology; what still remained under those adventitious shapes is the intrinsic impetus and natural direction of Neoplatonism itself (Lloyd, 158).” p. 81.

(*) Neoplatonic Logic and Aristotelian Logic in: Phronesis, A Journal for Ancient Philosophy (1) 1956, 58-72 and 146-160, henceforth quoted as Lloyd. This study should be corrected in many points, however.

2. Participation and the multiplication of the Form in Plato; 2.1. A particular's partaking of several Forms; 2.2. The Forms' capacity for mutual communion; 2.3 The Forms and their being known; "2.4. The Forms' epistemologic function and their ontological status. The basic question of what is the extent of the World of Forms appears with Plato in two distinct shapes: (a) which are the several classes of things belonging to the Ideal World? and (b) where Forms are found? As a matter of fact the two questions are clearly related.

The former is concerned whenever is asked about the transcendent nature of organic and even anorganic (both honorable and undignified) things as well as mathematical and moral entities (**) In last analysis this form of the question has much to do with the hierarchic order of the transcendent world. However, it is first the second question that should come under review now; it is concerned with the status of the Forms. Next, the former question as confined to the Hierarchy of Being will be discussed in the second part of this section.” pp. 96-97.

(**) The classical passages are found in the Phaedo, Republic, Parmenides, Timeus, and the Seventh letter, 342 A.D.

2.4.1. The different status of the Platonic Form; 2.4.2. The hierarchic arrangement of the Forms; 2.5. The threefold status of the Forms as found with Plato; 2.5.1 The Form taken in its transcendent status; 2.5.2. The Form taken in its immanent status; 2.5.3. The Form taken in its mental status.

3. The multiplication of being in Aristotle's Categories.

3.1. Introduction. One of the results of the preceding section may be that Lloyd (1956, p. 59) seems to be wrong in asserting that in Plato's view the rôle of the universal is played by the Idea exclusively, and that only by the time of the Middle Academy, that is, for the Platonists of the first two centuries A.D., the performers of this rôle have been multiplied. As a matter of fact the distinction between Plato and his followers of the Middle Academy on this score would seem to be a different one. The ontological problems of participation were felt as early as in the Platonic dialogues (see our section 2), as well as the logical ones concerning predication (which will be discussed in a later section). Well, the Platonists of the first two centuries A.D., introduced explicitly a threefold distinction I of the Platonic Form or rather of its status which was (only) implied with Plato. I think, Lloyd is hardly more fortunate in ascribing (ibid.) this introduction chiefly to the influence of Aristotelian logic on Platonic interpretation. It is true, in stating the basic distinction between en hypokeimenôi and kath' hypokeimenou Aristotle tried to face the same cluster of fundamental problems which induced later Platonists to the distinction of the Forms as taken before or after the methexis (cf. Simplicius, In Arist. Categ., 79, 12fl.). However, Plato's disciple, Aristotle (the most unfaithful one, in a sense, as must be acknowledged) was as deeply engaged on the same problems as were his condisciples and the Master himself in his most mature period. It is certainly not Aristotle who played the rôle of a catalyst and was the first to provoke the multiplication of the Platonic Form in order to solve problems which were not recognized before in the Platonic circle. On the contrary, Plato himself had saddled his pupils with a basic and most intricate problem, that of the nature of participation and logical predication. It was certainly not left quite unsolved in the later dialogues, but did still not have a perspicuous solution which could be accepted in the School as a scholastic one. So any of his serious followers, (who were teachers in the School, at the same time) was bound to contrive, at least, a scholastic device to answer the intricate question. To my view, Aristotle's solution should be discussed in this framework. For that matter, Aristotle stands wholly on ground prepared by his master to the extent that his works on physic and cosmology, too, are essentially discussions held within the Academy (Cp. Werner Jaeger, Aristotle. Fundamentals of the history of his development, Oxford 1949, 308).” pp. 81-82

3.2. Aristotle's classification of being as given in the Categories; 3.2.1. The common view: categories = predicates; 3.2.2. The things said 'aneu symplokés'; 3.2.3. The doctrine of substance given in the Categories; 3.2.4. The ontological character of the classification; 3.2.5. Some obscurities of the classification; 3.2.6. The different status of the 'things' meant; 3.2.6.1 The first item of the classification; 3.2.6.2. The second item of the classification; 3.2.6.3. The third item of the classification; 3.2.6.4. The ontological status of the 'things' meant in the items (2) and (3); 3.2.6.5. The fourth item of classification; 3.2.7. The relation between the different 'things'; 3.3. Categories and predicables; 3.3.1. The opposition...
of category and predicative; 3.3.2. The impact of the opposition; 3.3.3. The obscure position of the differentia; 3.3.4. Conclusion.


"English translation (by Jop Spiekermann) subsidized by the University of Leyden of part of my introductory book on Medieval Philosophy (Middleeuws wijsbegeerte. Traditie en vernieuwing. Assen 1977) being part of Chapter II (On the philosophical presuppositions of historical periodization)." p. 1

"Summary. Basically, a historian's conception of history is to be judged by the status he assigns to historical fact. We on our part have defined fact as the mental entity to which direct reference is made by a descriptive statement accepted as true (1.2-1.4). Next, we have tried to throw further light on this conception, not least by enlisting the aid of linguistics (1.5-1.7).

Further reflection on what ultimately constitutes fact has led us to adopt, in line with others, an extension of Kuhn's paradigm concept: paradigms is whatever is constitutive of any external world experience, regardless of what this experience may be; it is of a compelling nature.

When the historian, intent on getting a grip on his vis-à-vis (XYZ), delineates and structures it, any such structuring operation is, from the perspective of the vis-à-vis, arbitrary and intrusive. On the historian's part, however, it is of a compelling, paradigmatic nature (3.1). This lends piquancy to such phrases as 'Historical truth dictates the observation that...'; since it is not any 'past reality' which dictates to us. Rather, it is our own, indeed historical (!) paradigmatically determined experience of our vis-à-vis which, without dictating anything, compels us.

But a paradigm can be reversed, thereby giving rise to a different, eventually perhaps completely different, mode of experiencing the vis-à-vis (3.2-3.3).

The historian-the medievalist no less than his fellow-historians-is confronted with this matter on two counts. In his probing quest he himself is tied clown to the contemporary paradigm. Though he is unable to discern the outlines of the paradigm he is caught up in which must indeed, by definition, be postulated-yet his realization that his mode of experiencing the vis-à-vis determines his scientific activities and that both are shaped by the prevailing paradigm, should restrain him from entertaining unwarranted ideas about 'objectivity'. Equally, he must take into account that his documentary sources, in turn, are paradigmatically determined. For anyone writing at any moment in the past it was possible to be 'objective' only in the sense that he honestly recorded what lie saw." pp. 41-42.


Inhalt.

EINLEITUNG

DIE TEXTE


"4. The Categories as class of names; 4.1. Status quaestionis. The previous sections contain several hints to the close interrelation between three major issues in Plato's doctrine, viz. the question about the true nature of the Forms and those about participation and predication. Indeed, for the founder of the theory of the Forms, predication was bound to become a problem. Forms are immutable and indivisible; yet other Ideas have to participate in them; they are unique, by themselves and subsistent; yet, when saying 'John is man' (or white), 'Peter is man' (or white), should there be one perfect, eternal, immutable etc. Form of MAN (or WHITE) in the one and another in the other? Or, as I have put it above [1977: 85]: if John, Peter, and William are wise, does this mere fact mean that there must be something which they are all related to in exactly the same manner, namely WISDOM itself? And if 'John is wise', 'Peter is wise', and 'William is wise' are all true statements, what exactly is the meaning of the predicate name 'wise'? The former question is concerned with participation, the latter with predication. Well, that the crux of the latter problem is not the separate existence of the Forms (chôrismos) clearly appears from the fact that
also the author of the *Categories*, who had entirely abandoned all kind of *chôrismos*, could apparently not get rid of a similar problem: if the categories really are classes of *things there are* (1 a 20) (i.e. *real* substances, *real* natures, and *real* properties), rather than concepts (i.e. logical attributes), what kind of *thing* is *meant by* a term *qua* *category*? So for Aristotle the semantic problem still remained. His distinction between *en hypokeimenôn* and *kath* *hypokeimenou* could only hide the original problem. It is often said that these phrases refer to different domains, the metaphysical and the logical one, respectively. We have already found some good reasons to qualify this opposition (see [1978], 84; 88). It seems to be useful now to collect all kind of information from Aristotle's writings, not only the *Categories*, about the proper meaning of the categories. This will be the aim of our sections 4.2-4.7."

4.2. On some modern interpretations of *'kata symplókên';* 4.3. Aristotle's use of the categories; "For this section see also my Utrecht dissertation, The place of the Categories of Being in Aristotle's philosophy, Assen 1952 pp. 76-88. I have to correct or to adjust my former views on several points.

4.31. The categories as a classification of reality; 4. 32. The categories as a classification of sentence predicates; 4.33. The categories as a classification of *'copulative being';* 4.4. How did Aristotle arrive at his list of categories?; 4. 5. Are the categories the *'highest predicates'?* 4.6. The categories taken as names in Metaph. Z 1-6 and Anal. Post. 1. 4; 4.7. An attempt at a reinterpretation of Categories, chs. 1-5; 4.8. Aristotle's view on relatives: 4.9. Conclusion.

18. ———. 1980. "The Semantical Impact of Abailard's Solution of the Problem of Universals." In Petrus Abaelardus (1079-1142), Person, Werk Und Wirkung, edited by Thomas, Rudolf, Jolivet, Jean, Luscombe, David and de Rijk, Lambertus Marie, 139-151. Trier: Paulinus-Verlag. Reprinted as chapter III in: Through Language to Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics. "It is most unfortunate that as late as in the second edition of his Theory of Universals Richard Aaron has based his rather unfavourable view on Peter Abailard's contribution to the solution of the problem of universals on the older work of our famous logician only, viz. the Logica Ingrediensibus. As is known, the French Master's most mature solution is found in the Logica Nostrorum petitioni (LNP) (*). In this work (LNP 522, 10 ff.) Abailard attributes the commonness of common nouns neither to extramental things nor to words (voces), rather he states that it is significant word (sermo), that is either singular or universal. He finds much support in Aristotle's definition of the universal: 'a universal is that which is by its nature predicated of a number of things.' (**) Abailard lays much stress on the nature of the formation of sermons, which to his mind is a human establishment (hominum institutio), unlike the formation of extramental things and that of words taken as articulated sounds, which are creations of nature. His solution is entirely focused on his explicit distinction between the material identity of vox and sermo as opposed to their formal diversity (non-identity'). There is, he says, a clear formal distinction between *being predicable of many,* or: *'predicability' and *'that which is predicable of many.'* It is predicability that must belong to a vox for it to be a universal; just being something that is predictable of many is not enough.


"After the discussion of the well-known sophism "Cuiuslibet hominis asinus currit" William of Sherwood rejects an alternate analysis in the following words: "quod sic vel sic iudicetur non est ex parte sermonis sed ex parte nostra tantum" (…)"

The aim of this paper, written in honour of a meritorious scholar in the history of medieval linguistic thought, Geoffrey Bursill-Hall, is, first, to discuss Sherwood's treatment of the sophism (and especially clarify his concluding sentence); then, to put the question into its proper historical context, viz. the medieval discussion of the logico-semantic impact of the structure of discourse (i.e., the effect of word order on the meaning of a given sentence)."

p. 23

"3. The semantic impact of the discussion.

Kilwardby's formulation of the condemned position is well-suited to clarify the semantic impact of the whole discussion. It seems to be focused on the question of whether, or not, nouns (names), by their own nature (secundum propriam inventionem) refer to existent things alone. As is known the affirmative answer is energetically answered by Roger Bacon (Braakhuis 1977). However, Roger's position is certainly not an isolate one. Not only a William of Sherwood came very close to it (Braakhuis 1977), but, generally speaking, many medieval logicians adhere to the view that a noun's primary inclination is to refer to particular, demonstrable individuals and that class-designation and connotation is just a secondary function of names. To take our sophism. In 'asinus cuiuslibet hominis currit' the subject term 'asinus' preceding the distributive sign 'cuiuslibet' is not affected by it and, accordingly, refers to one particular individual.

On the other hand, in 'cuiuslibet hominis asinus currit', in following the sign the term 'asinus' is prevented from pursuing its primary inclination and cannot help being confused over (confundit) a multitude of individuals.

Elsewhere (De Rijk 1980a, 1980b) I have tried to show that as early as from Abelard's days medieval logicians developed semantic views to the effect that, in fact, they endowed names with, at least, two levels: (a) a name in its own nature refers to an existent thing alone, and (b) when occurring in a syntactic formation (constructio), especially when joined to a verb of a tense other than the present, a name is reduced to a confused level on which it designates realization of a certain nature (form), including that in the past or future, or even a possible one.

Later discussions of our sophism (e.g., the controversy between Paul of Venice and Peter of Mantua on the issue (as found in the former's *Logica magna*, Treatise Two make clear that our sophism should be put into the general semantic framework of the period. Medieval word-order problems, indeed, were often considered very important since word-order was viewed as the rendez-vous of grammar and ontology." p. 230.

Braakhuis 1977 = *The views of William of Sherwood on some semantical topics and their relation to those of Roger Bacon* in *Vivarium* 15: (1977) pp. 111-142

De Rijk 1980a = The semantical impact of Abailard's solution of the Problem of Universals

De Rijk 1980b = Abailard's semantic views in the light of later developments


"5. Plato's semantics in his critical period; 5.1. Introduction. In concluding the previous section I argued (1980: nr. 4.9, p. 62) that Aristotle's *Categories* may be viewed as dealing with the several ways in which an individual man can be named without destroying his concrete unity. A well-known passage of Plato's *Sophist* (251 A 8ff.) was referred to in which Plato deals with the puzzle of one man with many names. It is true, Plato labels the puzzle as just 'a magnificent entertainment for the young and the late-learners' (251 B), and is more interested in the related question of how 'things' like Rest and Change (presently called *Kinds*) can also have several attributes (attributive names) and the general problem of attribution as implying the 'Communion' of *Kinds*. But it is obvious at the same time that in this shape too the puzzle is mainly concerned with the notions of naming, asserting and predication. So Plato's *Sophist* undoubtedly has to be part of our discussion.

A further argument for taking the *Sophist* into consideration may be found in Ammonios' commentary to Aristotle's *De interpretatione*. He remarks (ad 17 a 26ff.: *Comm. in Aristot. graeca IV* 5, p. 83, 8-13, ed. Busse) that the analysis of the *apohantikos logos* as given by Aristotle is to be found scattered all over Plato's *Sophist* (261 Cff.) right after that master's excellent expositions about Non-being mixed with Being (*peri tou synnekrameno tou onti me ontos*). For that matter, on more than one item of Aristotle's *Categories* and *De interpretatione* the Ancient commentators refer to related questions and discussions in Plato's later dialogues, especially the *Sophist*. I hope to show in sections (5) and (6) that the views found
22.


5. Plato's semantics in his critical period (Continuation); 5.6.2. The problem of giving several names and the Communion of Kinds; 5.6.2.1. On the 'trivial' question of 'one individual -- many names'; 5.6.2.2. Giving several names and the Communion of Kinds;

"5.6.3. Dialectic and the Communion of Forms"

In order to clarify the Communion of Kinds an analogy is drawn between the vowels which 'form a sort of bond running through the whole system (253 A 4-5) and certain Forms that are 'running through all' (253 C 1). Just as without the help of vowels it is impossible for one of the other letters to fit in with any other (A 5-6), similarly it is the special Forms that make possible Communion and are responsible for Division (C 2-3). It seems to be useful to have a look at the impact of this analogy." p. 95

5.6.3.1. The precise impact of the vowel-analogy; 5.6.3.2. The proper task of Dialectic; 5.6.3.3. The description of the dialectician's practice; 5.6.4. On the Communion of Forms as occurring in particulars; 5.6.5. The question of 'what is not' reduced into a problem of name-giving; 5.6.6. Four antinomies concerning the Five Kinds raised and solved (254D-255E); 5.6.6.1. The first round: on the relations of Being, Rest and Change; 5.6.6.2. The second round: on the relations of Change, Rest, Same and Other; 5.6.6.3. The third round: 'What is' and 'the Same' disentangled; 5.6.6.4. The fourth round: 'What is' and 'the Other' disentangled; 5.6.6.5. On the different uses of kath' hauto; 5.6.6.6. 'What is' and 'the Other' disentangled. Continuation; 5.6.6.6. 'What is' and 'Other' disentangled. Continuation.

23.


"Das Thema dieser Plenarsitzung, SPRACHE UND LOGIK, könnte man als ein rein logisches, bzw. rein linguistisches Problem auffassen. Der Titel dieses Vortrags jedoch genügt, um deutlich zu machen, dass dies nicht meine Absicht ist; uns interessiert zur Stunde das Bedeutungsproblem als philosophische Frage. Ich halte es für nicht ganz unwichtig zu bemerken, dass es sich für mich dabei nicht um eine durch diesen Philosophiekongreß bedingte Wahl handelt, sondern um eine prinzipielle Auffassung, und zwar, dass überhaupt das Bedeutungsproblem nur als ein semantisches aufgefasst werden sollte. Wer aber Semantik sagt, kann die Fragen der Ontologie und Metaphysik nicht ausser acht lassen.

Diejenigen unter uns, die auf dem Gebiet der Logik eher Amateure als Liebhaber sind, dürfen sich aber nicht darüber freuen, dass jetzt das Verhältnis Sprache und Metaphysik unmittelbar, ich möchte sagen, geradlinig, zu Wort gebracht werden wird. Es bleibt ja immer, zur Vermeidung eines Kurzschlusses, der Umweg über die Logik wesentlich, da sonst eine rein evokative, mehr andeutende als deutende Bewältigung der metaphysischen Fragen in den Vordergrund treten würde. Ich möchte von einem logischen Spezialfall der Seinsdeutung ausgehen. Zuerst wird er in seinen logisch-semantischen Kontext gestellt; danach wird der Doppelcharakter des Verbums „est“ näher analysiert, wobei die generelle Frage der Namensbezeichnung sich als das eigentliche Problem entpuppt, und zum Abschluss wird sich dies besonders auf die Relation Aktualität und Faktizität verlegen." p. 19

24.


25.


"Le grand historien Etienne Gilson a bien remarqué que c'est à propos du problème du Bien que la pensée de Boèce fut la plus personnelle et la plus féconde. Avec Platon et Saint Augustin, il identifie dans son opuscule Quomodo substantiae l'être au Bien (comme le Mal au non-être). Il est évident que dans l'opinion de Boèce la doctrine de l'être obtient une importance décisive comme base de la théorie du Bien. Aussi la solution du problème du Bien et du Mal fut esquissé dans sa métaphysique de l'être."
L'identification de l'être et du Bien implique que pour tout ce qui est, c'est une seule et même chose d'être et d'être bon. Mais si les choses sont substantiellement bonnes, en quoi différent-elles du Bien en soi, qui est Dieu? Dans cette question la problématique du Sophiste de Platon a dû revivre. On sait que dans cette dialogue Platon a essayé de resoudre le problème fondamental de l'être des choses périssables par une analyse vraiment pénétrante des notions de «Même» (tauton) et «Autre» (heteron). Il me semble que Boèce fait une chose comparable. Il n'est pas étonnant qu'il commence (dans De hebdomadibus = Quomodo substantiae etc.; voir l'édition de Stewart-Rand) ses exposés approfondis sur la notion de l'être par l'axiome qui a dû provoquer tant de commentaires pendant le moyen âge: *diversum est esse et quod quod est* (*II 28-30: il ya diversité entre "être" et "ce qui est"). Cette formule, qui est valable pour tout être composé concerne la différence ontologique entre l'élément constitutif, ou la forme, de tout être composé d'un côté, et la chose elle-même, ou le tout établi par cette forme, de l'autre. Le tout doit son être à l'élément constitutif qui est la forme substantielle, sans laquelle il n'est pas du tout. Cependant la question sur son essence ne peut pas être résolue en désignant cette forme. (...) Il semble être utile de prendre au sérieux la suggestion des commentateurs médiévaux et d'entreprendre la réponse à notre question du point de vue sémantique. Je propose de discuter d'abord (1) la notion de qualitas chez Boèce (2), ensuite son modèle sémantique (3), et ses idées sur le rôle (logico-sémantique) du nom et du verbe (4-5); enfin la signification exacte de sa notion de l'être (esse) sera discutée (6) et éclaircée en mettant en lumière le but et la méthode du traité Quomodo substantiae (7)." pp. 141-142 (Notes omitted).

"L'arrive à la conclusion de cette courte intervention. Comme le fait remarquer Olga Weijers dans sa contribution, il faut que les divers lemmes montrent bien quelles sont les distinctions principales des divers sens d'un mot, quelles sont les nuances, quelles sont les différentes expressions dans lesquelles le mot est utilisé dans le cadre d'une même signification; bref, il faut établir le tableau sémasiologique de façon détaillée et structurée. Cette chose ne peut se faire qu'en se fondant sur une interprétation des textes assez élaborée. Cette interprétation exige l'assistance de spécialistes de divers domaines, surtout en ce qui concerne tous ceux qui, dès la période médiévale, étaient de nature assez particulière et parfois tellement ésotérique que les contemporains des auteurs médiévaux qui n'appartaient pas au petit cercle des initiés, ne comprenaient, pas plus que la plupart d'entre nous, cette terminologie spécialisée. Un de ces domaines était celui de la logique terministe et de la sémantique à partir du XIII siècle. Dans cette période bien des mots-clé ont été forgés, qui devaient être d'une grande importance pour la terminologie philosophique jusqu'à nos jours. Dans cet ordre d'idées il est essentiel que le lexique du latin médiéval ne manque pas à sa tâche." p. 292

(*) Logica nostrorum petitioni, ed. Geyer (Münster 1933), pp. 505-533 (henceforth quoted as L.N.P.) "Finally, I will briefly sum up some of the important items of Mediaeval semantics which may be fitted into the frame-work of what I have labeled the 'semantic stratification of appellative names'. First. There is the distinction of *esse actuate* and *esse habituate* as adhered to by many 13th century authors but energetically rejected by Roger Bacon, whereas William of Sherwood turns out to stand somewhere half-way between Roger and the majority. The point at issue is the significative force of an appellative noun. Whereas others commonly accepted a name's referring to an *esse habituale* (that is, being common to present, preterite and future being and even to what actually is and what actually is not), Roger most strictly held that even in such metaphysical propositions as 'omnis homo de necessitate est animal' the subject term can only refer to actually existing things (therefore they are all false on Roger's view). William, though admitting the distinction between *esse actuale* and *esse habituale*, regarded such propositions as equivocal. This reminds us of William's view that a name's meaning is determined by the language - users rather than by speech itself (Syncat., 52, 25 - 26). The pivotal point of
this controversy seems to be the different application of our F.R. On Roger's view, for instance, the
determination 'de necessitate' in propositions such as 'omnis homo de necessitate est animal' is unable to
strip an appellative noun of its primary function, of signifying only existing things, whereas his
opponents are apparently of the opinion that that phrase compels the noun to withdraw to its second
semantic level of designating just an esse habituale, with the result that the proposition is true.
Secondly, the problems concerning verbs expressing a mental attitude may be looked at from the same
point of view. To quote Abailard (L.N.P. 531, 9 - 13; cfr. also above, pp. 4 - 5): When it is said: "I want a
hood (desidero cappam); well, every hood is this or that hood", yet it does not follow that I want this or
that hood. If, however, one would say as follows: "I want a hood; well, every one who wants a hood is
wants this or that hood; (therefore I am wanting this or that hood)", then, indeed, the argument would go on correctly.
However, the assumption would be false, then. This much is certain, Abailard rejects that in 'I want a
hood' and 'every hood is this hood or that hood' the term 'hood' has the same signification. As a matter of
fact the term 'hood' in the former proposition, unlike that in the latter proposition, does not designate a
hood actually existing, (except in case, I have some particular hood in mind, of course). So we have to
conclude that the verb 'desidero' governing the object 'cappam' precludes us from taking it for an actually
existing hood and compels us to understand it in the second-level-meaning of 'a concrete, particular,
hood', whether or not actually existing." pp. 50-51.
No doubt, it is Abailard who initiated many developments in Mediaeval semantics. So I have considered it
useful to draw the attention to the achievements of this great master in the field of logic, since 'the logic
before Ockham' cannot be properly understood unless Abailard is recognized as the man who stood, in
many respects, at the craddle of fourteenth century logic." p. 52.

Sur Aristote Conservés Dans Les Bibliothèques Publiques Aux Pays-Bas.* Amsterdam: North Holland
Publishing Company.
Avant-propos.
"Il y a quelques années, la Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.)
decida d'entreprendre un projet visant à cataloguer et à décrire tous les manuscrits contenant des
commentaires latins du moyen âge sur les œuvres (authentiques ou pseudépigraphes) d'Aristote, y
compris, en ce qui concerne la logique, les commentaires sur l' *Isagoge* de Porphyre et sur les *Opuscula*
de Boèce. Dans le présent volume nous avons voulu, conformément au projet, décrire les manuscrits qui se
trouvent aux Pays-Bas.
Notons en passant que le manuscrit Utrecht, Universiteitsbibliotheek 695, qui contient selon le catalogue
des questions sur le *De Anima* d'Aristote, est un recueil de textes médicaux et que le passage en question
(f. 79r-90'a) est en fait un ouvrage de médecine. Il ne sera donc pas décrit dans ce volume.
Les descriptions codicologiques sont toutes de la main du second cosignataire. Le premier soussigné, en
faisant l'analyse du contenu des manuscrits, a bénéficié du concours de dr. É.P. Bos (Leyde) qui a
notamment mis à sa disposition ses analyses circonstanciées des mss. Cuyck, La Haye Meermanno-
Westreenianum 10 A 8 et 9 et Utrecht 825.
L. M. de Rijk, Olga Weijers"

Logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th Centuries*, edited by Maièriù, Alfonso, 167-183.
Reprinted as chapter XII in: *Through Language to Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and
Metaphysics.*
"I shall try to elucidate in this paper some remarkable developments of the theory of meaning found in
Venator's comments upon Billingham" p. 168.
"I shall try to give a general framework of fourteenth century semantic views.
A specimen of a model of Mediaeval semantics.
It should be noticed first that any model designed in order to elucidate the peculiarities of Mediaeval
semantic views should start from the well-established fact that Mediaeval logic was substantially
determined by the existing hood and compels us to understand it in the former proposition, unlike that in the latter proposition, does not designate a
hood actually existing, (except in case, I have some particular hood in mind, of course). So we have to
conclude that the verb 'desidero' governing the object 'cappam' precludes us from taking it for an actually
existing hood and compels us to understand it in the second-level-meaning of 'a concrete, particular,
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useful to draw the attention to the achievements of this great master in the field of logic, since 'the logic
before Ockham' cannot be properly understood unless Abailard is recognized as the man who stood, in
many respects, at the craddle of fourteenth century logic." p. 52.

Critical Period (Third Part)." *Vivarium* no. 20:97-127.
5.6.7. How the diverse Kinds have communion with one another; 5.7. The reinstatement of 'What is not'
(256d-259D); 5.7.1. Forms being and Forms not being; 5.7.2. The not-being of 'What is'; 5.7.3. The being
of what is not'; 5.7.4. Are there Forms corresponding to negative expressions?; 5.7.5. The Parmenidean
dogma refuted. Summary;
"5. 8 Conclusion. From our analysis of *Soph.,* 216 A-259 D it may be concluded that Plato did certainly
not abandon his theory of Forms. We may try to answer, now, the main questions scholarship is so sharply
divided about (see Guthrie [*A History of Greek Philosophy*] V, 143ff.). They are, in Guthrie's formulation:
(1) does Plato mean to attribute Change to the Forms themselves, or simply to enlarge the realm of Being
to include life and intelligence which are not Forms?, and (2) is he going even further in dissent from the friends of Forms and admitting what they called Becoming --changing and perishable objects of the physical world -- as part of the realm of True Being?

The first question should be answered in the negative. Indeed, Plato is defending a certain Communion of Forms, but this regards their immanent status and, accordingly, the physical world primarily, rather than the 'Forms themselves' (or: 'in their exalted status' as Guthrie has it, p. 159). As to the second question, to Guthrie's mind Plato's language makes it almost if not quite insoluble. I think that if one pays Plato's expositions the patient attention he asks for 'at 259 C-D and follows his analysis stage by stage, the exact sense and the precise respect in which he makes his statements (cf. 259 D 1-2: ekeinêi kai kat' ekeino ho physi) about Being and Not-being, Sameness and Otherness, and so on will appear. It will be easily seen, then, that there is no recantation at all in Plato's development. He still maintains, as he will maintain in his later works (e.g. Philebus, 14 D ff.) the Transcendent Forms as what in the last analysis are the only True Being. But Plato succeeds in giving a fuller sense to the old notions of 'sharing' and 'presence in' without detracting the 'paradigm' function of the Forms in any respect. Matter, Change and Becoming is given a better position in the Theory of Forms in that their immanent status has been brought into the focus of Plato's interest. From his Parmenides onwards Plato has been searching for the solution of his metaphysical problems and has actually found it in the Sophist in a new view of participation. Forms in their exalted status are just a too eminent cause for the existence of the world of Becoming. But their being shared in, i.e. their immanent status, make them so to speak 'operative' and yet preserve their dignity of being paradigmatic standards. What makes something to be a horse is, no doubt, the Transcendent Form, HORSENESS, but it only can partake of that Form and possess it as an immanent form. So the Highness of the Form and the unworthy matter can come together as matter 'informed', that is, affected by an immanent form.

Plato never was unfaithful to his original view about Forms as the only True Being. In our dialogue, too, he brings the eminence of True Being (taken, of course, as a Transcendent Form) into relief by saying (254 A) that the true philosopher, through his devotion to the Form, 'What is' ('Being'), dwells in the brightness of the divine, and the task of Dialectic, accordingly, is described from that very perspective (see Part (5), 96ff.). Focussing on the immanence of the Forms does not detract anything from their 'exalted status', since immanent forms are nothing else but the Transcendent Forms as partaken of by particulars. (...)

In his critical period Plato never ceased to believe in the Transcendent World. The important development occurring there consists in his taking more seriously than before their presence in matter and their activities as immanent forms. In the Sophist he uses all his ingenuity to show that a correct understanding of the Forms may safeguard us from all extremist views on being and not-being and zealous exaggerations of the Friends of Forms as well." pp. 125-127.


"Beginning as early as the eleventh century, the relationship between thought and language was a focal point of medieval thought. This does not amount to saying that the basic nature of that relationship was being studied; rather it was accepted without discussion, as it had been in antiquity. Thought was considered to be linguistically constrained by its very nature; thought and language were taken to be related both to each other and to reality in their elements and their structure. In the final analysis, language, thought, and reality were considered to be of the same logical coherence. Language was taken to be not only an instrument of thought, expression, and communication by also in itself an important source of information regarding the nature of reality. In medieval thought, logico-semantics and metaphysical points of view are, as a result of their perceived interdependence, entirely interwoven." p. 161.
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