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Annotated Bibliography of Lambertus Marie de Rijk. Second Part: from 1976 to 1986

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Bibliography

1. Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1976. "Some Thirteenth century tracts on the Game of Obligation. Part III. The Tract *De petitionibus contrariorum*, usually attributed to William of Sherwood." *Vivarium* no. 14:26-49.
 "William of Sherwood (born between 1200-10 died between 1266-71) (*) is commonly (*) considered the author of not only a tract *De obligationibus* but also a short tract called in the only manuscript (Paris, B. N. Lat. 16.617, f. 64v) *Petitiones contrariorum*. This small work deals with the solution of logical puzzles (sophismata) that arise from hidden contrariety in the premisses of an argumentation.
 The aim of this paper is to publish the shorter tract from the Paris manuscript and to investigate its attribution to Sherwood." (p. 25)
 (*) The most extensive biography of Sherwood is found in Norman Kretzmann, *William of Sherwood's Introduction to Logic* translated with an introduction and notes. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1966, Intro. pp. 3-12.
 (**) See Kretzmann, op. cit., p. 15.
2. ———. 1976. "On Buridan's doctrine of connotation." In *The Logic of John Buridan. Acts of the Third European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Copenhagen 16-21 November 1975*, edited by Pinborg, Jan, 91-100. Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum.
 Reprinted as chapter XI in: *Through Language to Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics*.
 "Mediaeval Terminist logic was concerned with the so-called properties of terms (proprietas terminorum), to the extent that it not only studied the formal structures of Latin language, its logical syntax, and all kinds of specifications within this scope, but also interpreted the linguistic elements and structures. This interpretation mainly focussed on what the moderns would call semantics rather than on formal logic as such. The properties of terms (significatio, appellatio, suppositio and its various forms: ampliatio, restrictio, distributio) were investigated in their relation to the so-called *res extra animam* (extra-mental reality).
 Two statements can be made. First: Who wants to detect a Mediaeval thinker's implicit ontological points of view, finds a wealth of firm evidence in his doctrine of the properties of terms. Secondly: Within the domain of these properties it is Buridan's appellatio that has a very interesting role because of its affinity with the modern concept of connotation. So Buridan's appellatio is entitled to have the attention of both the historians of Mediaeval thought and learning as of those modern logicians who do not want to seclude themselves from the historical background of modern doctrines.
 My approach to the matter concerned now is to compare Buridan's appellatio with modern connotation, more specifically to put the translation 'connotation' for Buridan's appellatio to the test." (p. 91)
3. ———. 1976. "Richard Billingham works on logic." *Vivarium* no. 14:121-138.
 "Since Professor Alfonso Maierù published (*) his most useful work-edition (strumento di lavoro) of Richard Billingham's *Speculum puerorum* every student of Mediaeval logic has been acquainted with that famous work which exerted such a great influence in the fourteenth and fifteenth century logic curriculum, especially in the schools of Eastern and Southern Europe. Elsewhere (**) I have tried to show that Billingham's work is part of a certain tradition of similar works on the truth and falsity of propositions and certainly not unique in the, genre nor at its origin." (p. 121)

(...)

The aim of this paper is to recollect all manuscript evidence for Billingham's logical works." (p. 123)

(*) Alfonso Maierù, Lo 'Speculum puerorum sive Terminus est in quem' di Riccardo Billingham. Estratto da A Giuseppe Ermini, Centro italiano di studi sull' alto Medioevo, Spoleto 1970, 297-397. (= *Studia medievalia* 3, (1969), 297-397).

(**) L. M. de Rijk, The Place of Billingham's *Speculum puerorum* in 14th and 15th Century Logical Tradition, with the Edition of Some Alternative Tracts in: *Studia Mediewistyczne* 16 (1975), 99-153.

4. ———. 1977. "Logica Oxoniensis. An attempt to reconstruct a Fifteenth century Oxford Manual of logic." *Medioevo* no. 3:121-164.

"In a recent paper (*) I have attempted to show that the study of logic at Cambridge University during the fifteenth century led to the compilation of an own textbook. It seems rather obvious that the rival school of Oxford had also its specific textbook *in usum delphini*. However, our manuscript tradition is less clear at this point; whereas the Cambridge logic seems to be handed down as a whole, its Oxford counterpart presents itself in a rather scattered form, to the extent, indeed, that, to my knowledge at least, no manuscript contains all (presumable) parts of this work. This paper attempts to reconstruct the (supposed) Oxford textbook." (p. 121)

(...)

"Conclusions. It is quite clear from the previous investigations that about 1400 the study of logic in the Oxford schools led to a remarkable production of tracts. There seems to have existed a more or less established set of tracts on the different logical topics of those days. Far from having one specific author this «Oxford Logic» seems to consist of adaptations of famous fourteenth century tracts. This holds also good for other famous Oxford treatises. So is Bradwardine's well-known tract on proportion frequently found in various anonymous adaptations in our fifteenth century manuscripts (see also some of the manuscripts analysed above).

(...)

Much work is still to be done about the exact affiliations and interdependency of the tracts of the «Oxford Logic» and eponymous works of the 14th and 15th centuries. Again, as with the Cambridge Logic, the Southern Europe (especially Italian tradition, will turn out to be of the utmost importance. The only aim of this paper is to give a survey of the manuscript evidence. Most of the conclusions drawn can only be accepted with all proper reserves." (pp. 163-164)

(*) 'Logica Cantabrigiensis'. A fifteenth century manual of logic

5. ———. 1977. "On ancient and mediaeval semantics and metaphysics. Part I." *Vivarium* no. 15:81-120.

"1. Introduction. The aim of this study is, rather than to give a contribution to the history of semantics as such, to show (i) the interdependence of Ancient (and Mediaeval) semantic views and metaphysical doctrines, and (2) how some Mediaeval semantic points of view may be clarified when traced back to the corresponding Ancient views. As far as Antiquity is concerned, Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics as well as Neoplatonism and Peripatetics are discussed. However, it should be noticed at the outset that in many cases it is practically impossible to discern exactly what precisely in the different views found in Late Antiquity came from what School, let alone to attribute the various views to specific authors. To my mind, in his inspiring paper on the logical doctrines in the Neoplatonic and the Peripatetic schools (*) A. C. Lloyd made the correct approach to the subject matter. When discussing the question how much of the Neoplatonic views is borrowed from Stoic logicians his answer is that substantially it is nothing but the fact that the forms of Neoplatonism are sometimes conditioned by Stoic logical doctrine and terminology; what still remained under those adventitious shapes is the intrinsic impetus and natural direction of Neoplatonism itself (Lloyd, 158)." p. 81.

(*) Neoplatonic Logic and Aristotelian Logic in: *Phronesis, A Journal for Ancient Philosophy* (1) 1956, 58-72 and 146-160, henceforth quoted as Lloyd. This study should be corrected in many points, however.

2. *Participation and the multiplication of the Form in Plato*; 2.1. *A particular's partaking of several Forms*; 2.2. *The Forms' capacity for mutual communion*; 2.3 *The Forms and their being known*;

"2.4. *The Forms' epistemologic function and their ontological status*. The basic question of what is the extent of the World of Forms appears with Plato in two distinct shapes: (a) which are the several classes of things belonging to the Ideal World? and (b) where Forms are found? As a matter of fact the two questions are clearly related.

The former is concerned whenever is asked about the transcendent nature of organic and even anorganic (both honorable and undignified) things as well as mathematical and moral entities (**). In last analysis this form of the question has much to do with the hierarchic order of the transcendent world. However, it is first the second question that should come under review now; it is concerned with the status of the Forms. Next, the former question as confined to the Hierarchy of Being will be discussed in the second part of this section." (pp. 96-97)

(**) The classical passages are found in the *Phaedo*, *Republic*, *Parmenides*, *Timeus*, and the *Seventh letter*, 342 A.D.

2.4.1. *The different status of the Platonic Form*; 2.4.2. *The hierarchic arrangement of the Forms*; 2.5. *The threefold status of the Forms as found with Plato*; 2.5.1 *The Form taken in its transcendent status*; 2.5.2. *The Form taken in its immanent status*; 2.5.3. *The Form taken in its mental status*.

6. ———. 1978. "On ancient and mediaeval semantics and metaphysics. Part II. The multiplication of Being in Aristotle's *Categories*." *Vivarium* no. 16:81-117.

"3. *The multiplication of being in Aristotle's Categories*.

3.1. *Introduction*. One of the results of the preceding section may be that Lloyd (1956, p. 59) seems to be wrong in asserting that in Plato's view the rôle of the universal is played by the Idea exclusively, and that only by the time of the Middle Academy, that is, for the Platonists of the first two centuries A.D., the performers of this rôle have been multiplied. As a matter of fact the distinction between Plato and his followers of the Middle Academy on this score would seem to be a different one. The ontological problems of participation were felt as early as in the Platonic dialogues (see our section 2), as well as the logical ones concerning predication (which will be discussed in a later section). Well, the Platonists of the first two centuries A.D., introduced explicitly a threefold distinction I of the Platonic Form or rather of its status which was (only) implied with Plato. I think, Lloyd is hardly more fortunate in ascribing (*ibid.*) this introduction chiefly to the influence of Aristotelian logic on Platonic interpretation. It is true, in stating the basic distinction between *en hypokeimenôî* and *kath' hypokeimenou* Aristotle tried to face the same cluster of fundamental problems which induced later Platonists to the distinction of the Forms as taken before or after the *methexis* (cf. *Simplicius*, In *Arist. Categ.*, 79, 12ff.). However, Plato's disciple, Aristotle (the most unfaithful one, in a sense, as must be acknowledged) was as deeply engaged on the same problems as were his condisciples and the Master himself in his most mature period. It is certainly not Aristotle who played the rôle of a catalyst and was the first to provoke the multiplication of the Platonic Form in order to solve problems which were not recognized before in the Platonic circle. On the contrary, Plato himself had saddled his pupils with a basic and most intricate problem, that of the nature of participation and logical predication. It was certainly not left quite unsolved in the later dialogues, but did still not have a perspicuous solution which could be accepted in the School as a scholastic one. So any of his serious followers, (who were teachers in the School, at the same time) was bound to contrive, at least, a scholastic device to answer the intricate question. To my view, Aristotle's solution should be discussed in this framework. For that matter, Aristotle stands wholly on ground prepared by his master to the extent that his works on physic and cosmology, too, are essentially discussions held within the Academy (Cp. *Werner Jaeger*, *Aristotle. Fundamentals of the history of his development*, Oxford 1949, 308)." (pp. 81-82)

- 3.2. Aristotle's classification of being as given in the *Categories*; 3.2.1. The common view: categories = predicates; 3.2.2. The things said 'aneu symplokés'; 3.2.3. The doctrine of substance given in the *Categories*; 3.2.4. The ontological character of the classification; 3.2.5. Some obscurities of the classification; 3.2.6. The different status of the 'things' meant; 3.2.6.1 The first item of the classification; 3.2.6.2. The second item of the classification; 3.2.6.3. The third item of the classification; 3.2.6.4. The ontological status of the 'things' meant in the items (2) and (3); 3.2.6.5. The fourth item of classification; 3.2.7. The relation between the different 'things'; 3.3. Categories and predicables; 3.3.1. The opposition of category and predicable; 3.3.2. The impact of the opposition; 3.3.3. The obscure position of the differentia; 3.3.4. Conclusion..
7. ———. 1979. "Facts and events. The historian task." *Vivarium* no. 17:1-42.
 "English translation (by Jop Spiekermann) subsidized by the University of Leyden of part of my introductory book on Medieval Philosophy (*Middeleeuwse wijsbegeerte. Traditie en vernieuwing*. Assen 1977) being part of Chapter II (On the philosophical presuppositions of historical periodization)." (p. 1)
 "Summary. Basically, a historian's conception of history is to be judged by the status he assigns to *historical fact*. We on our part have defined *fact* as the mental entity to which direct reference is made by a descriptive statement accepted as true (1.2-1.4). Next, we have tried to throw further light on this conception, not least by enlisting the aid of linguistics (1.5-1.7).
 History -- as distinct from what others have termed 'history in an objective sense' -- has been defined as '*histoire connaissance*', whose central concerns it is to render insightful what we have called the vis-à-vis (XYZ), sometimes indicated by the, to me repellent, term '*histoire réalité*' (2.2).
 Further reflection on what ultimately constitutes *fact* has led us to adopt, in line with others, an extension of Kuhn's paradigm concept: paradigms is whatever is constitutive of *any* external world experience, regardless of what this experience may be; it is of a compelling nature.
 When the historian, intent on getting a grip on his vis-à-vis (XYZ), delineates and structures it, any such structuring operation is, from the perspective of the vis-à-vis, arbitrary and intrusive. On the historian's part, however, it is of a compelling, paradigmatic nature (3.1). This lends piquancy to such phrases as 'Historical truth dictates the observation that...', since it is not any 'past reality' which dictates to us. Rather, it is our own, indeed historical (!) paradigmatically determined experience of our vis-à-vis which, without dictating anything, compels us.
 But a paradigm *can* be reversed, thereby giving rise to a different, eventually perhaps completely different, mode of experiencing the vis-à-vis (3.2-3.3)
 The historian-the medievalist no less than his fellow-historians-is confronted with this matter on two counts. In his probing quest he himself is tied clown to the contemporary paradigm. Though he is unable to discern the outlines of the paradigm he is caught up in which must indeed, by definition, be postulated-yet his realization that his mode of experiencing the vis-à-vis determines his scientific activities and that both are shaped by the prevailing paradigm, should restrain him from entertaining unwarranted ideas about 'objectivity'. Equally, he must take into account that his documentary sources, in turn, are paradigmatically determined. For anyone writing at any moment in the past it was possible to be 'objective' only in the sense that he honestly recorded what *lie* saw." (pp. 41-42.
8. ———. 1980. *Die Mittelalterlichen Traktate De modo opponendi et respondendi: Einleitung und Ausgabe der einschlägigen Texte*. Münster: Aschendorff.
 Inhalt:
 EINLEITUNG
 1. Eine jüdisch-arabische (?) Vorlage des bekannten pseudo-albertischen Traktats *De modo opponendi et respondendi* 1; 2. Der *Thesaurus philosophorum* des 'Aganafat' 11; 3. Die Albert dem Grossen fälschlicherweise zugeschriebene Überarbeitung des *Thesaurus philosophorum* 26; 4. Eine weitere Bearbeitung des *Thesaurus* aus der Feder eines Magisters Gentilis aus dem 14. Jahrhundert 35; 5.

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1. Die *Thesaurus Philosophorum* des Aganafat 106; 2. Die Prager version des *Thesaurus philosophorum* 159; 3. Pseudo-Alberti Magni *De modo opponendi et respondendi* 193; 4. Gentilis de Monte Ste Marie in Georgio *De arte et modo disputandi* 287-379.

9. ———. 1980. "On ancient and mediaeval semantics and metaphysics. Part III. The categories as classes of names." *Vivarium* no. 18:1-62.
 "4. *The Categories as classes of names; 4.1. Status quaestionis.* The previous sections contain several hints to the close interrelation between three major issues in Plato's doctrine, viz. the question about the true nature of the Forms and those about participation and predication. Indeed, for the founder of the theory of the Forms, predication was bound to become a problem. Forms are immutable and indivisible; yet other Ideas have to participate in them; they are unique, by themselves and subsistent; yet, when saying '*John is man*' (or *white*), '*Peter is man*' (or *white*), should there be one perfect, eternal, immutable *etc.* Form of MAN (or WHITE) in the one and another in the other? Or, as I have put it above [1977: 85]: if John, Peter, and William are wise, does this mere fact mean that there must be something which they are all related to *in exactly the same manner*, namely WISDOM itself? And if '*John is wise*', '*Peter is wise*', and '*William is wise*' are all true statements, what exactly is the meaning of the predicate name '*wise*'? The former question is concerned with participation, the latter with predication. Well, that the crux of the latter problem is not the separate existence of the Forms (*chôrismos*) clearly appears from the fact that also the author of the *Categories*, who had entirely abandoned all kind of *chôrismos*, could apparently not get rid of a similar problem: if the categories really are classes of 'things there are' (1 a 20) (i.e. 'real' substances, 'real' natures, and 'real' properties), rather than concepts (i.e. logical attributes), what kind of 'thing' is *meant by* a term *qua* 'category'? So for Aristotle the semantic problem still remained. His distinction between *en hypokeimenôî* and *kath' hypokeimenou* could only hide the original problem. It is often said that these phrases refer to different domains, the metaphysical and the logical one, respectively. We have already found some good reasons to qualify this opposition (see [1978], 84; 88). It seems to be useful now to collect all kind of information from Aristotle's writings, not only the *Categories*, about the proper meaning of the categories. This will be the aim of our sections 4.2-4.7." (pp. 1-2)
 4.2. *On some modern interpretations of 'kata symplokên'*; 4.3. *Aristotle's use of the categories*; "For this section see also my Utrecht dissertation, *The place of the Categories of Being in Aristotle's philosophy*, Assen 1952 pp. 76-88. I have to correct or to adjust my former views on several points."; 4.31. *The categories as a classification of reality*; 4.32. *The categories as a classification of sentence predicates*; 4.33. *The categories as a classification of 'copulative being'*; 4.4. *How did Aristotle arrive at his list of categories?*; 4.5. *Are the categories the 'highest predicates'?*; 4.6. *The categories taken as names in Metaph. Z 1-6 and Anal. Post. I 4*; 4.7. *An attempt at a reinterpretation of Categories, chs. 1-5*; 4.8. *Aristotle's view on relatives*; 4.9. *Conclusion.*

10. ———. 1980. "The semantical impact of Abailard's solution of the problem of Universals." In *Petrus Abaelardus (1079-1142). Person, Werk und Wirkung*, edited by Thomas, Rudolf, Jolivet, Jean, Luscombe, David and de Rijk, Lambertus Marie, 139-151. Trier: Paulinus-Verlag.
 Reprinted as chapter III in: *Through Language to Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics.*
 "It is most unfortunate that as late as in the second edition of his *Theory of Universals* Richard Aaron has based his rather unfavourable view on Peter

Abailard's contribution to the solution of the problem of universals on the older work of our famous logician only, viz. the *Logica Ingredientibus*. As is known, the French Master's most mature solution is found in the *Logica Nostrorum petitioni* (LNP) (*).

In this work (LNP 522, 10 ff.) Abailard attributes the commonness of common nouns neither to extramental things nor to words (voces), rather he states that it is significant word (sermo), that is either singular or universal. He finds much support in Aristotle's definition of the universal: 'a universal is that which is by its nature predicated of a number of things.' (**). Abailard lays much stress on the nature of the formation of sermones, which to his mind is a human establishment (hominum institutio), unlike the formation of extramental things and that of words taken as articulated sounds, which are creations of nature. His solution is entirely focused on his explicit distinction between the material identity of vox and sermo as opposed to their formal diversity ('non-identity').

There is, he says, a clear formal distinction between 'being predicable of many,' or: 'predicability' and 'that which is predicable of many'. It is predicability that must belong to a vox for it to be a universal; just being something that is predicable of many is not enough.

Well, Abailard makes every effort to explain the formal difference between vox (word, i. e. articulated sound) and sermo (significant word), which should be put beside their material identity. The distinction is so important to him that we need not wonder that throughout the whole discussion Abailard makes use of his best weapon, his incomparable skill in the field of linguistic (or rather: semantic) analysis." (p. 139)

(*) Richard I. Aron, *The theory of Universals*, Oxford, 1967 (2nd ed.), p. 13.(...)

(**) *De interpretatione* 7, 17a 39-40.

11. ———. 1980. "Peter Abälard (1079-1142), Meister und Opfer des Scharfsinns." In *Petrus Abaelardus, 1079-1142. Person, Werk und Wirkung*, edited by Thomas, Rudolf, 125-138. Trier: Paulinus-Verlag.

Conference at the Trierer Theologischen Fakultät in Trier (18 April 1979).

Reprinted as chapter II in: *Through Language to Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics*.

"Kehren wir zum Abschluss nochmals zu Abälards eigenen Worten zurück: „Von der ganzen Philosophie sagte mir die Logik am meisten zu: für ihre Waffen gab ich die Ritterwaffen dahin." Ihrer Stimme ist er tatsächlich gefolgt, nicht nur als Theoretiker der Logik, sondern auch durch Anwendung seiner subtilen Logik auf sonstige Wissensgebiete. Aber der Einfluss seiner logischen Natur lässt sich auch des weiteren spüren: Sein ganzes Leben wurde von seinem Scharfsinn geprägt: wusste er doch auch die Schwächen seiner Gegner erbarmungslos zu analysieren. Sein Schüler Berengar von Poitiers schrieb nach der Verurteilung seines Lehrers (durch die Synode von Sens im Jahre 1140) eine Verteidigungsschrift, die u. a. Abälards Glaubensbekenntnis (*Confessio fidei*) enthält (= *Epist. 17*). Nun denn, die *Confessio fidei* gleicht keineswegs Augustins *Retractatio*, scheint doch Abälard vielmehr versucht zu sein, abermals recht zu behalten. Was er beiseite zu schaffen wünscht, sind nicht etwa eigene Irrtümer, sondern Missverständnisse seitens anderer, worunter ihm wohl das Wichtigste war, dass die Leute seinen aufrichtigen Glauben angezweifelt hatten. Seine Stärke, die Logik, hat ihn bei vielen verhasst gemacht, indem man sie dem christlichen Glauben gegenüberstellte."(s. 138).

12. ———. 1980. "Each man's ass is not everybody's ass. On an important item in 13th century semantics." In *Historiographica Linguistica Studies in medieval linguistic thought. Dedicated to Geoffrey L. Bursill-Hall on the occasion of his sixtieth birthday on May 15, 1980*, 221-230.

Reprinted as chapter VIII in: *Through Language to Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics*.

"After the discussion of the well-known sophism "*Cuiuslibet hominis asinus currit*" William of Sherwood rejects an alternate analysis in the following words: "*quod sic vel sic iudicetur non est ex parte sermonis sed ex parte nostra tantum*" (...)

The aim of this paper, written in honour of a meritorious scholar in the history of medieval linguistic thought, Geoffrey Bursill-Hall, is, first, to discuss Sherwood's treatment of the sophism (and especially clarify his concluding sentence); then, to put the question into its proper historical context, viz. the medieval discussion of the logico-semantic impact of the structure of discourse (i. e., the effect of word order on the meaning of a given sentence)." (p. 221)

(...)

"3. *The semantic impact of the discussion.*

Kilwardby's formulation of the condemned position is well-suited to clarify the semantic impact of the whole discussion. It seems to be focused on the question of whether, or not, nouns (names), by their own nature (*secundum propriam inventionem*) refer to existent things alone. As is known the affirmative answer is energetically defended by Roger Bacon (Braakhuis 1977). However, Roger's position is certainly not an isolate one. Not only a William of Sherwood came very close to it (Braakhuis 1977), but, generally speaking, many medieval logicians adhere to the view that a noun's primary inclination is to refer to particular, demonstrable individuals and that class-designation and connotation is just a secondary function of names. To take our sophism. In 'asinus cuiuslibet hominis currit' the subject term 'asinus' *preceding* the distributive sign 'cuiuslibet' is not affected by it and, accordingly, refers to one particular individual.

On the other hand, in 'cuiuslibet hominis asinus currit', in *following* the sign the term 'asinus' is prevented from pursuing its primary inclination and cannot help being confused over (*confundi*) a multitude of individuals.

Elsewhere (De Rijk 1980a, 1980b) I have tried to show that as early as from Abelaird's days medieval logicians developed semantic views to the effect that, in fact, they endowed names with, at least, two levels: (a) a name in its own nature refers to an existent thing alone, and (b) when occurring in a syntactic formation (*constructio*), especially when joined to a verb of a tense other than the present, a name is reduced to a confused level on which it designates realization of a certain nature (form), including that in the past or future, or even a possible one.

Later discussions of our sophism (e.g., the controversy between Paul of Venice and Peter of Mantua on the issue (as found in the former's *Logica magna*, Treatise Two make clear that our sophism should be put into the general semantic framework of the period. Medieval word-order problems, indeed, were often considered very important since word-order was viewed as the rendez-vous of grammar and ontology." (p. 230).

References

Braakhuis 1977 = *The views of William of Sherwood on some semantical topics and their relation to those of Roger Bacon in Vivarium* 15: (1977) pp. 111-142

De Rijk 1980a = The semantical impact of Abailard's solution of the Problem of Universals

De Rijk 1980b = Abailard's semantic views in the light of later developments

13. ———. 1981. "On ancient and mediaeval semantics and metaphysics. Part IV. Plato's semantics in his critical period (First part)." *Vivarium* no. 19:1-46.

"5. *Plato's semantics in his critical period; 5.1. Introduction.* In concluding the previous section I argued (1980: nr. 4.9, p. 62) that Aristotle's *Categories* may be viewed as dealing with the several ways in which an individual man can be named without destroying his concrete unity. A well-known passage of Plato's *Sophist* (251 A 8ff.) was referred to in which Plato deals with the puzzle of one man with many names. It is true, Plato labels the puzzle as just 'a magnificent entertainment for the young and the late-learners' (251 B), and is more interested in the related question of how 'things' like Rest and Change (presently called *Kinds*) can also have several attributes (attributive names) and the general problem of attribution as implying the 'Communion' of *Kinds*'. But it is obvious at the same time that in this shape too the puzzle is mainly concerned with the notions of naming, asserting and predication. So Plato's *Sophist* unavoidably has to be part of our discussion.

- A further argument for taking the *Sophist* into consideration may be found in Ammonios' commentary to Aristotle's *De interpretatione*. He remarks (*ad 17 a 26ff.: Comm. in Aristot. graeca IV 5*, p. 83, 8-13, ed. Busse) that the analysis of the *apophantikos logos* as given by Aristotle is to be found scattered all over Plato's *Sophist* (261 Cff.) right after that master's excellent expositions about Non-being mixed with Being (*peri tou synkekramenou tōi onti me ontos*). For that matter, on more than one item of Aristotle's *Categories* and *De interpretatione* the Ancient commentators refer to related questions and discussions in Plato's later dialogues, especially the *Sophist*. I hope to show in sections (5) and (6) that the views found in the *Categories* and *De interpretatione* are most profitably compared with what Plato argues in the related discussions of the *Sophist*." (p. 1)
- 5.2. On the main theme of Plato's *Sophist*; 5.3. Plato's preliminary attempt to search 'the *Sophist*' (216A-231E); 5.4. The semantic character of the procedure; 5.5. On current views about 'what is' and 'what is not'; 5.5.1. Introductory: on the genus of image-making; 5.5.2. What should be understood by the phrase 'what is not'? (237B-242B); 5.5.2.1. On the notion of 'what absolutely is not'; 5.5.2.2. On the association of 'what is not' with likeness and falsehood; 5.5.3. Pluralists and Monists about 'what is'; 5.5.3.2. On 'what is' as taken by the Monists; 5.5.4. Materialists and Idealists about 'what is'; 5.5.4.1. The Materialists (245E-247E); 5.5.4.2 The Idealists (248A-249D); 5.5.4.3. Does 'what is in change' include Forms?; 5.6. The general problem of name-giving (249D-256D); 5.6.1. 'Being' as a (formally) separate and (materially) all-embracing Form.
14. ———. 1981. "On ancient and mediaeval semantics and metaphysics. Part V. Plato's semantics in his critical period (Second part)." *Vivarium* no. 19:81-125.
5. Plato's semantics in his critical period (Continuation); 5.6.2. The problem of giving several names and the Communion of Kinds; 5.6.2.1. On the 'trivial' question of 'one individual -- many names'; 5.6.2.2. Giving several names and the Communion of Kinds;
"5.6.3. Dialectic and the Communion of Forms
In order to clarify the Communion of Kinds an analogy is drawn between the vowels which 'form a sort of bond running through the whole system (253 A 4-5) and certain Forms that are 'running through all' (253 C 1). Just as without the help of vowels it is impossible for one of the other letters to fit in with any other (A 5-6), similarly it is the special Forms that make possible Communion and are responsible for Division (C 2-3). It seems to be useful to have a look at the impact of this analogy." (p. 95)
5.6.3.1. The precise impact of the vowel-analogy; 5.6.3.2. The proper task of Dialectic; 5.6.3.3. The description of the dialectician's practice; 5.6.4. On the Communion of Forms as occurring in particulars; 5.6.5. The question of 'what is not' reduced into a problem of name-giving; 5.6.6. Four antinomies concerning the Five Kinds raised and solved (254D-255E); 5.6.6.1. The first round: on the relations of Being, Rest and Change; 5.6.6.2. The second round: on the relations of Change, Rest, Same and Other; 5.6.6.3. The third round: 'What is' and 'the Same' disentangled; 5.6.6.4. The fourth round: 'What is' and 'the Other' disentangled; 5.6.6.5. On the different uses of *kath' hautō*; 5.6.6.6. 'What is' and 'the Other' disentangled. Continuation; 5.6.6.6. 'What is' and 'Other' disentangled. Continuation.
15. ———. 1981. "Die Wirkung der neuplatonischen Semantik auf das mittelalterliche Denken über das Sein." In *Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter. Akten des 6. internationalen Kongresses für mittelalterliche Philosophie der Société internationale pour l'étude de la philosophie médiévale, 29. August-3. September 1977 im Bonn*, edited by Beckmann, Jan P., 19-35. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter. Reprinted as chapter V in: *Through Language to Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics*.
"Das Thema dieser Plenarsitzung, SPRACHE UND LOGIK, könnte man als ein rein logisches, bzw. rein linguistisches Problem auffassen. Der Titel dieses Vortrags jedoch genügt, um deutlich zu machen, dass dies nicht meine Absicht ist; uns

interessiert zur Stunde das Bedeutungsproblem als philosophische Frage. Ich halte es für nicht ganz unwichtig zu bemerken, dass es sich für mich dabei nicht um eine durch diesen Philosophiekongreß bedingte Wahl handelt, sondern um eine prinzipielle Auffassung, und zwar, dass überhaupt das Bedeutungsproblem nur als ein semantisches aufgefasst werden sollte. Wer aber Semantik sagt, kann die Fragen der Ontologie und Metaphysik nicht ausser acht lassen.

Diejenigen unter uns, die auf dem Gebiet der Logik eher Amateure als Liebhaber sind, dürfen sich aber nicht darüber freuen, dass jetzt das Verhältnis *Sprache* und *Metaphysik* unmittelbar, ich möchte sagen, geradlinig, zu Wort gebracht werden wird. Es bleibt ja immer, zur Vermeidung eines Kurzschlusses, der Umweg über die Logik wesentlich, da sonst eine rein evokative, mehr andeutende als deutende Bewältigung der metaphysischen Fragen in den Vordergrund treten würde.

Ich möchte von einem logischen Spezialfall der Seinsdeutung ausgehen. Zuerst wird er in seinen logisch-semantischen Kontext gestellt; danach wird der Doppelcharakter des Verbums „*est*“ näher analysiert, wobei die generelle Frage der Namensbezeichnung sich als das eigentliche Problem entpuppt, und zum Abschluss wird sich dies besonders auf die Relation Aktualität und Faktizität verlegen." (p. 19)

16. ———, ed. 1981. *Anonymi auctoris franciscani Logica 'Ad rudium'*. Edited from the MS Vat. lat 946. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.

Edited by L. M. de Rijk with a short introduction, notes and indices.

"The greater part of the manuscript seems to have been written in 1338." (p. 11)
(...)

"4 - On its possible sources

Ockham, Gerald Odonis and some Magister Petrus are already mentioned as sources of our compiler. Since in the first part of his work our author often rejects Ockham's views on the matter involved (e.g. I 12; 36; 42) one may be tempted to suggest that he had ps-Campsall's *Logica contra Ockham* at his elbow, of which we have only an incomplete copy extant (or should we say: which was never completed?). It should be remembered, in this connection, that our compiler has quite the same division of his work as Ockham has in his *Sum of Logic*. It should not be excluded, therefore that when having Ockham's work on his desk (for a possible clue, see I 35), our author used ps-Campsall's critical objections against Ockham, for the first part of his work, at least. Further investigation is eagerly needed. I hope that it will be facilitated by the present edition." (p. 12)

17. ———. 1981. "Boèce logicien et philosophe: ses positions sémantiques et sa métaphysique de l'être." In *Atti del Congresso internazionale di studi boeziani (Pavia, 5-8 Ottobre 1980)*, edited by Obertello, Luca, 141-156. Genova: Accademia Ligure di scienze e lettere.

"Le grand historien Etienne Gilson a bien remarqué que c'est à propos du problème du Bien que la pensée de Boèce fut la plus personnelle et la plus féconde. Avec Platon et Saint Augustin, il identifie dans son opuscule *Quomodo substantiae* l'être au Bien (comme le Mal au non-être). Il est évident que dans l'opinion de Boèce la doctrine de l'être obtient une importance décisive comme base de la théorie du Bien. Aussi la solution du problème du Bien et du Mal fut esquissé dans sa métaphysique de l'être.

L'identification de l'être et du Bien implique que pour tout ce qui est, c'est une seule et même chose *d'être* et *d'être bon*. Mais si les choses sont *substantiellement* bonnes, en quoi diffèrent-elles du Bien en soi, qui est Dieu? Dans cette question la problématique du *Sophiste* de Platon a dû revivre. On sait que dans ce dialogue Platon a essayé de résoudre le problème fondamental de l'être des choses périssables par une analyse vraiment pénétrante des notions de «Même» (*tauton*) et «Autre» (*heteron*).

Il me semble que Boèce fait une chose comparable. Il n'est pas étonnant qu'il commence (dans *De hebdomadibus* = *Quomodo substantiae* etc.; voir l'édition de Stewart-Rand) ses exposés approfondis sur la notion de l'être par l'axiome qui a dû provoquer tant de commentaires pendant le moyen âge: *diversum est esse et quod quod est* (II 28-30: «il ya diversité entr "être" et "ce qui est"»). Cette formule, qui

- est valable pour tout être composé concerne la différence ontologique entre l'élément constitutif, ou la forme, de tout être composé d'un côté, et la chose elle-même, ou le tout établi par cette forme, de l'autre. Le tout doit son être à l'élément constitutif qui est la forme substantielle, sans laquelle il n'est pas du tout. Cependant la question sur son essence ne peut pas être résolue en désignant cette forme. (...) Il semble être utile de prendre au sérieux la suggestion des commentateurs médiévaux et d'entreprendre la réponse à notre question du point de vue sémantique. Je propose de discuter d'abord (1) la notion de *qualitas* chez Boèce (2), ensuite son modèle sémantique (3), et ses idées sur le rôle (logico-sémantique) du nom et du verbe (4-5); enfin la signification exacte de sa notion de l'être (*esse*) sera discutée (6) et éclaircie en mettant en lumière le but et la méthode du traité *Quomodo substantiae* (7)." (pp. 141-142, notes omitted).
18. ———. 1981. "La lexicographie du latin médiéval et l'histoire de la logique." In *La lexicographie du latin médiéval et ses rapports avec les recherches actuelles sur la civilisation du moyen âge*, 289-293. Colloque international, Paris 18-21 October 1978.
"J'arrive à la conclusion de cette courte intervention. Comme le fait remarquer Olga Weijers dans sa contribution, il faut que les divers lemmes montrent bien quelles sont les distinctions principales des divers sens d'un mot, quelles sont les nuances, quelles sont les différentes expressions dans lesquelles le mot est utilisé dans le cadre d'une même signification; bref, il faut établir le tableau sémasiologique de façon détaillée et structurée. Cette chose ne peut se faire qu'en se fondant sur une interprétation des textes assez élaborée. Cette interprétation exige l'assistance de spécialistes de divers domaines, surtout en ce qui concerne tous ceux qui, dès la période médiévale, étaient de nature assez particulière et parfois tellement ésotérique que les contemporains des auteurs médiévaux qui n'appartenaient pas au petit cercle des initiés, ne comprenaient, pas plus que la plupart d'entre nous, cette terminologie spécialisée. Un de ces domaines était celui de la logique terministe et de la sémantique à partir du XIII siècle. Dans cette période bien des mots-clé ont été forgés, qui devaient être d'une grande importance pour la terminologie philosophique jusqu'à nos jours. Dans cet ordre d'idées il est essentiel que le lexique du latin médiéval ne manque pas à sa tâche." (p. 292)
19. ———. 1981. "Abailard's semantic views in the light of later developments." In *English Logic and Semantics: from the End of the Twelfth Century to the Time of Ockham and Burleigh*, edited by Braakhuis, Henk A.G., Kneepkens, Corneli Henri and de Rijk, Lambertus Marie, 1-58. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
Acts of the 4th European Symposium on Mediaeval Logic and Semantics, Leiden-Nijmegen 23-27 April 1979.
Reprinted as chapter VI in: *Through Language to Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics*.
"1. Semantics in Abailard's solution of the problem of universals. Abailard's attempt at solving the problem of universals may be characterized as a remarkable achievement in the field of semantics. The procedure of this solution found in his mature work, the *Glosses on Porphyry* (*) can be divided into two stages: first, the extensive discussion of the formal distinction between *vox* and *sermo*, the semantic analysis of the intensional act of intellection." (p. 1)
(*) *Logica nostrorum petitioni*, ed. Geyer (Münster 1933), pp. 505-533 (henceforth quoted as L.N.P.)
"Finally, I will briefly sum up some of the important items of Mediaeval semantics which may be fitted into the frame-work of what I have labeled the 'semantic stratification of appellative names'.
First. There is the distinction of *esse actuate* and *esse habituate* as adhered to by many 13th century authors but energetically rejected by Roger Bacon, whereas William of Sherwood turns out to stand somewhere half-way between Roger and the majority. The point at issue is the significative force of an appellative noun. Whereas others commonly accepted a name's referring to an *esse habituale* (that is, being common to present, preterite and future being and even to what actually is

and what actually is not), Roger most strictly held that even in such metaphysical propositions as '*omnis homo de necessitate est animal*' the subject term can only refer to actually existing things (therefore they are all false on Roger's view). William, though admitting the distinction between *esse actuale* and *esse habituale*, regarded such propositions as equivocal. This reminds us of William's view that a name's meaning is determined by the language - users rather than by speech itself (*Synecat.*, 52, 25 - 26). The pivotal point of this controversy seems to be the different application of our *F.R.* On Roger's view, for instance, the determination '*de necessitate*' in propositions such as '*omnis homo de necessitate est animal*' is unable to strip an appellative noun of its primary function, of signifying only existing things, whereas his opponents are apparently of the opinion that that phrase compels the noun to withdraw to its second semantic level of designating just an *esse habituale*, with the result that the proposition is true.

Secondly, the problems concerning verbs expressing a mental attitude may be looked at from the same point of view. To quote Abailard (L.N.P. 531, 9 - 13; cfr. also above, pp. 4 - 5): When it is said: "I want a hood (*desidero cappam*); well, every hood is *this* or *that* hood", yet it does not follow that I want *this* or *that* hood. If, however, one would say as follows: "I want a hood; well, every one who wants a hood is wanting this or that hood; (therefore I am wanting *this* or *that* hood) ", then, indeed, the argument would go on correctly.

However, the assumption would be false, then. This much is certain, Abailard rejects that in '*I want a hood*' and '*every hood is this hood or that hood*' the term '*hood*' has the same signification. As a matter of fact the term '*hood*' in the former proposition, unlike that in the latter proposition, does not designate a hood actually existing, (except in case, I have some particular hood in mind, of course). So we have to conclude that the verb '*desidero*' governing the object '*cappam*' precludes us from taking it for an actually existing hood and compels us to understand it in the second-level-meaning of '*a concrete, particular, hood*', whether or not actually existing." (pp. 50-51)

No doubt, it is Abailard who initiated many developments in Mediaeval semantics. So I have considered it useful to draw the attention to the achievements of this great master in the field of logic, since 'the logic before Ockham' cannot be properly understood unless Abailard is recognized as the man who stood, in many respects, at the cradle of fourteenth century logic." (p. 52)

20. Rijk, Lambertus Marie de, and Weijers, Olga. 1981. *Répertoire des commentaires latins du moyen âge sur Aristote conservés dans les bibliothèques publiques aux Pays-Bas*. Amsterdam: North Holland.

Avant-propos.

"Il y a quelques années, la Société Internationale pour l'Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.) decida d'entreprendre un projet visant à cataloguer et à décrire tous les manuscrits contenant des commentaires latins du moyen âge sur les oeuvres (authentiques ou pseudépigraphes) d'Aristote, y compris, en ce qui concerne la logique, les commentaires sur l' *Isagoge* de Porphyre et sur les *Opuscules* de Boèce. Dans le présent volume nous avons voulu, conformément au projet, décrire les manuscrits qui se trouvent aux Pays-Bas.

Notons en passant que le manuscrit Utrecht, Universiteitsbibliotheek 695, qui contient selon le catalogue des questions sur le *De Anima* d'Aristote, est un recueil de textes médicaux et que le passage en question (f. 79r-90"a) est en fait un ouvrage de médecine. Il ne sera donc pas décrit dans ce volume.

Les descriptions codicologiques sont toutes de la main du second cosignataire. Le premier soussigné, en faisant l'analyse du contenu des manuscrits, a bénéficié du concours de dr. É.P. Bos (Leyde) qui a notamment mis à sa disposition ses analyses circonstanciées des mss. Cuyck, La Haye Meermanno-Westreenianum 10 A 8 et 9 et Utrecht 825.

L. M. de Rijk, Olga Weijers"

21. Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1982. "Semantics in Richard Billingham and Johannes Venator." In *English Logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th Centuries: Acts of the 5th*

European Symposium, Rome, 10-14 November 1980., edited by Maierù, Alfonso, 167-183.

Reprinted as chapter XII in: *Through Language to Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics.*

"I shall try to elucidate in this paper some remarkable developments of the theory of meaning found in Venator's comments upon Billingham" (p. 168)

"I shall try to give a general framework of fourteenth century semantic views. *A specimen of a model of Mediaeval semantics.*

It should be noticed first that any model designed in order to elucidate the peculiarities of Mediaeval semantic views should start from the well-established fact that Mediaeval logic was substantially dialogic: any statement is considered (or supposed to be) actually occurring in a disputation." (p. 178)

22. ———. 1982. "On ancient and mediaeval semantics and metaphysics. Part VI. Plato's semantics in his critical period (Third part)." *Vivarium* no. 20:97-127. 5.6.7. *How the diverse Kinds have communion with one another*; 5.7. *The reinstatement of 'What is not' (256d-259D)*; 5.7.1. *Forms being and Forms not being*; 5.7.2. *The not-being of 'What is'*; 5.7.3. *The being of what is not*; 5.7.4. *Are there Forms corresponding to negative expressions?*; 5.7.5. *The Parmenidean dogma refuted. Summary*;
 "5. 8 *Conclusion*. From our analysis of *Soph.*, 216 A-259 D it may be concluded that Plato did certainly not abandon his theory of Forms. We may try to answer, now, the main questions scholarship is so sharply divided about (see Guthrie [*A History of Greek Philosophy*] V, 143ff.). They are, in Guthrie's formulation: (1) does Plato mean to attribute Change to the Forms themselves, or simply to enlarge the realm of Being to include life and intelligence which are not Forms?, and (2) is he going even further in dissent from the friends of Forms and admitting what they called Becoming --changing and perishable objects of the physical world -- as part of the realm of True Being?
 The first question should be answered in the negative. Indeed, Plato is defending a certain Communion of Forms, but this regards their *immanent* status and, accordingly, the physical world primarily, rather than the 'Forms themselves' (or: 'in their exalted status' as Guthrie has it, p. 159). As to the second question, to Guthrie's mind Plato's language makes it almost if not quite insoluble. I think that if one pays Plato's expositions the patient attention he asks for 'at 259 C-D and follows his analysis stage by stage, the exact sense and the precise respect in which he makes his statements (cf. 259 D 1-2: *ekeinêi kai kat' ekeino ho physi*) about Being and Not-being, Sameness and Otherness, and so on will appear. It will be easily seen, then, that there is no recantation at all in Plato's development. He still maintains, as he will maintain in his later works (e.g. *Philebus*, 14 D ff.) the Transcendent Forms as what in the last analysis are the only True Being. But Plato succeeds in giving a fuller sense to the old notions of 'sharing' and 'presence in' without detracting the 'paradigm' function of the Forms in any respect. Matter, Change and Becoming is given a better position in the Theory of Forms in that their immanent status has been brought into the focus of Plato's interest. From his *Parmenides* onwards Plato has been searching for the solution of his metaphysical problems and has actually found it in the *Sophist* in a new view of participation. Forms in their exalted status are just a too eminent cause for the existence of the world of Becoming. But their being *shared in*, i.e. their immanent status, make them so to speak 'operable' and yet preserve their dignity of being paradigmatic standards. What makes something to be a horse is, no doubt, the Transcendent Form, HORSENESS, but it only can *partake of* that Form and possess it as an immanent form. So the Highness of the Form and the unworthy matter can come together as matter 'informed', that is, affected by an immanent form.
 Plato never was unfaithful to his original view about Forms as the only True Being. In our dialogue, too, he brings the eminence of True Being (taken, of course, as a Transcendent Form) into relief by saying (254 A) that the true philosopher, through his devotion to the Form, 'What is' ('Being'), dwells in the brightness of the divine,

and the task of Dialectic, accordingly, is described from that very perspective (see Part (5), 96ff.). Focussing on the immanence of the Forms does not detract anything from their 'exalted status', since immanent forms are nothing else but the Transcendent Forms as partaken of by particulars.

(...)

In his critical period Plato never ceased to believe in the Transcendent World. The important development occurring there consists in his taking more seriously than before their presence *in* matter and their activities as *immanent* forms. In the *Sophist* he uses all his ingenuity to show that a correct understanding of the Forms may safeguard us from all extremist views on being and not-being and zealous exaggerations of the Friends of Forms as well." (pp. 125-127)

23. ————. 1982. *Some 14th Century Tracts on the Probationes terminorum* (Martin of Alnwick O.F.M., Richard Billingham, Edward Upton and others). Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.

An edition by L. M. de Rijk of four current textbooks, with an introduction and indexes.

"Introduction

1. The so-called Probationes literature

From the second half of the 14th century onwards the *Speculum puerorum* (or: *iuvenum*; the alternative, and original, title seems to be *Terminus est in quem*, after the opening words) compiled by the English logician Richard Billingham (fl. c.1340) enjoyed a great popularity, especially in Southern and Central European universities. The *Speculum* was, together with such famous works as those by Thomas Manlevelt and William Heytesbury, a formidable competitor of Peter of Spain's *Tractatus*, in German universities in particular.

Billingham's work is an introduction to what from about the 1330's onwards was a genre of specific items of 14th-century logic, distinct from the comprehensive *Summule* of the type of Peter of Spain's *Tractatus*(1) and the adaptations made to that work by a number of logicians (such as John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen(2)). The latter genre indeed contains a complete arrangement of the well-known conventional items of the *logica antiqua* and *moderna* favoured in those days." (p. 3)

"As to the tradition of the *Probationes* literature it is important to realise that Richard Billingham, though heavily dominating the scene with his work, was in fact just one of the authors of such tracts and not the initiator of the genre either. Like Peter of Spain who through his *Tractatus* was a writer of the immense influence in all universities on the Continent rather than an original logician or an inventive didactician, Billingham too wrote a treatise which happened to become the most popular of its genre, although it is certainly not the best example of a work on the subject(5).

Habent sua fata libelli.

In the present volume several tracts belonging to the 14th-century *Probationes* literature will be edited: (1) the tract written by the Grey Friar Martin of Alnwick; (2) Richard Billingham's tract in its various versions;

(3) Edward Upton's *Terminus est in quem*, and finally (4) the anonymous *Tractatus aureus* which presumably dates from the end of the 14th century." (p. 4)

(1) See: Peter of Spain, *Tractatus called afterwards Summule logicales*. First critical edition from the manuscripts with an introduction by L.M. de Rijk, Assen 1972, p. LXXXVIII-XCV.

(2) See E.P. Bos, Marsilius of Inghen, *Treatises on the Properties of Terms. A First Critical Edition of the Suppositiones, Ampliationes, Appellationes, Restrictiones and Alienationes*, with introduction, translation, notes and appendices. (Diss. Leyde 1980); forthcoming in *Synthese Historical Library* (Dordrecht 1982).

(5) See L.M. de Rijk, The Place of Billingham's "Speculum puerorum" in the 14th and 15th century logical tradition, with the edition of some alternative tracts, in: *Studa Mediewistyczne* 16(1975), [99-153], 100.

24. ———. 1982. "The origins of the Properties of Terms." In *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism*, edited by Kretzmann, Norman, Kenny, Anthony Patrick, Pinborg, Jan and Stump, Eleonore, 161-173. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- "Beginning as early as the eleventh century, the relationship between thought and language was a focal point of medieval thought. This does not amount to saying that the basic nature of that relationship was being studied; rather it was accepted without discussion, as it had been in antiquity. Thought was considered to be linguistically constrained by its very nature; thought and language were taken to be related both to each other and to reality in their elements and their structure. In the final analysis, language, thought, and reality were considered to be of the same logical coherence. Language was taken to be not only an instrument of thought, expression, and communication by also in itself an important source of information regarding the nature of reality. In medieval thought, logico-semantics and metaphysical points of view are, as a result of their perceived interdependence, entirely interwoven." (p. 161)
25. ———. 1983. "Did Parmenides reject the sensible world?" In *Graceful Reason: Essays in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy Presented to Joseph Owens, CSSR on the Occasion of his Seventy-Fifth Birthday and the Fiftieth Anniversary of His Ordination*, edited by Gerson, Lloyd, 29-53. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.
- "Two camps of scholars interpreting Parmenides' poem have recently been distinguished and labeled as the Majority and the Minority. The former holds that, unlike the Alêtheia part, the Doxa part presents an altogether untrue account of things that properly speaking have no real existence. According to the Minority, however, the Doxa was put forward as possessing some kind or degree of cognitive validity. I shall try to show that both these two positions are ambiguous and accordingly fail in giving a clear insight into what Parmenides intends to tell us. They both seem to need correction to the extent that Parmenides does distinguish the Alêtheia route from the Doxa route(s), but there is nothing in the text to tell us that he makes a distinction between two separate domains. one true and the other untrue. As any genuine philosopher he was concerned about the sensible world, *our* world and it was *that* which he wanted to truly understand." (pp. 29-30)
- (...)
- One cannot deny that Heraclitus faced the primitive approach of the physicists in a radical way. So Parmenides in defending another steady inner nature ('Be-ing') sees in him his most dangerous rival. No wonder that his offences against Heraclitus are the most bitter. And indeed he tries to bring Heraclitus into the company of those who, two-headed as they are, are not able to make the great decision. Subsequent thinkers had to take into account Parmenides' doctrine and in fact could not help digesting its rigidity. Plato was the first to take the big decision so seriously that he left the idea of one world as approached by mortals along two different Routes and settled on the assumption of two separate worlds, one of Unshakable Being, the other of Unreliable Becoming. Aristotle, for his part, thought it possible to dispose of Plato's *chorismos* and find the inner nature of things right in themselves. No doubt it is Parmenides, cited by Fr. Owens as 'one of the truly great philosophic geniuses in the history of Western thought,' (*) who was the catalyst of all subsequent metaphysics" (p. 53)
- J. Owens, *A History of Ancient Western Philosophy* (New York 1959) p. 76.
26. ———. 1985. "Walther Burley's Tract *De exclusivis*. An edition." *Vivarium* no. 23:23-54.
- "Some years ago the late Jan Pinborg drew our attention to Burley's early work on propositions which contains some syncategorematic terms effecting an exclusion ('*tantum*', '*solus*'; '*only*'). (...)
- The treatise is found in only three manuscripts, and one of these contains only its beginning. It belongs to the oldest group of logical writings which may be assigned

to this famous English logician whose great renown is mainly due to his sagacious tract *De puritate artis logicae*. The earlier corpus comprises six tracts which in fact form a course of logic in general use in those days:

- (1) *De suppositionibus*, recently edited by Brown (Stephen F. Brown, *Walter Burleigh's Treatise De suppositionibus and Its Influence on William of Ockham*, in: *Franciscan Studies*, 32 (1972), 15-64)
- (2) *De exclusivis*, which will be edited here
- (3) *De exceptivis*, which will be edited in the next issue of this journal
- (4) *De consequentiis*, edited by Green-Pedersen (Niels Jorgen Green Pedersen, *Walther Burley's "De consequentiis". An Edition*, in: *Franciscan Studies*, 40 (1980), 102-66)
- (5) *De insolubilibus*, edited by Roure (M. L. Roure, *La problématique des propositions insolubles au XIIIe siècle et au début du XIVe, suivie de l'édition des traités de W. Shyreswood, W. Burleigh et Th. Bradwardine*, in: *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 45 (1970), 205-84)
- (6) *De obligationibus*, not edited so far. For the MSS tradition, see J. Weisheipl, *Repertorium Mertonense*, in: *Mediaeval Studies*, 31 (1969), [174-224], 196." (pp. 23-24)

27. ———. 1985. "Martin M. Tweedale on Abailard. Some criticisms of a fascinating venture." *Vivarium* no. 23:81-97.

See also: "Reply to Professor de Rijk's 'Martin M. Tweedale on Abailard: some criticisms of a fascinating venture' by Martin M. Tweedale in: *Vivarium* (25), 1987 pp. 3-22 and the postscript by L.M. de Rijk. *id.* p. 23.

"Some years ago Martin M. Tweedale wrote a book on a quite fascinating subject: *Abailard on Universals* (North Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, New York, Oxford, 1976). (...)

Mr. Tweedale's study is bound to give any of his readers the firm impression that, as logician, Peter Abailard has accomplished a tremendous achievement.

Unfortunately, however, Tweedale, (...) is on the wrong track in claiming-throughout his study-that the modern interpreter has to 'ferret' Abailard's answers out of 'rather obscure passages' (p. 7), and that he is inconsistent (p. X and *passim*).

Tweedale has failed to appreciate Abailard's lucidity and clear language. He has missed the point several times and more than once this is due to his defective knowledge of Latin. However, let me not move too hurriedly to my conclusion.

In writing this book, the author had two main objectives in mind, as we learn from the *Preface*. First, 'to present in a form easily accessible to professional philosophers, theologians and historians those scattered portions of Abailard's logical writings which seem to record a very original scrutiny of the foundations of logic and in particular the problem of universals'. Secondly, 'to interpret the texts in a way that would connect them with the ancient tradition and also make them intelligible to contemporary philosophers.' So chapters I and II try to give an insight into the classical and post-classical background. The core of the essay is to be found in Chapters III-V; Chapter VI contains a comparison between Abailard and Frege.

Without doubt, the author has succeeded in enlarging the modern scholar's acquaintance with, and admiration of, Abailard as a logician and early Medieval philosopher and theologian. Even someone who has had only a glimpse of the contents of this rich essay, cannot help experiencing a kind of thrill on realising that he is meeting in Peter Abailard a remarkable and original thinker.

However, to write a successful book something more is needed. To my mind the author was heavily hampered in realising the two objectives he had set himself, as a result of his poor knowledge of (both classical and Medieval) Latin grammar and syntax. Sometimes his judgment of Abailard's achievements is incorrect, for no other reason than his inability to correctly read Abailard's concise language." (81-82)

28. ———. 1985. *La philosophie au moyen âge*. Leiden: Brill.

Translation from Dutch by Pierre Swiggers of: *Middeleeuwse wijsbegeerte. Traditie en vernieuwing*, Assen, 1981.

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"Le présent ouvrage rassemble un nombre de cours préparatoires, tous consacrés à la philosophie médiévale. L'auteur y insiste sur le problème du caractère spécifique de cette philosophie. Il cherche à préciser son propre point de vue, e.a. par la mise-en-cause des problèmes posés par la philosophie de l'histoire. Son classement de la philosophie au Moyen Age part de la même trame. Le chapitre IV traite de la méthode scolastique et fournit des renseignements sur les points de départ des penseurs médiévaux dans le domaine des différentes disciplines.

Dans le chapitre sur la croyance et la connaissance au Moyen Age l'auteur commence par donner un exposé général du problème et ensuite il trace son évolution au moyen des preuves de l'existence de Dieu, d'Anselme (11^e s.) jusqu'à Guillaume d'Ockham (14^e s.). Une analyse de l'ontologie de Thomas d'Aquin donne lieu à l'auteur d'étudier la confrontation des pensées néoplatonicienne et aristotélicienne de l'époque. Le chapitre sur la logique et la sémantique médiévales permet au lecteur de s'initier à la relation entre la sémantique et le point de vue philosophique d'un auteur du Moyen Age.

Le dernier chapitre traite de la différence profonde entre le criticisme médiéval et le scepticisme de penseurs comme Montaigne. L'auteur montre que Descartes a été profondément influencé par la pensée médiévale en ce qui concerne sa victoire du scepticisme." (p. XI)

29. ———. 1986. *Pedro Hispano. Tractatus llamado después Summule logicales*. Ciudad de México: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, UNAM. Spanish translation by Mauricio Beuchot of: *Tractatus*, called afterwards *Summule logicales*.
30. ———. 1986. "Walther Burley's *De exceptivis*. An edition." *Vivarium* no. 24:22-49.
Contents:
 1-3 *Introductio*
 4 *Regula 1a: omnis propositio in parte vera et in parte falsa potest verificari per exceptionem*
 5-15 *Dubitatio*
 16 *Regula 2a: exceptiva est preiacenti instantia*
 17-23 *Instantiae*
 24 *Regula 3a: si tot excipiuntur quot supponuntur, exceptiva est impropria*
 25-34 *Instantiae*
 35-69 DE SUPPOSITIONE IN EXCEPTIVA
 36-40 *De suppositione subiecti*
 41-61 *De suppositione partis extracapte*
 42-45 *De prima opinione*
 46-54 *De secunda opinione*
 55-62 *De tertia opinione*
 63-69 *De suppositione predicati*
 70-84 DE HABITUDINE INTER EXCEPTIVAM ET EXCLUSIVAM
 70-77 *An omnis exclusiva inferat exceptivam et econverso*
 78-82 *An exceptiva inferatur ex negativa exponente exclusive*
 83-84 *An exceptiva inferatur ex affirmativa exponente exclusive*
 85-91 UTRUM EXCEPTIVA POSSIT ESSE FALSA, UTRAQUE EXPONENTE EXISTENTE VERA
 92-99 AN POST EXCEPTIONEM FIAT DISTRIBUTIO
 100-109 QUID DETERMINET PREPOSITIO CUM SUO CASUALI" (p. 22)

- "Here is the edition of Walther Burley's early tract on the so-called 'exceptive propositions.' For some information on it, see the *Introduction* preceding my edition of Burley's *De exclusivis*, in this journal, vol. 23 (1985), (pp. 23-54)
31. ———. 1986. *Plato's Sophist: A Philosophical Commentary*. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
 Contents: Preface 9; Preliminary: Plato's *Sophist* to be reconsidered? 11; Introduction 13; Chapter 1. The dispute about interpreting Plato 22; Chapter 2. The evolution of the doctrine of *Eidos* 30; Reconsidering Plato's *Sophist* 69; Chapter 3. The dialogue's main theme and procedure 71; Chapter 4. On current views about 'what is not' 82; Chapter 5. On current views about 'what is' 93; Chapter 6. Plato's novel metaphysical position 103; Chapter 7. The variety of names and the communion of kinds 110; Chapter 8. An important digression on dialectic 126; Chapter 9. The communion of kinds; Chapter 10. How the five kinds combine 159; Chapter 11. The reinstatement of 'what is not' (256d-259d) 164; Chapter 12. On philosophic and sophistic discourse 186; The framework: semantics and philosophy in Plato; Chapter 13. Plato's semantics in the *Cratylus* 217; Chapter 14. Naming and representing 254; Chapter 15. Language and knowing 277; Chapter 16. Semantics and metaphysics 327; Bibliography 355; Index of passages quoted or referred to 365; Index of proper names 377; Index of terms and topics 383-394.
 "The way in which Plato announces (*Sophist*, 249c-d) his novel metaphysics has been puzzling modern scholars for a long time: 'What is and the All consist of what is changeless *and* what is in change, both together'. Did Plato really introduce Change into the Transcendent World and thus abandon his theory of Unchangeable Forms?
 Many of Plato's commentators have claimed that the use of modern techniques of logico-semantical analysis can be a valuable aid in unravelling this problem and other difficulties Plato raised and attempted to solve. However, not all modern distinctions and tools can be applied without reservation; for many of these are entirely alien to Plato's thought. Interpreters of Plato must also resist the temptation of applying methods as disjointing the dialogue and selecting specific passages only, in their eagerness to prove that Plato was explicitly interested in (their own favourite) problems of 'identity and predication' (not to mention such oddities as the 'self-predication of Forms'), or the distinctions between different senses (or applications) of 'is'.
 The present author has tried to understand Plato by a close reading of the complete dialogue and to relate the doctrinal outcome of the *Sophist* to Plato's general development. Close reading Plato involves following him in his own logico-semantical approach to the metaphysical problems, an approach which shows his deep interest in the manifold ways to 'name' (or to 'introduce into the universe of discourse') 'what is' (or the 'things there are').
 The reader may be sure that my indebtedness to other authors on this subject is far greater than it may appear from my text. Also many of those who have gone in quite different directions than mine have been of great importance to me in sharpening my own views and formulations. Two authors should be mentioned *nominatim*: Gerold Prauss and the late Richard Bluck; two scholars, whose invaluable works deserve far more attention than they have received so far. I owe my translations of the Greek to predecessors. Where I have not followed them, my rendering is no doubt often painfully (and perhaps barbariously) literal: I do not wish to incur the suspicion of trying to improve Plato by modernising him."
 (From the Preface)
32. ———. 1986. "Peter Abelard's semantics and his doctrine of Being." *Vivarium* no. 24:85-127.
 1. Preliminary: *Significatio* in Abelard; 2. *Nomen, verbum, oratio*; 3. On the predicative-copulative function of the verb; 4. The noun and verb in Abelard. A survey; 5. Sentencehood: connection and predication; 5.1. Some preliminary remarks on naming and predication; 5.2. Predication as a semantic problem: linguistics vs semantics 5.3. On dating the logical works of Abelard; 5.4. Abelard's

tackling of the problem of Predication in *Glossae super Periermeneias*; 5.5. The present interpretation confirmed by *Super Topica Glossae*; 5.5. The discussion of predication in the *Dialectica*; 6. Conclusion."6. Conclusion.

"Upon surveying Abelard's investigations about sentencehood it may be stated that it certainly developed gradually and, as a result, so to speak, of our author's continuously scrutinizing the recalcitrant problems concerning the ways in which, in our linguistic behaviour, we deal with the vital problem of being.

First, Abelard makes us recognize the peculiar nature of the substantive verb 'to be' ('esse'), peculiar indeed, since it is the only verb that is capable of conjoining but, at the same time, when serving, thus, as a device for predication, conveys, due to its proper invention, the notion of 'substantialness' ('essentia'). As was said before (above, p. 109), Abelard's entire discussion of the problem is ostensibly concerned with mastering the antagonism between coupling and predication. First, he considers the vicissitudes the predicate noun cannot escape undergoing as the very result of this antagonism and finds a remedy in splitting up the different strata present in nouns such as 'album' ('the or a white thing'). In this endeavour, the chimaera and the like (the 'non-existents') turn out to be a real spoil-sports.

In the *Dialectica*, then, Abelard maintains, a a whole, his previous position (which is found in two parts of the *Logica Ingredientibus*, viz. the *Perihermeneias* commentary and the one on Boethius *De topicis differentiis*), but sets on to refine it in that he gives the *coupling* of 'substantialness' a predominant position over and against the *predication* of a (substantial or accidental) form. However, he aptly combines this move (quite unavoidably, it may seem) with a subtle emptying of the notion of 'essentia' ('substantialness'), with the result that, from now on, 'est' ('is') has developed into a mere container (meaning 'undetermined substantialness') for a 're-al' ('thing-like') content (or sememe) conveyed by a predicate noun (which also may be a participle of an ordinary verb). An additional result is that, on this interpretation, the existential import seems to come from the predicate noun, so that our chimaera is no longer a spoil-sport. Finally, the empty-container view of the copula is completed by Abelard's suggestion to take the 'is' *plus* the predicate noun as merely one linguistic construct." (pp. 123-124)

(...)

"However this may be, Abelard's achievements in semantics are astonishingly great and even remain unparalleled for centuries." (p. 125)

Note: This paper is meant as a continuation to the series '*On Ancient and Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics*' published in this Journal [*Vivarium*] from 1977-82. For bibliographical reasons the original title has been dropped and the studies will be continued under separate titles.

33. ———. 1986. "Abelard and moral philosophy." *Medioevo* no. 12:1-27.

"When speaking of ethics in this connection, we are not referring to a 'doctrine on human behaviour'; rather it is to be understood as the philosophical (or theological) pursuit concerning the justification of such a theory. Beforehand it must be said that Abelard's *Ethica seu Scito te ipsum* can be regarded as a theological work in being part of the curriculum presented in theological training. The central question this work deals with can be expressed as follows: what are the exact standards by which human behaviour is judged good or evil?

One should not ask whether Abelard's *Ethics* is a theological or philosophical work, for that is not the point. As we have already mentioned, ethics was part of theological enquiry and teaching. This answer is not a final one, however. For Abelard's conception of theology was such that philosophy, as an ultimate *rational* justification, was certainly admitted to theology, but, moreover, it even implied that philosophy was an essential constituent of fundamental theological enquiry. We must examine his *Ethics* in detail in order to see how Abelard in fact discusses the issue." (p. 1)