

[History of Logic from Aristotle to Gödel \(www.historyoflogic.com\)](http://www.historyoflogic.com)

by Raul Corazzon | e-mail: rc@ontology.co

Bibliography on Bhartrhari, grammarian-philosopher (First part)

Contents

This part of the section [Intercultural logic](#) includes the following pages:

[Ancient Chinese Logic](#) (a survey of contemporary studies)

[Bibliography on Language and Logic in Ancient China A - F](#)

[Bibliography on Language and Logic in Ancient China G - Z](#)

[Ancient Indian Logic and Ontology](#)

[Bibliography on Language and Logic in Ancient India A - L](#)

[Bibliography on Language and Logic in Ancient India M - Z](#)

[Bibliography on the Indian grammarian-philosopher Bhartrhari A-Cha \(Current page\)](#)

[Bibliography on the Indian grammarian-philosopher Bhartrhari Cow-Hon](#)

[Bibliography on the Indian grammarian-philosopher Bhartrhari Hou-Oet](#)

[Bibliography on the Indian grammarian-philosopher Bhartrhari Par-Z](#)

[Bibliographie sur le grammarien-philosophe Indien Bhartrhari](#)

[Bibliography on the Indian logician Gaṅgeśa](#)

[Buddhist Logic and Ontology. Indian and Tibetan developments](#)

[Bibliography on Language and Logic in Ancient Buddhism](#)

[Bibliography on the Buddhist logician Dignāga](#)

Bibliography on the Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti

Bibliography on the Buddhist logician Nāgārjuna

Islamic (Arabic and Persian) Logic and Ontology

Bibliography on Language and Logic in Ancient Islam

Bibliography (Studies in English) A-Cha

1. Akamatsu, Akihiko. 1993. "Pratibhā and the meaning of the sentence in Bhartrhari's Vākyapadīya." *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques* no. 47:37-43. Reprinted in Saroja Bhate, Johannes Bronkhorst (eds.), *Bhartrhari, Philosopher and Grammarian*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1994, pp. 37-44.
 "In the second book of the Vākyapadīya (VP), Bhartrhari sets forth a theory that pratibhā 'intuition' or 'flash of understanding' is the meaning of the sentence (vākyārtha). He discusses the issue of pratibhā in kārikās 2.143-152. The first kārikā of this section is as follows:
 When we understand the meanings [of the individual words in a sentence] by discriminating them from each other, there arises flash of understanding (pratibhā) which is totally different [from every knowledge of the meanings of the words]. We call that [*pratibhā*], caused by the meanings of the words, the meaning of the sentence.
 As a beginning, by placing this statement in the philosophical and historical context about the linguistic theory in India, I will reconsider the reason Bhartrhari introduced the concept of pratibhā into his linguistic theory." (p. 37, sanskrit text omitted)
2. ———. 1999. "The Two Kinds of *Anumāna* in Bhartrhari's *Vākyapadīya*." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 27:17-22.
 "The aim of the present paper is to make clear how Bhartrhari characterized inference (*anumāna*) when he put forward the two kinds of *anumāna*. The problem of *anumāna* may not be important for Bhartrhari.
 Although it is evident that he counted *anumāna* among the *pramāṇas*,⁽⁹⁾ he considered it as indirect and incomplete cognition in comparison with *agama*. Accordingly it is useless to attempt to estimate his view in the history of Indian logic. Finally, however, we can ask the following question: From where did Bhartrhari borrow the twofold distinction of *anumāna*?
 As is well known, Bhartrhari lived and worked before Dignāga and Praśastapāda. Now we must recall a passage of Dignāga translated by Frauwallner (1968). It runs as follows: "Der Vṛttikāra [= Bhavadāsa] vertritt im allgemeinen die Lehre des Vaiśeṣika von der Schlußfolgerung, da er Sehen (*dr̥ṣṭam*) und Sehen dem Gemeinsamen nach (*sāmānyato dr̥ṣṭam*) usw. unterscheidet" (p. 87). It is probable that Bhartrhari also borrowed the view on the two kinds of *anumāna* from the early Vaiśeṣika system. Bronkhorst (1993) has noted some possible links between Bhartrhari's Vākyapadīya and the early Vaiśeṣika; we can see the same possibility in Bhartrhari's view on *anumāna*." (p.20)
 (9) Cf. Aklujkar (1989).
 References
 Aklujkar, Ashok (1989). 'The Number of Praman. as according to Bhartrhari, Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 33: 151–158.

- Bronkhorst, Johannes (1993). 'Studies on Bhartrhari, 5: Bhartrhari and Vaiśeṣika', *Asiatische Studien/ Études Asiatiques* XLVII-1: 75-94.
- Frauwallner, E. (1958). 'Die Erkenntnislehre Klassischen Sāmkhya Systems', *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 2: 84-139
3. Aklujkar, Ashok. 1969. "Two Textual Studies of Bhartrhari." *Journal of the American Oriental Society* no. 89:547-563.
Abstract: "The first half of the article discusses the range of reference and the significance of the title *Vākyapadīya*. It is argued that the title was originally given to the first two books only of Bhartrhari's monumental work and that the word "Vākyapadīya" has been explained more precisely by ancient writers than is generally supposed. In the second half, the article points out how the published parts of Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāra-prakāśa* contain a number of borrowings from Bhartrhari's partly *vṛtti* of the *Vākyakāṇḍā*, and how the discovery is significant for a textual study of both the works, the manuscript material for which is extremely insufficient."
4. ———. 1970. *The Philosophy of Bhartrhari's Trikāṇḍi*. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation.
"My completed dissertation could have been published in Professor Matilal's then newly established *Journal of Indian Philosophy*. However, Professor Matilal did not think he could publish the whole dissertation together in one issue, and, in my view, on the other hand, the chapters of the dissertation were too interdependent to withstand segmented publication. Thus, it remained unpublished. I did not make any effort to have it published elsewhere either, for by that time almost every established scholar who was known to be interested in B [= Bhartrhari] had either read it or had acquired a photocopy of it and I had moved on to (or returned to) an activity I had deliberately suspended to complete the dissertation, namely the activity of settling the TK [= Trikāṇḍi] text. Recently, I have once again been advised by kind colleagues in the field that I should do the minimally necessary revision and have the dissertation published. But now it seems wasteful to publish it without coordinating the textual references with the better or more convenient editions I think I will be able to finish in the next few years." (A. Aklujkar, *An Introduction to the Study of Bhartrhari*, (1993), pp. 12-13)
5. ———. 1971. "Nakamura on Bhartrhari." *Indo-Iranian Journal*:161-175.
"An article by Professor Hajime Nakamura, "Bhartrhari The Scholar", was published in the fourth volume of the *Indo-Iranian Journal* (1960: 282-305). That article was a revised translation of a part of Nakamura's *Kotoba no Keijijogaku*, which is regarded by many scholars to be Nakamura's important contribution to the study of Vedānta in general and to Bhartrhari studies in particular. Naturally I was very surprised to find in it, as I shall presently demonstrate, a large number of inaccurate translations, remarks, conclusions, and comparisons. My purpose in demonstrating what I consider to be Nakamura's mistakes is, of course, purely that of *śāstra-suddhi* "purification of a branch of learning"; the positive aspects of the present article, namely the correct translations of some of the key verses in Bhartrhari's *Trikāṇḍi* (1) (*TK* in abbreviation) and a correct understanding of Bhartrhari's position, are more important in my view than the refutation of the contents of Nakamura's article." (p. 161, a note omitted)
(1) (a) It is generally believed that the title of the work to which I refer as the *Trikāṇḍi* is *Vākyapadīya*. In a recent article (Aklujkar, 1969: 547-555), I have argued that *Vākyapadīya* was originally the title of only the first two books of Bhartrhari's magnum opus and that *Trikāṇḍi* is the only ancient name that can refer to the work under study as a whole. (b) Some scholars advocate the view that the composition referred to as *Vṛtti* (as *V* in abbreviation) is not Bhartrhari's work and that it is much later than the verses (*kārikā*) which alone form the genuine *TK*. I see absolutely no reason to subscribe to this view. In my paper, "Authorship of the *Vākyapadīya-vṛtti*", read at the annual meeting of the American Oriental Society (1969) (to appear in *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens*, vol. xvi,

May 1972), I have exposed the weaknesses of the arguments on which this view is based, and I have shown with unmistakable internal evidence that the traditional ascription of the *V* to Bhartrhari cannot be doubted by any unprejudiced mind."

6. ———. 1972. "The Authorship of the *Vākyapadīya-Vṛtti*." *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* no. 15:181-198.
- "1.1 It has been a long tradition in India to ascribe the *Vṛtti* (*V* in abbreviation) of the first two *kāṇḍas* of the *Trikāṇḍi* to Bhartrhari and to accept it as an integral part of the *Vakyapadiya*."
 (...)
 "1. 2 Under these circumstances, any doubt about Bhartrhari's authorship of the *V* may seem highly improbable; but, today, all scholars who are interested in the *Trikāṇḍi*, as far as I know, entertain such a doubt. Their uncertainty of opinion usually begins when they realize that the *V* occasionally gives two or more interpretations of one verse (*kārikā*). Then this uncertainty is deepened either by the occurrence in the *V* of the word *tatra-lihavat*, which, in the usage of some ancient authors, serves as Bhartrhari's epithet, in a manner indicating reference to a person other than the author (S. Iyer 1965: >xxxix-xxxii), or by a feeling that some divergence of views exists between the *V* and the *kārikā*-text (Biardeau 1964a: 5-21 (summarized by S. Yier 1965: xxxiii-xxxiv), 1964b: 260). But doubtful as they may be, no scholar except Madeleine Biardeau is known to me who has declared the traditional authorship of the *V* to be ill-founded and incorrect. Biardeau has gone beyond the range of uncertainty about the validity of the tradition and reached the conclusion that the *V* cannot be a work of Bhartrhari, that it must have been written by Hari Vṛṣabha sometime after Kumarila, and that the tradition accepted it as Bhartrhari's work through a confusion of names.
- 1.3 The purpose of the present article is to refute this conclusion. Not only do I uphold the validity of the traditional ascription, but I also maintain that the *V* is an inseparable part of the *Vākyapadīya* and that it is wrong to think of the *Vākyapadīya* as a work consisting of *kārikās* only. Now, there are two ways of establishing this thesis, one negative and another positive. The negative way consists in challenging Biardeau's method of solving the problem of authorship, in pointing out the difficulties to which her conclusion leads, and in demonstrating that the divergences which she notices between the views and use of terms in the *V* on the one hand, and in the *karikas* on the other, are superfluous and that some of her interpretations are inaccurate. I have followed this way in a forthcoming sequel article, and hence it would be proper to devote the present article to a positive demonstration of Bhartrhari's authorship of the *V*." (pp. 181-185, notes omitted)
7. ———. 1974. "The Authorship of the *Vākya-kāṇḍa-tīkā*." In *Charudeva Shastri Felicitation Volume*, 165-188. Delhi: Charu Deva Shastri Felicitation Committee.
- "1.1 Since the date of its publication (1887) in the Benares Sanskrit Series, the *tīkā* on the verses of the second book of Bhartrhari's *Trikāṇḍi* or *Vākyapadīya* (Aklujkar 1969: 547-555) has been ascribed to Punya-rāja. A few scholars (e.g. Kosambi 1945:65.9-10, ft7.7-9; Bhattacharya 1954:4-5) have given the name of the author of this commentary as Helā-rāja, but that is obviously due to oversight and is not intended to be a deliberately reached conclusion regarding the authorship of the work. Thus, on the whole, the ascription to Punya-rāja has gone unchallenged in the writings of the compilers of manuscript catalogues, of the editors of Bhartrhari's works, of the scholars working on Bhartrhari's views and of the historians of Sanskrit grammar. However, it seems likely to me that a serious mistake has been made in deciding the problem of authorship in this case and that the *Vākya-kāṇḍa-tīkā* is more likely to be a work of Helā-rāja, the well-known commentator of the third book of the *Trikāṇḍi*, than of Punya-rāja. The evidence favouring this view is manifold and considerably strong when taken cumulatively." (pp. 165-166, notes omitted)

References

Aklujkar, Ashok. 1969. "Two Textual Studies of Bhartrhari." *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, S9:547-63. New Haven.

- Bhattacharya, Ram Shankar. 1954. "A New Verse of the Saṅgraha." *Poona Orientalist*, 19:4-5. Poona.
- Kosambi, D. D. 1945. "The Authorship of the Śataka-trayi" *Journal of Oriental Research*, 15:64-17. Madras.
8. ———. 1977-78. "The concluding verses of Bhartrhari's 'Vākya-kāṇḍa.'" *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* no. 58-59:9-26.
 "In this paper I wish to offer some observations on verses 481-490 (1) appearing at the end of the second book of Bhartrhari's *Trikāṇḍi* or *Vākya-padīya*.
 (,,,
 My objective here is neither to review what has been said about them, nor to pronounce judgements on all the controversies they have given rise to. I wish rather to put forward a few considerations that have not so far appeared in print and to refute a few interpretations that have so far gone unrefuted." (p. 9)
 (1) (a) In the present and following publications I shall follow Rau's (1977) enumeration of the *Trikāṇḍi* kārikās. It is the only flawless enumeration we have at present that enables us to refer to a tradition of the *Trikāṇḍi* text (the kārikā manuscript tradition) in a form determined by objective textual criticism. It will be highly convenient if the *Trikāṇḍi* text as preserved in the other (Vṛtti and Tīkā) traditions is critically established by following Rau's enumeration. This I advocate simply as a procedure that facilitate future text-critical research concerning Bhartrhari. I do not hold that the kārikā manuscripts give us the oldest accessible form of the *Trikāṇḍi* text. See Aklujkar 1971, 1978.
 (b) The text of verses 481-490 given below is based on a consideration of all known manuscript traditions. In the case of kārikā manuscripts I have simply followed Rau's lead. It is only the collection and evaluation of the evidence of the Vṛtti and Tīkā manuscripts that I have freshly attempted.
 [Note added by R. Corazzon: in the English translation by K. A. Subramania Iyer, *The Vakyapadiya of Bhartrhari. Chapter II*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1977, the verses are numbered 476-485, pp. 203-205]
9. ———. 1982. "Interpreting Vakyapadiya 2.486 Historically (Part 1)." In *Dr. K. Kunjunn Raja Felicitation Volume*, 581-601. Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre.
 "The verse I propose to discuss (*parvatād āgamaṃ, labdhvā bhāsyā-bijānusāribhiḥ/ sa nīto bahu-śakhatvaṃ candrācāryādibijḥ punah/*) [*] is a part of the ten epilogue type verses found at the end of the Vākya-kāṇḍa or second book of *Bhartrhari's Vākya-padīya* or *Trikāṇḍi*.(1)
 I have argued elsewhere (Aklujkar 1978:9-26) that the ten verses were not written by Bhartrhari but by a student of his. However, this does not diminish the historical importance of the verses, for they remain almost as ancient as they have been thought to be. Secondly, acceptance of my view on the authorship of the verses is not a presupposition underlying the points I wish to make in this article. As far as I can see, the observations I offer below are logically independent of the problem of authorship." (pp. 581-582)
 In referring to the *Vākya-padīya/Trikāṇḍi*. verses I have followed the enumeration in Rau 1977.
 (1) Eight of these verses are directly or indirectly relevant to the following discussion. They are given below for easy reference: [the author cite the verses in sanskrit, I give the translation by K. A. Subramania Iyer, *The Vakyapadiya of Bhartrhari. Chapter II*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1977, verse 476-483, pp. 203-204 [Rau numeration is given in parenthesis]:]
 476. [481] After the *Saṅgraha* declined when it came into the hands of Grammarians who were fond of abridgements and had acquired only little knowledge.
 [The *Saṅgraha* is mentioned in the *Mahābhāṣya*, I. p.6.1.12
 We are told that there the question whether the word is eternal or only an effect is discussed as one of the main topics.

Commenting on this, Bhartrhari says in his commentary on the Mahābhāṣya that there were 14 000 topics discussed in the *Saṅgraha: Caturdaśa sahasrāṇi vastūni asmin saṅgrahagranthe* (M. Bhā. dīpikā, p. 21, 1. 4-5. B. O. R. I. Post Graduate and Research Department Series no. 8.)]

477. [482] And when the Master Patañjali who knew all the traditions (*tīrthadarśinā*) had incorporated into his Mahābhāṣya all the arguments and principles.

478. [483] It was found that those who were not sufficiently equipped (*akṛtabuddhīnām*) could not arrive at proper decisions while studying that work at once bottomless because of its depth and clear because of its lucidity.

479. [484] When that sacred work which was an epitome of the *Saṅgraha* was ruined by Baiji, Saubhava and Haryakṣa who merely followed dry reasoning.

480. [485] The Grammatical Tradition slipped away from the hands of the disciples of Patañjali and in time the mere text of it survived in the South.

481. [486] Then Ācārya Candra and other followers of the principles of the Bhāṣya obtained the true Tradition from the mountain and elaborated it into many branches.

482. [487] After mastering those principles and cultivating his own discipline this collection of traditions was composed by our Teacher.

483. [488] Here only the gist of a few of those traditions is given. In the third *Kāṇḍa*, there will be full discussion.

References

Aklujkar, Ashok. 1978. The concluding verses of Bhartrhari's Vākya-kāṇḍa. *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*, Diamond Jubilee Volume, pp. 9-26.

Rau, Wilhelm. 1977. (Ed.) *Bhartrhari's Vākyapadīya (mula-karikas)*. Monograph Series of the Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft, no. 42, 4. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag.

10. ———. 1982. "Interpreting Vakyapadiya 2.486 Historically (Part 2)." In *Indological and Buddhist Studies: Volume in Honour of Professor J. W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday*, edited by Hercus, Luise Anna, 1-10. Canberra: Faculty of Asian Studies.

"In the first part of this article, to be published in the Dr K. Kunjunni Raja Felicitation Volume, I have pointed out, among other things, that the explanation of *parvatād āgamaṃ, labdhvā bhāṣya-bijānusāribhiḥ// sa nīto bahu-śakhatvaṃ candrācāryādibhiḥ punahli* II given in Puṅyarāja's or Helārāja's Tīkā is contextually unjustifiable. In the present part I wish to analyse the Tīkā explanation further to establish its mythic character and to account for its acquisition of that character.(...) (1)" (p. 1)

(1) An English summary of the Tīkā explanation is given in section 2.5 of the first part of this article. The aspects in which the Tīkā explanation appears hazy and hesitant are clarified in a footnote to that section.

[From the section 2. 5 of the first part of this article:

"According to it [the Tīkā], what happened in the history of Pāṇinian grammar was essentially this: Because of the peculiar style of the *Mahābhāṣya* and because of the insensitive interpretations advanced by Vaiji and others, the successors of Patañjali lost the knowledge of what Patañjali actually wished to say and what Patañjali accepted as *siddhānta*. This knowledge was no longer a part of their living tradition of study and was preserved only in manuscripts among the Southerners.

Candrācārya and others again gave it currency in a much developed form, once they came in possession of the *mūla-bhūta vyākaraṇāgama*. In other words, although the *Tika* seems hesitant and hazy it probably visualizes the relevant happenings as follows: Candrācārya and others got hold of the essential, most fundamental, body of Vayākaraṇa doctrines.

They studied the intimations in the *Mahābhāṣya* on the background of these doctrines; they used the principles implicit in Patañjali's statements to provide flesh to the skeleton they had received. This activity enabled them to make current once again a multifaceted, robust tradition of Vayākaraṇa views." (pp. 588-569, a note omitted)

11. ———. 1989. "The Number of *Pramāṇas* According to Bhartṛhari." *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* no. 33:151-158.
 "In an article entitled "*prāmāṇya* in the philosophy of the Grammarians", expected to be published in the near future,[*] I have tried to explain the distinctive nature of the view of *prāmāṇya* or 'validity of the means of cognition' which the Grammarians or Vaiyākaraṇas held.
 I have pointed out in that article that whereas most other traditions of Indian philosophy, knowingly or unknowingly, emphasized the separability of the means of cognition (*pratyakṣa* 'perception', *anumāna* 'inference', etc.), the Gram-marian-philosophers like Bhartṛhari ("B" in abbreviation) played down the separability of the means and looked upon them as functioning conjointly(1). In particular, *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* work on the backdrop of *āgama*, and *āgama* changes, usually gradually, in the light of the knowledge received through *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*. This is so because the Grammarian's idea of *āgama* was significantly different, which, in turn, was due mostly to his four-fold or multi-level concept of language and his awareness of the centrality of language in our experience of the world." (pp. 151-162)
 [*] "Prāmāṇya in the philosophy of the grammarians", in Avinandra Kumar et al. (eds.), *Studies in Indology. Prof. Rasik Vihari Joshi Felicitation Volume*, Delhi: Shree Publishing House 1989, pp. 15-28.
 (1) This is not to say that Indian philosophers of other persuasions are not aware of the mutual dependence or limitations of *prāmāṇas*. They too would readily concede that an *anumāna* is not valid if it is vitiated by a perception, that the perception of a rope as a snake should be rejected if one can infer at a later moment the real nature of the object, and that one cannot assert that fire does not burn simply because a reliable text or person says so. What I have in mind here is not invalidation or delimitation that obtains after the operation of a *prāmāṇa*. My remark has rather to do with what takes place while a *prāmāṇa* is in operation: The Grammarian school is unlike the other schools of Indian philosophy in accepting at that point the penetration of (what is considered to be) the domain of one *prāmāṇa* by (what is considered to be) the domain of another *prāmāṇa*. While the Buddhist thinkers like Dignāga avoid such overlapping of *prāmāṇas* by restricting the object of *pratyakṣa* (to *svalakṣaṇa*, i.e. by redefining *pratyakṣa*), the Grammarians accept the overlapping as an unavoidable fact of life and view the operations of (so-called separate) *prāmāṇas* as basically complex."
12. ———. 1990. "Introduction and Summary of the First Two Books of the *Vākyapadīya*." In *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 5: The Philosophy of the Grammarians*, edited by Coward, Harold G. and Raja, Kuniunni, 121-153. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
 "As with many great figures of classical times in India, a large number of works have been attributed to Bhartṛhari, and once again current scholarship has hardly settled all questions concerning the authenticity of some of these claims. By definition, the Bhartṛhari we are speaking of is the author of the work that is regularly referred to as the *Vākyapadīya*, a seminal work on Grammar and grammatical philosophy the influence of which, though difficult to calculate precisely, is certainly considerable in subsequent philosophical developments, both within Grammar and outside it. This work has three chapters, and it was more properly termed *Trikāṇḍī* on that account. Ashok Aklujkar has argued that only the first two chapters constitute the *Vākyapadīya*.
 It seems likely that Bhartṛhari also composed the commentary called *vṛtti* on at least the first two chapters of the *Trikāṇḍī*. Beside this body of literature—verses and prose commentary—Bhartṛhari apparently also wrote a commentary—or part of one— on Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*.
 Again, the proper title is a matter of discussion: Aklujkar points out that the title *Tripādi* for it has extensive sanction among early commentators in the grammatical tradition, while the title under which it is frequently known nowadays, *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, has only one manuscript mention in its favor. No doubt the

work is referred to regularly as a *ṭikā* on the *Mahābhāṣya*. It seems likely that it was a lengthy work, perhaps covering the entire scope of Patañjali's masterpiece, though only a small portion is now available." (pp. 121-122, a note omitted)

13. ———. 1990. "Summary of the Third Book of the *Vākyapadīya*." In *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 5: The Philosophy of the Grammarians*, edited by Coward, Harold G. and Raja, Kuniunni, 153-172. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. In collaboration with Karl. H. Potter.
"1. On Universal Property (*Jāṭisamuddeśa*)
1-5 (E58; T1-9). Words abstracted from sentences have been regarded as falling into two (noun, verb), four (with the addition of prepositions and particles) or five (with the addition of postpositions) categories. In the analysis into word meanings there are said to be two eternal word meanings for all language (or linguistic forms), namely universal and particular. Sometimes the particular as characterized by the universal of its class is intended, and sometimes without such a characterization." (p. 153)
14. ———. 1991. "Interpreting Vakyapadiya 2.486 Historically (Part 3)." In *Paninian Studies: Professor S. D. Joshi Felicitation Volume*, edited by Deshpande, Madhav and Bhate, Saroja, 1-48. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
"Vākyapadīya (VP in abbreviation) 2.486, the first word of which I intend to discuss here, runs thus:
parvatād āgamaṃ, labdhvā bhāṣya-bijānusāribhiḥ/ sa nīto bahu-śakhatvaṃ candrācāryādibjih punah//
The question of the precise import of this verse has given rise to a substantial body of literature extending over 125 years (Aklujkar 1978:9). As I have already examined this literature directly and indirectly in the publications mentioned above, I shall merely state here that I prefer to translate the verse along the following lines: 'Having acquired the traditional knowledge from parvata, Candrācārya and others, who followed the indications in the *Bhāṣya*, again made it (i.e., the traditional knowledge) many-branched'. I should also clarify that in my view, as argued in the 1978 article, the verse was probably authored by a student of Bhartrhari (B in abbreviation) and not by B as has been commonly supposed. Although parvata is a common Sanskrit word with 'mountain, mountain range' as its definite meaning and it would not be incompatible in that meaning with the other words of VP 2.486, it has caused much reflection on the part of scholars." (pp. 1-2)
15. ———. 1993. "An Introduction to the Study of Bhartrhari." *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques* no. 47:7-36.
Reprinted in Saroja Bhate, Johannes Bronkhorst (eds.), *Bhartrhari, Philosopher and Grammarian*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1994, pp. 7-36.
"My lecture has been described as introductory and to some extent it *will* be introductory. However, please note that it will not be introductory in the sense of a presentation proceeding on the assumption that the audience knows nothing or little about Bhartrhari (hereafter abbreviated to "B") and the works associated with him and hence the principle goal should be to give to the audience some very basic or preliminary information in that regard. Rather, I am principally going to talk about what research has achieved so far, what parameters are emerging, and what we could expect in the future. From the observations made along these lines and the information given in the appendix, it should be possible for you to infer, if you do not already know, what basic factual information and surmises made by scholars there are regarding B, his works, and his commentators." (p. 8)
16. ———. 1993. "Once Again on the Authorship of the *Trikāndī-Vṛtti*." *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques* no. 47:45-57.
Reprinted in Saroja Bhate, Johannes Bronkhorst (eds.), *Bhartrhari, Philosopher and Grammarian*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1994, pp. 45-58.
"I keep an open mind on the issue of the authorship of the *Vṛtti* (hereafter "V" in abbreviation) of the first two *kāṇḍas* of the *Trikāndī* (abbreviated to "TK" in the following lines) or *Vākyapadīya*. My interest is not in arguing for a position by

implicitly assuming the adversarial system analogous to that of the British or North American judiciary. That is why when I discussed the problem in 1972 I tried to consider in as much detail as possible all the pieces of evidence that had the potential to disturb the traditional authorship of the V. For example, I collected all cases of double or multiple glossing in the V and attempted to determine if each of them indicated alternative possibilities of meaning entertained by an uncertain commentator or whether the different glosses were in fact intended by the kārīkā author - whether what we had in front of us were, in effect, cases of sophisticated śāstra punning. In the end, the time-consuming investigation I invited upon myself revealed that the latter indeed was the case. Wherever we had more than one explanation given for a kārīkā expression, the content of each explanation was acceptable to the kārīkā author on some level or in some specific context. The alternative explanations could not be thought of as signs of uncertainty of understanding and thus be an evidence of the V author's difference from the kārīkā author." (p. 45)

17. ———. 2000. "The Epistemological Point of View of Bhartrhari." In *Concept of Knowledge: East and West*, edited by Shaw, J. L. , 1-19. Calcutta: Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture.

§S.1 In the preceding, I have implicitly made a distinction between B [= Bhartrhari] as a philosopher (in our most prevalent contemporary Western sense of the term) and as a religious thinker. What that distinction suggests is that B, as a philosopher, need not be seen as needing the concept of *mokṣa* or, to use his expression in Vṛtti 1.5, of *brahmaṇaḥ prāptiḥ* or the other elements of his philosophy to stand.

Another implication of what I have said so far is that there are levels in B's ontology and they are related to his roles as a thinker. As a Grammarian or Vaiyākaraṇa, he accepts as existing everything that words can denote (even 'hare's horn' is deemed to exist from the Grammarian's perspective).(24) As a philosopher, he admits only the physical things and the language principle as truly existing. Everything else is seen as inseparable from either the things or the principle (time and space, as capacities of the latter, are inseparable from it; all other entities such as qualities, universals, etc. have no separate existence from substance).

And as a religious thinker, he entertains the possibility that his philosophical ontic world could be superseded by one in which the language principle alone remains. The assumption then is that a person can reach a certain stage in which his mind (= *buddhi, paśyantī*) is divested of diversity and he 'becomes' the language principle.

§S .2 The distinction between B's roles as a Grammarian thinker and as a non-Grammarian thinker is conveyed by the remarks of his ancient commentators, particularly the remarks of Helā-rāja. The differentiation between a *śabda-pramāṇaka* ontology and a *non-śabda-pramāṇaka* (in effect, corresponding to our philosophical) ontology, which Helā-rāja makes, has support in B's remarks. That the *non-śabda-pramāṇaka* ontology is not explicitly characterized as philosophical or is not further divided into philosophical and religious is due to the absence of distinctive terminology for philosophy and religion in the Indian tradition." (p. 11, three notes omitted)

(24) Compare Quine's procedure of beginning the investigation of what exists with the position 'everything.'

18. ———. 2001. "The Word *is* the World: Nondualism in Indian Philosophy of Language." *Philosophy East and West* no. 51:452-473.

"Bhartrhari the grammarian-philosopher most eligible for attributing the view "the word is the world," lived sometime around A.D. 425-450, if not earlier. In the current state of our resources, he can be viewed as the originator of the view, although it is clear from his major surviving work, the *Trikāṇḍī* or *Vākyapadīya*, that the view must have preceded him by quite some time, probably many centuries, in several important details if not in its entirety. The argumentation in support of the view, as distinct from the statement of the view, is at present found for the first time only in Bhartrhari's incompletely preserved *magnum opus*, albeit it is not Bhartrhari's principal intention, except maybe for a part of the first book, to argue

- systematically in favor of the view. My aim here is to identify myself with Bhartrhari, unearth the many facets of his argumentation, and give him the best possible hearing that I can." (p. 456)
19. ———. 2009. "Veda Revelation according to Bhartrhari." In *Bhartrhari: Language, Thought and Reality*, edited by Chaturvedi, Mithilesh, 1-98. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
 "In his paper "Veda Revelation according to Bhartrhari", Ashok Aklulkar discusses the connotations of words like *sāksākrta-dharman* and *pratyakṣadharman* used in Bhartrhari's *Vṛtti* and earlier by Yāska and Patañjali. He interprets *dharma* as 'properties of things'. According to him, Bhartrhari uses the word *veda* in more than one sense: Veda in a subtle form as appearing in the vision of seers comes before the sequential language form or the textual corpus that is later divided into four Vedas and different śākhās. Aklujkar equates Veda in pre-revelation stage with para-pāśyanti-rūpa or the language principle itself and the first revelation with pāśyanti, i.e., the active or the extrovert stage of it. He also thinks that Bhartrhari's account of Veda revelation is not an expression of faith only but also has philosophical content and there is empiricist spirit in the account. He further draws the conclusion that although Bhartrhari has genuine reverence for the Veda, he opts for theoretical fictions when necessary. Aklujkar has added four appendices, mainly discussing the relevant *Vṛtti* and Nirukta Passages textually, to his paper." (*Editor's Introduction*, p. XXVI)
20. Alackapally, Sebastian. 2002. *Being and Meaning: Reality and Language in Bhartrhari and Heidegger*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
 Contents: Foreword. General introduction. Philosophical background of Bhartrhari and Heidegger: Bhartrhari: the grammarian philosopher. Heidegger: the philosopher of being and language. 1. Sabdatattva: the ultimate reality; 2. Sabdatattva: the Sphota of language; 3. Heidegger's concept of reality; 4. Language: the saying of being; General conclusion; Being and language in Bhartrhari and Heidegger: a synthesis; Glossary; Appendix; Bibliography. Index.
 "This is a study of the concepts of Being (Reality) and Language (Meaning) as has been envisioned by Bhartrhari, the Indian linguistic Philosopher and Martin Heidegger, a great independent German thinker. For both, the question of Being is essentially interwoven into the experience of the question of language. For them, there is no philosophy of Being without a philosophy of Language. Hence a thinking of Being is simultaneously a thinking of Language; to experience the truth of the one is necessarily to experience the truth of the other.
 In Bhartrhari's vision the language we speak is the medium of the self-expression of the ultimate Reality communicated through all meaning-bearing words. It leads us across the external appearance to the core of reality which is the source and the underlying unity beneath everything. This approach depends for its validity upon the presupposition that the real is a luminous Truth which needs to be discovered by every speaker and in every speech. The real breaks-forth (sphut) through the medium of speech (*sabda*). This *sabda* is not merely a means to a truth or reality but it is the Truth and Reality. The awareness of this fact leads one to the realization of the meaningfulness of Being." (p. 1)
21. Ananthanarayana, H. S. 1992. "Bhartrhari on Semantics and Pragmatics." *Bulletin of the Deccan College Post-Graduate and Research Institute* no. 51/52:211-219.
 "The present paper makes an attempt to bring to the notice of the students of modern linguistics, as they seem to be unaware of their great heritage, some of the finer points in Bhartrhari's discussion of semantics which is interpreted syntactically and determined to an extent also pragmatically. We may quote Bhartrhari himself on this who warns that the Goddess of learning does not smile on those students who would neglect their own ancients (11.485). There is close similarity between Bhartrhari and modern linguistics in many issues discussed in *Vākyapadīya*. The paper makes a reference also to these similarities to the extent possible and suggests that a closer study of the Indian tradition is worth its trouble and makes us proud of

- our heritage. Bhartrhari starts from the observation that a linguistic unit say, a word, can be considered under two aspects, viz. sound and meaning bearer (1.44). He terms the first as *dhvani* which the speaker utters and which are the *nimitta* 'manifestors' of the real word. The second is called *sphoṭa* which, when manifested by the *dhvanis*, conveys the meaning. It is the meaning bearing aspect of the word, an indivisible entity which is over and above the sounds. The latter are many in number and are uttered by the speaker in a temporal sequence in order to manifest the *sphoṭa*. *Sphoṭa* is eternal while *dhvani* is transitory. The unit of expression as well as the unit of meaning is, for Bhartrhari, the sentence since it is only the sentence that is real and meaningful. Individual words for him have no reality and, thus, do not convey meaning. He says 'sounds have no separate existence in words nor do component features within the sounds; nor have the words any separate existence apart from the sentence' (1.73)." (pp. 211-212)
22. Antil, Ritoo Kartari, and Gautam, Vikas Singh. 2022. "Bhartrhari's Linguistic Philosophy: Śabda Brahman and the Question from Ineffability." *International Journal of Sanskrit Research* no. 8:280-283.
Abstract: "Bhartrhari mainly focuses on correct interpretation of Vedic literature through grammar and creates the notion of verbal holism, which describes the ultimate reality as a universal language (śabda) without any components. According to his philosophy, śabda is absolute reality, and the universe expresses itself in the shape of language; that is, objective reality is nothing more than the linguistic explanation of any kind of experience. We can only know something if we are able to cognise it verbally, whether in mind or orally. There is, nevertheless, a sense of ineffability, and there are experiences that do not fit within the realm of linguistic cognition and can only be described in terms of raw sensations. As a result, Bhartrhari's philosophical argument that absolute reality only exists in a word form, i.e. Śabda Brahman, is called into doubt. The paper briefly discusses the scope of ineffability in verbal holism, as well as some alternative remedies from other philosophical traditions, in order to keep the notion of ineffability alive in Bhartrhari's Śabda Brahman theory."
23. Bandyopadhyay, Nandsita. 1988. *Being, Meaning, and Proposition: A Comparative Study of Bhartrhari, Russell, Frege, and Strawson*. Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar.
24. Behera, Pitambar. 2015. "The Sphoṭa Theory in the Indic Philosophy: The Ancient vs the Modern." In *Proceedings of Twenty Second International Congress on Vedanta*, 223-235. New Delhi: D. K. Print World Publications.
Abstract: "Since the advent of the period of the great grammarians, Patañjali and Pāṇini, in the Indic philosophy, the concept of meaning has been a primordial concern. Different schools of philosophers have attempted to address the said conceptual issue in various ways in consonance with the philosophy of language ranging from the ancient to the modern. Almost all the schools of philosophy (the Vedic, Vedāntic, Buddhist and Jaina) have participated in the deliberation on the origin of meaning in semantics, which encapsulated the larger chunk of the Indian philosophy on language. The mystic and whimsical doctrine of the articulation of sounds (*sphoṭa*) and the meanings that they respectively convey has been revisited and demystified with a special reference to Bhartrhari's exponential theory of *sphoṭa*."
25. Bhate, Saroja. 1993. "Bhartrhari on Language and Reality." *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques* no. 47:67-73.
Reprinted in Saroja Bhate, Johannes Bronkhorst (eds.), *Bhartrhari, Philosopher and Grammarian*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1994, pp. 67-73.
"The present paper is an attempt to sum up Bhartrhari's views on the relation of language with reality. It is, in fact, a further extension of the problem posed by Dr. J. Kelley in his paper, namely, whether the Vākyapadiya (VP) can be looked upon as an argument about the limitations of a formal system of analysis to describe linguistic phenomena.(1) I would like to go a step further and pose the problem

whether the VP represents an argument about the limitations of language to describe reality.

Bhartrhari accepts perception, inference and word as valid means of knowledge. However, he acknowledges highest authority to word. He declares in the *Brahmakānda* that there is no knowledge which does not assume the form of a word(2). All knowledge must culminate in verbal knowledge. No object which is not expressed in words exists. Language is the only window to the world. Our knowledge of reality is shaped by the language we use. Thus Bhartrhari has initially accepted an intimate relationship of language with reality.

However, Bhartrhari shows the superficial character of this intimacy by pointing out how language falls short of reality. At several places in the VP he describes language not only as an inadequate tool to represent reality but also as a wrong means, which, in fact, never takes us to reality.

It is very intriguing that the VP begins with a declaration that there is no world beyond language, whereas it ends up with a note of disharmony between the two and declares that reality transcends language. What follows is a résumé of the views presented in the VP about the nature of language in relation to reality." (p. 67)

(1) John D. Kelly's paper entitled 'Meaning and the limits of analysis: Bhartrhari and the Buddhists, and post-structuralism' elsewhere in this volume [pp. 171-194].

(2) VP. 1.123:

na so 'sti pratyayo loke yah sabdānugamād rie /
anuviddham iva jñānam sarvam iabdena bhāsate //

26. Bhate, Saroja, and Bronkhorst, Johannes, eds. 1994. *Bhartrharii, Philosopher and Grammarian: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartrhari (University of Poona, January 6-8, 1992)*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Table of Contents: Acknowledgements 5; Ashok Aklujkar: An introduction to the study of Bhartrhari 7; Akihiko Akamatsu: Pratibha and the meaning of the sentence in Bhartrhari's *Vākyapadīya* 37; Ashok Aklujkar: Once again on the authorship of the *Trikāndī-Vṛtti* 45; PT. V.B. Bhagavat: *śrīmad-Bhartrharih Nāgeśaś ca* 59; Saroja Bathe: Bhartrhari on language and reality 61; Johannes Bronkhorst: Studies on Bhartrhari, 5 Bhartrhari and *Vaisesika* 15; Madha V.M. Despande: The changing notion of *śista* from Patañjali to Bhartrhari 95; Brendan S. Gillon: Bhartrhari's solution to the problem of *asamartha* compounds 111; Masaaki Hattori: Kamalaśīla's interpretation of some verses in the *Vakyakanda* of Bhartrhari's *Vākyapadīya* 135; Yoshichika Honda: Bhartrhari's definition of *kriyā* 141; Jan Houben:: Who are Bhartrhari's *padadarśins*? On the development of Bhartrhari's philosophy of language 155; John D. Kelly: Meaning and the limits of analysis: Bhartrhari and the Buddhists, and post-structuralism 171; Chr. Lindtner: Linking up Bhartrhari and the Bauddhas 195; G.B. Palsule: Points of agreement and difference between the *Vākyapadīya* and the *Mahābhāṣya-Dīpīka* in the matter of *sphoṭa* 215; Anna Radicchi: *Vivakṣā* in the *Vākyapadīya* 221; Yvves Ramseier: Bibliography on Bhartrhari 235; Index of references 262.
27. Bhattacharya, Bishnupada. 1985. *Bhartrhari's Vākyapadīya and Linguistic Monism*. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.
The *Vakyapadiya*, the magnum opus of the great Bhartrhari, is not only the most authoritative text on the analytic aspect of Sanskrit language as such, but also one of the most important philosophical works dealing with some of the basic problems of linguistic philosophy, which has also engaged the attention of some of the most eminent linguistic philosophers of our age. The question of the relation of language with the external reality on the one hand and with the internal thought-process on the other is one of the fundamental problems of philosophy. We are aware that there have been various trends of metaphysical quest in India from the very earliest times, and they can be usually classed under two broad heads viz. dualism-pluralism and monism. The *Sāmkhya-Yoga*, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*, and *Purva-Mīmāṃsā* systems are examples of dualistic/pluralistic metaphysics, while the Vedānta of the school of Śāṅkara is the most outstanding example of monism. But besides Śāṅkara's *advaita*, which is usually known as *brahmādvaita* there have been several other attempts at

- explaining the phenomenal universe of diversity from one absolute principle without any second. Several variants of monism, however, can be traced in the ancient philosophical literature of India, of which *śabdādvaita-vāda*, *viññādvaita-vāda*, and *sattādvaita-vāda* have been noticed in authoritative texts, besides the well-known *brahmādvaita-vāda* or *ātmādvaita-vāda* as taught in the Upaniṣads according to the interpretation of the school with which Śaṅkara is affiliated. Bhartrhari is the propounder of the theory of *śabdādvaita* or Linguistic Monism, which is a novel doctrine altogether, though the origin of the doctrine is traceable in the Vedic Saṃhitās. Thus Bhartrhari is a great exponent of Monism, though of a different sort, beside Śaṅkara." (pp. 1-2)
28. Bhattacharyya, Gaurinath. 1937. "A Study in the Dialectics of Sphoṭa." *Journal of the Department of Letters. University of Calcutta* no. 29:1-121.
 "We do not know when and by whom the doctrine of *sphoṭa* was first promulgated. There is no reference to it in the *sūtras* of Pāṇini nor in the *vārtikas* of Kātyāyana, But in the Pān. Su. VI. 1. 123, there is the name of a grammarian named Sphoṭāyana. The name may suggest that the grammarian was an exponent of the doctrine of *sphoṭa*. It is, however, Patañjali who for the first time appears to make a reference to *sphoṭa* in his epoch-making work on Sanskrit grammar, the *Vyākaraṇa-mahābhāṣya*. Therein he acknowledges in clear terms the distinction between two kinds of word (*śabda*)-permanent (*nītya*) and created (*kārya*); and it is "with reference to the former that he uses such epithets as "abiding" (*dhruva*), "unchangeable" (*kūṭasta*), etc., epithets that are ascribed to Brahman with which Sphoṭa has been identified. But Patañjali has not only hinted at *sphoṭa* by noticing the distinction referred to above; he has also actually used the term in his work and has given us a definition of the same. Thus Patañjali observes a distinction between *sphoṭa* and sound by holding that the latter is only a quality of the former and serves to manifest it. And he defines *sphoṭa* as what is perceived by the auditory organs, apprehended by the intellect, manifested by the auditory organs, apprehended by the intellect, manifested by sound and pertaining to ether.
 It is Bhartrhari, the celebrated author of the *Vākyapadīya*, who, to our knowledge, is the first grammarian to have presented to us a systematic treatment of the conception of *sphoṭa*. Bhartrhari has looked at *sphoṭa* from two standpoints - metaphysical and empirical. From the metaphysical standpoint, Bhartrhari conceives *Sphoṭa* as identical with the *Brahman* of the Vedāntists, the material cause of the phenomenal world. From the empirical point of view, *sphoṭa* is an indivisible sentence which is expressive of sense.
 His attitude towards word, syllable and letter is that they are no better than mere artifices resorted to for the purpose of helping the subject to grasp the indivisible character of *sphoṭa*." (pp. 1-2)
29. Bhattacharyya, Sibajiban, ed. 2002. *Word and Sentence: Two Perspectives. Bhartrhari and Wittgenstein*. New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi.
 Contents: Preface 5; K.G. Shah: Word and sentence: Two perspectives: Bhartrhari and Wittgenstein 9; Indra Nath Choudhuri: Welcome Speech 18; Vidya Niwas Misra: Key-note Address 21; Hiranmoy Banerjee: Understanding Bhartrhari A Modern Perspective 27; S. Bhattacharyya: Word and Sentence: Wittgenstein, Bhartrhari and Jagadīśa 34; Arindam Chakravarty: The 'glory' and impenetrability of the Peacock-egg: Eternalism versus Conventionalism about the Word-Meaning Relationship 45; D.P. Chattopadhyaya: Wittgenstein on Language: Some Remarks 55; Probal Dasgupta: The Sentence as Freedom 63; V.N. Jha: Word and Meaning: Identical? 67; Ashok R. Kelkar: What has Bhartrhari got to say on Language? 78; Lachman M. Khunchandani: Speech as an Ongoing Activity Comparing Bhartrhari and Wittgenstein 104; P.K. Mukhopadhyay: Alternative Conceptions of Sentence and Conflicting Perspectives of Language 123; R.C. Pradhan: Meaning Holism in Wittgenstein and Bhartrhari: A Study in Two Semantic Perspectives 134; M. Sreemannarayana Murti: Sphoṭa Theory Vis-a-Vis Picture Theory 162-185.

30. Bronkhorst, Johannes. 1989. "Studies on Bhartrhari, 2: Bhartrhari and Mīmāṃsā." *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* no. 15:101-117.
[Studies 1 and 4 are in French].
Reprinted in R. C. Dwivedi (ed.), *Studies in Mīmāṃsā. Dr. Mandan Mishra Felicitation Volume*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994, pp. 371–388.
"Both Bhartrhari and Śabara pay a good deal of attention to the subject of *ūha* 'modification, adjustment'. Bhartrhari discusses it in the first Āhnika of his commentary on the Mahābhāṣya (AL 5.18-8.17, Sw 6.17-9.27, Ms 2b9-3c1, while parts of Adhyāya 9 of Sahara's Bhāṣya deal with it. Two cases in particular are treated by both the authors and allow of a detailed comparison." (p. 101)
(...)
"The conclusion must be that Bhartrhari's description of *uha*, or rather of the absence of, in *aditiḥ pāsān pramoktu* does not represent the position of any group of Mimāṃsakas, but rather the position of the Maitrāyaṇīya branch of the Yajurveda. The Mimāṃsakas on the other hand, or at any rate Śabara, did not confine their attention to one Vedic school." (p. 104)
(...)
"The above observations, if correct, allow us to draw the following conclusions. Bhartrhari was acquainted with Mimāṃsa, but did not use it where we would expect him to use it. In the context of ritual details he rather draws upon another tradition, most probably on the traditional manuals current in his Vedic school, that of the Maitrāyaṇīyas. And where he makes references to Mimāṃsa, it is never to Śabara's Bhāṣya, but rather to a Mimāṃsa work in verse, or containing verse, which has not survived, but may have been Bhavadāsa's Vṛi. He may have known the Pūrva Mimāṃsa Sūtra, or a part of it, but this is not certain." (p. 114)
31. ———. 1991. "Studies on Bhartrhari, 3: Bhartrhari on *Sphoṭa* and Universals." *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques* no. 45:5-18.
"Both Brough and Herzberger worked from 'below' 'upward' in their attempt to understand Bhartrhari's thought. Brough never reaches the metaphysical 'superstructure', whose existence he none-the-less does not deny. For Herzberger the 'superstructure' is the 'top' of a construction built by her 'from below'. For Bhartrhari, however, we can be sure that the metaphysical superstructure did not come at the end, but rather at the beginning. It comes at the beginning literally, for the first stanzas of the Vākyapadīya speak of Brahman. But it must have come at the beginning in another sense as well: Bhartrhari wrote his work starting from a vision, in which the metaphysical aspects of his thought were already clearly represented. This at any rate seems an extremely reasonable assumption to make." (p. 12)
(...)
"The picture which thus evolves of universals is hardly that of an abstract entity different from the things in which it manifests itself, like the universals of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy. In an important way Bhartrhari's universal rather is the thing. It is not correct to think that there is a pot, and the universal potness which is different from it. Quite on the contrary, the pot in as far as it really exists is the universal; its not really existing shadow in the phenomenal world is the individual. It is therefore not possible to say that pot and potness are different, even though the former has a spatial and a temporal dimension, which the latter has not. Universals, seen in this way, can most easily be compared with Plato's ideas: they are real and unchanging, while the things that figure in our experience are their unreal reflections.
Returning now to Bhartrhari's sphoṭa, if the real pot is the universal, the same must be true of words: the real word, i.e. the sphoṭa, is a universal." (p. 14)
References
John Brough, "Theories of general linguistics in the Sanskrit grammarians", *Transactions of the Philological Society*, 1951, pp. 27-46. Reprinted in *A Reader on the Sanskrit Grammarians*, edited by J.F. Staal, MIT Press, Cambridge - Massachusetts and London - England, 1972, pp. 402-414.

- Radhika Herzberger, *Bhartrhari and the Buddhists, An Essay in the Development of Fifth and Sixth Century Indian Thought*, Dordrecht /Boston/ Lancaster / Tokyo: D. Reidel. 1986. (Studies of Classical India. 8.)
32. ———. 1993. "Studies on Bhartrhari, 5: Bhartrhari and Vaiśeṣika." *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques* no. 47:75-94.
Reprinted in Saroja Bhate, Johannes Bronkhorst (eds), *Bhartrhari, Philosopher and Grammarian: Proceedings of the First International Conference on Bhartrhari* (University of Poona, January 6–8, 1992), Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994, pp. 75–94.
"There are reasons to think that Bhartrhari's writings may shed light on the early history of Vaiśeṣika. One of these is that he obviously knew the Vaiśeṣika system. Almost all of its categories play a role in his work. Separate sections (*samuddeśa*) of the *Vākyapadīya* are dedicated to the categories *jāti*, *dravya*, *guṇa* and *kriyā*. The relationship called *samavāya* - a special feature of Vaiśeṣika - is mentioned and used repeatedly. Vaiśeṣika substances appear as 'powers' (*śakti*), most notably *kāla* (time) and *dis* (space).
A second reason is Bhartrhari's chronological position. I have argued in another publication that Prasaśtapāda's *Padārthadharmasāgraha*; as well as Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* before it, were heavily indebted to the Kaṭandī, a work written not long before Dignāga. This Kaṭandī, further argued, exerted a dominating influence on all Vaiśeṣika literature that came after it, including perhaps the versions of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra itself, not to speak of the surviving commentaries on this Sūtra work.(2)
Bhartrhari, on the other hand, lived long enough before Dignāga that someone different from Bhartrhari could write a commentary on the first two kāṇḍas of his *Vākyapadīya* still before Dignāga. Bhartrhari, therefore, lived and worked most probably before the *Kaṭandī*! If his work provides information on Vaiśeṣika, it would then be one of the very few sources of information dating from the pre-*Kaṭandī* period of this system.
In what follows we shall consider some possible links between Bhartrhari's *Vākyapadīya* and the Vaiśeṣika of his days." (p. 75)
(2) See Bronkhorst, forthcoming. "The Vaiśeṣika vākya and bhāṣya." *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute*.
33. ———. 1994. "Studies on Bhartrhari, 6: The Author of the Three Centuries." In *Vācaspatyam. Pt. Vamanshastri Bhagwat Felicitation Volume*, edited by Bhate, Saroja and Deshpande, Madhav, 32-41. Pune: Vaidika Samshodhana Mandala.
"There seems to be a tendency among recent scholars to consider as possible, or even probable, the identity of Bhartrhari, supposedly the author of the Three Centuries (*śatakatraya*, *subhāṣitatriśat*), with the grammarian-philosopher of the same name.
This article is meant to draw attention to the fact that the arguments adduced to support this position are far weaker than is generally realized." (p. 32)
34. ———. 1995. "Studies on Bhartrhari, 7: Grammar as the Door to Liberation." *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* no. 76:97-106.
"In the beginning of his *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartrhari describes grammar as *dvāram apavargasya* 'the door to liberation'. This remark has drawn the attention of several scholars, none of whom have been able to explain how the study of grammar could possibly lead to the highest aim of Indian religions, liberation from this world. Some complain about the lack of information about this in the *Vākyapadīya*. (p. 97) (...)
"There are many aspects of Bhartrhari's thought where the influence of Buddhism is clearly noticeable. His conception of the highest reality is an example, as I have tried to show elsewhere.(21) His view as to to what extent the world of our daily experience is determined by language, is another example(.22) The present paper has tried to show that even his ideas about the ultimate religious aim, and how to

reach it, may have been borrowed from the Buddhists. To all this we must however add that Bhartrhari never borrows ideas without thoroughly adjusting them to their new surroundings. Many of his ideas may be Buddhist in origin, together they constitute Bhartrhari's philosophy which, as such, is not Buddhist at all. His is the philosophy of a traditional Brahmin, who manages to adjust the Buddhist and other ideas in such a way, that they come to contribute to a Veda-centered view of the world." (pp. 104-105)

(21) Bronkhorst, 1992.

(22) Bronkhorst, 1996.

References

Bronkhorst, Johannes (1992): "Études sur Bhartrhari, 4: L'absolu dans le *Vākyapadīya* et son lien avec le Madhyamaka." *Asiatische Studien / Études Asiatiques* 46.1 (Études bouddhiques offertes à Jacques May), 6-80.

Bronkhorst, Johannes (1996): "Sanskrit and reality: the Buddhist contribution." *Ideology and Status of Sanskrit: Contributions to the history of the Sanskrit language*. Ed. Jan E. M. Houben. Leiden etc.: E.J. Brill. Pp. 09-135.

35. ———. 1996. "Sanskrit and Reality: the Buddhist Contribution." In *Ideology and Status of Sanskrit: Contributions to the History of the Sanskrit Language*, edited by Houben, Jan E. M., 109-135. Leiden: Brill.

"With this in mind we turn to another Brahmanical thinker who, as it seems to me, has been profoundly influenced by Buddhist ideas.(53) This is Bhartrhari, the linguistic thinker par excellence of classical India.

Bhartrhari stood, in fact, under the influence of both Vaiśeṣika and Buddhism, not to speak of several other currents of thought. The extent to which he is indebted to Vaiśeṣika is evident on almost every page of his *Vākyapadīya*. The Buddhist influence is less immediately obvious, but not any the less important, as it appears to me. I have drawn attention to Bhartrhari's indebtedness to Buddhist thought in an earlier publication.(54)

In the present lecture I will try to show how Bhartrhari, at least where ideas concerning the relationship between language and phenomenal reality are concerned, remains closer to the Buddhists than to the Vaiśeṣikas. I will also point out how he adapts these essentially Buddhist ideas to his own vision of the world. We will see that Bhartrhari accepts the close correspondence between language and phenomenal reality, that, like the Buddhists, he looks upon phenomenal reality as ultimately unreal, and that, like Nāgārjuna, he includes sentences in the parts of language that correspond to the phenomenal world." (p. 125)

(53) For the argument here presented it is not important to know whether Bhartrhari was directly acquainted with Nāgārjuna's works. Nāgārjuna's style of reasoning left a profound impression on Buddhist thought after him, so that Bhartrhari may have undergone his influence indirectly. Some features of Bhartrhari's thought suggest that he may have been acquainted with one or more Yogācāra thinkers; see note 81 below.

(54) Bronkhorst 1992a. [1992a "Études sur Bhartrhari, 4: L'absolu dans le *Vākyapadīya* et son lien avec le Madhyamaka." *Asian Studies/Études Asiatiques* 46.1 (Études bouddhiques offertes à Jacques May): 56-80.

(81) One is of course reminded of the *abhilapavāsana* of the Yogācāras, which is responsible for a number of percepts (*vijnapti*) besides the one of linguistic usage (*vyavahāravijnapti*). Cf. Lamotte [*La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asanga (Mahāyānasamgraha)*]. Tome II:traduction et commentaire. Publications de l'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain, 8 Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut Orientaliste] 1973: 88-89, 108 (= *Mahāyānasamgraha* II, 2; II, 16).

36. ———. 1999. "Studies on Bhartrhari, 8: *prākṛta dhvani* and the *Sāṃkhya tanmātras*." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 27:23-33.

"Bhartrhari distinguishes between the word itself (sometimes called *sphoṭa*) and the sounds that manifest it. These sounds themselves are subdivided in one passage of the *Vākyapadīya* into *prākṛta dhvani* and *vaikṛta dhvani*. These two expressions have puzzled modern scholarship." (p. 23)

(...)

"To conclude. For a correct understanding of Bhartrhari's *prākṛta* and *vaikṛta dhvani*, his intellectual context must first be taken into consideration. Comparison with theories of modern linguistics is delicate, and should not be made until Bhartrhari's own intellectual background has been properly explored.

It seems likely that the notions of *prākṛta* and *vaikṛta* forms of sound come from Sāṃkhya, where these notions appear to have been current until the revision of that philosophy during which the qualities as final evolutes were replaced by the five elements.

This hypothesis explains both Bhartrharis terminology and the ideas it covers: both Sāṃkhya and Bhartrhari distinguish between two perceptible forms of sound, the one "pure", the other one "impure". Questions remain as to their temporal relationship: does the *vaikṛta dhvani*, come into being after the *prākṛta dhvani*? Neither Bhartrhari's text nor our limited knowledge about the Sāṃkhya known to him allow us to reach a clear and certain answer to this question.

The revision of Sāṃkhya referred to above did away with both *prākṛta* and *vaikṛta dhvani*. Not surprisingly, the commentator Vṛṣabhadeva no longer understood Bhartrhari's short and enigmatic passage, and gave it a different interpretation." (pp. 32-33)

37. ———. 2001. "The Peacock's Egg: Bhartrhari on Language and Reality."

Philosophy East and West no. 51:474-491.

"Bhartrhari was not only a clever and well-informed philosopher but also a conservative Brahmin who maintained his own tradition's superiority against the philosophies developed in his time. He exploited a problem that occupied all his philosophical contemporaries to promote his own ideas, in which the Veda played a central role. Bhartrhari and his thought are situated in their philosophical context. As it turns out, he dealt with issues that others had dealt with before him in India and suggested solutions to existing problems. Indeed it becomes clear that he was both a philosopher who dealt with current problems and challenges and a traditionalist who used the philosophical debate of his time to gain respectability for his own Vedic tradition."

38. ———. 2009. "Bhartrhari and His Vedic Tradition." In *Bhartrhari: Language, Thought and Reality*, edited by Chaturvedi, Mithilesh, 99-118. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

"In this paper I wish to concentrate on one thinker and explore to what extent his thought may have been influenced, or even determined, by the Vedic school to which he belonged. This thinker is Bhartrhari — a Brahmanical philosopher belonging to the fifth century of the common era, author of the *Vākyapadīya* and of a commentary, *Tikā*, on the *Mahābhāṣya*, nowadays often referred to as *Mahābhāṣya-dīpikā*. The Vedic school to which he belonged is that of the *Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīyas*. Is it possible that this famous thinker may have borrowed, or rather inherited, some of his key ideas from this, his own, Vedic tradition? (p. 102)

(...)

"What can we conclude from the preceding? Not very much, ! fear. It seems possible, even likely, that Bhartrhari looked upon his Vedic school, that of the *Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīyas*, as one of his sources of inspiration which he refers to as authoritative tradition, *āgama*. The specific texts belonging to that tradition which he used probably include the *Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad*.

He also used other treatises of the *Mānava* school, among them probably a *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*. Whether he derived philosophical ideas from these treatises is not clear. The *Manusmṛti* — assuming that it is based on the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* known to Bhartrhari — does not provide much information that might support this." (p. 112)

39. ———. 2011. *Language and Reality: On an Episode in Indian Thought*. Leiden: Brill.

Revised and updated English edition of: *Langage et réalité : sur un épisode de la pensée indienne*, Turnhout: Brepols 1999.

Chapter Two, § 15: *Bhartrhari*, pp. 108-117.

"Bhartrhari, according to a few verses added at the end of the second book of his principal work, the *Vākyapadīya* ("Treatise on Sentences and Words"), played an important role in the resurgence of the *Mahābhāṣya* in the fifth century of the common era. The *Vākyapadīya* was aware of the problems relating to the correspondence principle, particularly the problem of the impossibility of the arising of things.

Bhartrhari proposes several solutions. We should not be surprised to find him making greater use, in comparison with other thinkers we have discussed, of the ideas found in the *Mahābhāṣya*.

A verse from the third book of the *Vākyapadīya* articulates the central problem as follows: "What we call origination is the fact of attaining one's own nature, and only something existent attains what is to be attained. If [this thing] exists [already], why does it arise? But if it does not exist, how does it arise?"(271) The problem is easily recognizable: for something to arise, it has to exist; but if it already exists, why would it arise? To quote once again the words of Nāgārjuna: "If there existed anywhere something unarisen, it could arise. Since no such thing exists, what is it that arises?"(272)" (P. 108, Sanskrit omitted)

(271) [Bhartrhari, *Vākyapadīya*, ed. W. Rau, Wiesbaden 1977] 3.3.4.

(272) [Nāgārjuna, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, ed. J. W. de Jong, The Adyar Library and Research Centre, Madras 1977] 7.17:

40. ———. 2012. "Studies on Bhartrhari, 9: *Vākyapadīya* 2.119 and the Early History of *Mīmāṃsā*." *Journal of Indian Philosophy* no. 40:411-425.
Abstract: "This article argues that in early *Mīmāṃsā* the view was current that there are objects in the world corresponding to all words of the Sanskrit language. Evidence to that effect is primarily found in passages from Bhartrhari's works, and in some classical *Nyāya* texts. Interestingly, Śabara's classical work on *Mīmāṃsā* has abandoned this position, apparently for an entirely non-philosophical reason: the distaste felt for the newly arising group of Brahmanical temple-priests."
41. Cardona, George. 1976. *Pāṇini: A Survey of Research*. The Hague: Mouton.
VI.2. Bhartrhari 295; VI.2.1, The *Vākyapadīya*: editions and translations. 295;
VI.2.2. The authorship of the *Vṛtti* 297; VI.2,3, The dates of Bhartrhari and his commentators 298; VI.2 4 Studies on the doctrines set forth in the *Vākyapadīya* 299; VI.2.5. Evaluations of Bhartrhari and his commentators 304-305.
"The major text on semantics and philosophy of grammar in the Paninian school is Bhartrhari's *Vākyapadīya*. This, together with the *Mahābhāṣya*, is the basic work for later treatments of topics in the treatises of Kauṇḍabhaṭṭa and Nāgeśa. Not only this, the *Vākyapadīya* is also referred to extensively in later treatises of many schools.
The text is composed in verses (*kārika*) and divided into three parts (*kāṇḍa*)'. the *Āgama-samuccya* ('compendium of traditional teaching') also called the *Brahma-kaṇḍa*, the *Vākyapadīya-kaṇḍa*, and the *Pada-kaṇḍa* or *Prakirnakāṇḍa* ('miscellaneous part'). The third part is further subdivided into fourteen sections called *samudeśa* in which are treated; generic properties (*jāti*), substance (*dravya*), relation (*sambandha*) between items and their meanings, substance again (*bhūyo-dravya-samudeśa*), properties (*guṇa*), spatial concepts (*dik*), *kāras* (*sādhana*), action (*kriyā*), time (*kāla*), the concept of person (*puruṣa*), number (*saṃkhyā*), the semantics associated with active and middle endings (*upagraha*), gender (*liṅga*), derivatives such as compounds (*vṛtti*, see note 263). The last *kāṇḍa* is considered by both commentators and most modern scholars to be lacking sections originally included therein. The term *vākyapadīya* was used to refer to the first two *kaṇḍas* and the term *trikāṇḍi* to refer to the whole work.
The following commentaries on the *Vākyapadīya* are extant: the *Vṛtti* on the first and second parts, the latter fragmentary; the *Ṭikā* on the second part, usually attributed to Punyarāja. Helārāja's *Prakāśa* on the third *kāṇḍa*. In addition, the *Vṛtti*

- on the first section itself has a commentary, the Paddhati of Vṛṣabhadeva." (pp. 295-296, notes omitted)
- "It is generally agreed that Bhartrhari deserves his reputation for his insights into language. There has, nevertheless, been some disagreement on how one should evaluate him. In particular, should one approach him as a linguist or as a philosopher, through his commentaries in addition to the Vākya-paḍīya and the Tripādi or through these alone?" (p. 304)
42. ———. 1999. "Approaching the Vākya-paḍīya." *The Journal of the American Oriental Society* no. 119:88-125.
This is a review-article of: *The Sambandha-Samuddesa (Chapter on Relation) and Bhartrhari's Philosophy of Language: A Study of Bhartrhari's Sambandha-samuddesa in the Context of the Vakyapadiya with a Translation of Heldrdja's Commentary, Prakirna-prakasa*. By Jan E. M. Houbeng. Gonda Indological Studies, vol. II. Groningen: Egbert Forsten, 1995. Pp. 460 + xv.
Abstract: "In connection with a recent work on the *Sambandhasamuddesa* of the *Vākya-paḍīya*, I consider some major issues concerning Bhartrhari, the tradition he represents, and how a modern scholar might approach the *Vākya-paḍīya*. I discuss theoretical principles which have been set forth as a basis for dealing with Bhartrhari and evidence from the *Vākya-paḍīya* in connection with these principles, chiefly what is referred to as Bhartrhari's perspectivism. I take up in some detail one large issue: the status of the received high language, associated with a group of model speakers called *sista*, who use speech forms characterized as "correct" (*sādhu*) linguistic units (*śabda*) opposed to incorrect linguistic units (*asadhusabda*, *apaśabda*), that are viewed as corruptions (*apabhramsa*) with respect to how meanings are understood by users. The principal issue here is: do *apaśabdas* directly signify meanings for *sistas* when they communicate with someone using a vernacular, or do these speakers resort to a translation technique such that the *apaśabda* used calls to mind a *sadhusabda*, which then directly signifies a meaning? This topic also involves another important question: how one should consider the *Vṛtti* and other commentaries in relation to what is said in the *kārikā* text."
43. ———. 2000. "Addendum to JAOS 119.1: Approaching the Vākya-paḍīya." *The Journal of the American Oriental Society* no. 120:234.
"Interpretation and paraphrase of Vākya-paḍīya 2.7-8 clarified."
44. ———. 2009. "Bhartrhari and Patanjali: Traditions Preserved." In *Bhartrhari: Language, Thought and Reality*, edited by Chaturvedi, Mithilesh, 119-162. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
"While remaining faithful to the tradition of his predecessors in grammar, Bhartrhari ranges widely in his treatment of pertinent topics, to the extent that he has been characterized as embracing an attitude of accommodation towards the views of others and of being not only encyclopedic but also perspectivistic. Scholars who have, with some justification, emphasized this aspect of Bhartrhari's approach, though they acknowledge Bhartrhari's close affiliation with the Mahābhāṣya, to the point where in many places—especially in the third kaṇḍa—the Vākya-paḍīya takes on aspects of a learned commentary on this work, have not, in my opinion, sufficiently emphasized the degree to which Patanjali anticipates Bhartrhari in devoting attention to various points of view. In addition, insufficient attention has been paid to the manner in which both authors can make known their sharp disagreements with views they find unacceptable. In the present contribution, I consider examples from the Mahābhāṣya and the Vākya-paḍīya to illustrate the similarity in approach, then discuss some general issues concerning Bhartrhari's attitude." (pp. 120-121, note omitted)
45. ———. 2012. "A Note on Vākya-paḍīya 1.45/46: ātmabhedas tayoh kecid ..." In *Saṃskṛta-Sādhutā. Goodness of Sanskrit: Studies in Honour of Professor Ashok Aklujkar*, edited by Watanabe, Chikafuma, Desmarais, Michele M. and Honda, Yoshichika, 100-109. New Delhi: D. K. Printworld.

46. Chattopadhyay, Madhumita. 2010. "Nature of Cognition in the Philosophy of Bhartrhari: A Short Note." *International Journal on Humanistic Ideology* no. 1:181-191.
Abstract: "In the history of Indian philosophy Bhartrhari occupies a very distinguished position for relating grammar to philosophy and elaborating the language-philosophical ideas which were hinted at in the grammatical traditions of Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali"
47. Chaturvedi, Mithilesh, ed. 2009. *Bhartrhari: Language, Thought and Reality*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Proceedings of the International Seminar Delhi, December 12-14, 2003.
Contents: Publisher's Note IX; G. C. Pande: Foreword XI; V. N. Jha: Keynote Address XV; Editor's Introduction XXV-XXXII; Ashok Aklujkar: Veda Revelation according to Bhartrhari 1; Johannes Bronkhorst: Bhartrhari and His Vedic Tradition 99; George Cardona: Bhartrhari and Patanjali: Traditions Preserved 19; Madhav M. Deshpande: Revisiting the Notion of Sista in Bhartrhari 163; K. D. Tripathi: Thought, Language and Consciousness: Bhartrhari's View of Language 177; Tandra Patnaik: Thought and Language: The Bhartrharian Perspective 185; Mithilesh Chaturvedi: Does Language Map the Reality: Bhartrhari View 205; Pierre-Sylvain Filliozat: Time as Power of Word according to Bhartrhari 215; Hideyo Ogawa: On Bhartrhari's Notion of 'Power' (sakti) 225; Vladimir P. Ivanov: Vidyā and Avidyā in Bhartrhari's Vākyapadīya 253; P. K. Mukhopadhyay: Did Bhartrhari Give Us a Philosophy of Language 259; R. C. Pradhan: Bhartrhari as a Philosopher of Language 281; Karunasindhu Das: Changing Approaches to Language in Indian Schools of Thought vis-a-vis Bhartrhari 's Vākyapadīya 291; Navjivan Rastogi: Vak as Pratyavamarśa: Bhartrhari from Abhinavan Perspective 301; Raffaele Torella: From an Adversary to the Main Ally: The Place of Bhartrhari in the Kashmirian Śaiva Advaita 343; Anna Radicchi: Dhvani in Bhartrhari and Abhinavagupta's Philosophical Works 355; Jan E. M. Housen: Bhartrhari and the Jainas 383; Toshiya Unebe: Mimāmsā and Buddhist Criticism on Bhartrhari's Vākyapadīya 2.119 and His Counterarguments 415; Brendan S. Gillon: Bhartrhari and the Syntax of Sanskrit Gerunds 433; Arindam Chakrabarti: The Case of the Accusative: Contemporary Relevance of Bhartrhari on the Kāraṅkas 447; Vincenzo Vergiani: Bhartrhari on Śesa relationships 459; Yoshie Kobayashi: All Words Denote the Universal (jāti): Bhartrhari's Approach 483; Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti: The Conception of Liṅga in Vākyapadīya III.13 499; Noriyuki Kudo: Some Remarks on the Term 'vākyabheda' in Bhartrhari's Mahabhāṣya-dīpikā 507; Jan E. M. Housen: Bhartrhari as a 'Cognitive Linguist' 523; Ana Agud: Comparing Humboldt and Bhartrhari 545; Yves Ramseier: A Bibliography on Bhartrhari 557; Contributors 613-615.