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Writings of E. J. Ashworth on the History of Logic. Fifth Part: Articles from 1996 to 2005

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1. Ashworth, Earline Jennifer. 1996. "Domingo de Soto (1494-1560) on Analogy and Equivocation." In *Studies on the History of Logic. Proceedings of the Third Symposium on the History of Logic*, edited by Angelelli, Ignacio and Cerezo, Maria, 117-132. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

"In 1543 the Spanish logician, Domingo de Soto, published a commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*. (1) As one might expect, Soto offers a detailed discussion of the opening lines in which Aristotle presents a definition of equivocal terms, but his discussion also includes an analysis of analogical terms, together with an account of the conceptual correlates of such terms. The purpose of this paper is to show how Soto's analysis fits into a long tradition of commentary on the *Categories*. In particular, I wish to show that although Soto betrays the influence of Thomas de Vio, Cardinal Cajetan, whose short book, *On the Analogy of Names*, was published in 1498, it is a great mistake to suppose that the history of analogy from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century should be read through the eyes of Cajetan. At the same time, I hope to throw some light on the background to Suarez, for it seems to me that there is a close relationship between the doctrines found in Soto and those developed by Suarez.

My paper is divided into three parts. In the first part, I shall look at the notion of equivocation and how it came to be related to analogy. In the second part, I shall describe Soto's divisions of analogy and how they are related to those of Cajetan. In the third part, I shall discuss what Soto had to say about the imposition of analogical terms and about their relationship to concepts and natures." (p. 117)
(...)

"3. *Analogy, Imposition, and Concepts*.

The mention of concepts brings us to the last section of my discussion, in which I shall consider Soto's explanation of the way analogical terms were related to conventional signification on the one hand, and to concepts on the other. For Soto, as for other medieval and post-medieval logicians, spoken words were endowed with their signification by arbitrary imposition. Some logicians, including the sixteenth-century Spaniard Antonio Coronel, argued that deliberate equivocation involves two acts of imposition, (39) but Soto followed Dominic of Flanders in affirming that only one act of imposition is involved for analogical terms. (40) In the case of such analogical terms as 'homo', used of painted men, 'ridere', used of fields, and 'sanum', used of urine, there is a transference of signification, and what is imposed to signify one thing, comes to signify another. In the case of 'ens', however, there is no transference. This word was originally imposed to signify *id quod est*, and so it signifies substance and accidents, God and creatures, without any need for a specially extended use. (p. 124)

(...)

"In his *Categories* commentary, Soto was more forthright. After giving a lengthy account of Scotus's arguments for the univocity of the word 'ens', he put forward four theses. (46) The first thesis was that there is one formal concept of being, a view which Soto supported both by reference to Scotus's arguments and by extra reasons of his own. One of these had to do with imposition. Whoever first imposed the word 'ens' could not have been thinking specifically of God or of creatures, of substance or of accidents, any more than do those Latin-speakers who are ignorant of philosophy. So far as the first thesis was concerned, Soto saw no difference between Scotus and Aquinas. His second thesis postulated just one objective concept. Even though many Thomists deny this, he said, 'ens' signifies one formal ratio in the object, abstracted by reason from substance and accidents. Nonetheless,

in his third thesis he stated that 'ens' signifies substance and accidents not univocally but analogically. This is because the ratio is not found simply but *proportionabiliter* in its significates, principally in one and through attribution in the others. In his fourth thesis, Soto turned to God and creatures, stating that 'ens' is also said analogically of them, even though the case is not strictly comparable to that of substance and accidents. Indeed, he remarked, we can understand why Aquinas said different things in different places if we realize that theological analogy, as Alain de Libera has called it, (47) involves both similarity to and difference from philosophical analogy. On the one hand, there is a similarity to analogy because of the dependence relation between God and creatures. This is why Aquinas, in *Summa theologiae* Ia q.13 a.5, compared 'ens' said of God and creatures with 'sanum'. As urine is a sign of an animal's health, so the perfections of creatures are nothing other than expressions of perfections in God. On the other hand, there is a difference from analogy in that ens is said simpliciter of both God and creatures, and this is why in *De Veritate* q.2 a. 11 Aquinas said that there was an analogy of proportionality between God and creatures. As God exists through the esse formally in him, so do creatures exist through the esse formally in them. In his conclusion, and without saying more about proportionality, Soto remarked that the analogy of being between God and creatures is called univocation because it is nearer to univocation than is the analogy of being between substance and accidents.

4. Conclusion.

Soto's four theses point the way to the subtle and intensive analysis of ens given by Suarez in his *Disputationes Metaphysicae*. While Suarez's doctrine is not precisely that of Soto, there are clear parallels between the two great Spaniards, and Suarez cites Soto's commentary on the *Categories* a number of times. A more precise account of how Suarez made use of Soto's arguments, and how Soto ranks in comparison to Suarez's other sources will, however, have to await another occasion."

(1) I shall use the facsimile edition of the 1587 edition: Domingo de Soto, *In Praedicamentorum*, in Soto, *In Porphyrii Isagogen, Aristotelis Categorias, librosque de Demonstratione Absolutissima Commentaria*, Venice 1587 /reprinted 1967 Frankfurt: Minerva).

(39) Antonius Coronel, *Magistri Antonii coronel Secobiensis super librum Praedicamentorum Aristotelis secundum utriusque vie realium scilicet et nominalium principia commentaria*. Parrhisiis. 1518, fol. ii va.

(40) Dominic of Flanders, *In D. Thomae Aquinatis Commentaria super Libres Posteriorum Analyticorum Aristotelis, nec non et in eiusdem Fallaciarum opus. Quaestiones Perutiles, Pauli quoque Soncinatis eiusdem ordinis, lucida et subtilis Expositio in Porphyrii Isagogen, et Aristotelis Praedicamenta, cum suis quaestionibus in unaquaque expositione Militer disputatis*. Venetiis 1600, p. 177B; 1499 sig. i 3vb. On sig. i 3va he writes "analogum debet significare unam principaliter et aliud secundaria, una impositione ex parte ipsius imponentis." (I have corrected the text slightly.) Soto 1587, p. 119a-b.

(46) Soto 1587, pp. 129a-133a.

(47) Alain de Libera, *Albert le Grand et la philosophie*, Paris: J. Vrin 1990, p. 96.

2. ———. 1996. "Autour des Obligationes de Roger Swyneshed: la *Nova responsio*." *Etudes Philosophiques* (3):341-360.

"D'après l'opinion reçue, les *Obligationes* de Roger Swyneshed, rédigées entre 1330 et 1335, signalent deux nouvelles directions dans les débats sur les règles qu'on est obligé de suivre dans un certain type de dispute logique, la dispute obligationnelle

(1). D'un côté, ils nous offrent une analyse des diverses formes de réflexivité beaucoup plus approfondie que celle de Gauthier Burley, dont les *Obligationes* de 1302 sont caractéristiques de la théorie standard (2). De l'autre côté, ils donnent une *nova responsio* sous la forme de deux règles assez surprenantes du point de vue de la logique: 1 /On peut nier une proposition conjonctive après avoir concédé ses deux parties. 2 /On peut concéder une proposition disjonctive avant de nier ses deux parties (3).

Récemment, Angel D'Ors, tout en acceptant l'originalité de Swyneshed à propos des formes de réflexivité, s'est proposé de détruire le mythe de la *nova responsio* de Swyneshed (4). Il prétend que, malgré les apparences, Swyneshed suivait Burley, et qu'il n'y avait qu'une théorie des obligations durant le XIVe siècle (5).

D'Ors est surtout motivé par son incapacité de comprendre pourquoi Swyneshed aurait présenté une *nova responsio* aussi dépourvue de sens logique (6). Donc, au lieu de chercher une explication des deux règles, il cherche plutôt une explication du fait qu'on attribue ces règles à Swyneshed. Dans ses récents articles, il se concentre sur deux textes auxquels Spade, entre autres, a fait appel afin d'expliquer Swyneshed. Tout d'abord, il prétend que les *Obligationes* de Richard Lavenham (mort après 1399) (7) ont été mal comprises par ses récents lecteurs. Au lieu de suivre la supposée *nova responsio* de Swyneshed, Lavenham s'intéresse à la différence entre le dialogue d'une dispute obligationnelle et le métadiologue dans lequel on discute les raisons pour lesquelles les réponses étaient ou bonnes ou mauvaises, et les règles auxquelles on aurait dû faire appel (8). En ce qui concerne Robert Fland, un autre Anglais qui a écrit entre 1335 et 1370 (9), D'Ors et son collaborateur, Miguel Garcia-Clavel, admettent qu'il parle d'une *nova responsio*, mais ils prétendent que Fland a inventé cette réponse à cause d'un malentendu, et que personne n'a jamais adopté cette réponse (10). Tout comme les lecteurs de Lavenham, Fland n'a pas réussi à comprendre que Swyneshed parle à deux niveaux, le niveau du dialogue de base, et le niveau du métadiologue.

L'hypothèse de la nature mythique de la *nova responsio* est audacieuse et provocatrice. Malheureusement, quand on la regarde de plus près, elle se révèle fautive, le fruit d'un malentendu de la part de D'Ors lui-même (11). Dans cet article, je vais expliquer pourquoi Fland n'a rien inventé, et pourquoi il est possible de considérer Lavenham comme un disciple de Swyneshed.

Mon article se divise en quatre parties. Premièrement, j'aborderai le problème des textes eux-mêmes. Je suis entièrement d'accord avec D'Ors quand il dit que le texte de Fland (qui existe dans un seul manuscrit) est souvent peu fiable, et qu'il y a plusieurs façons de lire le texte de Lavenham. En général, les textes qui traitent des *obligationes* ne sont pas faciles à comprendre. Il y a trop de détails que nous ignorons; les auteurs écrivaient trop vite, sans donner des explications en profondeur; les copistes y ont ajouté trop d'erreurs. C'est précisément à cause de ces problèmes qu'il faut s'appuyer sur une base textuelle aussi étendue que possible, sans se limiter à deux ou trois œuvres. Je montrerai qu'il y avait d'autres auteurs que Fland et Lavenham qui parlaient d'une *nova responsio*, et qui discutaient des deux règles de Swyneshed. Deuxièmement, je donnerai un bref aperçu de la théorie standard des *obligationes*, et je ferai une comparaison entre cette théorie et celle de Swyneshed telle qu'elle est présentée par au moins dix auteurs, à part Fland et Lavenham. En troisième lieu, j'examinerai de plus près les définitions alternatives de la notion clef de propositions non pertinentes, et les différentes règles qui gouvernaient les réponses à ces propositions. Pour terminer, j'expliquerai le rapport entre les règles de Swyneshed et la théorie d'inférence que nous offre un auteur anonyme. C'est ici que l'on trouve enfin le raisonnement qui mena Swyneshed à adopter sa *nova responsio*." (pp. 341-343)

(...)

"Conclusion.

En somme, il faut accepter l'opinion reçue à propos de Swyneshed. Il y avait une *nova responsio* qui se basait sur une théorie d'inférence très restreinte.

Malheureusement pour ceux qui aimeraient interpréter les *obligationes* en fonction des contre-factuels ou des mondes possibles, cette théorie restreinte a ses racines dans un manque de compréhension des arguments que l'on retrouve chez Burley. Les enjeux étaient moins intéressants qu'on aurait voulu croire." (pp. 359-360)

(1) Paul Vincent Spade, Roger Swyneshed's *Obligationes*: Edition and Comments, *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge*, 44 (1977), p. 243-285.

Pour une bibliographie complète, voir E. J. Ashworth, *Obligationes* Treatises: A Catalogue of Manuscripts, Editions and Studies, *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale*, 36 (1994), p. 118-147.

- (2) Romuald Green, *The Logical Treatise «De Obligationibus »: An Introduction with Critical Texts of William of Sherwood and Walter Burley*, dissertation présentée pour l'obtention du grade de docteur en philosophie, Université de Louvain, 1963.
- (3) Swyneshed, p. 257 §32: « Propter concessionem partium copulativae non est copulativa concedenda nec propter concessionem disjunctivae est aliqua pars ejus concedenda ».
- (4) Angel D'Ors, Sobre las Obligationes de Richard Lavenham, *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, 58 (1991), p. 253-278 (pour l'opinion reçue, voir p. 255); Angel D'Ors, Sortes non currit vel Sortes movetur (Roger Swyneshed, Obligationes, § 137-138), *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, 60 (1993), p. 165-172 (pour l'opinion reçue, voir p. 165); Angel d'Ors y Manuel Garcla-Clavel, Sobre las Obligationes de Robert Fland, *Antiqua et nova responsio*, *Revista de Filosofia*, 7 (1994), p. 51-88 (pour l'opinion reçue, voir p. 51).
- (5) Ici, je laisse de côté les problèmes présentés par les *Sophismata* de Richard Kilvington et le texte anonyme de Merton College ms. 306. Pour discussion et références, voir Mikko Yrjönsuuri, Obligationes, 14th Century Logic of Disputational Duties, *Acta Philosophica Fennica*, vol. 55 (Helsinki, Societas Philosophica Fennica, 1994), un excellent guide aux obligationes jusqu'en 1335. Yrjönsuuri pense que le texte anonyme date de 1321 environ, et que son auteur critique Burley plutôt que Swyneshed: voir p. 77.
- (6) D'Ors y Garcia-Clavel, op. cit., p. 55: «... la nova responsio en la forma en que Fland nos la presenta: no parece obedecer a ninguna razón, no parece que pueda encontrarse una razón que explique tal propuesta de cambio », cf. p. 56.
- (7) Paul Vincent Spade, *Richard Lavenham's Obligationes*. (Edition and Comments by Paul Vincent Spade), *Rivista critica di storia della filosofia*, 33 (1978), p. 225-242.
- (8) D'Ors, Sobre las Obligationes de Richard Lavenham, p. 274-278; D'Ors y Garcia-Clavel, op. cit., p. 84-85, 87.
- (9) Paul Vincent Spade, Robert Fland's Obligationes. An Edition, *Mediaeval Studies*, 42 (1980), p. 41-60.
- (10) D'Ors y Garcia-Clavel, op. cit., p. 53: «... la obra de Fland no puede servir como guía para la interpretación del auténtico sentido de la doctrina de Swyneshed ; o lo que es lo mismo, que la nova responsio de la que nos habla Fland, como tal, no ha existido nunca, es decir, que no se corresponde con ninguna doctrina que alguien, sea éste quien sea, haya alguna vez realmente defendido, sino que es simplemente el fruto de una mala interpretación de la doctrina cuyo mis ilustre representante es Swyneshed», cf. p. 69.
- (11) Bien que je ne sois pas d'accord avec D'Ors en ce qui concerne Swyneshed, j'ai néanmoins beaucoup appris de lui et de ses œuvres.
3. ———. 1997. "Petrus Fonseca on Objective Concepts and the Analogy of Being." In *Logic and the Workings of the Mind. The Logic of Ideas and Faculty Psychology in Early Modern Philosophy*, edited by Easton, Patricia A., 47-63. Atascadero: Ridgeview.
- "Petrus Fonseca was a Portuguese Jesuit who lived from 1528 to 1599. He was one of those responsible for drawing up the Jesuit *Ratio Studiorum* which set the curriculum for Jesuit schools across Europe, and he was also responsible for initiating the production of the Coimbra commentaries on Aristotle, or *Conimbricenses*, which served as texts for many schools and universities in the seventeenth century.(1) He was himself the author of two popular texts, an introduction to logic, and a commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. (2) His logic text was one of two alternatives prescribed by the *Ratio Studiorum* of 1599, and may have been used at La Flèche; (3) his *Metaphysics* commentary was used at many Jesuit schools, and may also have been used at La Flèche. (4) In short, Fonseca was a leading figure in the Scholastic Aristotelian tradition of the late sixteenth century, a tradition which lies behind many of the developments in early modern philosophy, and which in many ways is more important than the humanist tradition represented by Petrus Ramus. (5)

I have chosen to discuss Fonseca on objective concepts and the analogy of being both because an examination of these issues will help us to understand how logic came to be bound up with the philosophy of mind and because the history of how these issues were treated helps solve a small problem about Descartes's sources. My paper has four parts. I shall begin by giving a historical outline of treatments of analogy and their relevance to Descartes. (6) Secondly, I shall discuss late medieval theories of signification, particularly as they appear in Fonseca, in order to show how logicians turned away from spoken language to inner, mental language. Thirdly, I shall explain how it was that analogy, as a theory of one kind of language use, was particularly bound up with the discussion of concepts. Finally, I shall look at the distinctions Fonseca made while discussing the concepts associated with analogical terms.

1 Historical Outline: From Scotus to Descartes

In *Meditation 3*, Descartes uses a distinction between formal and objective reality with respect to ideas in order to prove the existence of God. In the secondary literature this distinction is invariably linked with a distinction between formal and objective concepts found in Suarez, whose *Metaphysical Disputations* (published in 1597) was cited by Descartes on one occasion. (7) However, as the literature acknowledges, it is not clear where the distinction originated, or how Descartes came to know of it. The earliest paper I know of, published by Dalbiez in 1929, looked in two directions. (8) Dalbiez quite accurately traced the distinction back to Duns Scotus and his discussion of the kind of being creatures had in God's mind prior to creation, (9) but Dalbiez thought it improbable that Descartes would have read Duns Scotus. He then suggested that the notion is more likely to have come from Suarez and another near-contemporary, Vasquez, both of whom used the notion in a theological dispute about the views of the fourteenth-century theologian Durandus of Saint Pourçain (d. 1334) on the nature of truth. (10) Little new light has been shed since 1929. (11) In recent papers, Norman Wells still privileges both Suarez and the debate about Scotus on divine ideas. (12) In a paper entitled "Meaning and Objective Being: Descartes and His Sources," Calvin Normore first discusses Duns Scotus and William of Alnwick on objective being in the context of God's ideas; and he then shows how the notion was used by Peter Aureol, William Ockham, and Walter Chatton in a variety of contexts. However, Normore acknowledges that there is a gap between about 1340 and the beginning of the seventeenth century. In his conclusion, he writes that his examination "suggests a Descartes firmly rooted in a Scholastic tradition which is deeply in debt to Duns Scotus and closely allied with fourteenth-century developments in epistemology and in the theory of meaning. This makes the problem of Descartes' immediate sources and the question of his originality even more puzzling." (13)

My own recent work on analogy as a theory of one kind of language use shows that at least one historical path between Scotus and the early seventeenth century can be traced through the Thomistic tradition, though we must remember that late medieval and Renaissance Thomism embraced a variety of different approaches and doctrines. What Thomists had in common was a kind of moderate realism with respect to common natures that differentiated them from the nominalists on the one hand and the Scotists on the other. Nonetheless, Thomists embraced many theses put forward by nominalists, especially Pierre d'Ailly (d. 1420/1); and much of their agenda had been set by Duns Scotus rather than by Aquinas himself." (pp. 47-48) (...)

"Conclusion.

I don't want to claim that I can point to precise passages in Fonseca which have influenced Descartes, or Mersenne, or Arnauld, or any other early modern philosopher. On the other hand, I do want to claim that this is the style of discussion, and these are the types of distinctions, with which early modern philosophers, at least up to and including Locke, would have been familiar through the scholastic texts by which they were educated." (p. 63)

(1) On Fonseca's life and works, see Charles H. Lohr, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries: II. Renaissance Authors* (Florence: Olschki, 1988), pp. 150-51; and

- John P. Doyle, "Peter Fonseca," *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, E. J. Craig, ed. (Routledge: 1998).
- (2) Pedro da Fonseca, *Instituições Dialécticas. Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo*, 2 volumes, Joaquim Ferreira Gomes, ed. and trans. (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1964), cited as *Instit. Dial.*, Petrus Fonseca, *Commentariorum In Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros* (2 volumes), (Cologne, 1615; reprinted Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964), cited as *In Met.* Volume 1 contains Tomus I-II and has numbered columns; volume 2 contains Tomus III-IV, and has numbered pages.
- (3) Timothy J. Cronin, *Objective Being in Descartes and in Suarez* (Roma: Gregorian University Press, 1966), p. 34
- (4) Cronin suggests, pp. 32-33, that Fonseca's commentary was normally used in Jesuit schools.
- (5) Useful background is provided by Peter Dear, *Mersenne and the Learning of the Schools* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988). However, Dear overemphasizes the influence of Ramist-style humanism on Fonseca's logic: see pp. 19-21. For an alternative assessment of Fonseca, see E. J. Ashworth, "Changes in Logic Textbooks from 1500 to 1650: The New Aristotelianism," *Aristotelismus und Renaissance: In Memoriam Charles B. Schmitt*, Eckhard Kessler, Charles H. Lohr and Walter Spam, eds. (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1988), pp. 82-84.
- (6) Jean-Luc Marion, *Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1981), devotes much of his book to the theme of Descartes's reaction to Suárez's doctrine of the analogy of being. In his discussion, he notes the relation between the analogy of being and objective concepts (e. g., p. 119), and he also mentions Fonseca briefly (p. 123). However, the nature and scope of our investigations is quite different.
- (7) Descartes, *Replies IV*, AT VII 235. For discussion see Roger Ariew, "Descartes and scholasticism: the intellectual background to Descartes' thought," *The Cambridge Companion to Descartes*, John Cottingham, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 58-90, esp. p. 79.
- (8) R. Dalbiez, "Les sources scolastiques de la théorie cartésienne de l'être objectif à propos du 'Descartes' de M. Gilson," *Revue d'histoire de la philosophie* 3 (1929), pp. 464-472.
- (9) For Fonseca on God's ideas, including reference to formal and objective concepts, see *In Met.*, III, pp. 280b-296b, esp. 286a-288b (Lib. VII, cap. VIII, q. 2).
- (10) Dalbiez, pp. 468-470.
- (11) Cronin, p. 206, opts for Scotus and Suarez as Descartes's sources. One useful source is Gabriel Nuchelmans, *Judgment and Proposition from Descartes to Kant* (Amsterdam, Oxford, New York: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1983). He traces the early history of the phrases "esse objective" and "conceptus obiectivus" in Hervaeus, Aureol, and Durandus, pp. 17-26. In discussing Descartes, he says (p. 41), "it remains difficult to single out any individual sources. His debt is of a very general nature and could have come from any work belonging to a certain climate of thought. There can be little doubt, however, that one of the main determinants of this climate was the objective-existence theory as it had been developed by such thinkers as Durandus and Aureolus."
- (12) Norman J. Wells, "Objective Reality of Ideas in Descartes, Caterus, and Suarez," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 28 (1990), pp. 33-61, esp. pp. 49-50. See also Norman J. Wells, "Objective Being: Descartes and His Sources," *The Modern Schoolman* 45 (1967), pp. 49-61; id., "Objective Reality of Ideas in Amauld, Descartes, and Suárez," *The Great Amauld and Some of His Philosophical Correspondents*, Elmar J. Kremer, ed. (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 138-183.
- (13) Calvin Normore, "Meaning and Objective Being: Descartes and His Sources," *Essays on Descartes' "Meditations"*, Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, ed. (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1986), pp. 223-241, esp. p. 240.

4. ———. 1997. "Petrus Fonseca on Objective Concepts and the Analogy of Being." In *Logic and the Workings of the Mind. The Logic of Ideas and Faculty Psychology in Early Modern Philosophy*, edited by Easton, Patricia A., 47-63. Atascadero: Ridgeview.

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1 Historical Outline: From Scotus to Descartes

In *Meditation 3*, Descartes uses a distinction between formal and objective reality with respect to ideas in order to prove the existence of God. In the secondary literature this distinction is invariably linked with a distinction between formal and objective concepts found in Suarez, whose *Metaphysical Disputations* (published in 1597) was cited by Descartes on one occasion. (7) However, as the literature acknowledges, it is not clear where the distinction originated, or how Descartes came to know of it. The earliest paper I know of, published by Dalbiez in 1929, looked in two directions.(8) Dalbiez quite accurately traced the distinction back to Duns Scotus and his discussion of the kind of being creatures had in God's mind prior to creation, (9) but Dalbiez thought it improbable that Descartes would have read Duns Scotus. He then suggested that the notion is more likely to have come from Suarez and another near-contemporary, Vasquez, both of whom used the notion in a theological dispute about the views of the fourteenth-century theologian Durandus of Saint Pourçain (d. 1334) on the nature of truth. (10) Little new light has been shed since 1929. (11) In recent papers, Norman Wells still privileges both Suarez and the debate about Scotus on divine ideas. (12) In a paper entitled "Meaning and Objective Being: Descartes and His Sources," Calvin Normore first discusses Duns Scotus and William of Alnwick on objective being in the context of God's ideas; and he then shows how the notion was used by Peter Aureol, William Ockham, and Walter Chatton in a variety of contexts. However, Normore acknowledges that there is a gap between about 1340 and the beginning of the seventeenth century. In his conclusion, he writes that his examination "suggests a Descartes firmly rooted in a Scholastic tradition which is deeply in debt to Duns Scotus and closely allied with fourteenth-century developments in epistemology and in the theory of meaning. This makes the problem of Descartes' immediate sources and the question of his originality even more puzzling." (13)

My own recent work on analogy as a theory of one kind of language use shows that at least one historical path between Scotus and the early seventeenth century can be traced through the Thomistic tradition, though we must remember that late medieval and Renaissance Thomism embraced a variety of different approaches and doctrines. What Thomists had in common was a kind of moderate realism with respect to common natures that differentiated them from the nominalists on the one hand and the Scotists on the other. Nonetheless, Thomists embraced many theses put forward by nominalists, especially Pierre d'Ailly (d. 1420/1); and much of their agenda had been set by Duns Scotus rather than by Aquinas himself." (pp. 47-48) (...)

"Conclusion.

I don't want to claim that I can point to precise passages in Fonseca which have influenced Descartes, or Mersenne, or Arnauld, or any other early modern philosopher. On the other hand, I do want to claim that this is the style of discussion, and these are the types of distinctions, with which early modern philosophers, at least up to and including Locke, would have been familiar through the scholastic texts by which they were educated." (p. 63)

(1) On Fonseca's life and works, see Charles H. Lohr, *Latin Aristotle Commentaries: II. Renaissance Authors* (Florence: Olschki, 1988), pp. 150-51; and John P. Doyle, "Peter Fonseca," *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, E. J. Craig, ed. (Routledge: 1998).

(2) Pedro da Fonseca, *Instituições Dialécticas. Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo*, 2 volumes, Joaquim Ferreira Gomes, ed. and trans. (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1964), cited as *Instit. Dial.*, Petrus Fonseca, *Commentariorum In Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros* (2 volumes), (Cologne, 1615; reprinted Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964), cited as *In Met.* Volume 1 contains Tomus I-II and has numbered columns; volume 2 contains Tomus III-IV, and has numbered pages.

(3) Timothy J. Cronin, *Objective Being in Descartes and in Suarez* (Roma: Gregorian University Press, 1966), p. 34

(4) Cronin suggests, pp. 32-33, that Fonseca's commentary was normally used in Jesuit schools.

(5) Useful background is provided by Peter Dear, *Mersenne and the Learning of the Schools* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988). However, Dear overemphasizes the influence of Ramist-style humanism on Fonseca's logic: see pp. 19-21. For an alternative assessment of Fonseca, see E. J. Ashworth, "Changes in Logic Textbooks from 1500 to 1650: The New Aristotelianism," *Aristotelismus und Renaissance: In Memoriam Charles B. Schmitt*, Eckhard Kessler, Charles H. Lohr and Walter Spam, eds. (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1988), pp. 82-84.

(6) Jean-Luc Marion, *Sur la théologie blanche de Descartes* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1981), devotes much of his book to the theme of Descartes's reaction to Suárez's doctrine of the analogy of being. In his discussion, he notes the relation between the analogy of being and objective concepts (e. g., p. 119), and he also mentions Fonseca briefly (p. 123). However, the nature and scope of our investigations is quite different.

(7) Descartes, *Replies* IV, AT VII 235. For discussion see Roger Ariew, "Descartes and scholasticism: the intellectual background to Descartes' thought," *The Cambridge Companion to Descartes*, John Cottingham, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 58-90, esp. p. 79.

(8) R. Dalbiez, "Les sources scolastiques de la théorie cartésienne de l'être objectif à propos du 'Descartes' de M. Gilson," *Revue d'histoire de la philosophie* 3 (1929), pp. 464-472.

(9) For Fonseca on God's ideas, including reference to formal and objective concepts, see *In Met.*, III, pp. 280b-296b, esp. 286a-288b (Lib. VII, cap. VIII, q. 2).

(10) Dalbiez, pp. 468-470.

(11) Cronin, p. 206, opts for Scotus and Suarez as Descartes's sources. One useful source is Gabriel Nuchelmans, *Judgment and Proposition from Descartes to Kant* (Amsterdam, Oxford, New York: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1983). He

- traces the early history of the phrases “esse obiective” and “conceptus obiectivus” in Hervaeus, Aureol, and Durandus, pp. 17-26. In discussing Descartes, he says (p. 41), “it remains difficult to single out any individual sources. His debt is of a very general nature and could have come from any work belonging to a certain climate of thought. There can be little doubt, however, that one of the main determinants of this climate was the objective-existence theory as it had been developed by such thinkers as Durandus and Aureolus.”
- (12) Norman J. Wells, “Objective Reality of Ideas in Descartes, Caterus, and Suarez,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 28 (1990), pp. 33-61, esp. pp. 49-50. See also Norman J. Wells, “Objective Being: Descartes and His Sources,” *The Modern Schoolman* 45 (1967), pp. 49-61; id., “Objective Reality of Ideas in Amauld, Descartes, and Suárez,” *The Great Amauld and Some of His Philosophical Correspondents*, Elmar J. Kremer, ed. (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 138-183.
- (13) Calvin Normore, “Meaning and Objective Being: Descartes and His Sources,” *Essays on Descartes’ “Meditations,”* Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, ed. (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1986), pp. 223-241, esp. p. 240.
5. ———. 1997. “L’analogie de l’être et les homonymes. *Catégories*, 1 dans la “*Guide de l’étudiant*”.” In *L’enseignement de la philosophie au XIII siècle. Autour du “Guide de l’étudiant” du ms. Ripoll 109. Actes du Colloque International*, edited by Lafleur, Claude and Carrier, Joanne, 281-295. Turnhout: Brepols.
- “C’est par trois définitions que s’ouvrent les *Catégories* d’Aristote (1). Dans la traduction d’Yvan Pelletier, Aristote écrit: «On dit homonymes les êtres dont le nom seul est commun, tandis que la définition de l’essence signifiée par ce nom est différente. Par exemple, l’animal, c’est à la fois l’homme et son image peinte [...]. Par ailleurs, on dit synonymes les êtres dont le nom est commun et pour lesquels, de plus, la définition de l’essence signifiée par ce nom est la même. Par exemple, l’animal, c’est aussi bien l’homme que le bœuf [...]. Enfin, on dit paronymes tous les êtres qui, tout en différant d’un autre par leur cas, reçoivent leur appellation d’après son nom. Ainsi dénomme-t-on, d’après la grammaire, le grammairien et, d’après le courage, le courageux » (2).
- Ces trois définitions courtes et sèches nous donnent un point de départ pour examiner les rapports entre la théorie des catégories et la théorie de l’analogie, ou plutôt les théories de l’analogie, chez les logiciens du XIIIe siècle. J’ai dit «les théories de l’analogie», parce qu’il y en a au moins deux. D’un côté, il y a l’analogie comme théorie du langage; d’un autre côté, il y a l’analogie comme théorie métaphysique des rapports hiérarchiques entre substance et accident, Dieu et créature. Dans son analyse approfondie des sources gréco-arabes de la théorie médiévale de l’analogie de l’être, Alain de Libéra parle de divers textes et problématiques, soit sémantiques, soit théologiques, qui sont à l’origine de cette théorie. Pourtant, en soulignant l’importance primordiale des textes aristotéliens, il dit: «La théorie médiévale de l’analogie de l’être est principalement issue de la rencontre de *Cat.*, I, 1, *Eth. Nic.*, 1, 4 et *Métaph.*, IV, 2», pour ajouter ensuite : « Avant cette synthèse, la notion d’analogie a été utilisée en dehors de toute préoccupation métaphysique, comme concept sémantique lié à l’interprétation des deux problèmes logiques standards de l’homonymie: l’élucidation de la distinction entre homonymes et synonymes dans *Cat.*, I, 1 ; l’analyse des mécanismes sémantiques de la *fallacia aequivocationis* dans *Ref. soph.*, 17» (3).
- De Libéra a raison quand il dit que l’on trouve l’analogie comme théorie du langage ou théorie sémantique dans les manuels de logique plutôt que l’analogie de l’être, et que, pour comprendre l’analogie de l’être, il faut faire tout particulièrement attention à la *Métaphysique* d’Aristote et à ses commentateurs arabes. Néanmoins, pour des raisons que j’essaierai d’expliquer dans ce travail, il y a des liens étroits entre les *Catégories* et l’étude de l’être comme tel, et il me semble que dans le «Guide de l’étudiant» et dans les autres sources contemporaines que j’ai examinées, nous trouvons la préhistoire de l’analogie de l’être, une préhistoire fondée sur une lecture strictement ontologique des *Catégories* d’Aristote. En même temps, étant donné les

problèmes causés par une telle lecture, on peut très facilement comprendre pourquoi les logiciens de la fin du XIII^e siècle et du début du XIV^e siècle préféraient, soit une interprétation linguistique, soit une interprétation conceptualiste des catégories elles-mêmes et des notions liées d'analogie et d'homonymie.

Les textes sur lesquels repose mon interprétation sont tout d'abord le «Guide de l'étudiant» et le *De communibus artium liberalium*, édités par Claude Lafleur avec la collaboration de Joanne Carrier (4). À part les commentaires sur les *Catégories* de Boèce et du Pseudo-Augustin (5), j'utilise le commentaire de Jean le Page, écrit entre 1231 et 1235, le commentaire de Robert Kilwardby, écrit vers 1240, et les *Tractatus* écrits entre 1230 et 1245 (6). Tous ces textes sont à peu près contemporains du «Guide de l'étudiant». En plus, j'utilise les *Summule dialectices* de Roger Bacon, écrites vers 1250, la *Summa* de Lambert de Lagny, dont la première rédaction date de 1250-1255, ainsi que le commentaire sur les *Catégories* d'Albert le Grand, écrit vers 1260 (7). Ces trois textes sont à peu près contemporains du *De communibus artium liberalium*. Enfin, pour donner une idée des développements doctrinaux dans la dernière partie du XIII^e siècle, je ferai référence aux commentaires de Pierre d'Auvergne, de l'Anonyme de Madrid, de Simon de Faversham et de Martin de Dacie, tous écrits entre 1270 et 1300 (8). Mon étude se divise en trois parties. En premier lieu, comme introduction à mon thème principal, je donnerai un bref aperçu de l'analogie dans les manuels de logique et dans les commentaires sur Aristote. Ensuite, je traiterai du sujet de la logique aristotélicienne en général et du sujet des *Catégories* en particulier. Mon but ici est de montrer l'importance de l'être, surtout dans le contexte de deux questions: y a-t-il une science unique des catégories, et quels sont les rapports entre la logique et la métaphysique ? Pour terminer, j'aborderai les rapports entre homonymes, synonymes et paronymes, interprétés comme des réalités et non pas comme des mots, dans le contexte de la question: pourquoi Aristote a-t-il placé les homonymes avant les synonymes et les paronymes?" (pp. 281-283)

(...)

"Avant de terminer, je voudrais examiner les paronymes de plus près. Rappelons la définition aristotélicienne: «on dit paronymes tous les êtres qui, tout en différant d'un autre par leur cas, reçoivent leur appellation d'après son nom». L'expression «par leur cas» («solo casu» en latin) suggère une variation de forme purement linguistique, mais l'auteur du «Guide de l'étudiant» réussit à trouver une interprétation ontologique. Il dit que «solo casu» veut dire «par une inclinaison ou une contraction ou une agrégation relative à un sujet» («inclinacione uel contractione uel concretionem ad subiectum», § 539), et on peut lier ce passage à celui dans la section sur la grammaire (§ 224) où il dit que le logicien s'occupe de la relation entre les accidents et la substance («logicus intendit de comparatione quam habent accidentia ad substantiam»). À première vue, Kilwardby semble donner une interprétation voisine de celle de notre auteur. Il dit que les termes dénominatifs signifient cum casu car ils signifient un accident en fonction de sa relation à un sujet, et que le mot principal signifie sine casu, c'est-à-dire sans une relation au sujet (61). Cependant, quand il nous offre ses précisions sur l'expression « sola cadencia ad materiam a principali» comme explication de «différant solo casu», il parle de la matière des *voces*. Roger Bacon nous offre trois interprétations de l'expression «solo casu», dont deux sont linguistiques (62). En premier lieu, le cas peut être une simple variation de forme, et on trouve cette interprétation chez Albert le Grand (63). En deuxième lieu, le cas peut être une variation de forme relevant de la dérivation lexicale, et ici il emploie l'expression «sola cadencia unius ab alio, sive formatione». On trouve cette interprétation chez Lambert de Lagny (64). En troisième lieu, le cas peut être la chute d'une forme vers la matière et le sujet, et ici il emploie l'expression «sola cadencia formae ad materiam et ad subiectum». Cette dernière interprétation est la plus proche de celle de notre auteur." (pp. 294-295)

Voilà donc un bref aperçu de la façon dont l'auteur du «Guide de l'étudiant» et ses contemporains traitent de la problématique de l'être dans le contexte des *Catégories*. Je suis persuadée qu'une étude plus approfondie et plus longue que la

mienne nous aidera à mieux comprendre l'apparition de l'analogie de l'être chez les philosophes et théologiens du XIIIe siècle.

(1) Aristote, *Catégories*, I (la 1-15).

(2) *Les Attributions (Catégories). Le texte aristotélicien et les prolégomènes d'Ammonios d'Hermeias*, présentés, traduits et annotés par Y. Pelletier, Montréal: Bellarmin/Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1983, p. 23 (Collection d'études anciennes publiée sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Budé. Collection Noësis publiée par le Laboratoire de recherches sur la pensée antique d'Ottawa).

(3) A. De Libera, Les sources gréco-arabes de la théorie médiévale de l'analogie de l'être, dans *Les études philosophiques* 3/4 (1989), p. 321.

(4) Cl. Lafleur, avec la collaboration de J. Carrier, *Le « Guide de l'étudiant » d'un maître anonyme de la Faculté des arts de Paris au XIIIe siècle. Édition critique provisoire du ms. Barcelona, Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó, Ripoll 109, fol. 134ra-158va*, Québec, 1992 (Publications du Laboratoire de philosophie ancienne et médiévale de la Faculté de philosophie de l'Université Laval, I): j'utilise ici cette prépublication dont la division du document en paragraphes demeurera inchangée dans l'édition révisée à paraître chez Brepols, dans la *Continuatio mediaevalis du Corpus Christianorum; Id., Un instrument de révision destiné aux candidats à la licence de la Faculté des arts de Paris, le «De communibus artium liberalium» (vers 1250?)*, dans *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 5, 3 (1994), pp. 129-203.

(5) Boèce, *In Categorias Aristotelis libri quatuor*, PL 64, col. 159-294. Pour les *Categoriae decem* du Pseudo-Augustin, longtemps attribuées à Augustin mais aujourd'hui éditées sous le titre de *Paraphrasis Themistianae*, voir *Categoriae vel Praedicamenta, translatio Boethii [...] Pseudo-Augustini Paraphrasis Themistianae*, éd. L. Minio-Paluello, Bruges-Paris, Desclée de Brouwer, 1961, pp. 133-175 (AL, I, 1-5).

(6) Pour Jean le Page, avec extraits de son texte, voir E. Franceschini, *Giovanni Pigo: le sue «Rationes super Predicamenta Aristotelis» e la loro posizione nel movimento aristotelico del secolo XIII*, dans *Sophia* 2 (1934), pp. 172-182, 329-350, 476-486. Pour une discussion de Robert Kilwardby avec une édition partielle (pp. 367-378) de ses *Notule super librum Predicamentorum*, voir P.O. Lewry, *Robert Kilwardby's Writings on the «Logica Vetus» Studied with Regard to Their Teaching and Method*, Oxford, 1978 (thèse inédite). Pierre d'Espagne (Petrus Hispanus Portugaliensis), *Tractatus Called afterwards Summule Logicales*, éd. L.M. De Rijk, Assen, Van Gorcum, 1972 (Philosophical Texts and Studies, XXII).

(7) Pour l'édition de l'ouvrage de Roger Bacon, voir A. de Libéra, *Les «Summulae dialectices» de Roger Bacon: I - II. De termino, De enuntiatione*, dans *AHDLMA* 53 (1986), pp. 139-289; Lambert d'Auxerre (= Lambert de Lagny), *Logica (Summa Lamberti)*, éd. Fr. Alessio, Firenze, La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1971; Albert Le Grand, *Liber de praedicamentis*, dans *B. Alberti Magni, Ratisbonensis episcopi, Ordinis Praedicatorum, Opera omnia*, éd. A. Borgnet, Paris, Vivès, 1890, t. I, pp. 149-304.

(8) Pour Pierre D'Auvergne, voir R. Andrews, *Petrus de Alvernia, « Quaestiones super Praedicamentis »: An Edition*, dans *CIMAGL* 55 (1987), pp. 3-84; Martin de Dacie, *Quaestiones super librum Praedicatorum*, dans *Martini de Dacia Opera*, éd. H. Roos, Hauniae, Gad, 1961, pp. 153-231 (Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi, II); Simon de Faversham, *Quaestiones super libro Praedicatorum*, dans *Magistri Simonis Anglici sive de Faverisham Opera omnia, volumen primum: Opera logica*, t. Ior, éd. P. Mazarella, Padova, CEDAM, 1957, pp. 69-148 ; pour ΓAnonyme de Madrid voir R. Andrews, *Anonymus Matritensis, « Quaestiones super librum Praedicatorum »: An Edition*, dans *CIMAGL* 56 (1988), pp. 117-192.

(61) Robert Kilwardby, *Notule super librum Predicamentorum*, éd. Lewry, pp. 376-377. Cf. Pierre d'Espagne, *Tractatus, III*, 1, éd. De Rijk, p. 27,1. 3-4: «Differunt solo casu, idest sola cadentia que est a parte rei [...]».

(62) Roger Bacon, *Summule dialectices*, 1,2, éd. De Libera, pp. 190-191.

- (63) Albert le Grand, *Liber de praedicamentis*, tract. I, cap. 4, éd. Borgnet, p. 158a: «Et quod subdicatur solo casu differentia, dicitur hic casus quaecumque inflexio nominis secundum finem nominis sive dictionis».
- (64) Lambert d'Auxerre (Lambert de Lagny), *Logica*, III (*De predicamentis*), éd. Alessio, p. 64: «Differant enim solo casu, id est sola cadentia, quia unum cadit ab alio, id est derivatur, ut a grammatica grammaticus et sic de aliis». Cf. *Ibid.*, III (*De predicamentis*), p. 66.
6. ———. 1998. "Analogy and Equivocation in Thomas Sutton O.P." In *Vestigia, Imagines, Verba. Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (XIIIth-XIVth Century)*. *Acts of the XIth Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics*. San Marino, 24-28 May 1994, edited by Marmo, Costantino, 289-303. Turnhout: Brepols.
- "One of the most obvious places where theology and logic meet is in the discussion of the divine names. From the 1240s on, the standard way for theologians to handle the problem of religious language involved an appeal to the theory of analogy, (1) a theory which was worked out in the logic textbooks in the context of equivocal and univocal terms (cfr. Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic. Aquinas in Context", *Mediaeval Studies* 54, 1992, pp. 94-135). The problem of religious language can be put roughly like this. Words such as 'good', 'just', and 'wise' do not seem to have exactly the same sense when used of God as they do when used of human beings. That is, they are not univocal. On the other hand, they cannot be used with a completely different sense if religious discourse is to have any point. That is, they cannot be equivocal. If they are neither univocal nor equivocal, they must be used with some related sense, that is, analogically. But what is the appropriate model for analogical usage? If the model is that of the word *sanum* (healthy), which can be applied in an extended sense to a diet on the grounds that the diet is causally related to the animal which is called healthy in the primary sense, then we have what Cajetan later called the analogy of attribution. (2) On the other hand, if the model is that of the word *principium* (principle), which is applied both to a point and to a source on the grounds that the source is related to a river in the way that a point is related to a line, we have what Cajetan later called the analogy of proportionality. The first type of analogy, the analogy of attribution, involves just one relationship whereas the second type, the analogy of proportionality, involves a comparison between two relationships. As is well known, Thomas Aquinas appealed to the analogy of proportionality in *De veritate* q. 2, a. 11, but more usually appealed to the analogy of attribution. Cajetan, on the other hand, claimed that the analogy of proportionality was the only true analogy, and that it should be employed in metaphysics and theology.
- Thomas Sutton, an Oxford Dominican who lived from about 1250 to 1315 or 1320, has attracted some attention because he employed the analogy of proportionality in his *Quaestiones ordinariae*, written in the first decade of the fourteenth century. (3) Insofar as he did so, he was described by Montagnes (1963, p. 124) as a precursor of Cajetan who moved away from Aquinas. Schneider (1977), in his introduction to the *Quaestiones* tried to modify Montagnes's judgment, by suggesting that there was no real break with Aquinas; (4) but none of those who have discussed Sutton in the literature have done other than suggest that he appealed to analogy of proportionality to resolve problems of linguistic use, whereas the analogy of attribution had to do with those relations of things that ground our language. In an early article on Sutton, Przedziecki (1959) presented Question 32 as showing that *ens* is an analogical term, but turned to Question 33's account of proportionality for an explanation of what type of analogy was involved, completely ignoring the discussion of attribution in the earlier question. (5) In a recent book, Riva (1989) noted the presence of the two types of analogy in Sutton's work, but argued that the tension between them is resolved by the distinction between words and things. (6) He claims that for Sutton proportionality has to do with terms, while attribution concerns the relations among things on which talk about proportionality is based.

In this paper I intend to look at the details of Sutton's theory of analogy in relation both to the authors with whom he is debating, and to the basic logical distinctions he employed. In the first section I shall give a brief outline of what the logicians had to say. In the second section I shall discuss the word *ens*, beginning with three views that Sutton rejected before going on to examine his own views about *ens* in metaphysics in theology. In the final section, I shall consider Sutton's discussion of the divine names proper, namely perfection words such as 'good', 'wise' and 'just'. I shall show that although Sutton appeals to proportionality in this last case, he uses the analogy of attribution in his discussion of how the word *ens* is applied to substance and accident. Moreover, he is just as much concerned with language in the one case as he is in the other. As a result his overall view is a lot more flexible than Cajetan's." (pp. 289-290)

(...)

"Despite Montagnes's description of Sutton as a precursor of Cajetan, I think that he is in many ways quite different. While holding that the analogy of proportionality is analogy in the strictest sense, he makes no attempt to apply it to metaphysical problems in general or to link it with the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic denomination. The real importance of the distinction between the analogy of attribution and the analogy of proportion is not that one is in fact linguistically more proper than the other; nor is it that one deals with intrinsic denomination whereas the other deals with extrinsic denomination, for both involve at least some cases of intrinsic denomination. Rather, the real importance of the distinction has to do with the areas of discourse in which the two types of analogy function. The analogy of attribution works at the level of (non-theological) metaphysics and the discussion of created beings; the analogy of proportionality is necessary in theology given the doctrine that an infinite God creates beings which, while finite and infinitely distant from their creator, nonetheless participate in his being and goodness, imitating him as far as they are able." (p. 298)

(1) See, e.g., Alexander of Hales, *Summa theologica*, 4 vols, Ad Claras Aquas (Quaracchi), Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1924-1948, I, p. 544b: "nomina [...] ut iustus, bonus et huiusmodi, non dicuntur aequivoce nec univoce, quia non penitus secundum aliam rationem nec tamen secundum eandem, sed dicuntur analogice secundum prius et posterius". (This passage is continued in note 31.)

(2) For Cajetan, whose *De nominum analogia* was published in 1498, see Bruno Pinchard, *Métaphysique et sémantique. Autour de Cajetan*, Etude [texte] et traduction du "De nominum analogia", Paris, Vrin, 1987.

(3) For recent references concerning Sutton's life and works, see Alessandro D. Conti, "La composizione metafisica dell'ente finito corporeo nell'ontologia di Sutton", *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale* 2/2, 1991, pp. 317-60 (317-18, note 1). It should be noted that Sutton does not use the word *proportionalitas*, but speaks of *aequivoca secundum proportionem*, see, e.g., p. 918.247.

(4) Cf. Johannes Schneider, "Introduction", in Thomas Sutton, *Quaestiones ordinariae*, Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften 1977, pp. 241*-262*, especially pp. 257*-258* and p. 261*.

(5) Przewdziecki, Thomas of Sutton's critique on the doctrine of univocity", in *An Etienne Gilson tribute*, ed. C. J. O'Neil, Milwaukee, Marquette University Press 1959, pp. 189-208. In this article, Schneider's Question 32 A is referred to as Question 33 and Schneider's Question 33 is referred to as Question 34.

7. ———. 1998. "Aquinas on Significant Utterance: Interjection, Blasphemy, Prayer." In *Aquinas's Moral Theory: Essays in Honor of Norman Kretzmann*, edited by MacDonald, Scott and Stump, Eleonore, 207-234. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. "It may seem perverse to turn to Aquinas's moral philosophy for light on his philosophy of language, but I argue that his study of human actions forced him to modify the intellectualism prevalent in much thirteenth-century logic and grammar. This intellectualism had three components. First, it privileged the notion of language as a rational, rule-governed system which could be studied in isolation

from context and speaker intention.(2) Second, it focused on propositions as the linguistic units which conveyed the information necessary for *scientia* and rejected other forms of discourse as irrelevant. Third, it described individual words as the signs of concepts and ignored utterances which express passions of one sort and another. These components, particularly the second and third, do indeed characterize Aquinas's considered approach to language as expressed particularly in his commentary on Aristotle's *De interpretatione*. Nonetheless, his recognition that human beings are animals with passions, together with his recognition that utterances are themselves a kind of action subject to moral assessment, forced him to take a different direction in other places.(3)

I proceed as follows. In sections 1 and 2, I set forth the intellectualist components of Aquinas's theory, paying particular attention to the manifestation of truth and to the senses in which conventionally significant utterances could also be said to be naturally significant. In sections 3, 4, and 5, I explore the relationships between animal noises and human utterances, paying particular attention to the role of the imagination and to interjections. In sections 6 and 7, I consider the role of human passions and human intentions in the understanding and production of conventional utterances, especially sinful ones. In sections 8 and 9, I look at two aspects of language production which can serve to mitigate sin: slips of the tongue, and linguistic incontinence, or breaking out into ill-considered words. In the last section, I turn to the situation in which we recite and appropriate the words of others, particularly in prayer. Throughout, I examine not only Aquinas's own doctrines but also those of grammarians and logicians contemporary with him." (pp. 207-208)

(2) For discussion of this approach in the *modistae*, and for full information about grammarians who adopted an alternative approach, which she has dubbed intentionalist because of its focus on the *intentio proferentis*, see the papers by Irène Rosier cited throughout, all of which contain further references. See esp. Irène Rosier. "La distinction entre *actus exercitus* et *actus significatus* dans les sophismes grammaticaux du MS BN lat. 16618 et autres textes apparentés," in *Medieval Logic and Grammar*, ed. Stephen Read (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992}, pp. 257-59; and her book (published after this paper was written), *La parole comme acte: Sur la grammaire et la sémantique au xiii^e siècle* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1994).

Rosier's work is particularly important for its demonstration that the modistic paradigm does not apply to much thirteenth-century grammar. I would like to take this opportunity of thanking Irène Rosier for the generous way in which she has shared her as yet unpublished research with me; this e&sav owes much to her work.

(3) Rosier has shown that in his discussion of the sacraments Aquinas was far closer to the intentionalist grammarians than he was to the *modistae*. See Irène Rosier, "Signes et sacrements: Thomas d'Aquin et la grammaire spéculative", *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 74 (1990): 431-32. She writes (p. 394): "Les particularités linguistiques des formules sacramentaires, et du sacrement comme signe non seulement cognitif, mais opératif, l'importance accordée à l'intention du locuteur et du récepteur, la conjonction de ces divers éléments dans un acte à chaque fois singulier, nous situent d'emblée dans la dimension 'pragmatique' du langage, développée, à la même époque, en ce milieu du XIII^e siècle, par les grammairiens 'intentionalistes.'" Both here and later (p. 433) she speaks of the encounter between grammarians and theologians, but she refuses to speculate about whose influence was primary (pp. 432-33).

8. ———. 1998. "Antonius Rubius on Objective Being and Analogy: One of the Routes from Early Fourteenth-Century Discussions to Descartes's *Third Meditation*." In *Meetings of the Minds. The Relation between Medieval and Classical Modern European Philosophy*, edited by Brown, Stephen F., 43-62. Turnhout: Brepols.

"In this paper I shall use Rubius's tract on analogy to show how a rich medieval tradition survived into the seventeenth century and to shed some light on the problem of Descartes's sources for the notion of an idea's objective reality. I shall proceed as follows. First, I shall state the problem as it has been set out in recent

- secondary literature. Second, I shall trace the distinction between formal and objective concepts from the early fourteenth century to the early seventeenth century in the context of the discussion of analogical terms. Third, I shall examine the analogical use of terms as it was presented by Rubius. Fourth, I shall explain why a theory of language use and a theory of concepts came to be linked together. Finally, I shall discuss what Rubius had to say about formal and objective concepts, and I shall suggest a relationship between this account and Descartes's own attitude towards mental contents and simple natures."
9. ———. 1999. "Text-Books: A Case Study - Logic." In *The Cambridge History of the Book in Britain (vol. 3)*, edited by Trapp, Joseph Burney and Hellinga, Lotte, 380-386. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- "This book covers the years 1400 to 1557. In such a long period, we would expect great changes in the logic text-books used at Oxford and Cambridge. Indeed, there were great changes, but their timing is some what unexpected. If one considers just books written by Englishmen and copied or printed in England, then there is hardly any change at all between 1400 and 1530, the year in which the last surviving edition of the compilation text-book known as *Libellus Sophistarum* was printed. A period of fifteen years follows in which no surviving logic text was either written or printed, and then suddenly in 1545 we are confronted with the *Dialectica* of John Seton, a work which was to go through fourteen editions by the end of the sixteenth century, and which represents a completely different type of logic.(1) In what follows, I shall focus on the *fortuna* of just one type of logic text in use between 1400 and 1530, namely the treatises devoted to *obligationes*, or the rules prescribing what one was obliged to accept and reject in a certain kind of logical disputation.
- It is necessary first to consider the place of logic in the curriculum and the type of instruction which was offered, then to say something about fourteenth-century logicians and the *obligationes* texts used in the fifteenth century, and finally to examine the *Libelli Sophistarum* and other early printed texts in relation to fifteenth-century manuscript collections." (p. 380)
- (1) A useful chronological list of logic books printed in England before 1620 is in Schmitt 1983b [*John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England*, Kingston and Montreal] pp. 225-9. For English logic during the sixteenth century: Ashworth 1985b [*Introduction* to Robert Sanderson. *Logicae artis compendium*, Bologna], especially pp. XXIII-XXXIII; 1991; Giard 1985 [La production logique de l'Angleterre au 16e siècle, *Les Études philosophiques*, 3, 303-324]; Jardine 1974 [The place of dialectic teaching in sixteenth century Cambridge, *Studies in the Renaissance*, 21, 31-62]. No attention should be paid to Howell 1956 [*Logic and rhetoric in England, 1500-1700*, Princeton] whose account of developments in logic, particularly during the medieval period, is wildly inaccurate, and this vitiates his judgements about the texts described.
10. ———. 2000. "Domingo de Soto on *Obligationes*: His Use of *Dubie positio*." In *Medieval and Renaissance Logic in Spain. Acts of the 12th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics*, edited by Angelelli, Ignacio and Perez-Illzarbe, Paloma, 291-307. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
- "Soto's *Opusculum obligationum* was published in 1529 as the last treatise in his *Summulae*. (1) I have chosen to discuss it in this paper both because it is one of the very last serious discussions of the medieval doctrine of *obligationes*, and because it sheds some light on the history of *dubie positio* as a type of obligational dispute. This is important, because *dubie positio* is one of the areas pertinent to medieval epistemic logic, and the material found in *obligationes* treatises has not yet been the subject of much investigation. (2) In what follows, I shall first discuss the nature of *dubie positio* and its relation to other types of obligational disputation. I shall then describe the rules which were used. Third, I shall take up a particular problem concerning apparently indubitable propositions, such as 'I exist'. Finally, I shall discuss a sophisma in which the response 'I am in doubt about it' seemed to cause problems for one of the standard obligational rules.

(1) Domingo de Soto, *Opusculum obligationum in Summulae* (Burgos, 1529), ff. cl ra-cliii vb; Domingo de Soto, *De obligationibus in Summulae* (Salamanca 1554-1555: reprinted Hildesheim, New York: Georg Olms, 1980), ff 156 ra-159 vb. The latter is a reproduction of the third edition which, as Dr. Angel d'Ors has shown, modifies the second edition in certain respects: see Angel d'Ors, "Las "Summulae" de Domingo de Soto", *Anuario Filosófico (Universidad de Navarra)* 16 (1983), p. 212. All my references are to the 1529 edition unless otherwise specified.

(2) For a good discussion of some other sources, see Ivan Boh, *Epistemic Logic in the Later Middle Ages*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1993). See also William Heytesbury, 'The Compounded and Divided Senses' (pp. 413-434), and "The Verbs 'Know' and 'Doubt'" [chapter 2 of the *Regulae*] (pp. 435-479) in Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump, trans., *Logic and the Philosophy of Language*, vol. 1 of *The Cambridge Translations of Medieval Philosophical Texts*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988)."

11. ———. 2003. "L'équivocité, l'univocité et les noms propres." In *La tradition médiévale des catégories (XIIe-XVe siècles). Actes du XIII Symposium européen de logique et de sémantique médiévales (Avignon, 6-10 juin 2000)*, edited by Biard, Joël and Rosier-Catach, Irène, 127-140. Louvain: Peeters Publishers.

"Dans ses *Quaestiones in artem veterem*, Albert de Saxe commence la section consacrée aux *Catégories* d'Aristote en posant la question « Est-ce que le même terme peut être équivoque et univoque ? » (1). Un peu plus tard, Marsile d'Inghen reprend cette question, légèrement reformulée, dans ses propres *Questiones libri predicamentorum* (2); et en 1428, Paul de Venise consacre une partie de son *Commentaire sur les Catégories* à la même question (3). De plus, on retrouve une discussion approfondie des rapports entre les équivoques et les univoques dans le *Compendium totius logice Joannis Buridani* de Jean Dorp, qui date probablement de la dernière décennie du xive siècle (4). Certes, la question posée par Albert de Saxe n'était pas nouvelle, ayant son origine dans les commentaires de Boèce et de Simplicius, mais les réponses à cette question introduisent deux thèmes nouveaux, l'univocité des noms propres, et l'équivocité des termes mentaux. Ces deux thèmes sont importants, étant donné que depuis l'Antiquité classique le nom propre est l'exemple standard d'un mot équivoque par hasard (*a casu*), et étant donné la présupposition que le langage mental est un langage clair, donc univoque.

Mon étude se divise en trois parties. En premier lieu, je donnerai un bref aperçu de la doctrine des noms propres, telle qu'on la retrouve chez les grammairiens et les logiciens. Ensuite, je ferai quelques remarques sur les définitions avec lesquelles s'ouvrent les *Catégories* d'Aristote. Finalement, j'aborderai la question principale, celle des rapports entre les équivoques et les univoques, surtout en ce qui concerne les noms propres et les termes mentaux.

Avant d'aller plus loin, je dois préciser que je vais laisser de côté la question, pourtant très intéressante, de l'équivocité du nom propre appliqué au vivant et au mort. Je me concentrerai sur le cas que l'on trouve dans les premières sections des commentaires sur les *Catégories*, celui d'un nom propre appliqué à deux personnes différentes." (pp. 127-128)

(...)

"Conclusion.

Les discussions que nous venons d'examiner montrent comment les logiciens du XIVe et XVe siècles ont essayé de concilier les catégories du nom offertes par Aristote, c'est-à-dire les noms équivoques et les noms univoques, avec les catégories du nom offerts par Priscien, c'est-à-dire les noms propres et les noms communs. En même temps, elles montrent comment les commentateurs des *Catégories* d'Aristote ont absorbé la nouvelle épistémologie qui reconnaissait les concepts singuliers et la nouvelle sémantique qui utilisait la terminologie de la grammaire et celle de la logique pour parler de ces concepts." (p. 140)

(1) Albert de Saxe, *Quaestiones in Artem Veterem*, éd. et trad. esp. A. Munoz Garcia, Maracaibo, 1988, p. 292. Pour plus d'informations sur l'équivocité et l'univocité, voir E.J. Ashworth, « 'Nulla propositio est distinguenda' : la notion

- d'equivocatio chez Albert de Saxe » dans Joël Biard (éd.), *Itinéraires d'Albert de Saxe: Paris-Vienne au XIV siècle*, Paris, 1991, pp. 149-160 ; et E.J. Ashworth, « Equivocation and Analogy in Fourteenth Century Logic : Ockham, Burley and Buridan », dans Burkhard Mojsisch et Olaf Pluta (éds.), *Historia philosophiae medii aevi: Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, Philadelphia, Amsterdam, 1991, vol. 1, pp. 23-43.
- (2) Marsile d'Inghen, *Questiones libri predicamentorum Aristotelis*, Bodleian Library, Oxford: MS Canon, misc. 381, fos 16 ra-17 ra et fo 8 rb-va.
- (3) Paul de Venise, *In Praedicamenta*, Bodleian Library, Oxford: MS Canon, misc. 452, f°s 81va-83vb, et MS Canon. Lat. Class. 286, fos 68ra-70vb. Je cite le premier manuscrit dans ce qui suit.
- (4) Jean Dorp, tract. III, *De predicamentis*, dans *Johannes Buridanus, Compendium totius Logicae*, Venise, 1499 ; repr. Frankfurt/Main, 1965, sign, e 5 vb - sign, e 6 ra. Pour plus d'informations sur Jean Dorp, voir E. P. Bos, « Die Rezeption der Suppositiones des Marsilius von Inghen in Paris (Johannes Dorp) und Prag (ein anonymes Sophistria-Traktat) um 1400 », dans M.J.F.M. Hoenen et P.J.J.M. Bakker (éds.), *Philosophie und Theologie des ausgehenden Mittelalters. Marsilius von Inghen und das Denken seiner Zeit*, Leiden-Boston-Köln, 2000, pp. 213-230.
12. ———. 2003. "Language and Logic." In *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy*, edited by McGrade, Arthur Stephen, 73-96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"I survey the texts used and the developments from Augustine onwards, and discuss views of the purpose and nature of language and logic, emphasizing their cognitive orientation. I examine the basic semantic notion of signification, the distinction between conventional and natural language, and the notion of mental language. I discuss extended uses of language, especially paronymy and analogy, and theories of reference, especially supposition theory. Finally, I consider various types of paradox: "There is no truth" in proofs for the existence of God, the Liar paradox, and the paradoxes of strict implication as treated in theories of inference."
13. ———. 2004. "Singular Terms and Singular Concepts: From Buridan to the Early Sixteenth Century." In *John Buridan and Beyond. Topics in the Language Sciences 1300-1700*, edited by Ebbesen, Sten and Friedman, Russell L., 121-151. Copenhagen: C. A. Reitzel.
"This article considers medieval treatments of proper names and demonstrative phrases in relation to the question of when and how we are able to form singular concepts. The logical and grammatical background provided by the authoritative texts of Porphyry and Priscian is examined, but the main focus is on John Buridan and his successors at Paris, from John Dorp to Domingo de Soto. Buridan is linked to contemporary philosophers of language through his suggestion that, although the name 'Aristotle' is a genuine proper name only for those who have the appropriate singular concept caused by acquaintance with Aristotle, it can be properly treated as a singular term by subsequent users because of their beliefs about the original imposition of the name."
14. ———. 2004. "Singular Terms and Predication in some Late Fifteenth and Sixteenth Century Thomistic Logicians." In *Medieval Theories on Assertive and Non-Assertive Language: Acts of the 14th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics. Rome, June 11-15, 2002*, edited by Maierù, Alfonso and Valente, Luisa, 517-536. Florence: Olschki.
"In an influential paper, Frege made a sharp distinction between the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of predication. He wrote «The concept (as I understand the word) is predicative. On the other hand, a name of an object, a proper name, is quite incapable of being used as a grammatical predicate. This admittedly needs elucidation, otherwise it might appear false. Surely one can just as well assert of a thing that it is Alexander the Great, or is the number four, or is the planet Venus, as that it is green or is a mammal? If anybody thinks this, he is not distinguishing the usages of the word 'is'».(1)

(...)

"It is very tempting to apply Fregean distinctions to medieval discussions, and Hermann Weidemann for one suggests that this is justifiable. He cites Aquinas's use of «*praedicatio per identitatem*» to support the claim that «Aquinas is well aware of the difference between the 'is' of predication and the 'is' of identity(2) and he reads the distinction into a passage from the *Summa theologiae* (*ST* Ia.13.12c) when he writes: «That is to say to make explicit what Aquinas seems to be implying - that, just as the *predicative statement* that Socrates is white states the inherence in Socrates of the property of whiteness as the identity of Socrates with something while, the *identity statement* that Socrates is Socrates states the identity of Socrates with himself as the inherence in Socrates of the property of being Socrates».(3) We should note that there are two issues here. The first is whether one can distinguish an 'is' of identity from an 'is' of predication. The second has to do with the identity and inherence interpretations of statements containing the so-called 'is' of predication. Is it the case that a predication is true if and only if the referents of subject and predicate are identical, or is it the case that a predication is true if and only if the form signified by the predicate inheres in the subject? Weidemann's remarks draw our attention to an important feature of medieval discussions, namely the various ways in which questions of reference and questions of predication were brought together. Just as medieval logicians did not make a sharp, once and for all, distinction between the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of predication, or between subjects and predicates, so Thomists at least did not make a sharp distinction between identity and inherence interpretations of statements containing the 'is' of predication.

In this paper I shall attempt to show how some medieval authors approached these issues by considering some Thomistic views about the predication of proper names and by exploring various uses of the phrases '*praedicatio per identitatem*' and '*praedicatio identica*'. The two authors that I shall focus on are Thomas de Vio, Cardinal Cajetan (1468-1534), whose commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's *Categories* were written by 1498 but not published until 1506, and Domingo de Soto (1494-1560), whose commentaries on the same two works were first published in 1543. I shall also make some use of commentaries by the later Jesuit author, Francisco de Toledo (1533-1596). My paper has five sections. I shall begin by considering the authoritative texts that caused the debate about whether proper names and perhaps individual things themselves can be predicated. Next, I shall consider some non-Thomistic solutions to the problem. Third, I shall make some remarks about the Thomistic theory of predication in relation to the central case of true, affirmative, present-tense, unquantified propositions whose subject terms are not intended to be taken with either simple or material supposition. Fourth, I shall explore the notion of «*praedicatio per identitatem*». Finally, I shall consider the distinctions made by Cajetan and Soto." (pp. 516-519, some notes omitted)

(1) G. Frege, *On Concept and Object*, [1892] in *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, ed P. Geach ad M. Black, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1960, p. 42-55: 43.

(2) H. Weidemann, *The Logic of Being in Thomas Aquinas*, in *The Logic of Being: Historical Studies*, ed. S. Knuuttila and J. Hintikka, Dordrecht, Reidel, 1986, p. 181-200:183.

(3) Weidemann, *The Logic of Being* cit., p. 188 [emphasis added].

15. ———. 2005. "Ockham et la distinction entre les termes abstraits et concrets." *Philosophiques* no. 32:427-434.

"Quand j'ai lu l'ouvrage magistral de Claude Panaccio (*), je me suis rendu compte que j'aurais de la difficulté à en discuter, parce que je suis d'accord avec tout ce dit l'auteur, surtout en ce qui concerne les problèmes du langage. Je trouve en particulier décisif les arguments qu'il présente contre les thèses de Paul Spade. Ce dernier a argumenté, en se basant sur trois prémisses, qu'il n'y a pas de terme connotatif simple dans le langage mental. Premièrement, chaque terme connotatif a

une définition nominale qui, en principe, ne contient que des termes absolus. Deuxièmement, un terme connotatif est synonyme de sa définition. Troisièmement, il n'y a pas de synonymie dans le langage mental. Il s'ensuit que, dans le langage mental, un terme connotatif sera remplacé par une séquence de termes absolus qui, selon Ockham, réfèrent aux substances et qualités individuelles d'une manière directe. En opposition à Spade, Panaccio a montré qu'il est impossible d'éliminer les concepts connotatifs simples du langage mental et que les termes connotatifs simples ne sont pas synonymes de leurs définitions nominales. Il est vrai que par ses analyses du langage Ockham voulait montrer que l'on pouvait parler du monde sans multiplier les entités, mais on peut atteindre cet objectif tout en admettant une certaine complexité au niveau des concepts simples. En outre, Panaccio a établi deux thèses importantes. D'abord, Ockham ne s'intéresse pas à la construction d'un langage mental idéal mais plutôt au fonctionnement idéal de notre esprit. En deuxième lieu, l'étude de ce fonctionnement idéal ne nous donne pas toutes les solutions aux problèmes de signification parce que, pour comprendre l'acception des termes, il faut connaître les intentions des impositors, ceux qui ont donné leur signification primordiale aux termes oraux. Selon Panaccio, Ockham présente une théorie externaliste de la signification du langage." (p. 427)

(*) *Ockham on Concepts*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004.