

History of Logic from Aristotle to Gödel (www.historyoflogic.com)

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Selected Bibliography of English Studies on Abelard's Logic and Ontology. Fourth Part: Rij - Z

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Bibliography

1. Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1980. "The Semantical Impact of Abailard's Solution of the Problem of Universals." In *Petrus Abaelardus (1079-1142). Person, Werk und Wirkung*, edited by Thomas, Rudolf, 139–151. Trier: Paulinus-Verlag.
Reprinted as chapter III in: L. M. de Rijk, *Through Language to Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics*, Edited by Bos Egbert, Northampton: Variorum Reprints, 1989.
"It is most unfortunate that as late as in the second edition of his *Theory of Universals* Richard Aaron has based his rather unfavourable view on Peter Abailard's contribution to the solution of the problem of universals on the older work of our famous logician only, viz. the *Logica Ingredientibus*. As is known, the French Master's most mature solution is found in the *Logica Nostrorum petitioni* (LNP) (*).
In this work (LNP 522, 10 ff.) Abailard attributes the commonness of common nouns neither to extramental things nor to words (voces), rather he states that it is significant word (sermo), that is either singular or universal. He finds much support in Aristotle's definition of the universal: 'a universal is that which is by its nature predicated of a number of things.' (**) Abailard lays much stress on the nature of the formation of sermones, which to his mind is a human establishment (hominum institutio), unlike the formation of extramental things and that of words taken as

articulated sounds, which are creations of nature. His solution is entirely focused on his explicit distinction between the material identity of vox and sermo as opposed to their formal diversity ('non-identity').

There is, he says, a clear formal distinction between 'being predicable of many,' or: 'predicability' and 'that which is predicable of many'. It is predicability that must belong to a vox for it to be a universal; just being something that is predicable of many is not enough.

Well, Abailard makes every effort to explain the formal difference between vox (word, i. e. articulated sound) and sermo (significant word), which should be put beside their material identity. The distinction is so important to him that we need not wonder that throughout the whole discussion Abailard makes use of his best weapon, his incomparable skill in the field of linguistic (or rather: semantic) analysis." (p. 139)

(*) Richard I. Aron, *The theory of Universals*, Oxford, 1967 (2nd ed.), p. 13.(...)

(**) *De interpretatione* 7, 17a 39-40.

2. ———. 1981. "Abailard's Semantic Views in the Light of Later Developments." In *English Logic and Semantics: From the End of the 12th Century to the Time of Ockham and Burleigh*, edited by Braakhuis, Henk A.G., Kneepkens, Corneille Henri and Rijk, Lambertus Marie de, 1–58. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.

Reprinted as chapter VI in: L. M. de Rijk, *Through Language to Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics*, Edited by Bos Egbert, Northampton: Variorum Reprints 1989.

"1. Semantics in Abailard's solution of the problem of universals. Abailard's attempt at solving the problem of universals may be characterized as a remarkable achievement in the field of semantics. The procedure of this solution found in his mature work, the *Glosses on Porphyry* (*) can be divided into two stages: first, the extensive discussion of the formal distinction between vox and sermo, the semantic analysis of the intensional act of intellection." (p. 1)

(*) *Logica nostrorum petitioni*, ed. Geyer (Münster 1933), pp. 505-533 (henceforth quoted as L.N.P.)

"Finally, I will briefly sum up some of the important items of Mediaeval semantics which may be fitted into the frame-work of what I have labeled the 'semantic stratification of appellative names'.

First. There is the distinction of *esse actuate* and *esse habituate* as adhered to by many 13th century authors but energetically rejected by Roger Bacon, whereas William of Sherwood turns out to stand somewhere half-way between Roger and the majority. The point at issue is the significative force of an appellative noun.

Whereas others commonly accepted a name's referring to an *esse habituale* (that is, being common to present, preterite and future being and even to what actually is and what actually is not), Roger most strictly held that even in such metaphysical propositions as '*omnis homo de necessitate est animal*' the subject term can only refer to actually existing things (therefore they are all false on Roger's view).

William, though admitting the distinction between *esse actuale* and *esse habituale*, regarded such propositions as equivocal. This reminds us of William's view that a name's meaning is determined by the language - users rather than by speech itself (*Synecat.*, 52, 25 - 26). The pivotal point of this controversy seems to be the different application of our *F.R.* On Roger's view, for instance, the determination '*de necessitate*' in propositions such as '*omnis homo de necessitate est animal*' is unable to strip an appellative noun of its primary function, of signifying only existing things, whereas his opponents are apparently of the opinion that that phrase compels the noun to withdraw to its second semantic level of designating just an *esse habituale*, with the result that the proposition is true.

Secondly, the problems concerning verbs expressing a mental attitude may be looked at from the same point of view. To quote Abailard (L.N.P. 531, 9 - 13; cfr. also above, pp. 4 - 5): When it is said: "I want a hood (*desidero cappam*); well, every hood is *this* or *that* hood", yet it does not follow that I want *this* or *that* hood. If, however, one would say as follows: "I want a hood; well, every one who wants a

hood is wanting this or that hood; (therefore I am wanting *this* or *that* hood) ", then, indeed, the argument would go on correctly.

However, the assumption would be false, then. This much is certain, Abailard rejects that in '*I want a hood*' and '*every hood is this hood or that hood*' the term '*hood*' has the same signification. As a matter of fact the term '*hood*' in the former proposition, unlike that in the latter proposition, does not designate a hood actually existing, (except in case, I have some particular hood in mind, of course). So we have to conclude that the verb '*desidero*' governing the object '*cappam*' precludes us from taking it for an actually existing hood and compels us to understand it in the second-level-meaning of '*a concrete, particular, hood*', whether or not actually existing." (pp. 50-51)

No doubt, it is Abailard who initiated many developments in Mediaeval semantics. So I have considered it useful to draw the attention to the achievements of this great master in the field of logic, since 'the logic before Ockham' cannot be properly understood unless Abailard is recognized as the man who stood, in many respects, at the cradle of fourteenth century logic." (p. 52)

3. ———. 1985. "Martin M. Tweedale on Abailard: Some Criticisms of a Fascinating Venture." *Vivarium* no. 23:81–97.

"Mr. Tweedale's study is bound to give any of his readers the firm impression that, as logician, Peter Abailard has accomplished a tremendous achievement.

Unfortunately, however, Tweedale, (...) is on the wrong track in claiming-throughout his study that the modern interpreter has to 'ferret' Abailard's answers out of 'rather obscure passages' (p. 7), and that he is inconsistent (p. X and *passim*). Tweedale has failed to appreciate Abailard's lucidity and clear language. He has missed the point several times and more than once this is due to his defective knowledge of Latin.

However, let me not move too hurriedly to my conclusion.

In writing this book, the author had two main objectives in mind, as we learn from the *Preface*. First, 'to present in a form easily accessible to professional philosophers, theologians and historians those scattered portions of Abailard's logical writings which seem to record a very original scrutiny of the foundations of logic and in particular the problem of universals'. Secondly, 'to interpret the texts in a way that would connect them with the ancient tradition and also make them intelligible to contemporary philosophers.' So chapters I and II try to give an insight into the classical and post-classical background. The core of the essay is to be found in Chapters III-V; Chapter VI contains a comparison between Abailard and Frege.

Without doubt, the author has succeeded in enlarging the modern scholar's acquaintance with, and admiration of, Abailard as a logician and early Medieval philosopher and theologian. Even someone who has had only a glimpse of the contents of this rich essay, cannot help experiencing a kind of thrill on realising that he is meeting in Peter Abailard a remarkable and original thinker.

However, to write a successful book something more is needed. To my mind the author was heavily hampered in realising the two objectives he had set himself, as a result of his poor knowledge of (both classical and Medieval) Latin grammar and syntax. Sometimes his judgment of Abailard's achievements is incorrect, for no other reason than his inability to correctly read Abailard's concise language." (pp. 81-82)

4. ———. 1986. "Peter Abelard's Semantics and His Doctrine of Being." *Vivarium* no. 24:85–127.

"6. *Conclusion*. Upon surveying Abelard's investigations about sentencehood it may be stated that it certainly developed gradually and, as a result, so to speak, of our author's continuously scrutinizing the recalcitrant problems concerning the ways in which, in our linguistic behaviour, we deal with the vital problem of being.

First, Abelard makes us recognize the peculiar nature of the substantive verb 'to be' ('esse'), peculiar indeed, since it is the only verb that is capable of conjoining but, at the same time, when serving, thus, as a device for predication, conveys, due to its proper invention, the notion of 'substantialness' ('essentia'). As was said before (above, p. 109), Abelard's entire discussion of the problem is ostensibly concerned

with mastering the antagonism between coupling and predication. First, he considers the vicissitudes the predicate noun cannot escape undergoing as the very result of this antagonism and finds a remedy in splitting up the different strata present in nouns such as 'album' ('the *or* a white thing'). In this endeavour, the chimaera and the like (the 'non-existents') turn out to be a real spoil-sports. In the *Dialectica*, then, Abelard maintains, a whole, his previous position (which is found in two parts of the *Logica Ingredientibus*, viz. the *Perihermeneias* commentary and the one on Boethius *De topicis differentiis*), but sets on to refine it in that he gives the *coupling* of 'substantialness' a predominant position over and against the *predication* of a (substantial or accidental) form. However, he aptly combines this move (quite unavoidably, it may seem) with a subtle emptying of the notion of 'essentia' ('substantialness'), with the result that, from now on, 'est' ('is') has developed into a mere container (meaning 'undetermined substantialness') for a 'real' ('thing-like') content (or sememe) conveyed by a predicate noun (which also may be a participle of an ordinary verb). An additional result is that, on this interpretation, the existential import seems to come from the predicate noun, so that our chimaera is no longer a spoil-sport. Finally, the empty-container view of the copula is completed by Abelard's suggestion to take the 'is' *plus* the predicate noun as merely one linguistic construct.

(...)

However this may be, Abelard's achievements in semantics are astonishingly great and even remain unparalleled for centuries." pp. 123-124 and 125.

1. Preliminary: *Significatio* in Abelard; 2. *Nomen, verbum, oratio*; 3. On the predicative-copulative function of the verb; 4. The noun and verb in Abelard. A survey; 5. Sentencehood: connection and predication; 5.1. Some preliminary remarks on naming and predication; 5.2. Predication as a semantic problem: linguistics vs semantics 5.3. On dating the logical works of Abelard; 5.4. Abelard's tackling of the problem of Predication in *Glossae super Perihermeneias*; 5.5. The present interpretation confirmed by *Super Topica Glossae*; 5.5. The discussion of predication in the *Dialectica*; 6. Conclusion.

Note: This paper is meant as a continuation to the series '*On Ancient and Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics*' published in this Journal [Vivarium] from 1977-82. For bibliographical reasons the original title has been dropped and the studies will be continued under separate titles.

5. ———. 2003. "The Logic of Indefinite Names in Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, and Radulphus Brito." In *Aristotle's Peri hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages. Essays on the Commentary Tradition*, edited by Braakhuis, Henk A.G. and Kneepkens, Corneille Henri, 207–233. Groningen: Ingenium Publishers.
"Aristotle's doctrine of indefinite names (nouns) was handed down to the Middle Ages together with Boethius' comments and explanations. Boethius' view of the matter has two characteristic features. For one thing, there is a certain ambiguity on his part concerning the precise semantic value of such terms; for another, Boethius deviates considerably from Aristotle in that he explicitly assigns the property of 'holding indifferently of existents and non-existents' not only to the indefinite *rhéma* (as it is found in Aristotle, *De interpr.* 3, 16b15) but to the indefinite name (*onoma*) as well.

Until the end of the 12th century the logic and grammar (1) of indefinite terms (nouns and verbs) was a much debated issue. Although assiduously echoing the well-known *auctoritates* Medieval thinkers did not always go the whole way with their predecessors. For example, Abelard and Scotus, starting from their own philosophical tenets, more or less inconspicuously corrected some dubious elements in Boethius' interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of the indefinite name. Peter Abelard, especially, took great pains to precisely define the meaning of indefinite terms. He focussed his attention on the proper meaning of indefinite terms rather than on the question whether they are 'holding indifferently of existents and non-existents'. In contrast, 13th-century scholars like Duns Scotus and Radulphus Brito based their discussion of the proper meaning of the indefinite name upon the

question '*Utrum nomen infinitum aliquid ponat*' ("Whether an infinite name posits something"), which calls to mind Boethius' claim that indefinite names 'hold indifferently of existent and non-existents'.

Abelard's discussion of the proper meaning of the indefinite name is also interesting in that it helps us to gain a good understanding of what Boethius had in mind in claiming that the indefinite name 'signifies an infinite number of things' ('*significat infinita*'). For, thanks to Abelard's expositions, it becomes clear that the phrase '*significare infinita*', which, on the face of it, may be taken as referring to the extensional of the indefinite name, on closer inspection proves to concern its intension, because the controversy between Abelard and Boethius turns out to be about two different views of the indefinite name's intension rather than about any opposition of intension as against extension." (pp. 207-208.)

(1) For the grammatical approaches to the problem of the indefinite term in the 12th century, see C.H. Kneepkens, "Orléans 266 and the Sophismata Collection: Master Joscelin of Soissons and the infinite words in the early twelfth century", in St. Read (ed.) *Sophisms in Medieval Logic and Grammar*. Acts of the Ninth European Symposium for Medieval Logic and Semantics, held at St Andrews, June 1990 (Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, 48; Dordrecht/Boston/London 1993), 64-85.

6. Rosier, Irène. 2002. "Abelard and the Meaning of the Propositions." In *Signification in Language and Culture*, edited by Gill, Harjeet Singh, 23–49. Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study.

Abstract: "For Abelard (first half of the twelfth century), nouns signify things on one hand, intellections on the other. But what about propositions, which are composed of words? Do they signify things, intellections, or neither of those? We will consider the various problems involved in that question, which lead Abelard to conclude that, although they are about things, propositions signify something which is neither a thing, nor a complex of things, nor an intellection, but a dictum : "what is said by the proposition". It is the dictum which is true or false. Although it is "absolutely nothing", it is a projection in reality of the way our intellect connects things. When I think of Socrates and of his whiteness, I decide to connect them by saying Socrates is white, or to separate them by saying Socrates is not white, thus seeing these two things as connected in some way, as being in some kind of relation. But this connection does not exist in reality: it is by comparing this connection which I produce with the actual state of the world, that what I am actually saying, not the words themselves but the dictum they express, will be judged true or false. Abelard's positions will be discussed in connection with other logicians and grammarians of his time. It will be shown that, although the theory of the dictum answers problems, it seems not to have been known, even in his own school, and other theories were devised. The relevance of this theory for theology will also be discussed briefly."

7. Rosier-Catach, Irène. 2007. "Priscian on Divine Ideas and Mental Conceptions: the Discussions in the *Glosulae in Priscianum*, the *Notae Dunelmenses*, William of Champeaux and Abelard." *Vivarium* no. 45:219–237.

Abstract: "Priscian's *Institutiones Grammaticae*, which rely on Stoic and Neoplatonic sources, constituted an important, although quite neglected, link in the chain of transmission of ancient philosophy in the Middle Ages. There is, in particular, a passage where Priscian discusses the vexed claim that common names can be proper names of the universal species and where he talks about the ideas existing in the divine mind. At the beginning of the 12th century, the anonymous *Glosulae super Priscianum* and the *Notae Dunelmenses*, which heavily quote William of Champeaux (as master G.), interpret the passage in the context of a growing interest in the problem of universals, raising semantic as well as ontological questions, and introducing a Platonic view on universals in the discussions on the signification of the noun. Moreover, this same passage will be used by Abelard to elaborate one of his opinions about the signification of universal or common names—that they signify "mental conceptions".

8. ———. 2017. "Understanding as Attending. Semantics, Psychology and Ontology in Peter Abelard." In *The Language of Thought in Late Medieval Philosophy. Essays in Honor of Claude Panaccio*, edited by Pelletier, Jenny and Roques, Magali, 249–274. Dordrecht: Springer.
Abstract: "How can we explain that understandings (*intellectus*) and sound understandings are formed or that expressions signify when there is no *res subiecta* that corresponds to them? Abelard discusses this question in various contexts relating to the formation of understandings, the signification of nouns, the problem of universals, and the formation of propositions. In all of them, the notion of *attentio-attendere*, Augustinian in origin, plays a crucial role. It orients Abelard towards an intentionalist semantics, which insists on the difference between the speaker's act of focusing on something (the *modus attendendi*) and this something as existing (the *modus subsistendi*), and away from a semantics based on the notion of similitude. I would like to show how all these analyses are connected, thereby showing the links between ontology, semantics, and psychology in Abelard's thought."
9. Schuman, Boaz Faraday. 2024. "Do Thoughts Have Parts? Peter Abelard: Yes! Alberic of Paris: No!" *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 32:974–998.
Abstract: "Spoken sentences have parts. Therefore they take time to speak. For instance, when you say, 'Socrates is running', you begin by uttering the subject term Socrates, before carrying on to the predicate. But are the corresponding thoughts also composite? And are such thoughts extended across time, like their spoken counterparts? Peter Abelard gave an affirmative response to both questions. Alberic of Paris denied the first and, as a corollary, denied the second. Here, I first set out Abelard's account. I then present a series of arguments against Abelard, reconstructed from (sometimes fragmentary) manuscripts associated with Alberic's school. I conclude with an observation about present philosophy of language: this twelfth-century debate points to some undefended (and largely unstated) assumptions common to more recent thinking about propositions."
10. Seuren, Pieter Albertus Maria. 2009. *Language from Within: Vol. I: Language in Cognition*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Summary of the two volumes: "Volume I begins by setting up certain central principles of the natural ontology according to which humans develop a theory of the actual world with the help of nonactual, thought-up 'worlds' or, better, situations. It then presents a view of how language expresses thoughts developed in terms of this natural ontology, with an emphasis on the mechanism of reference not only to extensional, actually existing objects but also to intensional, thought-up objects. An important aspect, elaborated in Chapter 4, is the fact that human communication does not, as is usually thought, consist in the transfer of propositionally structured information, but, rather, in a socially binding form of position-taking with respect to such information.
We then go on to a discussion of the general semantic aspects of language in the context of the total ecological 'architecture' of language, mind, and world. This leads to a cursory tour of lexical meaning and of the ways lexical meanings are structured so as to make linguistic utterances fit into given contexts or discourses. Concentrating again on propositional content, basic principles of logic are introduced in Volume II, although not in the traditional fashion. A new and unconventional view of logic is developed there, in which the logical constants are treated as lexical items, in fact as lexical predicates, with the special property that their meanings allow for the computation of entailments. It is argued that this reduction of logic to lexical meaning shows better than anything else the relevance of logic and logical analysis for the study of linguistic meaning. This point of view is reinforced in Chapter 10 of Volume II, where it is shown that presuppositions are a general semantic property of lexical predicates and where it is argued that a proper theory of presuppositions requires a trivalent presuppositional logic. We then concentrate, in Chapter 3 of Volume II, on a reconstruction of the natural logic which nature may be taken to have instilled into human cognition."

This reconstructed logic is then placed in a historical perspective, which shows that basic natural predicate logic is, in fact, largely but not entirely identical with the logic proposed and defended by the Edinburgh philosopher William Hamilton in the nineteenth century. Aristotelian predicate logic is dissected in Chapter 5 of Volume II and reconstructed on the basis of Aristotle's own texts, whereby it is found that Aristotle was not guilty of the logical error of undue existential import but left his logic incomplete. It is also found that the twelfth-century French philosopher Abelard completed Aristotelian predicate calculus in Aristotle's spirit, avoiding undue existential import in a way that leads to a logically sound system that is more powerful than standard modern predicate logic. Chapter 4 of Volume II shows that traditional predicate logic, with its undue existential import, has maximal logical power, in stark contrast to standard modern predicate logic, which has hardly any logical power left. It also shows that the logically sound Abelardian system of predicate logic has much greater logical power than standard modern predicate calculus, while still staying within the bounds of a strictly extensional ontology - a fact which raises questions regarding the status of standard modern predicate calculus in mathematics and mathematical logic.

In Chapter 6 of Volume II it is shown that traditional predicate logic is also much more functional from the point of view of transmitting information than its standard modern counterpart. The fact that, as a matter of principle, linguistic utterances need anchoring in context before they can be keyed to a given situation and the objects in it, is first discussed in Chapter 3, in the context of Aristotle's concept of proposition. Chapters 7 to 9 of Volume II are devoted to a further theoretical elaboration of the context-sensitivity of natural-language sentences and utterances. The notion of presupposition is central in this respect. Chapter 10 of Volume II is devoted to the logical aspects of the context-sensitivity of language. A presuppositional logic is developed for both the propositional operators and the universal and existential quantifiers. In this logic, a distinction is made between, on the one hand, a default, discourse-restricted area of metalogical relations, which is taken to have some degree of psychological reality, and a purely theoretical area which has no psychological reality but is presented merely to show the character and properties of the logic involved." (pp. 7-8).

11. ———. 2010. *Language from Within: Vol. II: The Logic of Language*. New York: Oxford University Press.
Chapter 4: *Logical power, Abelard, and empirical success rates*, pp. 122-146.
12. Shimizu, Tetsuro. 1995. "From Vocalism to Nominalism: Progression in Abaelard's Theory of Signification." *Didascalía* no. 1:15–46.
"In the present paper, I propose to analyse Abaelard's theory of signification with reference to his evolution from vocalism (or so called early nominalism) to nominalism in the strict sense. I shall examine (1) how the vocalist theory is defined and criticized by Abaelard in his *Glossae* on Porphyry's *Isagoge* with the incipit "Ingredientibus", (2) how he revises the vocalist theory in answering objections, and (3) how his later sermo-theory in his another gloss on Porphyry, entitled *Glossulae super Porphyrium* and distinguished by the incipit "Nostrorum petitioni sociorum", (2) is different from that of the *Glossae* 'I'. In other words, I suppose three stages in Abaelard's discussion: the first stage is the vocalist definition of universals in the *Glossae* 'I', which is his starting-point in it; the second is Abaelard's revision of vocalist theory of signification in the *Glossae* 'I'; and the third is the sermo-theory in the *Glossulae* 'NPS', which is a further revision of vocalism, but deserves to be called nominalism, and not vocalism any longer. That is, Abaelard's change in terminology from *vox* to *sermo* involves a revision in his basic conception of word itself." (p. 15, two notes omitted)
(2) While using the abbreviation 'LNPS' for Geyer's edition, I shall call this gloss *Glossulae* 'NPS'(...)
13. ———. 1999. "Words and Concepts in Anselm et Abelard." In *Langage, sciences, philosophie au XIIIe siècle*, edited by Biard, Joël, 177–197. Paris: Vrin.

"The main concern of the present article is with the theory of words and concepts in Anselm and Abelard. The Augustinian tradition tells us that mental concepts are words (*verba*) and that they correspond to God's Word, and the expository tradition since Philo combines the story of creation with Plato's *Timaeus*, identifying primordial ideas in God's mind before creation with God's words, or Word. By contrast, grammar - the preliminary, or introductory, discipline in early medieval schools - begins its course from vocal sounds (*voces*), so that words in grammar are defined as « vocal entities ». Furthermore, dialectic treats names and verbs as a subspecies of *vox significativa secundum placitum*, at least in the relevant chapter of Aristotle's *De interpretatione*. How, then, did the scholars at that period deal with the supposed inconsistency between these secular disciplines and the traditional Christian teaching on words?

To answer this question, I shall first examine a theory of the signification of names in the field of grammar from the late eleventh century, and show that the dominant tendency at that time was to interpret grammar on the basis of Aristotle's theory of categories. Then, I shall go on to examine Anselm and Abelard's viewpoints to show that both, basing themselves on Aristotle's *De interpretatione*, introduced new theories on signification independently from the theory in grammar, while they differed from each other in how to accept the Augustinian theory of God's Word and consequently on how to apprehend words in general." (p. 177)

14. ———. 2006. "Word and *Esse* in Anselm and Abelard." In *Anselm and Abelard. Investigations and juxtapositions*, edited by Gasper, Giles E.M. and Kohlenberger, Helmut, 179–195. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.

"The medieval controversy about the nature of universals was about nothing other than the relationship between word and thing. In order to understand the history and essence of the controversy, it is most important to examine the thoughts of the two key figures: Anselm and Abelard, respectively the revered authority among the realists (*reales*), and the founder of the nominalists (*nominales*). Though there certainly lies a crucial divergence in their views, nevertheless Abelard, as well as contemporary realists, owes many of his ideas, conceptions and terms to Anselm. Having examined elsewhere their views on the relationship between word and concept, I would like to examine here those on the relationship between word and the world. Through this examination I shall show how Anselm's metaphysical investigation about God's locution was transformed into Abelard's logical one about human words.

In the following, I shall first examine Anselm's theory of God's locution, showing how he explains it in terms of human language and in its relationship with created things, by examining some passages from his *Monologion* and *De grammatico*. Secondly, I shall focus my attention on Abelard's corresponding theories in his two commentaries on Porphyry, *Glosse 'ingredientibus'* and *Glossule 'nostrorum petitioni sociorum'*." (p. 179)

"Conclusion. The terms and concepts that Anselm proposed in his meditation on God's locution as the origin of created things constitute a common vocabulary for the controversy about universals. Even Abelard, the founder of nominalism, when refuting the realists, uses these terms and concepts to differentiate himself from them. Such terms, among others, are *essentia*, *esse hominem*, and *status hominis*, which is Abelard's substitute for Anselm's *esse hominis*. Again, Anselm's idea of *significatio* as an act of producing understanding in the hearer becomes the main idea in Abelard's semantics. We can, however, recognize elements of discrepancy between them as well as these examples of agreement. Abelard excludes *essentia* from his theory of universals, separating it from *esse hominem*, and shifts the idea of *esse hominis* to the one of *status hominis*. Again, Anselm's *intellectus* produced by a word is the understanding by which an *essentia*, or something's *esse*, is understood, and the latter is based on the *principalis essentia* in God, while Abelard's is separated from *essentia* and even from the facts in reality (*status*), in his later theory, though connected in his earlier one. It seems that Abelard cultivates a new realm of conceptions independent of things' *essentia*; this realm is properly for

human beings, not for God, the creator. In this sense, 'Deus homo' happened between Anselm and Abelard." (p. 195)

15. ———. 2006. "The Place of *Intellectus* in the Theory of Signification by Abelard and *Ars Meliduna*." In *Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale / Intellect and imagination in medieval philosophy / Intelecto e imaginação na filosofia medieval / Actes du XIe Congrès international de philosophie médiévale de la Société internationale pour l'Étude de la philosophie médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.): Porto, du 26 au 31 août 2002*, edited by Pacheco, Maria Cândida and Meirinhos, José F., 927–939. Turnhout: Brepols.

"The main concern of the present paper is with some theories of *significatio* in the 12th century, and how *intellectus* and *imaginatio* play a role in them, but not in others. In the present paper, I shall restrict my attention to Abelard and *Ars meliduna*, hoping to contrast them.

ABELARD'S THEORY OF SIGNIFICATION

As for Abelard's theory, I will make some comments concerning the present subject, with a summary of the conclusions that I have described elsewhere (1). In *Glosse super Porphyrium* ("Ingredientibus"), Abelard's theory of signification bound up with his explanation and revision of the vocalist theory of a universal. He starts with the definition of the universal, which involves the idea of *impositio* and *nominatio*, and so far the theory contains the name-things relationship only. Abelard, however, also shows its difficulties, by raising the two cardinal aspects of signification: the first concerns *nominatio*, or *significatio* in the broader sense, while the second, the *intellectus* that a name produces in the hearer, and this act of a name is *significatio* in the strict sense.

Then he tries to solve the difficulties and presents his revision of the theory regarding each of the two aspects (2)." (p. 927)

(...)

CONCLUSION

In sum, we can contrast Abelard and the *Ars meliduna* as for how *intellectus* are treated with reference to signification. For both of them, a *status* is some thing or some fact in the world, independent of *intellectus*, though it might be an object of *intellectus*,

but by no means a mental entity. This is the only point on which both will agree. To begin with, they oppose each other as for what is the *status*. For Abelard, *status* is *causa impositionis*, while for the *Ars meliduna*, it is the object of signification. On the contrary, *intellectus* is the object of signification for Abelard, while it is the *causa impositionis* for the *Ars meliduna*. Abelard thinks of *intellectus* from the hearer's point of view basing himself on Aristotle's *De interpretatione*, so that he attends to the act of producing *intellectus* in the hearer, while the *Ars meliduna* thinks of *intellectus* from the speaker's point of view, basing itself on Priscian's grammar, so that it attends to the vocal words as revealing the speaker's *intellectus*. Thus the *Ars meliduna* insists on the reverse of what Abelard insisted on." (p. 939).

(1) Shimizu, T., From Vocalism to Nominalism: Progression in Abaelard's Theory of Signification, *Didascalía*, 1,15-46.

(2) Abaelardus, *Glossae super Porphyrium*, hrsg. von Geyer, B., *Peter Abaelards philosophische Schriften* I, 1933: 16, 25-30; 18,4-19,20.

16. Spencer, Mark K. 2011. "Abelard on *Status* and their Relation to Universals. A Husserlian Interpretation." *International Philosophical Quarterly* no. 51:223–240. "The discussion of universals in Peter Abelard's Logica 'Ingredientibus' has been interpreted in many ways. Of particular controversy has been the proper way to interpret his use of the term *status*. In this paper I offer an interpretation of *status* by comparing Abelard's account of knowledge of universals to Edmund Husserl's presentations of categorial and eidetic intuition. I argue that *status* is meant to be understood as something like an ideal object, in Husserl's sense of the term. First, I present Abelard's discussion of *status* and distinguish this term from universals, things, acts of understanding, and forms. Next, I consider Husserl's account of categorial and eidetic intuition. Finally, I draw parallels between the two while

showing how an interpretation of status as ideal object overcomes the interpretive problems encountered by other commentators on Abelard."

17. Spruyt, Joke. 2003. "The Semantics of Complex Expressions in John Duns Scotus, Peter Abelard and John Buridan." In *Aristotle's Peri hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages: Essays on the Commentary Tradition*, edited by Braakhuis, Henk A.G. and Kneepkens, Corneille Henri, 275–303. Turnhout: Brepols.
 "Peter Abelard's Exposé on Single and Non-Single Propositions in the *Dialectica*(38)
 One of the works in which Abelard had concentrated on the question of single or simple propositions is the *Dialectica*, II, ii, in the treatise entitled 'De specierum differentiis categoricarum'. (39) At the beginning of his discussion Abelard makes it very clear that the property of being a single expression is based on the meaning (*sententia*) of an expression. In the same way as there are single words (*unae*), i.e. words that have one meaning, as well as non-single ones (*multiplikes*), or the ones that have more than one meaning, he tells us, there are also complex expressions (*orationes*) that can be either single (*unae*) or non-single (*multiplikes*). Moreover, it is not the privilege of complete propositions to be subjected to such a distinction, but incomplete expressions also, such as definitions or descriptions, can be either single or non-single." (p. 288)
 (38) Abelard also discusses this topic in the *Logica 'Ingredientibus'*, *Glossae super Periermeneias*, ed. Geyer (1927), 382ff. (see the contribution by C. Strub, elsewhere in this volume).
 (39) *Dial.* II, ii, ed. de Rijk (1970), 222-31.
 References
 Christian Strub, *Propositio una / multiplex in Abelard: A Note on the Relationship of Dialectic and Grammar*, same volume, pp. 257-273.
18. Strub, Christian. 2003. "Propositio una / multiplex in Abelard: A Note on the Relationship of Dialectic and Grammar." In *Aristotle's Peri hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages. Essays on the Commentary Tradition*, edited by Braakhuis, Henk A.G. and Kneepkens, Corneille Henri, 257–273. Turnhout: Brepols.
 "In his semantics, Abelard draws a basic threefold distinction between (a) what is said; (b) the object that something is said about; (c) the meaning of what is said. What is said are single words (*dictiones*) or sequences of such words (*orationes*); in the latter case they may be either incomplete expressions (such as 'a white man') or complete expressions, that is, full sentences (such as 'A man is white'). The meaning of what is said is grasped through specific mental concepts called understandings (*intellectus*). The object that something is said about is a thing (*res*) or a state of affairs (*dictum propositionis*). These objects are never named or expressed directly by a word or a sequence of words but always through understandings. Therefore, a criterion for the unity of sequences of words would have to depend upon a criterion for the unity of understandings. (9)
 The task, then, for clarifying the distinction between unitary and multiple understandings is to assign conditions that sequences of words, usually sentences, must meet in order to signify a unitary understanding. For this task it makes no difference initially whether we find these conditions at the level of utterances or of syntax or semantics." (pp. 259-260)
 (9) Cf. Jolivet (1982), 26: "C'est du cote de l'intellection qu'il faut donc chercher l'unité de la phrase, car, du simple point de vue de l'écoulement du temps, on ne pourrait jamais avoir que des instants successifs"
 References
 Jolivet, J. (1982). *Arts du langage et theologie chez Abélard*, 2^e edition (Etudes de philosophie medievale, 57; Paris 1982)
19. Stump, Eleonore. 1988. "Logic in the Early Twelfth Century." In *Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy*, edited by Norman, Kretzmann, 31–55. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
 On Abelard, pp. 44-47.

"The extant twelfth-century commentaries on Boethius's *De top. diff.* give us reason to believe that it was a controversial theory and that it was associated with Peter Abelard. A number of the commentaries know of the claim that syllogistic inferences hold in virtue of their form and not because they are warranted by a Topic.(60) In some of those commentaries this view is associated with views similar to Abelard's or even explicitly ascribed to a master P., who Green-Pedersen argues should be identified as Abelard.(61) And, in general, the commentaries which raise the issue of the Topical dependence of categorical syllogisms recognize it as controversial.

(...)

The evidence from these commentaries and our examination of early twelfth-century treatises, then, suggests that the separation of categorical syllogisms from Topical inferences in the twelfth century was controversial and original with Abelard. Up to the time of IMm [*Introductiones Montane minores*] around 1130, we find no recognition of this view, which plays so large a part in Abelard's *Dialectica*, but in the commentaries we have evidence that it was a very controversial view which tended to be associated with Abelard." (pp. 44-45)

(60) For a survey of these commentaries see Green-Pedersen 1974 and 1977. For the commentaries, see Green-Pedersen 1977, esp. pp. 143-4, also 138, 139, 141-2; and Green-Pedersen 1974, pp. 26-7, 27-30.

(61) For the identification of Master P. with Abelard, see Green-Pedersen 1974, pp. 19, 27, and 29; cf also Green-Pedersen 1977, p. 141.

References

Green-Pedersen, N. J. 1974. "William of Champeaux on Boethius' Topics according to Orleans Bibl. Mun. 266." *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-age grec et latin* 13: 13-30.

Green-Pedersen, N. J. 1977. "The Doctrine of 'maxima propositio' and 'locus differentia' in Commentaries from the 12th century on Boethius' 'Topics'." *Studia Mediewistyczne* 18: 125-163.

20. ———. 1989. *Dialectic and Its Place in the Development of Medieval Logic*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Chapter 5: *Abelard on the Topics* (pp. 89-109) and Chapter 6: *Logic in the Early Twelfth Century* (pp. 111-133).

"In this essay, I examine the general character of Abelard's discussion of Topics to show its place in the philosophical tradition between Garlandus Compotista and the thirteenth-century terminists; and then I consider in detail Abelard's discussion of those particular Topics which are the principal concern of early twelfth-century logic treatises to help determine the place of Abelard's work in the historical tradition of the twelfth century. In what follows I concentrate on Abelard's *Dialectica*, leaving to one side his commentary on Boethius. I think that it will be some time before a definitive account of Abelard's work on Topics can be written, and I am not attempting to do so here. For my purposes it is enough to make a preliminary study of Abelard's major work, *Dialectica*, investigating in detail Abelard's discussion of Topics there. (In the following essay I will say something more about Abelard's commentary on Boethius's *De top. diff.*).

A comparison of the tables of contents of Garlandus's *Dialectica* and Abelard's will suggest some of the fundamental differences between them. Garlandus's treatment of hypothetical syllogisms is roughly five times as long as his treatment of categorical syllogisms, and it is by far the lengthiest and most elaborate part of the book. In Abelard, the section on hypothetical syllogisms seems perfunctory, and the section on categorical syllogisms is almost twice as long. What is at least as significant, if not more so, is that Abelard places his discussion of Topics before the section on hypothetical syllogisms but after the section on categorical syllogisms, unlike Garlandus, who puts his treatment of the topics before any discussion of either sort of syllogism." (pp.89-90)

21. Tarlazzi, Caterina. 2014. "'Iam Corpus' or 'Non Corpus'? On Abelard's First Argument Against Material Essence Realism in the Logica 'Ingredientibus'."

- Vivarium* no. 52:1–22.
- Abstract: "This paper investigates Abelard's first argument against the 'material essence' realist view on universals in the *Logica 'Ingredientibus'*. It analyses three different interpretations of the argument, those of Alain de Libera, Peter King and Martin Tweedale. Much depends on the (for this section, single) manuscript reading 'iam corpus' in a crucial passage. The paper argues against the manuscript reading (endorsed by some scholars) and in favour of the emendation 'non corpus' suggested by the editor, Bernhard Geyer. The emended reading is supported by comparison with similar arguments of Abelard and his school found in published and unpublished sources."
22. ———. 2019. "'Collectio'-Theories of Universals in the Time of Peter Abelard and Boethius' Infinite Regress Argument Against Multiple Genus." In *Mereology in Medieval Logic and Metaphysics: Proceedings of the 21st European Symposium of Medieval Logic and Semantics*, edited by Amerini, Fabrizio, Binini, Irene and Mugnai, Massimo 75–108. Pisa: Edizioni della Normale.
 23. ———. 2021. "The Debate Over Universals in the Time of Peter Abelard: What It Is, And Is Not, About." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* no. 29:1012–1033.
 Abstract: "From the nineteenth century onwards, the so-called 'Debate over Universals' from the time of Peter Abelard (c. 1100–50) is regarded as one of the major problems of medieval philosophy. This paper tries to advance the current approaches (which fall into two broad categories: a more analytical line of enquiry and a more historical one) by establishing a new understanding based on assumptions and questions. Through a comprehensive analysis of both published and unpublished logical commentaries from the first half of the twelfth century, it shows that – contrary to the received narrative – a lot is not discussed, but rather assumed. It therefore investigates what the debate is not about – arguing that this is just as relevant as what the debate is about."
 24. Taylor, Andrew. 1998. "A Second Ajax: Peter Abelard and the Violence of Dialectic." In *The Tongue of the Fathers*, edited by Townsend, David R. and Taylor, Andrew, 14–34. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
 "The disputations in which Abelard first made his reputation offer an extreme instance of the adversarial method that remains the fundamental paradigm of academic philosophizing in the West.(63) This adversarial method now seems all too obviously characteristic of a specific culture, that male culture that "thrives on argument and prides itself on distinction"(64) yet to retain its authority the method must claim both objectivity and universality. It cannot afford to reveal itself as a masculine game. Abelard glories in this culture, but he shows as much, and in doing so gives the game away. Whether the figure of Ajax marks aggression, fear, or some combination of the two, he calls into question dialectic's pose of impersonality. Dialectic's claims to impersonal objectivity bear all too strongly the marks of its human proponents." (p. 30)
 25. Teräsväinen, Juha. 1983. "Ultimate Reality and Meaning in 12th Century Logic." *Ultimate Reality and Meaning* no. 6:22–31.
 "When discussing the task of logic Abelard notes that the function of logic is teaching people to distinguish valid arguments from non-valid, and this on the basis of logical principles (Abelard, 1933, p. 506). But then Abelard notes also that there are other indispensable concerns, namely those involving important distinctions regarding the nature of the things (Abelard, 1970, p. 287). Here the modern researcher mainly regrets the 'ambivalence' of Abelard's opinion (e.g. de Rijk, 1967, p. 188; Pinborg, 1972, p. 51). But for Abelard these 'external' aspects are necessary. Abelard deals with non-logical fundamentals chiefly in his theory of terms (Abelard, 1919-1927, p. 112); when discussing the theory of argumentation and the theory of propositions he is interested in the strictly formal character of these logical

matters (cf. e.g. Abelard, 1919-1927, p. 308f.). It even seems that he distinguishes between an inquiry that is strictly logical and one searching for truth itself (Abelard, 1954, p. 305).

While presenting the copula of an affirmative proposition he gives both the formal (the identity theory; Abelard, 1970, p. 132) and the metaphysical (the inherence theory; Abelard, 1919-1927, p. 360f.) aspect. The latter he deserts for the former, since the identity theory presumes nothing outside the proposition itself. Abelard's tendency was, therefore, towards a form of logic where non-logical presumptions are rejected or simply made superfluous." (pp. 24-25)

References

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_____. 1933. *Logica Nostrorum petitioni sociorum*, ed. Geyer, in *Peter Abaelards Philosophische Schriften*. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters XXI, 4, Münster i.W.: Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung.

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Pinborg, J. 1972. *Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter. Ein Überblick*, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.

Rijk, L.M. de, 1967. *Logica Modernorum*, Vol. II, part one. Assen: Van Gorcum.

26. Thom, Paul. 2006. *Medieval Modal Systems: Problems and Concepts*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

Chapter 3: *Abélard*, pp. 43-64.

"Abélard distinguishes between the syntactic features of a proposition *secundum constructionem* and *in sensu*. He asks two principal questions about modal propositions: What role does modality play in their syntactic structure, and. How are they derived from the corresponding assertories?

With regard to the first of these questions, Abélard's view is that modal words qualify neither the subject nor the predicate nor the whole proposition, but the relation between predicate and subject. On the second question, his view is that modal propositions are in sense *de rebus* - i.e. they share their subjects with the simple propositions from which they derive, rather than having the sense of those simple propositions as their subjects.(3) This is what it means to be *de rebus*. The doctrine that modal propositions are *de rebus* I will call actualism, since it claims that modal propositions are about the same actual things that are the subjects of assertoric propositions. Actualism, as we shall see, is not necessarily an anti-metaphysical doctrine." (p. 44)

(3) Abélard (1956) 198:8-9. These words occur at the climax of a long polemic, 195:11-198:11, against 'his master's' *de sensu* analysis, according to which modals are about the sense of the corresponding simples.

References

Abélard, P. (1956), *Dialectica*, edited by L.M. De Rijk, Van Gorcum, Assen

27. _____. 2012. "Logical Form." In *The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy*, edited by Marenbon, John, 271–288. New York Oxford University Press.

"An explicit formulation of a concept of logical form can be found in Abelard's distinction between perfect and imperfect inferences. A perfect inference is one where the truth of consequent is clear from the structure of the antecedent (*ex ipsius antecedentis complexione*) because the construction of the antecedent is arranged in such a way as to contain the construction of the consequent—as happens in syllogisms.

(22) An imperfect inference lacks this kind of structural integrity, even if it is necessary—as is the inference 'If every man is an animal, every man is animate' or the inference 'If every man is an animal, no man is a stone'. (23) Our knowledge of imperfect inferences comes from our knowledge of the things that the inference is

about (men, animals and stones in the above examples), not just our knowledge of the inference's structure. (24) But knowledge of a perfect inference depends on no such knowledge since the inference holds for all terms similarly arranged, whether the premises relating them are true or false. (25) Imperfect inferences, by contrast, do not hold for all terms similarly arranged: if we replace 'man' by 'stone' in 'If it's a man it's an animal', the resulting inference is false. Perfect inferences don't depend on the nature of things, and their structure (*complexio*) preserves a necessary consequence equally in all things, no matter how they are related. (26)" (p. 276)

(22) *Dialectica*, in Peter Abelard (1956), henceforth *Dial.*, 253:31–254:1: 'Haec autem inferentia alias perfecta est, alias imperfecta. Perfecta quidem est inferentia, cum ex ipsius antecedentis complexione consequentis veritas manifesta est et antecedentis constructio ita est disposita, ut in se consequentis quoque constructionem contineat, veluti in syllogismis aut in his hypotheticis quae formas habent syllogismorum'.

(23). *Dial.*, 255:1–6.

(24) *Dial.*, 255:13–17.

(25) *Dial.*, 255:31–37.

(26) *Dial.* [256:20–24] 'Istae ergo consequentiae recte ex natura rerum verae dicuntur quarum veritas una cum rerum natura variatur; illae vero veritatem ex complexione, non ex rerum natura, tenent quarum complexio necessitatem in quibuslibet rebus, cuiuscumque sint habitudinis, aequae custodit, sicut in syllogismo vel in consequentiis quae formas eorum tenent, ostenditur'.

28. Thompson, Augustine. 1995. "The Debate on Universals before Peter Abelard." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 33:409–429.
"This essay is an experiment, in which I shall attempt three things. First, I shall draw together the widely scattered discoveries and scholarship that have appeared since 1980 and reread our sources for the debate in light of them.
Next, I shall propose that the theories advanced by participants in the debate on universals before Abelard, which have hitherto seemed fragmentary and incoherent-intelligible only in terms of their culmination in or their refutation by Peter Abelard--can be fitted into a coherent narrative. This narrative calls into question the trustworthiness of Peter Abelard and John of Salisbury's widely accepted version of the debate. Finally, it suggests that, discounting his self-promotion, Peter Abelard was a far less pivotal thinker than conventional wisdom would have him." (p. 411)
29. Tweedale, Martin. 1967. "Abailard and Non-Things." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 5:329–342.
"On several occasions in his logical writings Abailard extracts himself from embarrassing ontological implications of his analyses of language by resorting to the notion of a something that is not a thing. I shall note here two such occasions and then discuss Abailard's explanations of this procedure based on the grammatical distinction of personal and impersonal constructions. Since the texts on this latter topic are especially confusing, a considerable portion of my effort will be spent on making sense of them as preparation for drawing some conclusions about Abailard's overall approach. My purpose here is to show how Abailard's grammatical analyses are fundamental to his defence of a number of metaphysical positions. I also want to suggest that Abailard's grammatical approach, especially on the question of *dicta*, contains insights of continuing interest." (p. 329)
30. ———. 1976. *Abailard on Universals*. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Contents: Preface IX–X; Introduction 1; I. Plato and Aristotle 17; II. Boethius and Porphyry 53; III. Abailard's Critique of Realist Solutions 89; IV. Abailard's Theory of Abstract Entities 133; V. Abailard's Theory of *Dicta* and *Status* 133; VI. Abailard and Frege: A Comparison 305; Bibliography 329; Index of Names and Subjects 331; Index of Textual Extracts 335–337.
"In writing this book I have had two main objectives in mind. The first was to present in a form easily accessible to professional philosophers, theologians and

historians certain scattered portions of Abailard's logical writings which seem to me to record a very original scrutiny of the foundations of logic and in particular of the problem of universals. I am of the opinion that if and when a complete history of logic in the West is written Abailard's ideas will appear as one of the ablest and most penetrating efforts to establish a philosophical foundation for the subject. To accomplish this objective I have arranged, translated and commented on relevant passages from Abailard's works in such a way that the reader, even if he knows no Latin, can follow Abailard's train of thought and see the relationships between texts whose bearing on each other is far from immediately apparent. The translations are very literal, sometimes to the point of awkwardness. But one must remember that the original is rarely any sort of paragon of literary style. Scholastic writing in logic generally sacrifices beauty to economy and accuracy. Sometimes, Abailard is too economical, and then I have inserted in the translation what is required to give an intelligible rendering. (Such insertions are bracketed.) For those who know Latin the original text is also provided from the most recent modern editions of Abailard's works.

The second objective was to interpret the texts in a way that would connect them with the ancient tradition and also make them intelligible to contemporary philosophers. I have tried to be both critical and sympathetic in this interpretive work. Indeed, criticism of Abailard without sympathy is almost bound to be superficial since he so frequently contradicts himself and talks in ways he himself knew to be misleading. Besides, Abailard is writing at a time when the conceptual tools of scholastic logic were being created; consequently it is not to be expected that his works would display the rigor of those, say, of Ockham or Tarski.

Chapters I and II give the classical background to the problem of universals, allowing the reader a glimpse of some of its ramifications. The real work of presenting and analysing texts takes place in chapters III through V. If the reader already has a good idea of the history of the subject, he could well limit himself to just this core part of the essay. Chapter VI tries to give a sense of the continuing relevance of Abailard's discussions by a comparison with Frege's philosophy of logic. I thought it was better to concentrate on one central figure in modern logic than attempt a general comparison with all the various strands of thinking on the subject since the nineteenth century. Only this last chapter supposes a bit of familiarity with modern philosophy. Elsewhere I have tried to write in a way historians and theologians, as well as philosophers, could understand. Certainly the range of interests a book on this topic appeals to should not be narrowed any more than necessary." (from the *Preface*)

"This work shows how Abailard elaborated and defended the view that universals are words, avoided the pitfalls of an image theory of thinking, and propounded a theory of "status" and "dicta" as objects of thought without treating them as subjects of predication. His defense of these views is shown to depend on certain fundamental departures from the Aristotelian term logic of his day, including a proposal for subjectless propositions, the treatment of copula plus predicate noun as equivalent to a simple verb, and a transformation of the 'is' of existence into the 'is' of predication." (Review by P. S. Spade, *Noûs*, 14, 1980, pp. 479-483)

31. ———. 1980. "Abailard and Ockham: Contrasting Defences of Nominalism." *Theoria* no. 46:106–122.

Abstract: "The Scholastics inherited from the Greeks a certain ideal of scientific knowledge, an ideal which both the nominalists and the realists of the middle ages accepted. In this paper I want first to show briefly how that ideal seems most naturally to lead to some form of realism as regards universals. I then review the attempts by Abailard in the 12th century and Ockham in the 14th to escape the realistic conclusions that apparently follow from that ideal, and in the course of this discussion I try to make clear just where their approaches differ. Finally, I point out that Ockham's approach suffers from certain basic difficulties which do not beset Abailard's and hope that this will motivate among the nominalistically minded a

certain sympathy for the Abailardian view despite its admittedly enigmatic and nearly self-contradictory character."

32. ———. 1982. "Abelard and the Culmination of the Old Logic." In *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100-1600*, edited by Kretzmann, Norman, Kenny, Anthony and Pinborg, Jan, 143–157. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
"Of all the scholastic logicians writing while the old logic (*logica vetus*) was still virtually the whole of the logical curriculum in the schools, Abelard is generally conceded to have been the most profound and original. (1) He himself was keenly aware of the subtlety required of the logician and in one place says it depends on a divinely bestowed talent, rather than anything that can be developed by mere practice.(2) Abelard treats dialectic (= logic) as an *ars sermocinalis*, i.e., like grammar a linguistic science. Its peculiar subject matter is arguments as expressed in language, whose validity it tries to judge in a scientific way.(3) This linguistically oriented conception of the subject means that dialectic will overlap to some extent with grammar. In the first section below I shall selectively explore this overlap; in the second section I shall consider some of Abelard's views on more purely logical topics.
For Abelard logic also had a close relation to *physica*,(4) i.e., the sciences of nature, since in explaining the 'uses of words' the logician must investigate in a general way the 'properties of things' which the mind uses words to signify. This relationship leads to a concern with the psychology of signification, to be explored in the third section below, and with ontology, the topic of the fourth section. This discussion is necessarily very selective and must omit consideration of many of Abelard's philosophical insights on relevant topics." (p. 143)
(1) For example, Jolivet 1969, p. 338: 'Logicien, Abelard doit être mis très haut. On ne connaît avant lui aucun médiéval qui soit de sa taille.'
(2) See Abelard 1956, p. 471.4-9.
(3) See Abelard 1954, p. 209.
(4) See Abelard 1956, pp. 286.31-287.1.
References
Jolivet, Jean (1969). *Arts du langage et théologie chez Abélard* (Etudes de Philosophie Médiévale, 57), J. Vrin.
Dal Pra, Mario, ed. (1954). *Pietro Abelardo. Scritti Filosofici, Editio Super Porphyrium, Glossae in Categorias, Editio Super Aristotelem De Interpretatione, De Divisionibus, Super Topica Glossae*, Bocca.
Peter Abelard (1956). *Dialectica*, ed. L. M. De Rijk (Wijsgerige teksten en studies, 1), Van Gorcum.
33. ———. 1987. "Reply to Professor de Rijk's "Martin M. Tweedale on Abailard: some criticisms of a fascinating venture"." *Vivarium* no. 25:3–22.
"I reply to professor de Rijk's criticisms of my book "Abailard on Universals". First I admit serious errors in some of my translations and offering some revisions of those. Second, I defend some of my other translations as well as my interpretation of what Abailard intends by "essentia" and my contention that Abailard's doctrine on universals is not a form of conceptualism."
34. ———. 1992. "Logic (I): from the Late Eleventh Century to the Time of Abelard." In *A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy*, edited by Dronke, Peter, 196–226. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
V. Abelard and his Contemporaries, pp. 216-226.
"Abelard (1079-1142), it seems, was the first philosopher in the Latin West since ancient times to make full use of Aristotle's *De interpretatione* and Boethius' commentaries on it. The main effect of this appears to have been a greatly increased role for psychological considerations in semantic theory.
Abelard promotes ideas (*intellectus*) to a key position in his analysis of how words signify. Having a simple idea is a mental act of attending to some nature of a thing;

it differs from acts of sensing (*sensus*) in that it does not require an actually existent object or 'subject thing', whereas sensing does.

Imagining too does not require the actual existence of what is imagined, but unlike having an idea it does not distinguish out any particular nature.(92)

There are, as well, complex ideas corresponding to whole propositions, whereas simple ideas correspond to nouns and verbs. To construct a complex idea out of simple ones requires a joining activity of the mind.(93)

Some words we use function merely as joiners or disjoiners without signifying any idea; such are the copula and various conjunctions like 'if and 'or'. Other words modify ideas without themselves signifying an idea; the modal operators and quantifiers are examples of this class. Such is Abelard's attempt to differentiate psychologically 'definite' and 'indefinite' terms, i.e. what later were to be called 'categorematic' and 'syncategorematic' terms.(94)" (pp. 216-217)

(92) Abelard 1919-33, pp. 317.9-15 and 20.20-8. See also the *Tractatus de intellectibus*, Ulivi 1976, pp. 103-4. For more on Abelard's psychology see Tweedale 1976, pp. 169-79; J. Jolivet, *Arts du langage et théologie chez Abélard* (2nd ed., Paris 1982), pp. 368-9; and K. Jacobi, 'Die Semantik sprachlicher Ausdrücke, Ausdrucksfolgen und Aussagen in Abailards Kommentar zu Peri Hermenias', *Medioevo* VII (1981) 41-89, at pp. 47-9.

(93) Abelard 1919-33, p. 339.20-30.

(94) Abelard 1919-33, pp. 337—40, and Minio-Paluello II 1958, 20-1. A different view is found in Abelard's *Dialectica* in de Rijk 1970, pp. 118-20. See I. Damska, 'La semiotique des "Dictiones Indefinitae" dans la *Dialectique* d'Abelard', *CIMAGL* xxi (1977) 10-20.

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35. Valente, Luisa. 2013. "Philosophers and Other Kinds of Human Beings according to Peter Abelard and John of Salisbury." In *Logic and Language in the Middle Ages: a volume in honour of Sten Ebbesen*, edited by Fink, Jacob Leth, Hansen, Heine and Mora-Marquez, Ana María 105–124. Leiden.

"To celebrate Sten Ebbesen's birthday I would like to offer a paper about Peter Abelard and John of Salisbury; two twelfth-century thinkers who share with Sten and his favourite medieval masters—Boethius of Dacia, Radulphus Brito and John Buridan, *mutatis mutandis*—an interpretation of philosophy which emphasizes rationality, logic, and freedom. In particular, I intend to consider, although of necessity in a somewhat partial and provisional manner, both Peter Abelard's and John of Salisbury's views regarding the status of the philosopher within the context of their thoughts on the variety of kinds of human beings.

I will begin by analysing a passage from Macrobius's *Commentarii in somnium Scipionis*, for the text of book 1, chapter 8 is explicitly quoted by Abelard in both his *Theologia christiana* and *Dialogus inter philosophum, iudeum et christianum*. Macrobius's views are, in my opinion, one of the chief sources of Abelard's and Salisbury's own representations of philosophers whether they are real or simply ideal persons." (p. 105)

36. ———. 2015. "*Aliquid amplius audire desiderat*: Desire in Abelard's Theory of Incomplete and Non-Assertive Complete Sentences." *Vivarium* no. 53:221–248.
Abstract: One of the peculiarities of Peter Abelard's analysis of incomplete and non-assertive sentences is his use of the notion of desire: in both *Dialectica* and *Glosses on Peri hermeneias* the terms *desiderium* and *desidero* move to the foreground side by side with *optatio*, *expectatio*, *suspensio* and the related verbs. Desire plays a structural role in Abelard's descriptions of the compositional way in which the linguistic message is received, changing step by step from incomplete to complete: the person who receives the incomplete message (e.g., 'Socrates' or 'Socrates legens') desires to get further information through other words since he knows that the purpose of such words or sequences of words (their *causa inventionis*) is to combine with other words in order to form a complete sentence. On the other hand, the expression of the speaker's attention to his inner affections renders the same semantic content a different complete sentence (injunction, prayer, or *desiderativa oratio*)."
37. Viri, Federico. 2022. "Mental Actions in Semantics. On Abelard's Question "Can a True Proposition Generate a False Understanding?": A Tentative Interpretation." *Vivarium* no. 60:192–225.
Abstract: "This article aims to demonstrate the interdependence of semantics and noetics against the referentialist trend in Abelard studies conceiving semantics as confined to the truth/falsity function. The article takes as a turning point of the argument Abelard's question "can a true proposition generate a false understanding?" which secondary literature does not take into account. Starting from the analysis of this question, the article aims to show the development of an enhanced notion of understanding compared to the Boethian one. The core of this enhanced notion of understanding is the action of *attentio*, which is the condition for the elaboration of a coherent and global definition of signification (*de rebus* and *de intellectibus*). The analysis of the mental action of *attentio* entails the description of other kinds of mental actions, leading one to conceive understanding as a multi-layered complex of actions."
38. Wade, Francis C. 1963. "Abelard and Individuality." In *Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter. Ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung*, edited by Wilpert, Paul, 165–171. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
"Peter Abelard, in his *Logica Ingredientibus* proposed to inquire into and solve "diligenter et perquiramus et solvamus"(1) the questions concerning genus and species, which Porphyry had refused to answer in his *Introduction* to the *Categories* of Aristotle. Abelard states his intention: "and since it is known that genera and species are universals and in them Porphyry touches on the nature of all universals generally, let us inquire here into the common nature of universals by studying these two (genus and species), and let us inquire also whether they apply only to words or to things as well."(2)
The thesis of this brief paper is that Abelard, in spite of his diligent inquiry, could not explain genus and species owing to his unanalyzed conception of an individual." (p. 165)
(1) *Logica Ingredientibus*, 913. All references to Abelard will be made to B. GEYER, *Peter Abaelard's Philosophische Schriften*, in: BGPhMA. 21, Münster, H.I 1919, H. 2 1921, H. 3, 1927, H. 4 1933.
(2) *Log. Incred.* 913~17, trans, by R. McKEON, *Selections from Medieval Philosophers*, I, New York: Scribner's Sons, 1929, 221.
39. Wciórka, Wojciech. 2008. "Abelard on Porphyry's Definition of Accident." *Mediaevalia philosophica Polonorum. Bulletin d'information concernant les recherches sur la philosophie médiévale en Pologne* no. 37:168–181.
"Abelard explicitly distinguishes two senses of the word "accident" when used with reference to things(2). The broader sense includes all forms, i.e. beings belonging to any category other than substance. According to this sense it is true to follow

- Boethius and say that every thing is either a substance or an accident(3). However, it is the narrower, 'Porphyrian' sense of "accident", and Abelard's understanding of it, that will be the focus of this paper." (p. 168, two notes omitted)
- (2) *LI Isag.* 83.31-37.
- (3) Boethius, *In Categorias Aristotelis libri quatuor*, in: *Patrologiae cursus completus*, vol. 64, J.-P. Migne (ed.), Paris 1847 (hereafter, *In Cat.*), 192A. Cf. *In Cat.* 169D, where he plainly follows Porphyry, *In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium*, A. Busse (ed), *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, vol. 4.1, Berlin 1887, 71.20-22.
40. ———. 2019. "Indispensable Parts and Abelard's Circle." In *Mereology in Medieval Logic and Metaphysics: Proceedings of the 21st European Symposium of Medieval Logic and Semantics*, 135–178. Pisa: Edizioni della Normale.
41. Wilks, Ian. 1993. *The Logic of Abelard's Dialectica*, University of Toronto. Available at ProQuest Dissertation Express. Order number: NN82768.
Abstract: "In this work I provide a fairly discursive treatment of Abelard's logical theory, discussing his views on a considerable number of syntactic and semantic issues at the levels of argument, statement and word: the formulation of syllogistic rules, the *oratio*, assertion, tense, grammatical voice and number, the copula and the copula verb phrase, the quantifier, and the negative particle; the nature and varieties of inference, the nature of the statement, the co-referential theory of truth, identity conditions for names, signification, reference, the intellectus, imposition, abstraction and the status. My contention is that there is a unifying theme in Abelard's treatment of all of these issues: his concern to develop a logic with no theoretical reliance on what, for the purpose of this study, I call 'the standard ambiguity'. This ambiguity is present in Aristotelian formulations of syllogistic logic, where a statement such as 'Every man is mortal' will be described by a formula such as this: mortal is in the whole of man. This formula treats 'mortal' and 'man' as names referring, in each case, to a single item of some sort, and suggests that the statement 'Every man is mortal' simply expresses a relation holding between two such items. The general effect of the standard ambiguity is to suggest that logic has these kinds of items, and their relations, as its subject matter. For Abelard the subject matter of logic is language. A statement is to be considered syntactically as a group of words, not as a pair of standardly ambiguous items; but this view presupposes that the structural requirements of syllogistic inference (and in particular, conversion) can actually be met by statements considered in this light. I interpret Abelard's theory of syntax as an attempt to prove the truth of this presupposition; this is the essential business of Part 1 of my study. In Part 2 I show that Abelard likewise provides theories of inference, truth and meaning which avoid theoretical reliance on the standard ambiguity, and treat these issues instead in terms (respectively) of the formal properties of syntax, coreferentiality in subject and predicate names, and the abstracted *intellectus*."
42. ———. 1998. "Peter Abelard and the Metaphysics of Essential Predication." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* no. 36:365–385.
"Abelard's explanation of his reasoning in the passages from *DP* (where he justifies the statement that a penalty is *bona* but not *bonum* by observing that "changing the gender in adjectival names often varies the sense"(65) is obviously inadequate in capturing the full subtlety of his analysis, and one naturally assumes that he is writing for an audience expected to be already schooled in some of these technicalities. Indeed, a much fuller description of those technicalities is possible than any he provides in any one place; I have attempted to supply that desideratum in this study.
The general lesson we take from the above sequence of texts begins with the insight that what is one essentially can be many definitionally, and that a predicate fully applicable to some member of that definitional plurality can fail to be fully applicable to some other member. Most predicates, one would think, would either be fully applicable to all, or fully inapplicable; but some--those which actually

constitute the differences in definition -- fall in this middle ground, where of at least one member they are adjacently and essentially predicable, and of at least one other they are only essentially predicable. As we have seen, there are three such cases that loom very large in Abelard's work: "predicable of many" in the definitional plurality that constitutes the universal, "is generated" in the definitional plurality that constitutes God, and "is good" in the definitional plurality that constitutes a good thing; the importance of these cases in providing centerpiece doctrines for his critical metaphysics, theology and ethics show the method they employ to be of the highest importance for this philosopher.(66)

And one should, finally, give a thought to the uniqueness of this analytic approach; in the catalogue of methods that philosophers have used in quest of truth, this one of Abelard's presents itself to view as a distinctly novel entry." (pp. 384-385) (65) *DP*, x 29 (2335-37).

(66) Indeed, the potential range of application can be extended to the very distinction of genus and species itself, since the genus can be viewed as standing to the species just as the bronze of the statue does to the statue itself. See *LI Per*, 79 (5-14), 10 (29-34), and Jolivet, *Arts du langage*, 303.

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Petrus Abaelardus. *DP = Dialogus inter philosophum, Iudaeum, et Christianum*, ed. Rudolf Thomas (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1970);

*LI = Peter Abaelards philosophische Schriften t: Die Logica *ingredientibus*, "ed. Bernhard Geyer, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters* 21.1- 3 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1919- 27);

LI Per --- Glossae super Peri hermeneias, *LI* 21.3;

J. Jolivet, *Arts du langage et thologie chez Abélard*, 2nd ed. rev., *Études de philosophie médiévale*, vol. 57 (Paris: J. Vrin, 1982),

43. ———. 1998. "Abelard on Figurative Language and Transferred Meaning." In *The Future of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance: Problems, Trends, and Opportunities for Research*, edited by Dahood, Roger, 171–186. Turnhout: Brepols. "Enlightened study of semantic theory will repeatedly teach the same basic lesson about human language: that meaning is mapped onto words in a highly complex way, so that a simple correspondence of one distinct unit of meaning to each distinct word is rarely, probably never, what is involved in the meaningfulness of a whole sentence, clause, or even phrase. Context matters; words bear the meaning they do only by virtue of their use alongside other words-and can bear a quite different meaning alongside other words. We typically understand a word by viewing it in context, which is as much as to say that we typically impute meaning to words not in fine-grained units of meaning, which correspond precisely to individual words, but in larger, less fine-grained units of meaning, which correspond less precisely to larger syntactic structures-to whole phrases, clauses, or even sentences. It is impossible to do semantic theory at any level of sophistication without at least a rudimentary understanding of these facts. We find lots of evidence for this claim in the work of twentieth-century philosophers of language; and, perhaps more surprisingly, we find a good deal of similar evidence in the work of the medievals. It is, for instance, a fact that one of the medieval period's greatest semantic theorists, Peter Abelard, clearly had and expressed some insights along these lines; and it is the precise purpose of the present study to focus in on this one particular case, by paying special attention to his discussion of figurative language and transferred meaning. The issue of context dependency as a determiner of meaning was important enough to Abelard that he wrote in some detail about it-important enough, indeed, that he even changed his mind about it. In what follows I convey a few of his insights and suggest the direction in which they seem to have undergone a shift." (p. 171)
44. ———. 2007. "Abelard on Context and Signification." *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* no. 81:189–208.
Abstract: "Abelard maintains that individual words in a sentence represent distinct semantic units of its overall meaning. He employs two strategies to defend this

position in the face of troublesome counterexamples. One strategy—the earlier of the two—sacrifices normal intuitions about what a word is, often labeling what seem to be words as non-signifying syllables. The later strategy invokes a rather fluid conception of what the signification of a word is, allowing this signification considerable latitude to alter under the contextual influence of other words. This evolution of strategy is linked to a new willingness on Abelard's part to adopt the principle of charity in interpreting sentences; this approach presumes the truth of the statement, and tries to find an interpretation which bears that presumption out. This new willingness to adopt the principle is in turn linked to Abelard's developing vocation as an interpreter of biblical texts."

45. ———. 2008. "Peter Abelard and His Contemporaries." In *Handbook of the History of Logic, Vol. 2: Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic*, edited by Gabbay, Dov and Woods, John, 83–156. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

"It is standard practice to develop an account of categorical logic which starts with a discussion of words, and moves through categorical propositions to the categorical syllogisms themselves. Abelard consciously adopts a parallel course for the logic of hypotheticals by beginning with a treatment of topics and hypothetical propositions. In general we can think of Abelard's development of material as falling along these two axes: discussion of words and categorical propositions leading to categorical syllogisms; and then discussion of topics and hypothetical propositions leading to hypothetical syllogisms. This way of organizing material is overtly embraced by Abelard in the *Dialectica*, in his attempt to depart from the commentary format. So it can be taken as representing his most basic intuitions on how the subject matter of logic should be organized.

I will structure my discussion below accordingly. Part 1 deals with words, categorical propositions and categorical syllogisms. Part 2 deals with topics, hypothetical propositions and hypothetical syllogisms. These two parts complete the treatment of Abelard, and Part 3 turns to his contemporaries and their schools." (pp. 84-85)

46. ———. 2016. "Latin Logic up to 1200." In *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Logic*, edited by Dutilh Novaes, Catarina and Read, Stephen, 94–118. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4.4: *Twelfth Century: Peter Abelard*, pp. 108-111.

47. ———. 2020. "Peter Abelard." In *Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy between 500 and 1500. Second Edition*, edited by Lagerlund, Erik, 1406–1413. Dordrecht: Springer.

Abstract: "The characteristic doctrines of Peter Abelard (1079–1142) can be arranged under the headings of logic, metaphysics, and ethics.

Abelard rejects the position that logical theory deals with universals taken as things (*res*).

It deals with words, whose signification is explained by their association with thoughts stripped of individuating detail. His account of propositions is shaped by his distinction between propositional force and propositional content, and by his notion of the *dictum*, the causally efficacious non-thing which is what a proposition says. His account of inference is especially focused on the nature of conditionals and the sorts of relationships between terms that can be used to verify them.

Abelard's most characteristic metaphysical view is that the only things which exist are individuals. Forms exist as individual to the things they inhabit, not as shared between things. Material objects are indeed matter/form composites, but their forms are simply arrangements of underlying matter; material objects are thus usefully subject to mereological analysis (i.e., analysis in terms of part/whole relations).

Humans, but not animals, have immaterial souls, and are capable of freedom. By contrast God is not free; he can only do the things he does. Abelard's most characteristic ethical view is that it is the consent, not the action, that is to be judged as sinful or meritorious. A sinful consent is marked by contempt for God, and is formed explicitly in violation of God's law.

Law is itself revealed both in the Old and New Testament – yielding Old and New Law, respectively – but is also innately present to humans in the form of natural law. Meritorious consent is marked by love of God – in other words, by charity. Charity is the theological equivalent of justice, which itself holds central place among the cardinal virtues. Justice and charity both enjoin regard for the interests of others, but charity additionally does this as a product of the love of God, and for that reason counts as a more fundamental virtue than justice." (pp. 1406-1407)