Ancient Islamic Logic. Selected bibliography of studies in English: A - B

N.B. For Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina (Avicenna) separated bibliographies are under construction.

1. "Special Issue: Major Issues and Controversies of Arabic Logic." 2016. Oriens no. 44:179–416.

   Contents: Cornelia Schoeck: Major Issues and Controversies of Arabic Logic: Preface 179; Riccardo Strobino: Per Se, Inseparability, Containment and Implication. Bridging the Gap between Avicenna’s Theory of Demonstration and Logic of the Predicables 181; Tony Street: Al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī (d. 1325) and the Early Reception of Kātibī’s Shamsīya: Notes towards a Study of the Dynamics of Post-Avicennan Logical Commentary 267; Khaled El-Rouayheb: Does a Proposition Have Three Parts or Four? A Debate in Later Arabic Logic 301; Walter Edward Young: Mulāzama in Action in the Early Ādāb al-Baḥth 332; Cornelia Schoeck: The Criterion of Completeness in Avicenna’s Reorganization of the Predicables into a System of Notions Resulting in Concept Formation 386–416.

2. "Argumentation and Arabic Philosophy of Language / Argumentation et philosophie arabe du langage." 2022. Methodos. Savoirs et textes no. 22:1–15.

   Contents: Shahid Rahman and Walter Edward Young: Argumentation and Arabic Philosophy of Language: Introduction; Omer Awass: Modalities of Argumentation, Scriptural Reasoning, and the Structural Characteristics of Early Islamic Theological Discourse; Abdessamad Belhaj: Al-Ashʿarī’s Adab al-jadal: A Few Remarks on its Genre; Ali-Reza Bhojani: Linguistic philosophy in modern uṣūl al-fiqh: al-Ākhund al-Khurāsānī (d. 1911) on seeking something without willing it to be; Alexander Lamprakis: Did the Arabic Tradition Know a More Complete Version of Alexander’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Topics? The Evidence from Ps-Jābir’s Kitāb al-Nukhab / Kitāb al-Baḥth; Abdurrahman Ali Mihirig: Analogical Arguments in the Kalām Tradition: Abū l-Maꜥālī al-Juwaynī and Beyond; Necmettin Pehlivan and Hadi Ensar Ceylan: Old Rivalry, Eternal Friendship: The Story of an Opponent-al-Fuṣūl in the ʿilm al-naẓar; Jens Ole Schmitt: Preferring Formal Language over the Face? Avicenna on the Physiognomical Syllogism. Some Observations; Shahid Rahman and Walter Edward Young: In Existence and in Nonexistence: Types, Tokens, and the Analysis of Dawarān as a Test for Causation; Aaron Spevack: Defending Definitions: The Tools of Disputation in Logic of al-Fanārī; Walter Edward Young: On the Logical Machinery of Post-Classical Dialectic: The Kitāb ʿAyn al-Naẓar of Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d. 722/1322).

   All ther text are available on line, also in the French version.

3. Abed, Shukri B. 1996. "Language." In History of Islamic Philosophy: Volume II, edited by Nasr, Seyyed Hossein and Leaman, Oliver, 1602–1655. London: Routledge.

   "The purpose of this chapter is to characterize the debates concerning the development of the Arabic language (al-’arabiyyah) and to identify the specific mechanisms through which linguistic accommodations have been (and are being) made in the Arabic language to adapt to evolving circumstances. The first section will deal with the reaction of Arab intellectuals to the introduction of Greek, Indian and Persian philosophy and science into the Islamic world beginning in the second/eighth century. This reaction was mirrored in a series of debates concerning the relative merits of (Greek) logic and (Arabic) grammar. These culminated in a particularly important debate, documented toward the middle of the fourth/tenth century, which will serve as a focus for discussion in the first section of the chapter. The second and third sections will address the impact of the two external cultural confrontations cited above on the Arabic language, during the classical and the modern periods of Islam, respectively. The fourth and final section will briefly summarize contemporary debates concerning the future of the Arabic language.(2)" (pp. 1602-1603)

   (2) Owing to space limitations, other important linguistic issues, such as the discussion of the nature and the origin of language (i.e., whether it is conventional or inspired) cannot be dealt with here. A summary of various views on these subjects in the writings of medieval Islamic intellectuals may be found in J. al-Dln al-Suyuti (n.d.): 7ff. For the origin of the term lughah (language), consult the Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edition, s.v. “Lughah”, contributed by A. Hadj-Salah.

   [On the islamic views on the origin of language:

   Czapkiewicz, Andrzej, The views of the medieval Arab philologists on language and its origin in the light of ʾas-Suyūṭī’s “al-Muzhir”, Kraków 1988.

   Pierre Larcher, « Et Allah apprit à >Adam tous les noms … » (Cor. 2, 31) : l'origine du langage dans la pensée islamique, in Nadja Germann, Steven Harvey (eds.), The Origin and Nature of Language and Logic: Perspectives in Medieval Islamic, Jewish, and Christian Thought, Turnhout: Brepola 2020, 3-27.

   Loucel, Henri, L’origine du langage d’après les grammairiens arabes: I, Arabica 10 (1963), 188-208.

   Loucel, Henri, L’origine du langage d’après les grammairiens arabes: II, Arabica 10 (1963), 253-281.

   Loucel, Henri, L’origine du langage d’après les grammairiens arabes: III, Arabica 11 (1964), 57-72.

   Loucel, Henri, L’origine du langage d’après les grammairiens arabes: IV, Arabica 11 (1964), 151–187.

   Kees Versteegh, Linguistic Attitudes and the Origin of Speech in the Arab World, in Alaa Elgibali (ed.), Understanding Arabic: Essays in Contemporary Arabic Linguistics in Honor of El-Said Badawi, Cairo: American University in Cairo 1996, pp. 15-31.

   Bernard G. Weiss, Medieval Muslim Discussions of the Origin of Language, Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 124 (1974), 33-41.]

   [On Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505): Antonella Ghersetti (ed.), Al-Suyūṭī, a Polymath of the Mamlūk Period, Leiden: Brill 2017]

4. Adamson, Peter, and Key, Alexander. 2015. "Philosophy of Language in the Medieval Arabic Tradition." In Linguistic Content: New Essays on the History of Philosophy of Language, edited by Cameron, Margaret and Stainton, Robert J., 74–99. New York: Oxford University Press.

   "Our analysis will show that the distinction between Hellenic philosophy and the autochthonous Arabic disciplines was not the result of any prima facie incompatibility between the two epistemologies. In fact, once the sensitivities of politics and culture had died down, the tripartite and bipartite theories of meaning that each tradition brought to the table proved perfectly compatible and mutually productive.

   But, before that point was reached in the eleventh century, the two sides in our debate needed to work through their political and cultural differences. The polemical context drove them to make exaggerated claims for their respective disciplines: either logic was the only way to think, or it was grammar.

   The self-evidently false nature of that dichotomy contributed to its abandonment, but not before casting a long shadow on the philosophy of language in the medieval Arabic tradition. Our chapter will, through its analysis of the debate, provide a clarification of the autochthonous Arabic position, which has received less attention than the philhellenic discourse. There was a pre-existing theory of meaning in Arabic before Hellenic philosophy appeared, and we will show how that bipartite Arabic theory of meaning, consisting solely of vocal form and mental content, provided the terminology and epistemological architecture for a whole series of ideas about how the mental content could, and should, be turned into linguistic content." (pp. 74-75)

5. Afnan, Soheil M. 1964. Philosophical Terminology in Arabic and Persian. Leiden: Brill.

   Chapter Five: pp. 35-50.

   "The logic of the Falāsifah just like that of their Greek and Hellenistic predecessors was a subject-predicate(1) logic. And their metaphysics was a substance-accident(2), and universal-particular(3) metaphysics. Hence the insights of modern schools of philosophy could hardly be expected of them. It has been maintained that for the employment of the subject-predicate principle in language and logic there is "a sound pragmatic defence. But in metaphysics the concept is sheer error(4)". Perhaps for that reason it is easier to pick at their metaphysics than at their logic; though that may have been superceded also. In any case the methods of linguistic analysis as developed in modern times, and the form in which correct logical statements or philosophical questions need to be couched, cannot be applied to the works of the Falasifah with justice.

   Language and thought have been progressively changing in the Occident for centuries. They have been stagnant in the Orient for almost the same period. "Philosophy must ... involve the exercise of systematic restatement(5)"; not the tedious repetitions practiced in the East for so long." (pp. 34-35)

   (1) Al-mawḍū^c wa al-mahmūl.

   (2) Al-jawhar wa al-^caraḍ.

   (3) Al-kulliyyāt wa al-fuz 'iyyāt.

   (4) The Philosophy of A. N. Whitehead. ed. Schilpp. 2nd. ed. [1941] p. 306. [The reference is to A. Whitehead, Process and Reality. An Essay in Cosmology [1929], Corrected edition, New York: The Free Press 1978, p. 79]

   (5) Gilbert Ryle, [Systematically Misleading Expressions, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, Vol. 32 (1931-1932), pp. 139-170, p. 169].

   (...)

   "In view of the above considerations the logic propounded by the Arabs and Persians can be more easily equated with the Greek texts than their metaphysics. The terms were more definite even when literally translated whether through some happy equivalent or sheer improvisation. But such terms did not always convey to the Falāsifah exactly the same meanings. In metaphysics where the terminology is much more abstract it becomes extremely risky to equate the terms with the original Greek in spite of the apparent semblance. Furthermore they were as a rule unaware that certain terms were of Peripatetic origin, others came from the Stoics and still others from the Neoplatonists. They knew for instance that entelechy was a word coined by Aristotle, but that was only a rare case." (p. 39)

6. Ahmed, Asaq Q. 2008. "The Jiha/Tropos-Mādda/Hūlē Distinction in Arabic Logic and its Significance for Avicenna’s Modals." In The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition: Science, Logic, Epistemology and their Interactions, edited by Rahman, Shahid, Street, Tony and Tahiri, Hassan, 229–254. Dordrecht: Springer.

   Abstract: "The word tropos, translated in Arabic as jiha, is understood in the field of logic as mode. Though investigations of modals in the medieval Arabo-Islamic logical tradition trace their lineage back to Aristotle, the Greek word designating this concept was never used in this manner by the Stagirite. The closest word that the Arabic jiha translates from Greek is tropos, which was a technical term that gradually developed with Aristotle’s commentators. The word came to be understood as part of a dichotomy, tropos-hūlē, which was inherited by the Arabs as jiha-mādda. This dichotomy seems to have become a determining factor for conversion rules of modal propositions and thus for modal syllogistic. After an investigation outlining the evolution of the term tropos and the development of the dichotomy tropos-hūlē in the Commentary tradition of modal logic, the article presents philological evidence for their influence on Avicenna. It then briefly discuss the ramifications of this influence for his modal conversion rules and syllogistic. In sum, the article argues that the jiha-mādda (tropos-hūlē) division was part of a larger dichotomy that allowed Avicenna to construe propositions in various ways. How he understood a given proposition determined the validity of its conversion and so of its place in his modal syllogistic."

7. Ahmed, Asad Q. 2010. "Interpreting Avicenna: Urmawi/Tahtani and the Later Logical Tradition on Propositions." Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale no. 21:313–342.

8. Ahmed, Asaq Q. 2011. "Systematic growth in sustained error: a case study in the dynamism of post-classical Islamic scholarship." In The Islamic Scholarly Tradition: Studies in History, Law, and Thought in Honor of Professor Michael Allan Cook, edited by Ahmed, Asaq Q., Sadeghi, Behnam and Bonner, Michael, 343–378. Leiden: Brill.

   Contain the edition and translation of Āmidī, “On the Conflict between Avicenna and Fārābī on the Description of the Subject", pp. 363-371 (translation), pp. 372-377 (arabic text).

   "The details of my study are addressed to historians of medieval logic, philosophy, and theology, but what they tell us about transformations—and the mechanisms underlying the transformations—within the discipline of logic should interest Islamicists more generally. I therefore summarize the global picture in the next two sections. In section IV, I hope to have offered an explanation of the specialist details by way of some examples. The rest of the article, starting in section V, is the extended technical proof of the more general observations and conclusions.

   Thus, the reader not specializing in the fields of Arabic theology, philosophy, and logic should have no difficulty with sections II and III; and she may also wish to work through section IV for a non-formal sample presentation of the argument. Section V, however, assumes some knowledge of medieval logic in general and Arabo-Islamic logic in particular." (pp. 345-346)

9. ———. 2013. "Logic in the Khayrābādī School of India: A Preliminary Exploration." In Law and Tradition in Classical Islamic Thought: Studies in Honor of Professor Hossein Modarressi, edited by Cock, Michael, Haider, Najam, Rabb, Intisar and Sayeed, Asma, 227–243. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

   Abstract: "This chapter presents, in an exploratory fashion, the history of Arabo-Islamic logic in India between the tenth/sixteenth and fourteenth/twentieth centuries, with special focus on the formation of the Khayrābādī School in this discipline. Given its exploratory nature, the chapter does not promote any thesis that elaborates on the causes behind historical developments; however, it does point out that the study of logic passed through India in four distinct stages via Multān, Delhi, Lahore, the Awadh (generally), and Tonk. The aim of the chapter is simply to chart the trajectory of the scholars and works associated with logical studies in the specified period and region, so as to lay the groundwork for further technical research in Arabo-Islamic logical texts of the subcontinent."

10. ———. 2022. Palimpsests of Themselves: Logic and Commentary in Postclassical Muslim South Asia. Oakland, CA: University of California Press.

    "This book is a study of the Sullam al-ʿulūm (The Ladder of the Sciences) of Muḥibballāh al-Bihārī (d. 1119/1707), long considered to be the most advanced logic textbook in the Indian(1) Niẓāmī curriculum.(2) It also engages the vast commentarial tradition that its composition elicited and offers a theory of commentaries.

    The culminating South Asian articulation of discourses on logic issuing after the close of the classical period (ca. 200/800–600/1200), the Sullam is uniquely positioned to give scholars of Arabic logic a vantage point from which to reflect on the postclassical (ca. 600/1200–1300/1900) career of the discipline: as we will witness below, it was the South Asian heir to a continuous tradition that passed sequentially from Avicenna to Marāgha to Shīrāz to North India. The Sullam also allows one to reflect on the development of logic in the local Indian environment: its commentarial tradition was either internally self-referential or it reverted to the prehistory of the hypotext; contemporary developments outside the Subcontinent are practically never cited by the Sullam’s hypertexts. In other words, although the Sullam was the product of a protracted transregional affair, its commentarial tradition was locally responsive."

    (1) I do not use the expression “Indian” to refer to nation-state boundaries. I use it interchangeably for South Asia and as a shorthand for those domains that were under direct or indirect Mughal suzerainty at some point in the history of the region. This, too, should not be interpreted as a connotative concession to contested categories, but only as a way to set up a vague regional referent.

    (2) The so-called Niẓāmī curriculum was, properly speaking, a method of scholarly training. I do not use the expression to indicate a rigid set of texts or classes. For further discussion, see Ahmed, “Dars.”

    References

    Ahmed, Asad Q., “Dars-i Niẓāmī.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, THREE, online ed., 2015–. Edited by Kate Fleet, Gudrun Krämer, Denis Matringe, John Nawas, and Everett Rowson..

11. Ahmed, Asad Q. 2025. "The Negative-Predicate Proposition in Later Arabic Logic." In Logic, Soul, and World: Essays in Arabic Philosophy in Honor of Tony Street, edited by Ahmed, Asad Q., Zarepour, Mohammad Saleh and Strobino, Riccardo, 427–449. Leiden: Brill.

    "The article’s anchor is the presentation of the negative-predicate proposition in the Sullam al-ʿulūm of Muḥibballāh al-Bihārī (d. 1119/1707).(2) I focus on this late reception and engagement with the topic via some of the commentaries on this work. Insofar as the Sullam was part of a continuous dialectical tradition, I also explore discussions of this topic in three works of logic that played an influential role in the South Asian tradition.(3) Thus, the article is divided in the following manner. In the first part, I highlight the relevant principles whose common validity produced the problems that motivated the invention of the new kind of proposition; here I rely mostly on the tradition of the Sullam. In the second part, I present discussions of the negative-predicate proposition in Quṭb ad-Dīn at-Taḥtānī’s (d. 766/1365) Sharḥ al-Maṭāliʿ of Sirāj ad-Dīn al-Urmawī (d. 682/1283), As-Sayyid ash-Sharīf al-Jurjānī’s (d. 816/143) supercommentary on the Shamsiyya of Najm ad-Dīn al-Kātibī (d. 675/1276), and Jalāl ad-Dīn ad-Dawānī’s (d. 908/1502/3) commentary on the Tahdhīb al-Manṭiq of Saʿd ad-Dīn at-Taftāzānī (d. 793/1390). These three texts constituted the textual Sitz im Leben of the discussion in the Sullam tradition. In the third and final part, I summarize the discussion of this topic in the Sullam tradition mainly via the commentary of Mullā Mubīn (d. 1225/1810)." (pp. 427-428)

    (2) On the author and this work, see Asad Q. Ahmed, Palimpsests of Themselves: Logic and Commentary in Postclassical Muslim South Asia (Oakland/Berkeley: University of California Press,

    2022), Chapters 1 and 2.

    (3) On works central to the study of logic in South Asia, See Asad Q. Ahmed, “Logic in the Khayrābādī School of India,” in Law and Tradition in Classical Islamic Thought: Studies in Honor of Professor Hossein Modarressi, ed. Michael Cook, Najam Haider, Intisar Rabb, and Asma Sayeed (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 227–245.

12. Ahmed, Asad Q., Zarepour, Mohammad Saleh, and Strobino, Riccardo, eds. 2025. Logic, Soul, and World: Essays in Arabic Philosophy in Honor of Tony Street. Leiden: Brill.

    Notes on Contributors IX; Asad Q. Ahmed, Mohammad Saleh Zarepour and Riccardo Strobino: Introduction 1; Interview with Tony Street: A Retrospective 7; 1 Mohammad Saleh Zarepour: Al-Fārābī on Future Contingency 13; 2 Cornelia Schoeck: ‘Subtraction’ (rafʿ) as Method for Finding First Principles of Demonstrations and for Establishing or Destroying: From Aristotle to al-Fārābī 46; 3 Zhenyu Cai: On Avicenna’s Theory of Conception and Assertion: Towards a Systematic Ambiguity Reading 114; 4 Silvia Di Vincenzo: Struggling with the Essentials: A Debate between Avicenna and His Contemporaries on Essentiality and Necessity in Demonstrations 130; 5 Tianyi Zhang: Avicenna and as-Suhrawardī on the Flying Man: From the Flying Man to Existentialism 158; 6 Paul Thom: Al-Kātibī’s Deduction of the Predicables 186; 7 Daniel Davies: Harmonizing the Sages: Abravanel Reading Maimonides through Avicenna and Averroes 208; 8 Shahid Rahman and Alioune Seck: As-Suhrawardī’s Stance on Modalities and the Logic of Presence 227; 9 Tareq Moqbel: The Logic of Divine Discourse: Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s Application of Logic to Qurʾānic Interpretation 271; 10 Khaled El-Rouayheb: A Problem with the Wholly Hypothetical Syllogism: Some 13th-Century Arabic Discussions 300; 11 Dustin Klinger: A 12th-Century Attack on Peripatetic Logic: Rashīd ad-Dīn al-Waṭwāṭ’s (d. 1182) Treatise “A Doubt About reductio ad absurdum” and Its Aftermath 326; 12 Walter Edward Young: Four Moves to Rule Them All: Qiyās-Dialectic Metatheories and the Ascendancy of Master-Category Objections in Post-Classical Islamic Dialectics 366; 13 Asad Q. Ahmed: The Negative-Predicate Proposition in Later Arabic Logic 427; 14 Osama Eshera, Fateme Savadi and Robert Wisnovsky: Prolegomena to a Critical Edition of Sāwī’s Baṣāʾir 450; Index 499-503.

13. Ahsan, Abbas, and Karima, Marzuqa. 2022. "Torn Between the Contours of Logic: Exploring Logical Normativity in Islamic Philosophical Theology." European Journal of Analytic Philosophy no. 18.

    Abstract: "Western contemporary logic has been used to advance the field of Islamic philosophical theology, which historically utilised Aristotelian-Avicennian logic, on grounds of there being an inherent normativity in logic. This is in spite of the surrounding controversy on the status of logic in the Islamic theological tradition. The normative authority of logic means that it influences the content of what we ought to believe and how we ought to revise those beliefs. This paper seeks to demonstrate that, notwithstanding the incompatible differences between the two systems, the underlying feature of both Western contemporary logic and Aristotelian-Avicennian logic is logical normativity. It then argues that an inherent normativity of logic in the Islamic theological/philosophical tradition is unmotivated. Instead, it proposes to reinstate logic as anti-exceptional within the Islamic theological/philosophical tradition as a viable alternative."

14. Akgunduz, Ahmed. 2011. "Sa‘īd Nūrsī’s Approach to the Principles of Reasoning Vis-à-vis Analogical Inductive Reasoning." Journal of Islam in Asia no. 8:157–179.

    Abstract: "Analogical inductive reasoning (al-qiyās al-tamthīlī) is to some scholars a controversial issue related to Islamic law and logic. It is argued that this kind of qiyās can only afford non-certain knowledge in Islamic law. Bedi‘uzamān Said Nūrsī (1876-1960) however, evaluated this kind of qiyās and argued that there also exists al-qiyās al-tamthīlī which affords certain knowledge. This problem may not be appreciated unless information regarding the proofs (al-’adillah wa al-Íujaj) and the ways of inference (isÏinbāt) and argumentation (istidlāl) in logic and Islamic law is discussed. For that matter stand of great scholars like Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728) and Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751) have been shared in. They have actually gone the same way with different nuances."

15. Akrami, Musa. 2017. "From Logic in Islam to Islamic Logic." Logica Universalis no. 11:61–83.

    Abstract: "Speaking of relations between logic and religion in Islamic world may refer to logic in two respects: (1) logic in religious texts, from doctrinal sacred texts such as Qur'an and sayings of the Prophet (as well as Imāms, in Sh'ıism) to the Qur'anic commentaries and the texts related to the principles and fundamentals of jurisprudence, all of which make use of some reasoning to persuade the audiences or to infer the rules and prescripts for religious behavior of the members of religious community; and (2) logic as a discipline that is studied and applied both independently and as a tool for reasoning in (a) schools of Islamic theology (from Ash’arīs to Mu’tazilīs and Shī'īs), (b) systems of Islamic philosophy (from Peripatetics to Illuminationists), and (c) other types of knowledge in medieval Islamic world, all being strongly influenced by religious doctrines of Islam. Accordingly, this paper speaks of (i) the different manifestations of using logical reasoning, particularly analogy, in Qur'anic arguments, e.g. for the existence of God and resurrection after death; (ii) some contradictions or paradoxes reported by different opponents in the verses of Qur'an; (iii) the place of logic in the classification of disciplines and the courses taught at the schools and seminaries; (iv) the influence of the attitudes of different religious sects on logic; (v) the instrumental role of logic for both religious and secular reasonings; (vi) the relation between reason and dogmatic religious doctrines, and, finally, (vii) the reflection of this relation on progress or recession of logic in medieval Islamic world."

16. ———. 2020. "Logic in Islam and Islamic Logic." In Beyond Faith and Rationality: Essays on Logic, Religion and Philosophy, edited by Silvestre, Ricardo Sousa, Göcke, Benedikt Paul, Béziau, Jean-Yves and Bilimoria, Purushottama, 276–300. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.

    "Due to its appealing potential and possibilities, the Greek heritage in logic was broadly translated into other languages (for Arabic translation of Aristotle’s writings see (Walzer 1962)). The leading role of logic gave rise to studying, learning, and teaching it in various religious and philosophical circles. In spite of some antiphilosophical trends, it is not surprising that the translation of Greek works in logic was welcomed by most scholars with their own strong Islamic religious and theological attitudes. Such an attitude led to the emergence of important logicians and extension of Greek logic in the Islamic world.

    This chapter is arranged in three main sections to show the place of

    1. reason and reasoning in Islam as a religion,

    2. logic in Islam as a religion, and

    3. the well-known “Islamic logic”, a tradition in the history of logic that was developed in the Islamic world largely by Muslim logicians, in relation to logic in Islam as a religion that has its own sacred texts, on the one hand, and the theoretical and practical issues that possibly makes using logic necessary, on the other hand." (pp. 277-278)

    References

    Walzer, Richard. 1962. Greek into Arabic: Essays on Islamic philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

17. al-Karaki, Balqis. 2018. "The Poetic Syllogism in Fakhr al-Dîn al-Râzî’s Nihâyat al-îjâz fî dirâyat al-i’jâz." Mélanges de l’Université Saint-Joseph no. 67:127–155.

18. Ali, Mufti. 2002. " The image of the history of opposition against kalam and logic reflected in modern literature." Al Qalam no. 19:117–137.

    Abstract: "The attitudes of Islamic scholars toward Greek kalam, logic, and philosophy, which they generally refer to as 'ulum al-awa'il, are divided into two orientations: the Traditional orientation, which emphasizes that Islamic reason should be focused on understanding and applying revelation, away from philosophical activities, and the Rational orientation, which states that the Greek tradition does not contradict Islamic doctrine. This Traditional orientation has not received sufficient attention from modern writers. Through a review of modern literature by I. Goldziher, G. Maksidi, G.H.A. Juynboll, J. Pavlin, and P.Sj. van Koningsveld, which explicitly and elaborately outlines the schools, figures, opinions, and arguments of these "opponents," this study reveals that the stance of supporting or rejecting kalam and logic is not the monopoly of a particular religious school. Scholars who are considered representatives of the extreme Traditional school can be the main defenders of kalam and logic and make very significant contributions to the advancement of the two sciences, and vice versa. This study also reveals that the five modern authors did not refer to Shawn AI-Manthiq Wa Al-Kalam Min Fannay Al-Manthiq Wa Al-Kalam by Al Suyuthi, a text that is very rich in this theme."

19. ———. 2005. "Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī Against Logic and Kalām. Analysis and Significance of Ṣawn al-manṭiq wa'l-kalām ʿan fannay al-manṭiq wa'l-kalām." Hamdard Islamicus: Quarterly Journal of Studies and Research in Islam:23–44.

20. ———. 2008. "A Statistical Portrait of the Resistance to Logic by Sunni Muslim Scholars. Based on the Works of Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti (849-909/1448-15)." Islamic Law and Society no. 15:250–267.

    Abstract: "On the basis of my analysis of four works composed by al-Suyūṭi, I argue that hostility to logic was a predominant feature of Sunni scholarship, especially during the 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries. Logic was condemned by distinguished Sunni scholars in Valencia, Fez, Aleppo, Iraq, and Mecca, but especially in Egypt and Syria. This conlusion confirms Goldziher's argument that resistance to logic started already in the 2nd/8th century and increased in the 13th and 14th centuries; and disconfirms al-Rouayheb s argument that opposition to logic was never predominant among Muslim Sunni scholars."

    References

    I. Goldziher, "Die Stellung der alten Orthodoxie zu den antiken Wissenschaften," in Gesammelte Schriften (1970) vol. 5, 357-400 (originally published in Abhandlungen der konig. Preuss. Akademie der Wissenschaften [1915-1916], 3-46).English translation by Merlin L. Swartz, "The Attitude of Orthodox Islam toward the Ancient Sciences,"' in Studies on Islam (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 185-215.

    Khaled el-Rouayheb, "Sunni Muslim Scholars on the Status of Logic, 1500-1800," Islamic Law and Society 11,2 (2004), 213-232.

21. ———. 2008. "How did al-Suyūṭī abridge Ibn Taymiyya's Naṣīḥat ahl al-Īmān fī radd ʿalā Mantiq al-Yūnān?" Al-Jāmiʿah: Journal of Islamic Studies no. 46:279–301.

    Abstract: "Al-Radd ‘ala ’l-Mantiqiyyin (an alternative title for Nasihat Ahl al-Iman) is a work composed by Ibn Taymiyya to demolish each principle of logic as well as to unravel the depravity of their foundation. Probably due to Ibn Taymiyya’s being genius, when he destroys those principles, he could not avoid himself to discuss digressively irrelevant topics dealing with theological as well as metaphysical issues. In a number of passages in al-Radd, he could not even hinder himself to make a good deal of repetitions. Therefore, al-Radd ‘ala’l-Mantiqiyyin is complex and difficult to use. The coherence of arguments that Ibn Taymiyya formulated is not solid and comprehensive. His criticism of logic is not penetrating as well. On the basis of my analysis of al-Suyuti’s method of abridgement of Ibn Taymiyya’s al-Radd, I argue that al-Suyuti succeeded in rendering Ibn Taymiyya’s sequence of ideas superior to that found in the original work of the latter. The result of this study confirms Hallaq’s argument that the overall result of al-Suyuti’s abridgement of Ibn Taymiyya’s al-Radd is ‘a more effective critique of logic than that originally formulated by Ibn Taymiyya."

22. ———. 2008. Muslim Opposition to Logic and Theology in the Light of the Works of Jalal al-Din al-Suyūṭī (d. 9111505), Leiden.

    Available at Academia.edu.

    "In marked contrast to the abundance of modern literature on the history of theology and logic in Islam, we can only find a few works dealing with the history of the Muslim opposition to logic and theology. Usually, these works mainly focus either on the opposition to logic or on the opposition to theology." (p. 14)

    (...)

    "Our understanding of the Muslim opposition to logic and theology may be furthered by the study of the four works on these subjects written by Jalal al-Din al-Suyūṭī." (p. 30)

    "4. The Scope of the Present work

    The purpose of the present work is to deal with the following research-question:

    What can we learn from al-Suyūṭī’s four works against logic and theology about the history of Islamic thought concerning the condemnation of logic and theology, in addition to the light shed on this subject by modern scholars quoted earlier?

    In dealing with this research-question, I will discuss in the first chapter al-Suyūṭī’s earliest contribution to the history of the opposition to logic, entitled al-Qawl al-Muhriq fī Taḥrīm al-Ishtigāl bi 'Ilm al-Manṭīq, written by him when he was still a student of 18 years old. I will deal with the manuscripts and the edition of QM (1.1), the date and purpose of its composition (1.2), as well as with an analysis of its contents (1.3). In my conclusion, I shall evaluate this work as a source for the history of Muslim opposition to logic (1.4).

    In chapter two, I will discuss al-Suyuti’s abridgement of IT’s Naṣīḥa, entitled, Jahd al-Qarīha fī Tajrīd al-Naṣīḥa, a work composed when his knowledge of logic was doubted by some of his contemporaries. I will deal with the date (2.1) and purpose of his abridgement (2.2). I will also assess the contribution made by al-Suyūṭī in rendering IT’s Naṣīḥa more comprehensible. Elements of IT’s religious viewpoints against logic and theology in JQ will also be discussed (2.3). Some pages are devoted to deal with the question how al-Suyūṭī selected IT’s viewpoints against logic in his JQ (2.4). In the conclusion, I shall analyse the rationale of al-Suyūṭī’s selection of IT’s arguments in it (2.5).

    Chapter three will discuss al-Suyūṭī’s work that was composed twenty years after QM, when his call for ijtihād was refused by some of his contemporaries who doubted his ability to comply with an alleged precondition for ijtihād, i.e., the knowledge of logic. I will deal, first of all, with the manuscript and the edition of SM (3.1), with the date (3.2) and the purpose of the composition of this work, i.e. Ṣawn al-Manṭiq (3.3). An analysis will also be given of the content of this work (3.4). In my conclusion, I shall again evaluate this work as a source for the history of Muslim opposition to logic and theology (3.5).

    In chapter four, I will discuss al-Suyūṭī’s Fatwā against logic. In so doing, first of all, I will deal with its manuscript (4.1). I will give an analysis of the content of this Fatwā (4.2) and evaluate this sources on which al-Suyūṭī relies when issuing this Fatwā (4.3).

    In the conclusion, I will try to answer the research-question formulated above by synthesizing the last paragraphs of each of the four chapters of this study."

    Abbreviations

    IT = Ibn Taymiyya

    JQ = Jahdal-Qarīha fī Tajrīd al-Naṣīḥa

    QM = l-Qawl al-Muhriq fī Taḥrīm al-Ishtigāl bi 'Ilm al-Manṭīq

    SM = Ṣawn al-Manṭiq wa 'l-Kalām 'an Fannay al-Manṭiq wa 'l-Kalām

23. ———. 2008. "How did Al-Suyūtī abridge Ibn Taymyya's Naṣīḥat ahl al-Ĩmān fī al-Radd 'alā Manṭiq al-Yūnān?" Al-Jami'ah no. 46:279–301.

    Abstract: "Al-Radd ‘ala ’l-Manṭiqiyyīn (an alternative title for Naṣīḥat Ahl al-Ĩmān) is a work composed by Ibn Taymiyya to demolish each principle of logic as well as to unravel the depravity of their foundation. Probably due to Ibn Taymiyya’s being genius, when he destroys those principles, he could not avoid himself to discuss digressively irrelevant topics dealing with theological as well as metaphysical issues. In a number of passages in al-Radd, he could not even hinder himself to make a good deal of repetitions.

    Therefore, l-Radd ‘ala ’l-Manṭiqiyyīn is complex and difficult to use.

    The coherence of arguments that Ibn Taymiyya formulated is not solid and comprehensive. His criticism of logic is not penetrating as well. On the basis of my analysis of al-Suyūṭi’s method of abridgement of Ibn Taymiyya’s al-Radd, I argue that al-Suyūṭi succeeded in rendering Ibn Taymiyya’s sequence of ideas superior to that found in the original work of the latter. The result of this study confirms Hallaq’s argument that the overall result of al-Suyūṭi abridgement of Ibn Taymiyya’s al-Radd is ‘a more effective critique of logic than that originally formulated by Ibn Taymiyya."

24. ———. 2009. "Al-Suyūṭī's al-Qawl al-Mushriq against logic." Bibliotheca Orientalis no. 66:40–70.

    "Of four works against logic by al-Suyūṭī(1) al-Qawl al-Mushriq fi Taḥrim al-Ishtighal bi-¨Ilm al-Manṭiq (hereinafter: QM) can be said to have been the first to be composed, i.e. in 867 or 868/1465 or 1466. This is clearly indicated in the introduction of another work by al-Suyuṭi (born in 849/1445), i.e. Ṣawn al-Manṭiq, which says: “Long ago, in the year 867 or 868 [H] I composed a book on the prohibition of being occupied by the art of logic, which I named “al-Qawl al-Mushriq” into which I included the statements of the learned men of Islam to condemn and prohibit it.”(2)

    In this work al-Suyūṭī has discussed either explicitly or incidentally the opposition of more than 40 leading scholars of various law schools against logic by referring to more than 26 works which deal either explicitly or incidentally with the same issue.

    In this paper, I will deal with (1) the manuscript and the edition of QM, (2) the date and purpose of its composition, as well as with (3) an analysis of its contents. In (4), the Conclusion, I shall evaluate this work as a source for the history of Muslim opposition to logic." (pp. 40-41)

    (1) Al-Suyūṭī’s discussion of the Muslim opposition to logic and theology is found in four works which were composed by him within different literary contexts and times: Al-Qawl al-Mushriq fi Taḥrim al-Ishtighāl bi-'Ilm al-Manṭiq (QM), Jahd al-Qarīḥa fi Tajrīd al-Naṣīḥa (ed. al-Nashshar, 1947), Ṣawn al-Manṭiq wa-ˆl-Kalām 'an 'īFannay al-Manṭiq wa-'l-Kalām (published and edited twice: first together with Jahd; second: Cairo: Dār al-Naṣr li-'-Ṭibā'a 1970, ed. Su'āda 'Abd al-Raziq), and al-Suyūṭī’s Fatwā against Logic (hereinafter: Fatwā). As far as the chronological discussion of these four works is concerned, QM was written the first, followed respectively by Jahd, Ṣawn, and concluded by the Fatwā.

    (2) See Ṣawn (1970), p. 33.

25. ———. 2021. "Imām Suyūṭī's original thought on the opposition to (Greek) logic and theology in Sawn al-Manṭiq wa'l'Kalām 'an Fannay al-Manṭiq wa 'l-Kalām." Hamdard Islamicus: Quarterly Journal of Studies and Research in Islam no. 40:7–43.

    Abstract: "The transmission of Greek philosophy and sciences to the Islamic world through the translation movement in the eighth and ninth centuries played a major role in accelerating the Hellenizing process of that world. The emergence of scholastic theology (kalÉm) and Islamic Aristotelianism and Neo-Platonism (falsafah) in the Islamic world is considered, in Madjid’s opinions, as the direct cultural influence of it."

26. Alper, Ömer Mahir 2015. "Intellecting the Intellected: An Examination on the Interpretation of “the Second Intelligibles” in Islamic Tradition of Logic and its Reception during the Ottoman Period." Nazariyat: Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences no. 1:35–68.

    Abstract: "The interpretation of the “second intelligibles” (al-ma‘qūlāt al-thāniya/al-ma‘qūlāt al-thawānī), as a term which is highly sophisticated and closely related to many philosophical disciplines, began with al-Fārābī and continued to expand its content especially in the literature of logic until the modern times. In this process, following al-Fārābī several philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā, ‘Umar al-§āwī, Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī, ‘Umar al-Kātibī, Shams al-dīn al-Samarqandī, Qutb al-dīn al-Rāzī and Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī became salient igures in interpreting the second intelligibles. he accumulated tradition including various approaches and transformations on the subject was transmitted directly to the Ottoman period, during which the second intelligibles were widely discussed with new concepts and issues. As it had been before, these interpretations and discussions found place in the literature of logic during the Ottoman period. In this article, I will examine the interpretations on the second intelligibles from al-Arabi to Jurjānī while marking moments of change and development. hen I will examine how Ottoman philosophers and logicians approached the second intelligibles by comparing the commentaries of Burhān al-dīn Bulgārī, Kul Ahmed (Ahmed b. Muhammad b. Khıdr), §adr al-dīn-zāda Mehmed Emin Shirwānī and Kara Khalil b. Hasan al-Tirawī on Mullā Fanārī’s famous book on logic, al-Fawā’id al-Fanāriyya."

27. Altunya, Hülya. 2020. "A Study of al-Galanbawī’s Work Titled Commentary on al-Īsāghūjī in the Context of Signification and Definition Issues." Eskiyeni no. 41:571–598.

    Abstract: "Ismail al-Galanbawī (1730-1791) is known for his works in the fields of logic, al-munazara (Islamic disputation theory), mathematics, astronomy, tasawwuf (mysticism) and theology. al-Galanbawī, who followed the tradition of al-Fārābī - Avicenna which is a continuation of logic of Aristotle (322 B.C.), compiled a work on logic in the last period of the Ottomans. His work titled Burhān is considered to be the last compiled work written in logic in the Ottoman scien-tific world. In addition, he wrote a commentary text on Isāghūjī by Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. 1265), although he has other logical studies. There are many commentaries and hawashī (margin notes) on Isāghūjī text, which has a remarkable position in the history of Islamic logic. The advantage of Isāghūjī as a text of logic, regarding the texts in other branches of science, is its delineating a formal issue with a clear style. However, it is an ever changing historical need to revise its style simply because its potential readers are not the same in a different historical context. Islamic logicians wrote these commentaries in accordance with the level of understanding of the students in their own period. Here, al-Galanbawī aims to explain the incomprehensible issues in this treatise for the students of his period with the commentary on Isāghūjī. Even if we can witness similar contents in the texts after written 13th century, al-Galanbawī’s commentary attracts attention in terms of its delineating different viewpoints with some anal-ysis. In the introductory section of his text, al-Galanbawī establishes the close relation between logic and linguistic and religious disciplines. From this perspective, it puts a logical emphasis on the idea that a student of religious sciences cannot get a deep insight into religious sciences, like tafsīr (science of Qur’ānic commentary), kalām (theology), without learning logic. He discusses dialectically some theological problems with taking kalām tradition into consideration. His chief aim is to demonstrate that logic is a basic method for all Islamic sciences. Then al-Galanbawī posits some meaning and definition of logic. In this level, he employs the term cihat al-wahda (jihat al-wahda) which was used by Mollā Fanārī before him. It is understood that this term indicates his the unity in the theory of existence to the theory of knowledge and his mystical tendency in this issue.

    The logician, who called science of logic as ‘ilm al-mīzān (science of measurement), tries to highlight the applicable dimension of logic in its commentary. Since logic is the tool of religious sciences and therefore logic has a big duty to ensure the robustness and accuracy of all kinds of evidence. For this, while commentary on Isāghūjī has been explaining the rules of the science of logic together with logical explanations, at the same time, it investigates the meaning of the most of words from linguistic and grammatical perspectives. In this article, the introduction section of Galanbawī’s commentary on Isāghūjī, and the subjects of signification (dalālā) and definition in its conceptualizations (tasawwurāt) section are examined in terms of logical and linguistic. al-Galanbawī discusses in detail the matter of literal and non-literal aspects of signification, which was discussed by classical Muslim logicians. Each of this distinction has subdivisions such as natural (tabi‘ī), rational (‘aklī), and conventional (waz‘ī). Logicians focus mostly on literal conventional signification (lafzī waz‘ī). As from Avicenna, this literal conventional signification is considered mutabaqat (correspondence), tazammun (consequence), iltizām (concomitance). al-Galanbawī discusses these three elements in detail by displaying different perspectives in conflict and a possible solution for them. He passes his views on many disputed definitions and gives some responses to them. Thus he attempts to re-establish the discipline of logic in terms of Islamic disciplines with the aim of demonstrating that logic is a basic method. In addition, logicians who have influence on Ottoman logic, such as Mollā Fanārī and Dāwūd al-Qārisī, will be evaluated together with their the commentaries on Isāghūjī. Moreover, it will be tried to determine his place, importance and contributions by this work in Islamic logic tradition."

28. Alwishah, Ahmed, and Sanson, David. 2009. "The Early Arabic Liar: The Liar Paradox in the Islamic World from the Mid-Ninth to the Mid-Thirteenth Centuries CE." Vivarium no. 47:97–127.

    Abstract: "We describe the earliest occurrences of the Liar Paradox in the Arabic tradition. The early Mutakallimùn claim the Liar Sentence is both true and false; they also associate the Liar with problems concerning plural subjects, which is somewhat puzzling. Abhari (1200-1265) ascribes an unsatisfiable truth condition to the Liar Sentence - as he puts it, its being true is the conjunction of its being true and false - and so concludes that the sentence is not true. Tūsī (1201-1274) argues that self-referential sentences, like the Liar, are not truth-apt, and defends this claim by appealing to a correspondence theory of truth. Translations of the texts are provided as an appendix."

29. ———. 2016. "Al-Taftāzānī on the Liar Paradox." Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy no. 4:100–124.

    "Saʿad al-Dīn Masʿūd ibn ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Taftāzānī (1322–1390) was a Persian polymath who wrote on a wide range of subjects—grammar, logic, theology (kalām), jurisprudence (fiqh), and literature.

    Here we translate and discuss his remarks on the Liar Paradox, in which he (a) presents the first example of a Liar Cycle or Deferred Liar in the tradition, (b) gives the paradox a puzzling name—the fallacy of the “irrational root” (al-jadhr al-aṣamm)—which became the standard name for the paradox in the tradition, and (c) suggests a connection between the paradox and what it tells us about the nature of truth and falsehood, and related puzzles concerning reason and the nature of goodness and badness." (p. 100)

30. Aoude, Safia. 2011. "Classical logic in Islamic philosophy: Creating dichotomy or catalyst?" Tidsskrift om Islam & Kristendom no. 14:29–38.

    "Introduction

    Using classical Greek logic to explain the concept of a metaphor to his readers, the famous Islamic scholar Ibn Sina wrote in his book “Qiyâs”:

    “So and so is beautiful. Everything beautiful is a moon. Therefore so and so is a moon.”

    On the other hand, the equally famous Islamic scholar Imam al-Shafi'i is quoted to have said:

    "People did not become ignorant, nor differed except after their abandonment of the Arabic language and their inclination to the language of Aristoteles!"

    The words of Ibn Sina and Imam al-Shafi´i present each two opposites; one is using the methodology of classical Aristotelian logic to elaborate a metaphysical Islamic concept, the other one is claiming Aristotelian logic has ruined the basics of Islamic creed by the limitation of its semantics. Obviously, classical logic did play an important role in the development of philosophical ideas among Muslim scholars and philosophers, but there seems to be a dichotomous difference in approach.

    The aim of my paper is to look into the views of some of the well known thinkers in Islamic philosophy, extracting their specific opinions towards Aristotelian classical logic. What use did Muslim philosophers have for Aristotelian logic in the development of their own ideas?" (p. 29)

31. Ardeshir, Mohammad, and Nabavi, Fatemeh. 2022. "A Logical Framework for the Islamic Law." In New Developments in Legal Reasoning and Logic: From Ancient Law to Modern Legal Systems, edited by Rahman, Shahid, Armgardt, Matthias and Kvernenes, Hans Christian Nordtveit, 53–81. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.

    Abstract: "We introduce a new aspect of the notion of obligation inspired from the Islamic legal system.We then construct a dynamic deontic logic to model this notion of obligation. A semantics for this logic is introduced, and then its soundness and completeness theorems with respect to this semantics are proved."

    "To find out the logical system of the Islamic legal reasoning, we follow the following plan in this paper.

    In Sect. 3.2, we introduce a general outline of the method of reasoning in the Islamic legal system in Shī’ī style, which is discussed in the methodology of fiqh [ Islamic jurisprudence].

    Then in Sect. 3.3, we look for a meaning of obligation inspired from the principles of figh and fix it as our base in formalizing of the logic of the Islamic legal system.

    In Sect. 3.4, we argue that the dynamic approach is the most suitable one for the deontic notions we derive from the principles of figh in Sect. 3.3.

    Then in Sect. 3.5, we formalize some concepts according to the dynamic approach, which are based on the notion of action. We introduce our logical system, including syntax and its semantics in Sect. 3.6. In this section, we prove that our logic is sound and complete with respect to the proposed semantics. We have put the proofs of these theorems in the appendix to preserve smoothness for readers who want to have a general idea of our work.

    In Sect. 3.7, we briefly compare our system with some related works, and the final section includes our concluding remarks and possible extensions of our logic." (p. 54)

32. Arif, Syamsuddin. 2020. "The Art of Debate in Islam: Textual Analysis and Translation of Tasköprüzade’s Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓarah." Afkar no. 22:187–216.

    Abstract: "This article presents an analysis of a short treatise entitled Ādāb al-Baḥth wa al-Munāẓarah (The art of discussion and disputation) by the celebrated Ottoman scholar Abu al-Khayr ‘Iṣām al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Muṣṭafā ibn Khalīl Ṭāshkubrīzādah or Ṭaşköprüzade (d. 968 AH/ 1561 CE). An overview of the nomenclature and a brief introduction about the author and his work will be presented along with an annotated English translation of the text in order to highlight Ṭaşköprüzade’s contribution to this nearly forgotten discipline."

33. Arnaldez, Roger. 1991. "Mantik [Logic]." In Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edition, 442–452. Leiden: Brill.

    2. Definition of logic ('ilm al-mantik).

    Al-TahanawT, in his Dictionary of technical terms, comments that this is also called the science of balance ('ilm al-mizdn), "because this is a means of weighing arguments (huajadi) and demonstrative proofs (bardhiri)". Ibn Slna calls it "the servant of the sciences" (khādim al-'ulurn), "because it is not a science in its own right, but a means (wasīla) of acquiring sciences". But al-Fārābī called it the "mistress" (ra'isa) of sciences "on account of its efficacity (nafādh) in the practice of them". This science, al-TahanawT continues, "was called mantik because the root nutk (action of speaking, elocution) applies in a general fashion to statement (lafz), to the perception of universals (idrāk al-kulliyyāt) and to the reasonable soul (al-nafs al-nāṭika); since this art reinforces the first of these concepts, through the second it follows the path of rectitude (sadād), and by its means the perfection of the soul is realised, a word has been derived from this root to designate it, sc. the word mantik. It is the science of rules (kawānīn) which explains the methods for passing from that which is known to that which is unknown, and the conditions that they pose (sharā'it) so that error (ghalaṭ) will not survive in thought (fikr}. The known extends to the necessary truths of intuition (ḍarūriyyāt) and to speculative truths". It may be noted that this distinction corresponds to that made by Aristotle (Anal. Pr. i, 10, 76b 10) between "common axioms" and "entirely demonstrated conclusions".

    References

    Muhạmmad Aʻlā ibn ʻAlī al-Tahānawī (d. 1158/ 1745?), Kashshāf iṣṭilāḥāt al-funūn wa’l-ʿulūm al-islāmiyya. A Dictionary of the Technical Terms used in the Sciences of the Musulmans (1745) , Piscataway, Gorgias Press 2010 (2 volumes).

34. Azazy, Hany. 2017. "The Genesis of Arabic Logical Activities: From Syriac Rhetoric and Jewish Hermeneutics to āl-Śāfi‘y’s Logical Techniques." Studia Humana no. 6:65–95.

    Abstract: "This paper tries to outline a history of development of informal logic in Semitic languages and especially in Arabic. It tries to explain how the first definite formulation of rules of this logic appeared at āl-Śāfi‘y’ Risāla, a work on ’uswl āl-fiqh or methodology of law. It attempts also to provide new theories and hypotheses about the translation movement in the Arabic and Islamic medieval world."

35. Bäck, Allan. 2008. "Islamic Logic?" In The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition: Science, Logic, Epistemology and their Interactions, edited by Rahman, Shahid, Street, Tony and Tahiri, Hassan, 255–279. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Abstract: "A current ideology has it that different cultural traditions have privileged sources of insight and ways of knowing. Prizing one tradition over another would reek of cultural imperialism. In this vein we have those pushing for a unique status for Islamic philosophy—and no doubt alongside Chinese philosophy, Indian philosophy, African philosophy…. I begin by examining what could be meant by ‘Islamic philosophy’. I argue that embracing a multiculturalism that makes the philosophic enterprise relative to particular cultural traditions ignores a quite important part of the Islamic philosophical tradition itself: the quest for a transcultural, universal objectivity. The major Islamic philosophers embraced this ideal: al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), for instance. They held that some cultures are better than others at attaining philosophical wisdom, and some languages better than others at expressing it. They advocated selecting critically features from the different cultures for constructing a general theory. I illustrate their method by considering their treatment of paronymy and the copula. I end by advocating a return to this Islamic tradition."

36. ———. 2016. "Demostration and Dialectic in Islamic Philosophy " In The Routledge Companion to Islamic Philosophy, edited by Taylor, Richard C. and López-Farjeat, Luis Xavier, 93–104. New York: Routledge.

    "Introduction

    Plato had seen in dialectic a way to justify the first principles of philosophy, from which the demonstration of universal truths could proceed (e.g. Republic VI). Likewise, Aristotle uses dialectic to arrive at an intuitive grasp of the first principles on which demonstrative syllogisms are based (e.g. Metaphysics IV). Islamic philosophers inherited and developed these doctrines on demonstration and dialectic from the Greeks. In what follows I will sketch the Greek background and then examine some important developments in the Islamic context, in particular how dialectic became more removed from demonstration in the thought of Ibn Sīnā, if not in Islamic philosophy as a whole. I conclude by considering how intuition grew in importance and why this view deserves serious consideration even in philosophy today." (p. 93)

37. ———. 2016. "Aristotelian Protocol Languages." In Formal Approaches and Natural Language in Medieval Logic: Proceedings of the XIXth European symposium of medieval logic and semantics, Geneva, 12-16 June 2012, edited by Cesalli, Laurent, Goubier, Frédéric, de Libera, Alain and Isaac, Manuel Gustavo, 343–371. Barcelona - Rome: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales.

    "An alternative approach to the history of philosophy –one that takes the aim of opening up the discipline seriously– would treat both Western and non-Western philosophy as the regional inflections of a global phenomenon(1). In what follows I shall illustrate this approach by showing how Islamic and Latin Aristotelians inherited the same project, of constructing an ideal, protocol language but focused on developing different aspects of it.

    (...)

    I shall look briefly at how Aristotle develops an ideal protocol language, an artificial language isomorphic with the world and its structure. His project has two main stages: subtraction and addition.

    First, starting from natural language and its common ways of speaking, as he is wont to do in his endoxic method, he prunes away those ways of talking that he finds erroneous and misleading, as he does with unnatural predication. Second, after observing the phenomena and developing his theory, he adds terms to the pruned vocabulary, as he does for items in the categories.

    (...)

    Islamic philosophers like Al-Fārābī and Avicenna did likewise. Yet they also tended to worry much more explicitly than their Latin counterparts over the translation of Aristotle’s texts: how to express the same philosophical concepts in Greek and in Arabic, especially on account of how much Arabic differs from Greek grammatically. They did so by using in Arabic the verbal infinitive, the maṣdar, to make the language of paronymy reflect the reality more clearly. They also did so in their treatments of the statement, by modifying how ordinary Arabic expresses the copula and the quantifiers.

    How philosophically interesting are these issues? I shall end by comparing them to some current doctrines." (pp. 343-344)

    (1) «Philosophy’s Western Bias», New York Times, June 4, 2012.

38. Baffioni, Carmela. 1991. "Probable Syriac influences in the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā''s logical epistles?" Aram Periodical no. 3:7–22.

39. ———. 2013. "Logic in Islam." In Encyclopedia of Sciences and Religions, edited by Runehov, Anne L. C., Oviedo, Lluis and Azari, Nina P., 1174–1180. Dordrecht: Springer.

    "Logic developed through the Syriac language during the reign of the ‘Abbasid Caliph al-Ma’mūn (813–833), though a version of the Topics may have been made at the time of the third ‘Abbasid Caliph al-Mahdī (775–785).

    The translation movement focused on Porphyry (d. 304)’s Isagoge, Aristotle’s Categories, De interpretatione and Prior Analytics, Galen (d. 200)’s Introduction to logic, and on works by Aristotle’s commentators such as Theophrastus (d. 287 B.C.), Alexander of Aphrodisias (d. 222), Themistius (d. 387), Ammonius (d. 520), and John Philoponus (d. ca. 580).

    In line with the Alexandrian school and Syriac tradition, the Rhetoric and Poetics were also considered parts of Aristotle’s collected logical writings known as the Organon (instrument of reasoning); Porphyry’s Isagoge was placed at the beginning as an introduction (Inati 1996, pp. 802-803; Street (2008)).

    One of the first systems of logic was that of the tenth-century Ikhwān al-Safā’ (the Brethren of Purity), which appears in their encyclopedia of sciences at the end of the first section on the propaedeutical sciences. They paraphrase with some originality the Isagoge, Categories, De interpretatione, and the Prior and Posterior Analytics (Baffioni 2008, p. 105)." (pp. 1174-1175)

    References

    Baffioni, C. (2008). The Scope of the Rasā’il Ikhwān al-Safā'. In N. El-Bizri (Ed.) TheIkhwān al-Safā'’ and their Rasā’il (pp. 101–122). New York: Oxford University Press.

    Inati, S. (1996). Logic. In S. H. Nasr & O. Leaman (Eds.), History of Islamic philosophy (Vol. II, pp. 802–823). London/New York: Routledge.

    Street, T. (2005). Logic. In P. Adamson & R. C. Taylor(Eds.), The Cambridge companion to Arabic philosophy (pp. 247–265). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

40. ———. 2014. "The Legacy of the Aristotelian Logic in the Risâlat al-Djâmi’a." In De l’Antiquité tardive au Moyen Âge. Études de logique aristotélicienne et de philosophie grecque, syriaque, arabe et latine offertes à Henri Hugonnard-Roche, edited by Coda, Elisa and Martini Bonadeo, Cecilia, 213–224. Paris: Vrin.

41. Baqir, Zainal Abidin. 1998. The Problem of Definition in Islamic Logic: A Study of Abū al-Najā al-Farīd's Kasr al-mantiq in Comparison with Ibn Taimiyyah's Kitāb al-radd alā al-manṭiqiyyīn. Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization.

42. Beidokhti, Hanif Amin. 2018. "Suhrawardî on Division of Aristotelian Categories." In Islamic Philosophy from the 12th to the 14th Century, edited by Al Ghouz, Abdelkader, 377–408. Bonn: V&R unipress.

    "Suhrawardī’s discussion of the categories covers almost all aspects of the Peripatetic doctrine including the deduction method for attaining the final list of the categories. This paper will discuss Suhrawardī’s critical point of view on the Aristotelian list of the categories. For this purpose, I shall first discuss a long lasting debate on the subject matter of the Categories and the proper science for studying its topics and the way it relates to Suhrawardī’s treatment of the categories.

    Then, I shall discuss briefly the historical route of arguments for establishing the tenfold list of the categories probably available to Suhrawardī; after that, I shall introduce Suhrawardī’s own reductionist division, as well as the level of certainty that he associates with his fivefold division. This might provide us with a clue for ordering Suhrawardī’s works and depict the development of his discussion." (p. 379)

43. Belhaj, Abdessamad. 2016. "Ādāb al-Baḥth wa-al-Munāẓara: The neglected art of disputation in later medieval Islam." Arabic Sciences and Philosophy no. 26:291–307.

    Abstract: "Is it possible to invent a science that sets the rules for an ethical, logical and effective debate? Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (died in the first half of the 14th century), a logician and Ḥanafī jurist thought it possible. He undertook the task of developing a general theory of scientific discussion that had a tremendous success and impact on Muslim scholarship. Ādāb al-baḥth wa-al-munāẓara, as he called it, is a set of ethical and logical principles, taken from Aristotelian logic and Islamic law. His major treatise Risālat Ādāb al-baḥth, initiated a new discipline in which dozens of treatises, commentaries and glosses were written. In my contribution, I will shed light on this neglected science, describe its structure, expose its functions and highlight its significance for the development of debates and intellectual dialogues in the later medieval Islam."

44. Bellosta, Hélène. 1991. "Ibrāhīm Ibn Sinān: On Analysis ansd Synthesis." Arabic Sciences and Philosophy no. 1:211–232.

    "The leading role the problem of analysis and synthesis played until the 19th century is well known; yet ancient and mediaeval works bearing on it are extremely rare. That is why the text dealing with analysis and synthesis in geometrical demonstrations by Ibrahim Ibn Sinan, a tenth century mathematician,(1)

    is of special importance. It is the first theoretical treatise, strictly speaking, devoted to the subject in the whole history of mathematics. Ibn Sinan also treats, in connection with analysis, the closely related question of classification of problems.

    Before Ibn Sinan, the only authors to tackle the problem of analysis and synthesis (apart from Aristotle and Plato, who alludes to it briefly)(2) are Pappus in his preface to Book VII of the Collection, the most elaborate Greek statement on the subject,(3) Proclus in the second Prologue to his Commentary on Euclid, Book 7,4 and the Pseudo-Euclid in a short passage. Ibn Sinan's text invites two immediate questions: is it only a repetition, albeit more detailed and precise, of what can already be found in the earlier Greek texts, or does it offer a modification of the terms in which the problem is stated, and consequently present us with the emergence of new problematics? More directly, what impact did this text have on later mathematicians?" (pp. 211-212, a note omitted)

    (1) 1 Ibrahim Ibn Sinan Ibn Tabit Ibn Qurra (296/909-335/946), son of Sinan, physician and encyclopaedist, friend and companion of the caliph al-RadJ (934-940), grandson of Tabit Ibn Qurra, translator and mathematician of genius. Ibn Sinan's family comes from the town of Harran, on the Upper-Euphrates, crossroads of caravan routes and cultures, and religious centre of the Sabean sect. He was the heir to a prestigious scientific tradition and an intimate of the Caliphal court.

    (2) Plato, Meno, 86e-87c.

    (3) Pappus d'Alexandrie, La Collection mathématique, 2nd ed., trans. P. Ver Eecke, 2 vols. (Paris, 1982), vol. II, pp. 477-78.

    (4) Proclus de Lycie, Les Commentaires sur le premier livre des Elements d'Euclide, 1st ed., trans. P. Ver Eecke (Paris, 1948), pp. 5, 15, 37, 63.

45. Ben Ahmed, Fouad. 2020. "Ibn Ṭumlūs on Dialectical Reasoning: The Extent of His Reliance on al-Fārābī and Averroes." In The Origin and Nature of Laguage and Logic: Perspectives in Medieval Islamic, Jewish, and Christian Thought, edited by Germann, Nadja and Harvey, Steven, 245–276. Turnhout: Brepols.

    "Ibn Ṭumlūs’ (d. 620/1223) notion of dialectic, unlike that of his teacher Averroes (Ibn Rushd, d. 585/1198), is virtually unstudied in the modern scholarship devoted to logical issues in the Middle Ages." (p. 245)

    (...)

    "This paper intends to highlight the intellectual authenticity of Ibn Ṭumlūs that distinguishes him from his teachers, and makes of him not a mere disciple but also an innovator, a master himself, as Ibn al-Abbār indicated in his biography when he said that Ibn Ṭumlūs’ students “took science from him” (wa-qad ukhidha ʿanhu).(3) More specifically, it will attempt to show some facets of Ibn Ṭumlūs’ innovative efforts in the realm of a particular logical discipline, namely that of dialectic. After introducing Ibn Ṭumlūs’ Book of Dialectic and Book of Analysis, our study will focus on the originality of their writer’s conception of the division of Aristotle’s Topics compared to those of al-Fārābī and Averroes. Then, it will demonstrate the new orientations he offers in his work with regard to the limits of the use of that discipline." (p. 246)

    (3) Ibn al-Abbār, al-Takmila li-Kitāb al-Ṣila, ed. ʿAbd al-Salām al Harrās, Beirut 1995, IV, 222

46. Black, Deborah L. 1989. "The 'Imaginative Syllogism' in Arabic Philosophy: A Medieval Contribution to the Philosophical Study of Metaphor " Mediaeval Studies no. 51:242–267.

    "For the Arabic-speaking philosophers of the Middle Ages inherited from their Greek predecessors a conception oflogic that was well-suited to the task of securing the syllogism's dominion over all human cognitive activities. This conception took the form of an expansion of the scope of the Organon itself, through the appending to the six treatises that today are assumed to constitute the Aristotelian logical corpus - the Categories, On Interpretation, Prior and Posterior Analytics, Topics, and Sophistical Refutations - Aristotle's Rhetoric, and his Poetics as well.(3)

    (...)

    "The aim of the present discussion is twofold: 1) to elucidate the formal structure and the epistemological role that was assigned to this innovative concept in the philosophical writings of al-Fara.bi (870-950) and Avicenna (Ibn Sina, 980-1037); and 2) to examine the implications of their doctrines for an issue that continues to interest contemporary writers on the philosophy of language, namely, the question of the nature and purpose of figurative or metaphorical discourse, and its relation to the literal use of language in the assertion of truth-claims." (pp. 242-243)

    (3) The Greek versions of this taxonomy for the Organon were first documented in an article by Richard Walzer, 'Zur Traditionsgeschichte der Aristotelischen Poetik; Studi italiani di filologia classica N.S. 11 (1934) 5-14; rpt. in R Walzer, Greek into Arabic. Essays on Islamic Philosophy (Oriental Studies l; Oxford, 1962), pp. 129-36. For the Greek commentators' allusions to this taxonomy, see Ammonius, In 1 AP,., Prooemium (CAG 4.6), p. 11.22-38; Philoponus, In Cat., Prooemium (CAG 13.1), pp. 4.23-5.14; Olympiodorus, In Cat., Prolegomena (CAG 12.1), pp. 7.24-8.28; Elias, In Cat (CAG 18.1), pp. 116.29-117.14; and L. G. Westerink, 'Elias on the Prior Analytics; Mnemosyne 4th Ser. 14 (1961) 126-39.

47. ———. 1990. Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy. Leiden: Brill.

    "This book examines a widespread, and often misunderstood, doctrine within the medieval Aristotelian tradition, namely, the inclusion of Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics within the scope of the Organon. Throughout I have attempted to argue that this tradition is not a bizarre anomaly of medieval philosophy, but rather, provides the focal point for a considerable body of sophisticated speculation on the nature of human knowledge, human language, and human society. This does not mean that the Arabic philosophers' developments of this doctrine are entirely without blemish; but it does mean that, like all important figures in the history of philosophy, the Arabic philosophers offer their readers novel and interesting perspectives on problems that continue to be of interest within contemporary philosophical discussion.

    I have confined myself in the present study to the consideration of the Arabic Aristotelian tradition. Originally, it had been my intention to consider the interpretation of the logical character of the Rhetoric and Poetics in both the Arabic and the Latin traditions within medieval philosophy. But the wealth of material presented by the Arabic authors soon necessitated a full study in its own right. It is my hope that I will be able to return to the developments of this taxonomy amongst Latin authors at some later date, and that the present study will contribute in some measure to the understanding of the epistemological and logical framework shared by both traditions within medieval philosophy.

    In considering the Arabic tradition itself, I have confined my study by and large to the writings of the three most prominent Aristotelians of the medieval period, Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Ibn Rushd. Yet even to consider these three philosophers together runs the risk of creating the impression of unanimity and conformity in areas where there is considerable diversity of approach, if not disagreement. This is especially the case in considering the epistemological and psychological teachings that form the background to the logical problems upon which I have focused, for in these areas the three philosophers I have chosen offer a rich variety of alternative positions. In order to offset this danger, I have tried to give due attention to the positions of all three philosophers, and to note any significant divergences or exceptions to the perspectives that I have focused upon within the study. I hope that I have not, in my efforts to be inclusive, seriously misrepresented or unduly neglected any of my three subjects." (Preface, p. IX)

48. ———. 1991. "Aristotle's ‘Peri hermeneias’ in Medieval Latin and Arabic Philosophy: Logic and the Linguistic Arts." Canadian Journal of Philosophy no. Supplementary volume 21:25–83.

    "My aim in the present discussion is to explore a selection of the standard passages in the medieval commentary tradition which give rise to explicit considerations of logic's general status as a linguistic art, and its special relationship to grammar. Amongst the Latin commentators, I have confined my inquiry to authors whose commentaries were written in the thirteenth century, and with the exception of Robert Kilwardby, to commentaries available in printed editions.(2) Amongst Arabic authors, I have considered in the main the writings of Al-Fārābī (ca. 870-950 AD) and Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, 980-1037 AD).(3) Since the question of Arabic influence on the Latin discussions of these topics is minimal, I propose to begin with the writings of Latin commentators, since the Latin discussions of the issues with which I am concerned are on the whole more thematic and homogeneous, and hence more approachable, than those of the Arabic authors." (pp. 3-4)

    (2) For an overview of the Peri hermeneias commentaries prior to the time of Aquinas, see Gauthier, Introduction to the new Leonine edition of Aquinas‟s commentary, 64*-75*. On the general subject of the Peri hermeneias in the West see J. Isaac, Le “Peri hermeneias” en occident de Boèce a saint Thomas (Paris: Vrin 1953).

    For the most part, I have confined my remarks on the Latin authors to direct commentaries on the Peri hermeneias, and refrained from comparisons with more general logical texts, both by these commentators and by other thirteenth-century authors. I suspect, however, that there are some tensions between the approach to language and logic that is found in the commentary tradition, and that found in independent logical treatises and in works on speculative grammar. But a full investigation of this topic is beyond the scope of the present discussion.

    (3) I have omitted Averroes's Middle Commentary, even though it is the only Arabic text on the subject that was available in the West, since it is less concerned with the issues under consideration here than are the commentaries of Avicenna and Fārābī.

49. ———. 1998. "Logic in Islamic Philosophy." In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Craig, Edward, 706–713.

    "Islamic logic was inspired primarily by Aristotle’s logical corpus, the Organon (which according to a late Greek taxonomy also included the Rhetoric and Poetics). Islamic authors were also familiar with some elements in Stoic logic and linguistic theory, and their logical sources included not only Aristotle’s own works but also the works of the late Greek Aristotelian commentators, the Isagōgē of Porphyry and the logical writings of Galen. However, most of the logical work of the Islamic philosophers remained squarely within the tradition of Aristotelian logic, and most of their writings in this area were in the form of commentaries on Aristotle.

    For the Islamic philosophers, logic included not only the study of formal patterns of inference and their validity but also elements of the philosophy of language and even of epistemology and metaphysics. Because of territorial disputes with the Arabic grammarians, Islamic philosophers were very interested in working out the relationship between logic and language, and they devoted much discussion to the question of the subject matter and aims of logic in relation to reasoning and speech. In the area of formal logical analysis, they elaborated upon the theory of terms, propositions and syllogisms as formulated in Aristotle’s Categories, De interpretatione and Prior Analytics. In the spirit of Aristotle, they considered the syllogism to be the form to which all rational argumentation could be reduced, and they regarded syllogistic theory as the focal point of logic. Even poetics was considered as a syllogistic art in some fashion by most of the major Islamic Aristotelians.

    Since logic was viewed as an organon or instrument by which to acquire knowledge, logic in the Islamic world also incorporated a general theory of argumentation focused upon epistemological aims. This element of Islamic logic centred upon the theory of demonstration found in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, since demonstration was considered the ultimate goal sought by logic. Other elements of the theory of argumentation, such as dialectics and rhetoric, were viewed as secondary to demonstration, since it was held that these argument forms produced cognitive states inferior in certitude and stability to demonstration. The philosopher’s aim was ultimately to demonstrate necessary and certain truth; the use of dialectical and rhetorical arguments was accounted for as preparatory to demonstration, as defensive of its conclusions, or as aimed at communicating its results to a broader audience." (p. 706)

50. Brumberg Chaumont, Julie. 2016. "The legacy of ancient logic in the middle ages." In The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Logic, edited by Novaes, Catarina Dutilh and Read, Stephen, 19–44. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    "A history of translations and transmissions thus needs to be complemented by a careful study of circulations and appropriations, where the different versions of the Organon are identified, taking into account the texts that were considered as a complement to or substitute for Aristotle’s texts in the Middle Ages, as well as the various intellectual frameworks and filters through which logical theories were understood.(3)

    As a consequence, we focus on texts that belong properly to what the Middle Ages inherited from Antiquity, in order to reconstruct the state of logic in Late Antiquity that was actually transmitted to the Middle Ages – what Sten Ebbesen has labelled a ‘Logical Late Ancient Standard’, to be complemented point by point by a ‘Grammatical Late Ancient Standard’ (see Ebbesen 2007). A portion of these texts are now lost in their Greek versions, but were directly or indirectly available to medieval logicians. The exegetical context provided, on the one hand, by the Alexandrian school, for the Arabic world (see D’Ancona 2005), and, on the other hand, by Boethius’ project (see Ebbesen 1990) played a crucial role here.

    In what follows, the five first sections focus on the texts and doctrines indirectly and directly transmitted. A last section traces the stages of circulation of this legacy, as well as the various conceptions of logic related to these successive versions of the logical corpus; this is done by comparing Eastern and Western contexts." (pp. 21-22)

    References

    D’Ancona, Cristina. 2005. ‘Greek into Arabic: Neoplatonism in Translation’. In Peter Adamson and Richard C. Taylor (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, 10–31.

    Ebbesen, Sten. ‘Boethius as an Aristotelian commentator’. In Sorabji 1990, 373–391.

    Ebbesen, Sten 2007. ‘The Traditions of Ancient Logic- cum- Grammar in the Middle Ages: What’s the Problem?’. In Marenbon 2007, 136– 152.

    Marenbon, John, (ed.). 2007a. ‘The Many Roots of Medieval Logic: The Aristotelian and the Non-Aristotelian Traditions’. Vivarium 45 (special issue).

    Sorabji, Richard (ed.). 1990. Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

51. Brunschvig, Robert. 1970. "Logic and Law in Classical Islam." In Logic in Classical Islamic Culture, edited by von Grunebaum, Gustave E., 9–20. Wiesbaden: Ottto Harassowitz.

    "When, speaking of logic one thereby implies rationality. Consideration of a legal system from the standpoint of logic is conducted largely from that of its rationality, but only largely, for the two words are not exactly synonyms: it is not indispensable that the fundamental ideas be rational or present themselves as such for the juridical construction to show a rational character. In classical orthodox doctrine, Muslim Law (Shari'a), which is ethico-juridical, is based, in the first place, on sacred texts that need no justification. In the absence of a notion of natural law and in the negation of ethical or rational values that impose themselves upon God, or which God imposes upon Himself, or which may be inherent in Him, the revealed or inspired datum, a divine phenomenon, is a priori exempt from the demands of rationality which rightly manifest themselves with regard to human laws. In this sense, it is therefore permissible to speak of irrationality, it being understood that irrational means here “which is not subject to reason, which does not depend on it in any way” and not “which is contrary to reason.” And this is true to such an extent that a posteriori attempts have not been found lacking, even in the most orthodox circles, to explain as rationally as possible the prescriptions of the religious Law. This secondary justification will appeal more and more to notions of wisdom (hikma), goals or aims (maqasid) of interest or utility (masalih) to human beings; and the task will be made easier by the incontestably realistic and positive character of this law, which does not have recourse to the strange or to the mysterious and each provision of which does not shock human reason in any way at a given stage of society. But from the beginnings of Islam, if the arbitrary decision of God which is beyond all justification is necessarily respected by the Believers, the koranic text itself from time to time gave incipient explanatory considerations. On the other hand, there was certainly needed a principle that would decide between these successive legislative revelations whenever they could be reconciled only with difficulty and even in certain cases when they were apparently contradictory; to this effect the Koran teaches abrogation in the form of replacement of the oldest by the most recent." (p. 9)

52. Burnett, Charles. 2004. "The Translation of Arabic Works on Logic into Latin in the Middle Ages and Renaissance." In Handbook of the History of Logic, Volume 1: Greek, Indian and Arabic Logic, edited by Gabbay, Dov M. and Woods, John, 597–606. Amsterdam: Elsevier North-Holland.

    "In the Middle Ages, and again in the Renaissance, several Arabic texts on logic were translated into Latin. These included not only works by Arabic philosophers, Avicenna, Algazel, Alfarabi and Averroes, but also texts originally written in Greek, i.e. the Organon or corpus on logic by Aristotle, on which all Medieval and Renaissance texts were ultimately based. (1) While one can understand how Latin translations of Arabic works on mathematics, medicine, astrology and other practical sciences could useful, it is more difficult to imagine how texts on logic written in, and for, a Semitic language could make much sense in a language which is completely unrelated to it. For Aristotelian logic is, of course, very much language based. Moreover, while Latin scholars were lacking scientific texts in mathematics and medicine, they already had good translations and detailed expositions of at least the first half of the Organon (Aristotle's corpus of logical writings, with the Introduction--Isagoge--of Porphyry), made by Boethius in the early sixth century. And, when they wished to complete the Organon, they were able to do so by translating the texts directly from the Greek. In the mid-twelfth century James of Venice is credited with the translating the Topics, the Prior and Posterior Analytics with 'authentic expositions', and we have from the twelfth century, translations from Greek of the Topics and the Posterior Analytics (twice).

    And yet we find Gerard of Cremona translating the latter work from Arabic in the same century, and in the thirteenth century all Averroes' Middle Commentaries on the Organon were translated. Why was there any need to do this? This is the question that shall be addressed in this paper." (p. 597)

    (1) 1For an overview of the Latin versions of Aristotle made in the Middle Ages, see B. G. Dod, 'Aristoteles Latinus', in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, eds N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny and J. Pinborg, Cambridge University Press, 1982, pp. 43-79.

53. Butterworth, Charles E. 2004. "Finding First Principles, Possibility or Impasse?" In Words, Texts and Concepts Cruising the Mediterranean Sea: Studies on the sources, contents and influences of Islamic civilization and Arabic philosophy and science. Dedicated to Gerhard Endress on his sixty-fifth birthday, edited by Amzen, Rüdiger and Thielamann, Jön, 211–222. Leuven: Peeters.

    "The title of this essay seeks to capture a problem central to our quest for knowledge, determining the first principles on which reasoning - especially scientific or demonstrative, as opposed to popular or rhetorical and even dialectical - is based. In Short Commentaries on [Aristotle's] Logic (Jawāmi' fi l-Manṭiq), when explaining how demonstration is to be used, Averroes focuses his attention on this problem. His solution or, more precisely, lack of solution is unprecedented and has the potential of casting the whole scientific enterprise into doubt. Or, if that is too strong a judgment, suffice to say that it renders invalid all of his preceding examples of demonstrations that prove the world cannot be eternal.

    Slightly more than twenty-five years ago, a critical edition and English translation of the last three short commentaries was published(1). As explained at length there, these commentaries exist only in two Judaeo-Arabic manuscripts plus a Hebrew and Latin translation. The Arabic text is not extant(2). In the treatise entitled ''The Book of Demonstration'' (Kitāb al-Burhān), the eighth of the nine other treatises in this collection soon to be published as a whole, some - not all, for this is a short commentary - of the subjects treated in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics are examined(3). Before turning to an examination of the problem posed there, it might not be amiss to say something more general about the collection itself." (pp. 211-212)

    (1) See Averroës' Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle 's "Topics,'' "Rhetoric," and "Poetics," edited and translated by Charles E. Butterworth (Studies in Islamic Philosophy and Science; Unesco Collection of Representative Works, Arabic Series). Albany, N. Y., 1977.

    (2) Ibid-, p. 1-3 and 14-17.

    (3) Averroës Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle 's Organon, edited and translated, with an introduction, by Charles E. Butterworth. Albany. N. Y.: forthcoming [1977].