History of Logic from Aristotle to Gödel (www.historyoflogic.com)

by Raul Corazzon | e-mail: rc@ontology.co

Selected Bibliography on Stoic Philosophy of Language and Grammar

Contents of this Section

Bibliography on Stoic philosophy of language and semiotics

  1. Allen, James. 2001. Inference from Signs. Ancient Debates about the Nature of Evidence. New York: Oxford University Press.

    See Study III: The Stoics on Sign-Inference and Demonstration pp. 147-193.

  2. Ax, Wolfram. 1986. Laut, Stimme und Sprache. Studien zu drei Grundbegriffen der antiken Sprachtheorie. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

    Zweiter Teil: Die philosophischen Grundlagen 59, 1. Voraristotelische Belege 60; 2. Aristoteles 119; 3. Stoa 138, 3.1 Vorbemerkung 138, 3.2 Belege auusserhalb der stoischen Dialektik 141, 3.3 Diogenes Laertios VII 55-57 15,; Exkurs: phoné - dialektos - audé - ein konkurrierendes Modell? 207, Zusammemfassung 210-211.

  3. ———. 1993. "Der Einfluss des Peripatos auf die Sprachtheorie der Stoa." In Dialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer, edited by Döring, Klaus and Ebert, Theodor, 11-32. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

    Nachdruck: W. Ax, Lexis und Logos. Studien zur antiken Grammatik und Rhetorik, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner, 2000, pp. 73-94.

  4. Barnouw, Jeffrey. 2002. Propositional Perception. Phantasia, Predication, and Sign in Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. Lanham: University Press of America.

    Contents: Preface IX; Introduction 1; 1. Phantasia, Judgment and Statement in Plato 9; 2. Phantasia in Aristotle 49; 3. Predication and Sign in Aristotle 97; 4. Phantasia and Sign in Stoic Philosophy 149; 5. Recalling Sign and Revealing Sign. Part I. Sceptics and Stoics 21; Part II. The Debates of the Hellenistic Medical Sects 245; 6. Predication, Proposition, Sign and Proof in Stoic Logic 275; Appendix 1. Declarative Predication vs. Kahn's Veridical Be 327; Appendix 2. Peirce, the Epicureans and the Stoics 341; Bibliography 369; Indices 379-383.

    "There has been considerable growth in the understanding and estimation of Stoic logic in the last thirty years, yet an important dimension of this Stoic achievement has not been grasped. Stoic logic was broadly conceived to include their theories of knowledge and perception, and the theory of perception provides the starting point and foundation of their logic. It is essential to the structure and unity of that logic that the Stoics take perception to be propositional. Starting from a new interpretation of the Stoic conception of phantasia as propositional perception, this study offers a view of Stoic logic that brings out the continuity linking perception, predication, inferential signs and proof.

    For Plato and Aristotle the basic objects of perception are qualities. In effect they develop a phenomenological analysis, underpinned by a physiological conception of sensation. The Stoics take this over as an account of sensation, but they establish the theory of perception at a higher level of complexity. For the Stoics the objects of perception are not qualities nor discrete things or bodies but rather have the form of fact, event or situation, relating qualities to things and things to each other. In perceiving we are trying to make sense of things. This means that both inference (drawing on past perception) and judgment (i.e. judging that something holds in reality) are involved in perception from the start. Conversely, the logical capacities of the mind, extending through logical signs to proof, carry forward a revelatory power inherent in perception.

    The propositional character of perceptions does not derive from language. In the Stoic analysis perceiving picks out a focus or subject and links a predicate to it, and these are logical entities, strictly distinguished, terminologically and in their discrete treatment, from what are linguistic elements, the grammatical subject and predicate. What is predicated of the subject is generally doing or undergoing some action. This linking of elements within perception is at the same time propositional in the sense that it pro-poses something, that is, makes a truth- or reality-claim. What is perceived is by that very act taken to be the case, to be real.

    To translate 'phantasia' as 'perception' is unusual but justified, even required, in Stoic contexts. The term undergoes striking changes in meaning from Plato through Aristotle to the Epicureans, Sceptics and Stoics, which must be reflected in differing translations. For Plato it is misleading 'appearance', sensation wrongly taken as revealing reality. In some of the applications of the term in Aristotle the translation `imagination' seems appropriate, while in others something like `representation' or 'impression' is called for, either in a neutral sense or with a problematic cast akin to the Platonic and Sceptic versions.

    In the Hellenistic schools 'phantasia' (often in the plural) designates not a faculty but particular mental events. It is usually taken to mean `impression' or 'mental presentation'. This is apt for the Sceptics, for whom a further act would be needed to add belief to what is present to the mind and affirm it as real. But 'perception' is the translation called for by Stoic usage. To translate it as 'presentation' in Stoic arguments would be to concede a damaging point of contention to their Sceptic critics by eliding its intrinsic reality claim, its propositional character.

    To understand what the Stoics are doing to and with the idea of phantasia, we must see it in relation to the different purpose and character given the term first in Plato, then in Aristotle, and in those contemporary antagonists of the Stoics, the Sceptics and Epicureans. The starting point is Plato's origination of the notion phantasia, taken together with his analysis of predication or what constitutes 'statement', in the Theaetetus and Sophist. Building on the connection of phantasia and statement, the Stoics reverse the tendency which Plato embodies in his coinage in that they try to establish confidence in what phantasia reveals, whereas Plato took such confidence to be necessarily misplaced.

    Indeed, the purpose of his coinage (derived from 'phainesthai', 'to appear', meaning appearance in contrast to reality or being) was to embody the confusion of 'it seems to me' and 'it is' and so to show up the fundamental error of those who rely on the senses as revealing reality. To trust the senses as a basis of knowledge opens one to distortion from perspective and the illusory character of objects that never are the same." pp. 1-2.

  5. Bronowski, Ada. 2014. "La structure logique du langage ordinaire chez les Stoiciens." In Philosophie et langage ordinaire de l'Antiquité à la Renaissance, edited by Counet, Jean-Michel, 83-96. Louvain: Peeters.

  6. Bundy, Murray Wright. 1927. The Theory of Imagination in Classical and Medieval Thought. Urbana: University of Illinois.

    Contents: Preface 7; I. Pre-Socratic Philosophy 11; II. Plato 19; III. Aristotle 60; IV. Post-Aristotelian Philosophy 83; V. The Theory of Art: Quintilian, Longinus, and Philostratus 105; VI. Plotinus 117; VII. The Lesser Neoplatonists 131; VIII. Neoplatonic Views of Three Early Christians [Synesius, Augustine, Boethius] 146; IX. Mediaval Descriptive Psychology 177; X. The Psychology of the Mystics 199; Xi. Dante's Theory of Vision 225; XII. Conclusion 257; Index 281-289.

    On the Stoics see pp. 87-96.

  7. Chiesa, Curzio. 1991. "Le problème du langage intérieur chez les Stoiciens." Revue Internationale de Philosophie no. 45:301-321.

  8. Colish, Marcia. 1983. "The Stoic Theory of Verbal Signification and the Problem of Lies and False Statement from Antiquity to St. Anselm." In Archéologie du Signe, edited by Brind'Amour, Lucie and Vance, Eugène, 17-43. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies.

  9. Cortassa, Guido. 1978. "Pensiero e linguaggio nella teoria stoica del lekton." Rivista di Filologia e di Istruzione Classica no. 106:385-394.

  10. Detel, Wolfgang, Hülsen, Reinhard, Krüger, Gerhard, and Lorenz, Wolfgang. 1980. "Lekta ellipé in der Stoischen sprach-philosophie." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 62:276-288.

  11. Ebert, Theodor. 2005. "La théorie du signe entre la médecine et la philosophie." In Signe et prédiction dans l'Antiquité, edited by Kany-Turpin, José, 51-64. Saint-Etienne: Publications de l'Université de Saint-Etienne.

  12. Edlow, Robert Blair. 1977. Galen on Language and Ambiguity. Leiden: Brill.

    An English translation of Galen's De Captionibus (On Fallacies), with introduction, text and commentary.

    Se the Chapter Seven: The Stoics on Fallacy and Ambiguity, pp. 56-68.

  13. Egli, Urs. 1970. Zwei Aufsätze zum Vergleich der stoischen Sprachtheorie mit modernen Theorien. Bern: Institut für Sprachwissenschaft.

  14. ———. 2011. "Sprachwissenschaft in hellenistischer Zeit." In Neuere Forschungen zur Wortbildung und Historiographie der Sprachwissenschaft, edited by Asbach, -Schnitker Brigitte, Brekle, Herbert Ernst and Roggenhofer, Johannes, 261-269. Tübingen: Gunter Narr.

  15. Frede, Michael. 1983. "Stoics and Skeptics on Clear and Distinct Impressions." In The Skeptical Tradition, edited by Burnyeat, Myles, 65-93. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Reprinted in: M. Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987, pp. 151-176.

  16. Gentinetta, Peter M. 1961. Zur Sprachbetrachtung bei den Sophisten und in der stoisch-hellenistischen Zeit. Winterthur: P.G. Keller.

    On the Stoics see pp. 93-118.

  17. Hülser, Karlheinz. 1979. "Expression and Content in Stoic Linguistic Theory." In Semantics from Different Points of View, edited by Bäuerle, Rainer, Egli, Urs and Stechow, Arnim von, 284-303. New York: Springer.

  18. Ildefonse, Frédérique. 1992. "Perception et discours dans l'ancien Stoicisme." Histoire Épistemologie Langage no. 14:3-34.

    "As the Stoics (particularly through the status they grant to apprehensive representation) work out the relationship between perception and discourse, their definition of representation as alteration rather than impression may be understood as an effort to uphold perceptive multiplicity. I endeavour to find out how the multiplicity which perception implies is to be transcribed into discourse, and why such a transcription requires us to distinguish between two ways of partitioning discursive language, which are hinted at by the two expressions mérè tou logou and stoicheia tou logou."

  19. ———. 1999. "La théorie stoïcienne de la phrase (énoncé, proposition) et son influence chez les grammairiens." In Théories de la phrase et de la proposition de Platon à Averroés, edited by Büttgen, Philippe, Dieble, Stéphane and Rashed, Marwan, 151-170. Paris: Éditions Rue d'Ulm.

  20. Jackson, Darrell B. 1969. "The Stoic theory of signs in St. Augustine's "De doctrina christiana"." Revue des Études Augustiniennes no. 15:9-49.

    Reprinted in: Robert Austin Markus (ed.), Augustine: A Collection of Critical Essays, Garden City: Anchor Books, 1972, pp. 92-147.

  21. Long, Anthony Arthur. 1971. "Language and Thought in Stoicism." In Problems in Stoicism, edited by Long, Anthony Arthur, 75-113. London: Athlone Press.

  22. ———. 1996. "Stoic psychology and the elucidation of language." In Knowledge Through Signs. Ancient Semiotic Theories and Practices, edited by Manetti, Giovanni, 109-131. Turnhout: Brepols.

    "(1) During the creative period of Stoicism grammar was still in its infancy as a determinate field of study. I mention this fact because, as is well known, the Stoics were enormously influential on the Graeco-Roman grammatical tradition, which extends from the later Hellenistic epoch into the Christian period of the Roman Empire. Recourse to the Stoic influence on that tradition, excellently facilitated now by Karlheinz Hülser's collection (1987), can give the impression that these philosophers were merely pioneers in starting what the grammarians carried forward more fully and systematically. I want to suggest that such an impression may be seriously misleading in two respects.(2) First, it implies, incorrectly I believe, that the Stoics approached language as a phenomenon calling primarily for the kind of grammatical and syntactical description later grammarians developed. Secondly, it fails to identify the philosophical considerations that underpin the Stoics' principal interests in language. The Stoics had some splendid intuitions about the phonetic, grammatical and semantic levels of linguistic structure. Although these bear directly on the development of traditional grammar, they also seem to have clear affinities with what contemporary experts in linguistics call universal grammar.

    The material I have chosen in order to make this point will be drawn primarily from sections of Diogenes Laertius' doxography of Stoicism (7.41-83). This is our only comprehensive account of "the logical part" of Stoic philosophy. I shall be dealing mainly with Diogenes' section "on utterance" (peri phonés) or "on signifiers" (peri semainonton), which forms the first part of the subdivision of "dialectic" (D.L. 7.55-62). The second part of that subdivision (D.L. 7.63-82) is "on significations" (peri semainomenon). This division of dialectic into signifiers and significations has a clear rationale, as we shall see, but it too can yield misleading impressions, especially if it is taken to imply that the subdivisions are independent of one another or that there are no superordinate concepts that unite them. I shall argue that there are two such concepts, (phantaisia and logos, and that these together provide the foundations of the Stoic theory of language and logic.(3)

    There is a third general point that I want to address. Scholars have become accustomed to making a sharp distinction between the Stoic concept of linguistic signs (words and sentences) and their concept of semeion.(4) They applied the latter term (as distinct from the term semainon) to a pattern of sign-inference from a fact or proposition that is evident to a fact or proposition that is non-evident. It so happens that nothing is said about sign-inference in Diogenes Laertius' doxography of Stoic logic.(5)

    Whatever the explanation for this omission may be, it cannot be doubted that the Stoics classified sign-inferences under the "significations" heading of the division of dialectic. As such, they are not linguistic signs but a class of propositions signified by linguistic signs. The antecedent or "if' clause of a sign inference is a meaning or sayable (lekton), not the sentence by which this meaning is expressed, and what the "if' clause is the sign for is the truth value of its consequent and the connexion of that truth value to itself. However, what we should conclude from this is not that sign-inference is a function of logic as distinct from language, but that it is a normative function of language, i.e., language in its epistemic and truth-signifying capacity. Not only do sign-inferences require language for their expression; they are also tied to language as lekta, or sentence content. Correspondingly, language is tied to lekton (including sign inferences) for its semantic content. The Stoics appl,ÁÿÖ5òied the term logos both to significant utterances (linguistic signifiers) and to sign-inferences of the form: if p, then q. The presence of logos on both sides of the division of dialectic is hardly inadvertent. I take it as an indication that what the Stoics were seeking to elucidate was a unitary science of discourse, which would comprehend both linguistic signs and sign-inferences without reducing one to the other." pp. 109-110

    (1) (...) I have deliberately focused upon a limited range of texts, and I say virtually nothing about the antecedents of Stoic doctrines or their reception by later philosophers and grammarians. That is due in part to reasons of time and space, and also to the excellent studies covering these matters by Ax (1986), Frede (1977, 1978) and others. However, given the extremely fragmentary nature of our evidence, it also seemed to me important to focus rather narrowly on texts which have at least the appearance of being systematically Stoic and uncontaminated by other material. Hence my concentration on the "logical" doxography of Diogenes Laertius 7.

    (2) The three studies from which I have learned most about the complex relation between Stoicism and the work of grammarians are Lloyd (1971) and Frede (1977, 1978).

    (3) There is no novelty about this claim. Its implications are explored by Imbert (1978) and Manetti (1988), and I dealt with them at some length in Long (1971b). My main point here is to elucidate the primacy attached to phantasia in Stoic logic.

    (4) See for instance Long (1971b: 84-88).

    (5) This is noted and explored by Ebert (1991: 54 ff.).

  23. Manetti, Giovanni. 1988. "Perception, encyclopaedia, and language among the Stoics." Versus.Quaderni di Studi Semiotici no. 50%1:123-144.

  24. ———. 1993. Theories of the Sign in Classical Antiquity. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

    Original Italian edition: Le teorie del segno nell'antichità classica, Milano: Gruppo Editoriale Fabbri, 1987, translated by Christine Richardson.

    See Chapter Six: Theory of language and semiotics in Stoic philosophers, pp. 92-106.

  25. Melazzo, Lucio. 1975. "La teoria del segno linguistico negli Stoici." Lingua e Stile no. 10:199-230.

  26. Panaccio, Claude. 1999. Le discours intérieur. De Platon à Guillaume d'Ockham. Paris: Editions du Seuil.

    Sur ce livre voir: Laval Théologique et Philosophique, vol. 57 n. 2 (June 2001).

    Sur les Stoiciens, voir le Chapitre 2. Logos endiathetos 53-93.

  27. Pinborg, Jan. 1962. "Das Sprachdenken der Stoa und Augustins Dialektik." Classica et Medievalia no. 23:148-177.

  28. Pohlenz, Max. 1939. "Die Begründung der abendländischen Sprachlehre durch die Stoa." Nachrichten der Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, philosophische-historische Klasse no. 1, 3.6:151-198.

    Nachdruck: Heinrich Dörrie (Hrsg.), Max Pohlenz Kleine Schriften, Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965, vol. I, pp. 39-86.

  29. Sandbach, Francis Henry. 1971. "Phantasia Kataleptike." In Problems in Stoicism, 9-21. London: Athlone Press.

  30. Schubert, Andreas. 1994. Untersuchungen zur stoischen Bedeutungslehre. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

    Inhalt: Vorwort 7; Einleitung 9; I. Kapitel: Die Identität des Lektons 15; II. Die Identität der unvollständingen Lekta und die stoischen "Fälle" 57; III. Die Unkörperlichkeit der Lekta 110; IV. Das Konzept des Lektons in seiner Genese und in der philosophischen Diskussion 131; V. "hyparchein" und "hyphistasthai" bei den Stoikern 149; VI. "Bedeutungslehre" bei Aristoteles und Augustinus und ihr Verhältnis zur stoischen Semantik 175; VII. Die stoische "Kategorienlehre" 199; Appendix: Bemerkungen zu "hyparchein" und "hyphistasthai" im philosophischen Schriftttum und im Corpus Hippocraticum 246; Abkürzungsverzeichnis 261; Bibliographie 263; Index nominum 275; Index locorum 278-284.

  31. Shields, Christopher. 1993. "The Truth Evaluability of Stoic Phantasiai: Adversus Mathematicos VII 242-46." Journal of the History of Phiosophy no. 31:325-347.

  32. Sluiter, Ineke. 2011. "Language and Thought in Stoic Philosophy." In History of Language Sciences / Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaften / Histoire des sciences du langage I.1, edited by Auroux, Sylvain, Koerner, Konrad, Niederehe, Hans-Josef and Versteegh, Cornelis H.M., 375-384. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

  33. Steinthal, Heymann. 1890. Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und Römern mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Logik. Berlin: Ferdinand Dümmlers Verlagsbuchhandlung.

    Two volumes: I (1890); II (1891).

    Reprint: Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1961.

  34. Verbeke, Gérard. 1974. "Philosophie et séméiologie chez les Stoiciens." In Études philosophiques présentees au Dr. Ibrahim Madkour, 15-38. Paris: Gebo.

    Repris dans: G. Verbeke, D'Aristote à Thomas d'Aquin. Antécédents de la pensée moderne, Louvain: Presses de l'Université de Louvain, 1990, pp. 341-364.

  35. Watson, Gerard. 1988. "Discovering the Imagination. Platonists and Stoics on Phantasia." In The Question of "Eclecticism". Studies in Later Greek Philosophy, edited by Dillon, John M. and Long, Anthony Arthur, 208-233. Berkeley: University of California Press.

  36. ———. 1988. Phantasia in Classical Thought. Galway: Galway University Press.

    Contents: Acknowledgements VII; Preface IX-XIII; 1. Phantasia in Plato 1; 2 Phantasia in Aristotle and Theophrastus 14; 3. The Epicureans and Stoics 38; 4. The transformation of phantasia 59; 5. The Neoplatonists 96; 6. The transition to imaginatio 134; Bibliography 163; General Index 170; Index of Names 174-176.

    On the Stoics see pp. 44-59.

Bibliography on Stoic grammar

  1. Allen, James. 2005. "The Stoics on the Origin of Language and the Foundations of Etymology." In Language and Learning. Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age. Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium Hellenisticum, edited by Frede, Dorothea and Inwood, Brad, 14-35. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    "James Allen shows that this assumption explains the Stoics' preoccupation with etymology as part of their concern with a time 'when language was still young' and the product of a primordial wisdom. Since they held a naturalist rather than a conventionalist view the Stoics assumed that there had been a primary stock of words that somehow 'imitate' the nature of the objects in question and could therefore be used as a natural standard of correctness. Since they assumed that there had been a high level of rationality among humans at a primordial stage, the Stoics saw nothing unnatural in proposing the notion of an original 'name-giver' as a hypothetical construct. Such a construct escapes the sceptic's ridicule because it merely assumes that the human need and the ability to converse rationally with each other, which manifests itself in every individual at a certain age, must also have been part of the nature of the (assumed) first generation of human beings. The 'naturalness' of names consists, then, in their suitability for communication with others; though it presupposes a mimetic relation between words and certain kinds of objects, it is not confined to onomatopoetics; instead it makes use of other means to augment language by associations and rational derivations of further expressions that are gradually added to the original stock of words. This explanation, as Allen points out, may make the etymologies less interesting and relevant in our eyes; but though the Stoics did not assume mechanical laws of derivation that would allow them to recover the 'cradle of words', attempts at rational reconstruction of the relation between different expressions provided them with a means to discover and to correct later corruptions of thought and so to play a crucial role in philosophical progress. Despite certain similarities of concern with the naturalist position in the Cratylus, the Stoic position therefore differs in more significant ways from the Platonic position than is usually acknowledged." From the Introduction by Dorothea Frede and Brad Inwood, (pp. 4-5)

  2. Amsler, Mark. 1989. Etymology and Grammatical Discourse in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages. Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

  3. Atherton, Catherine. 1993. The Stoics on Ambiguity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  4. Auroux, Sylvain, ed. 1989. La naissance des metalangages en Orient et en Occident. Liège: Mardaga.

    Histoire des idéèes linguistiques, Vol. 1.

    Chapitre III. La naissance de la réflexion linguistique occidentale: Marc Baratin: Section 3. La constitution de la grammaire et de la dialectique 186; Section 4: La maturation des analyses grammaticaes et dialectiques p. 207; Section 45. Les difficultés de l'analyse syntaxique pp. 228-242.

  5. Ax, Wolfram. 1993. "Der Einfluß des Peripatos auf die Sprachtheorie der Stoa." In Dialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer, edited by Döring, Klaus and Ebert, Theodor, 11-32. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

    Nachdruck in: W. Ax: Lexis und logos: studien zur antiken Grammatik und Rhetorik, Hrsg. von Farouk Grewing, Stuttgart: Franz Steriner 2000, ss. 95-115.

    "Als Zenon von Kition (ca. 333/2-262/1 v. Chr.) etwa um das Jahr 300 seine Vorlesungen in der Stoa poikile in Athen begann, stand der Peripatos unter seinem Leiter Theophrast (ca. 372/69-288/5 v. Chr.) ohne Zweifel schon auf seinem Höhepunkt. 2000 Schüler - so berichtet Diogenes Laertios 5.37 - soll Theophrast gehabt haben, eine eindrucksvolle Zahl, auch wenn man die Gesamtzahl seiner Schüler, nicht die Besucherzahl einzelner Kurse darunter versteht. Daß er jedenfalls mehr Hörer als Zenon hatte, wissen wir von Zenon selbst. Es dürfte von vornherein einleuchten, daß eine derart angesehene und erfolgreiche Philosophenschule auf die sich zu dieser Zeit erst etablierende Stoa Zenons ihren Einfluß ausübte, auch wenn für die älteren Stoiker, etwa für Zenon und Chrysipp (ca. 282/77-208/4 v. Chr.), kein peripatetisches Studium bezeugt ist.

    Bevor ich jedoch auf diesen Einfluß unter dem Lemma Sprachtheorie zu sprechen komme, muß ich einige zeitliche und sachliche Präzisierungen vorausschicken, zunächst eine zeitliche. Ich beschränke mich auf den Zeitraum der sog. Älteren Stoa, also auf die Zeit von etwa 300 bis zum Tod des Diogenes von Babylon (ca. 240-ca. 150 v. Chr.). Diese Eingrenzung ist dadurch begründet, daß die stoische Sprachtheorie zur Zeit der bekannten und einflußreichen τέχνη πσρί φωνής des Diogenes etwa um 200 v. Chr. den Punkt einer gewissen Fertigkeit im Ausbau des sprachbeschreibenden Systems, zugleich auch der Bestandsaufnahme des bis dahin Erarbeiteten erreicht hatte, den Punkt also, von dem aus die Wirkung auf die pergamenische und alexandrinische Grammatik beginnen konnte. Entsprechend kommen natürlich nur Peripatetiker bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt (um 200 v. Chr.) für mein Thema in Frage." (s. 11, die Hinweis wurden weggelassen)

  6. Baratin, Marc. 1981. "Les origines Stoiciennes de la théorie augustinienne du signe." Revue des Études Latines no. 59:260-268.

  7. ———. 1982. "L'identité de la pensée et de la parole dans l'ancien stoïcisme." Langages no. 16:9-21.

  8. ———. 1989. "La constitution de la grammaire et de la dialectique." In Histoire des idées linguistiques. I. La naissance des métalangages en Orient et en Occident, edited by Auroux, Sylvain, 186-206. Liège: Mardaga.

  9. ———. 1991. "Aperçu de la linguistique stoïcienne." In Sprachtheorien der abendländischen Antike. Geschichte der Sprachtheorie Band II., edited by Schmitter, Peter, 193-217. Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag.

  10. Baratin, Marc, and Desbordes, Fraçoise. 1981. L'analyse linguistique dans l'Antiquité classique. 1. Les théories. Paris: Klincksieck.

    Avec la participation de Philippe Hoffman et Alain Pierrot.

  11. Barnes, Jonathan. 1962. "Medicine, experience and logic." In Science and Speculation: Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice, edited by Barnes, Jonathan, Brunschwig, Jacques, Burnyeat, Myles and Schofield, Malcolm. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  12. Berrettoni, Pierangiolo. 1989. "An Idol of the School: the Aspectual Theory of the Stoics." Rivista di Linguistica no. 1:33-68.

  13. ———. 1989. "Further Remarks on the Stoic Theory of Tenses." Rivista di Linguistica no. 1:251-275.

  14. ———. 1997. "La formazione di un paradigma stoico-alessandrino nella teoria dei tempi verbali." Quaderni dell'Istituto di Glottologia dell'Università di Chieti no. 8:5-28.

    "The article seeks to identify the philosophical premises of the theory of tense developed by the Stoics in the formation of a propositional logic and a temporal logic. It also indicates the presence of a number of suggestions derived from mathematical theories."

  15. Blank, David Leslie. 1982. Ancient Philosophy and Grammar. The Syntax of Apollonius Dyscolus. Chico: Scholars Press.

  16. ———. 1983. "Remarks on Nicator, the Stoics and the ancient theory of punctuation." Glotta no. 61:48-67.

  17. Blank, David Leslie, and Atherton, Catherine. 2003. "The Stoic Contribution to Traditional Grammar." In The Cambridge Companion to Stoics, edited by Inwood, Brad, 310-327. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  18. Brunschwig, Jacques. 1984. "Remarques sur la théorie stoïcienne du nom propre." Histoire Épistemologie Langage no. 6:3-19.

    Répris dans: J. Brunschwig, Études sur les philosophies hellénistiques: Epicurisme, stoïcisme, scepticisme, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1995.

  19. Caujolle-Zaslawsky, Françoise. 1985. "La scholie de Stéphanos. Quelques remarques sur la théorie des temps du verbe attribuée aux Stoiciens." Histoire Épistemologie Langage no. 7:3-19.

    "Although this testimony is isolated, the historians of ancient grammar, who are aware of the part played by the Stoics in the formation of an independent grammatical field, unreluctantly take for granted the indications of a scholium by Stephanos -- the commentator on Dionysios Thrax -- which imply the existence of stoic theory of verbal tenses; yet none of the reconstructions of this theory as the basis of the scholium can be taken as conclusive, for want of complementary documents. This paper offers neither a new reconstruction nor a critical survey of former ones, but tries to follow another path; it investigates whether elements which, in the scholium, are undoubtedly of stoic origin, did not stand up to the scholiast's skill in his attempt to integrate them within a framework which may be foreign to them."

  20. Dinneen, Francis P. 1985. "On Stoic Grammatical Theory." Historiographia Linguistica no. 12:149-164.

  21. Ebert, Theodor. 1987. "The Origin of the Stoic Theory of Signs in Sextus Empiricus." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 5:83-126.

    "In his critical discussion of the dogmatic philosophers Sextus Empiricus expounds a Stoic doctrine which has conveniently been labelled 'the theory of signs'. This chapter of Stoic philosophy offers a blend of logic and epistemology, a mixture bound to attract the interest of present-day 'ancient philosophers'. Hence, with the growing discussion focusing on the philosophy of the Hellenistic period, this part of Stoicism was to get a fair share of attention. (1) Controversy has been flourishing over the merits and weaknesses of this theory; it has been compared with tenets about the topic of signs held by earlier and later philosophers, yet in these discussions it has almost universally been taken for granted that there is a single theory of signs and that it can be attributed unqualifiedly to the Stoics. (2)

    Part of what I want to do in this paper is to challenge this assumption. I shall argue that the material relating to the theory of signs which is preserved in Sextus does not reflect Chrysippan teaching, but goes back to Stoics antedating Chrysippus. To have a convenient term, I shall refer to the pre-Chrysippan Stoics as 'early Stoics'. (3) I shall further argue that the theory of signs of the early Stoics was a harvest not grown in the fields of Stoic philosophy, but that it originated from the 'Dialecticians', a group of philosophers confused for a long time with the Megarians and rediscovered as a group in its own right by David Sedley. (4) I shall further try to point out some modifications which this theory underwent as it was integrated into the epistemology of the early Stoics. I shall not discuss the doctrine of signs advocated by the opponents of the Epicureans in Philodemus' de Signis -- almost certainly Stoic philosophers -- a doctrine which has been ably discussed by David Sedley in a recent paper. (5)" pp. 83-84.

    (1) Cf. G. Verbeke, 'La philosophie du signe chez les Stoiciens', in Les Stoiciens et leur logique, ed. J. Brunschwig (Paris, 1978), 401-24; J. M. Rist, 'Zeno and the origins of stoic logic', ibid. 387-400; M. Baratin, 'Les origines stoiciennes de la théorie augustinienne du signe', Revue des Etudes Latines, LIX (1981), 260-8; M. F. Burnyeat, 'The Origins of Non-deductive Inference', in Science and Speculation: Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice, ed J. Barnes et al. (Cambridge/Paris, 1982), 193-238; D. Sedley, 'On Signs', ibid. 239-72; D. Glidden, 'Skeptic Semiotics', Phronesis, XX (1983), 213-55. For discussions in the older literature cf. R. Philippson, De Philodemi Libro qui est peri semeion kai semeioseon et Epicureorum doctrina logica (Berlin, 1881); P. Natorp, Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnisproblems im Altertum (Berlin, 1884), 127 ff.; W. Heintz, Studien zu Sextus Empiricus (Halle, 1932), 42-51; G. Preti, 'Sulla dottrina del semeion nella logica stoica', Rivista Cntica di Storia della Filosofia, XI (1956), 5-14.

    (2) The only exception known to me is D. Sedley who wants to 'put into abeyance the widespread belief that Stoic doctrine is under discussion by Sextus Empiricus throughout M VIII. 141-298 and PH II. 97-133' (Sedley, above n. 1, 241).

    (3) The traditional division of Stoicism puts Chrysippus' Stoic predecessors together with his own school into the Old Stoa, separating it from middle Stoicism inaugurated by Panaetius. This classification seems to be based on Stoic ethics, and understandably so. After all, it was their moral philosophy which, beginning with Cicero, made the Stoics so immensely influential, and here the affinity between Zeno and Chrysippus is clearly stronger than the one between Chrysippus and Panaetius. Yet in logic and epistemology, there is no similar relationship between Chrysippus and his predecessors. Here the great break comes about with Chrysippus, and we should group Stoic philosophers in this field accordingly.

    (4) Cf. D. Sedley, 'Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic Philosophy', Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society, CCIII, N S 23 (1977), 74- 120.

    (5) Cf. D. Sedley, above n 1.

  22. Egli, Urs. 1979. "The Stoic Concept of Anaphora." In Semantics from Different Points of View, edited by Bäuerle, Rainer, Egli, Urs and Stechow, Arnim von, 266-283. New York: Springer.

  23. ———. 1986. "Stoic Syntax and Semantics." In The History of Linguistics in the Classical Period, edited by Taylor, Daniel J., 281-306.

    Also published in: Historiographia Linguistica, 13, 1986 and in J. Brunschwig (ed.), Les Stoiciens et leur logique, Paris, Vrin, 1986, pp. 135-147 (2nd edition 2006, pp. 131-148).

    "Let me now summarize the main points of my exposition of Stoic syntax:

    1. Stoic loquia (lekta) are designated by expressions of a normalized Greek. They have the same structure as these Greek expressions. Thus in most technical uses they serve approximately the same purpose as "semantic structures" or "semantic representations" in modem linguistics and philosophy of language.

    2. There is an infinity of loquia derived by a finite number of recursive rules of four types, lexical, inclusion, combination and transformation rules. Semantic categories like statement, predicate and subject are used in the formulation of these rules which enable us to build complex loquia of the various categories from atomar ones (asuntheta). The structure of a compound loquium may be revealed by using Chomsky or Montague analysis trees.

    3. This infinity of loquia is related with real things by an analogue of modern model theory. General terms are said to denote individuals according to a variant of multiple denotation theory. Deictic subjects are assigned values, like their modern analogues: individual variables by an assignment (deixis). Statements are either true or false. Complex expressions are valuated in function of their syntactic composition and the values of their parts.

    4. Denotations of Greek expressions are determined indirectly. E.g. appellatives signify appellative subjects, which refer to individuals. Thus appellatives indirectly denote these individuals too.

    5. All this would have to be refined by taking into account tense.

    6. By neglecting tense, plural and subjectivization, Stoic loquium theory becomes an analogue of modern first order predicate logic by

    a) the introduction of n place predicates with arbitrary n,

    b) the introduction of a means to handle relative clauses

    Stoic syntax and related model theory thus proves interesting and comparable to modern treatments."

    Les Stoiciens et leur logique, 2nd edition 2006, pp. 144-145.

  24. ———. 2000. "Anaphora from Athens to Amsterdam." In Reference and Anaphoric Relations, edited by Heusinger, Klaus von and Egli, Urs, 17-29. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

    "Excavating the prehistory of dynamic predicate logic in the Stoic theory of methodical arguments makes us aware of an interrupted tradition, in a way that is possible only by philological reconstruction and the use of similar facts independently invented in modern times. That such interrupted traditions can become important has been shown by the use of ancient temporal logic and its resurrection in Kripke's (1963) semantics of modal logic. Kripke combined Prior's reconstruction of the Diodorean system of time-logical modality with ideas from Carnap on modal logic in order to get his semantic

    characterization of the Lewis systems of modal logic. Modern developments offer scholars of classical logic a modern foil that can help them to understand ancient texts and to see interesting developments in them which otherwise would be incomprehensible.

    The modern representatives of this tradition also gain an advantage from such research, in that they can build on a tradition which helps to strengthen confidence in the new methods.

    The adherents of Stoicism gave their logic high priority, saying that if the Greek gods had a logic, then it must be that of Chrysippus. As we have seen, this logic was a form of dynamic predicate logic. It is equivalent to classical predicate logic and contains it as the static part. Classical predicate logic is according to Hilbert's thesis a privileged form of logic, and according to Quine it is the right regimentation of language. Perhaps the Stoic saying was not so false after all. But we can also learn something about our own form of predicate logic, classical and dynamic, because the Stoic developments can be considered as a finalized whole. Even if the Stoic version of dynamic predicate logic is no logic of the gods, it still is an important logic for human beings." p. 28

  25. Frede, Michael. 1977. "Some Remarks on the Origin of traditional Grammar." In Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, edited by Butts, Robert E. and Hintikka, Jaakko, 51-79. Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Reprinted with the title: The Origins of Traditional Grammar in: M. Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987, pp. 338-359.

  26. ———. 1978. "Principles of Stoic Grammar." In The Stoics, edited by Rist, John M., 27-75. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Reprinted in: M. Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987, pp. 301-337.

    "Historians of grammar have usually proceeded as if their subject had a continuous history starting in the fifth century B.C., with the Sophists. But even if one is willing to credit Sophists like Protagoras and Prodicus, and later philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, with a theory of language, It is obvious that their theories were not grammatical theories: they were not interested in finding out how a particular language, Greek, actually works in such detail as to be in a position even to attempt to start formulating the canons for correct Greek. Hence to treat them as part of one continuous tradition along with the later grammarians is to invite neglect of important questions. We may, for example, assume that those who actually started grammar had certain notions concerning the nature of language, and that these and other philosophical views influenced the way they set up their subject and thus also its later development. We may also assume that they had certain reasons for starting this enterprise and that these reasons influenced the way they went about it and hence, indirectly, the outlines of later grammar. For reasons of this sort it is important that we should have a better notion of the actual origins of the grammatical tradition.

    Now our question concerning the Stoics is important, since it has been claimed that it was the Stoics themselves who first formulated traditional grammar, To substantiate this claim it will not be sufficient to show that traditional grammar is Influenced in many respects by Stoic notions. For such a state of affairs would be completely compatible with the assumption that the Stoics still formed part of the earlier philosophical tradition, though they contributed more to this tradition than their predecessors, but that grammar itself only began among the classical scholars of Alexandria, who exploited the available philosophical tradition and the Stoic contributions to it. To substantiate the claim that grammar originated with the philosophers we have to show that it formed a definite part of Stoic philosophy (the evidence seems to rule out the other schools of philosophy as plausible candidates). But the origin of traditional grammar is not the concern of this paper. Even if grammar originated with the Alexandrians, it would be important to know whether in matters of language the Stoics still formed part of the earlier philosophical tradition or whether they were already engaged in doing grammar. For the evidence on the Stoic theory of language is so fragmentary that the context of the fragments and testimonies makes an enormous difference to their interpretation and evaluation."

  27. ———. 1993. "The Stoic Doctrine of the Tenses of the Verb." In Dialektiker und Stoiker. Zur Logik der Stoa und ihrer Vorläufer, edited by Döring, Klaus and Ebert, Theodor, 141-154. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

    "In traditional grammar, but also in modem linguistics, we talk of “the tenses of the verb”. We have inherited this notion from the Greek grammarians. The Greek grammarians, as a rule, distinguish 6 tenses of the verb: present, imperfect, aorist, perfect, plusquamperfect, and future. Sometimes they add a second aorist and the so-called Attic future. The linguistic phenomena which this grammatical doctrine tries to capture are notoriously difficult to understand. But the facts themselves are obvious enough: (i) Greek verbs have a pattern of inflection which in paradigm cases provides a characteristic form for each of the tenses distinguished, (ii) there are syntactical rules which govern the use of these tenses, and (iii) the choice of the tense very clearly affects the meaning of sentences, it makes a crucial difference to what gets said. One major difficulty is to understand how precisely the choice of tense does affect the meaning. There also is a good amount of controversy concerning the question to which extent this traditional grammatical scheme of the tenses of the verb, as originally developed for Greek, and then adapted by the Roman grammarians for Latin, is suitable for the classical languages; let alone for our modem languages. But in what follows it is not my primary concern to elucidate the linguistic phenomena themselves, nor to answer the question of the adequacy of the traditional grammatical doctrine concerning these phenomena. I am just concerned to understand the traditional doctrine itself. Indeed, my aim here is even more modest: I will try to get clearer about the historical origins of the traditional scheme of tenses. Perhaps this will help us to come to a better understanding of the doctrine itself.

    The first time we encounter this traditional doctrine in its fully developed form is in the Ars grammatica attributed to Dionysius Thrax (ed. G. Uhlig, Leipzig 1883), a treatise which presumably goes back to the end of the 2nd century B.C." (p. 141)

  28. ———. 1994. "The Stoic Notion of a Grammatical Case." Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies no. 39:13-24.

  29. Gaskin, Richard. 1997. "The Stoics on Cases, Predicates and the Unity of the Proposition." Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies no. 41:91-108.

  30. Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste. 1999. " La théorie stoïcienne et ses enjeux." In Théories de la phrase et de la proposition de Platon à Averroés, edited by Buttgen, Philippe, Dieble, Stéphane and Rashed, Marwan, 133-150. Paris: Éditions Rue d'Ulm.

  31. ———. 2009. "Épistémologie, rhétorique et grammaire." In Lire les Stoïciens, edited by Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste and Barnes, Jonathan, 23-39. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

  32. Hadot, Pierre. 1966. "La notion de "cas" dans la logique stoïcienne." In Le langage. Actes du XIII Congrés des Sociétés de philosophie de langue française. Genève, 2-6 août 1966, 109-112. Neuchâtel: La Baconnière.

  33. Hagius, Hugh. 1979. The Stoic Theory of the Parts of Speech.

    Ph. D. Dissertation, Columbia University available at: ProQuest Dissertation Express n. 8008733.

    Contents: Preliminary remarks IV--IX; Chapter I. Chrysippus 1; Chapter II. The Techne concerning sounds of Diogenes of Babylon 101; Chapter III. Aristarchus and the Aristarcheans 171; Chapter IV. The Dialectica of Augustine 249; Concluding remarks 260; Appendix I 265; Appendix II 280; Bibliography 283-290.

    Abstract: "This dissertation relates the history of the theory of the parts of speech from its origin in the Stoic school of dialectics through its passage into the Alexandrian school of literary criticism in the second century B.C.

    It pays especial attention to the way in which the theory was transformed in that passage. The Stoics had used it as part of their general system of dialectics, intended to give an account of the truth of true sentences and the validity of valid deductions. The Alexandrians, whose main activity was textual criticism, used the parts of speech as a system of naming and classifying the forms of Greek. The dissertation argues that for each of these purposes a different theory is required, and that in the Alexandrian grammarians' application of the theory two different ways of analyzing language were confused.

    The chief figures in this history are the Stoics, Chrysippus of Soloi (c. 281 to 208 B.C.) and his student, Diogenes of Babylon (c. 238 to 150 B.C.), and the Alexandrian, Aristarchus of Samothrace (c. 216 to 144 B.C.). One chapter is devoted to each of them.

    The first chapter is a reconstruction of Chrysippus's version of the theory of the parts of speech. It discusses the terminology which he inherited, such as "element of logos," the forerunner of our phrase "part of speech," as well as the notions of noun, verb, conjunction and article. It examines Chrysippus's theory of the significate (alternatively called the lekton), which was described as being what "the barbarians, although hearing the sound, do not understand," and also as being "just what is true or false." The several parts of speech were distinguished according

    to their association with significates.

    The second chapter is a reconstruction of a lost work of Diogenes of Babylon, his Techne Concerning Sound. This was a handbook which treated language as a single topic, beginning with acoustics and proceeding to the parts of speech. Diogenes's Techne probably was the vehicle by which the theory of the parts of speech reached Alexandria.

    The third chapter discusses Aristarchus's adaptation of the parts of speech to the purposes of textual criticism, and some of the ways in which he used it in his own edition of the Iliad. It also considers the difficulty which the confusion within the theory caused for Aristarchus's successors. Finally it compares the grammatical theory of the Alexandrians with that of the great Indian grammarian Panini and his commentators.

    The fourth and final chapter is devoted to a post-classical Latin text which has come down to us as the De Dialectica of Augustine. Its sources are obscure, but it appears to represent a development of Stoic theory later than Diogenes. It considers questions of metalanguage, and draws a distinction between use and mention very like the one made by Panini. This stage of Stoic theory did not pass into the grammatical tradition, but the De Dialectica was read during the medieval and Renaissance periods in Europe.

    The dissertation contains two appendices. The first is a collection of fragments upon which the reconstruction of Diogenes's Techne Concerning Sound was based. The second discusses Aristarchus's pupil Dionysius Thrax, and the grammar attributed to him."

  34. Hennigfeld, Jochem. 1994. Geschichte Der Sprachphilosophie. Antike und Mittelalter. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

    Kapitel V. Die Stoa. Laut und Bedeutung pp. 104-124.

  35. Householder, Fred Walter. 1981. The Syntax of Apollonius Dyscolus. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

    English translation with commentary.

  36. Hülser, Karlheinz. 1979. "Expression and Content in Stoic Linguistic Theory." In Semantics from Different Points of View, edited by Bäuerle, Rainer, Egli, Urs and Stechow, Arnim von, 284-303. New York: Springer.

  37. Ildefonse, Frédérique. 1997. La naissance de la grammaire dans l'Antiquité grecque. Paris: Vrin.

    Chapitre II: Les Stoïciens - pp. 119-251.

  38. ———. 1998. "Petite histoire de la metabasis." Histoire Épistemologie Langage no. 20:63-80.

    "I will try to illustrate the dynamics of the passage as described by metabasis in a few stoic texts and several grammatical analysis of Apollonius Dyscolus. I believe the concept of « décrochement », which I borrow from Claude Lévi-Strauss, helps to clarify it. The adjective metabatikos qualifies the type of human representation, logical representation, which, in as much as it is « transitive », allows an information to open into another, as well as their mutual articulation, therefore founding the conception of the sign « if this, then this » and the possibility of the conditional « if it is day, there is light ». According to the grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus, metabasis intervenes in the analysis of the transitive diathesis and in the definition of the person. I will procède to show the part played by metabasis in the grammatical treatment of conjunction and how it allows to throw some light upon the obscure part of the definition of conjunction in the Technè Grammatikè attributed to Dionysus the Trhax."

  39. Lallot, Jean. 1988. "Origines et développement de la théorie des parties du discours en Grèce." Langages no. 23:11-23.

  40. Lohmann, Johannes. 1968. "Über die Stoische sprachphilosophie." Studium Generale no. 21:250-257.

    Summarizes the important unpublished Dissertation by Hans-Erich Müller (1943).

  41. Long, Anthony Arthur. 2005. "Stoic linguistics, Plato' Cratylus, and Augustine's De dialectica." In Language and Learning. Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age. Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium Hellenisticum, edited by Frede, Dorothea and Inwood, Brad, 36-55. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    "Anthony Long also elaborates on the influence of Plato's Cratylus on Stoic theory. But he goes much further than Allen with his hypothesis that the Stoics not only made use of Plato's dialogue, but did so in a way that justifies he presentation of many central features of their linguistic theory as being he result of a revisionary reading of the Cratylus. It is a reading that makes Socrates' suggestions about the 'natural' relation of names to things much more coherent than they are in the dialogue itself. This also applies to their etymological explanation of the names of the gods that they suggested as a revision of a corrupted tradition and a return to the original name-givers' comprehension of the true nature of the universe. Given their `synaesthetic' reconstruction of the relation between phonetics and semantics, the Stoics could avoid the Cratylus' more absurd features of onomatopoetics, as Long shows by analysing different forms of 'naturalism', including 'formal and phonetic naturalism', and their application by the Stoics that not only ins hides names but also the famous lekta or 'sayables'. Long contends that the Stoics not only found a better balance between the phonetic and the formal constituents of meaningful discourse than emerges from Plato's dialogue itself, but restricted their use of etymology as a back-up to their theology, i.e. the naturalistic reconstruction of the names of the gods. As an additional witness to the sophistication of the Stoic linguistic theory Long adds an appendix on the four-fold semantic distinction (between dicibile, res, verbum, and dictio) in St Augustine's De dialectica, which he takes to be largely of Stoic origin.

    The Epicureans also held that language is part of the natural emergence of human culture. But here the similarity between the Stoic and the Epicurean theory of language ends. For instead of an early stage of rationality and inspired `name-givers', the Epicureans proposed a quite different account of the evolution of language as part of their mechanical reconstruction of the order in nature, which includes an animal-like primitive stage of human beings. Unfortunately the information on this early stage in the development of humans as cultural beings in Epicurean theory is extremely meagre; attempts to reconstruct it have to rely on a few lines in Epicurus' Letter to Herodotus and in Lucretius' poem." From the Introduction by Dorothea Frede and Brad Inwood, pp. 5-6

  42. Müller, Hans-Erich. 1943. Die Prinzipien der stoischen Grammatik.

    Unpublished dissertation (University of Rostock).

  43. Ophuijsen, Johannes M.Van. 2003. "Parts of what speech? Stoic notions of statement and sentence; or, how the dialectician knew voice and began syntax." In Syntax in Antiquity, edited by Swiggers, Pierre and Wouters, Alfons, 77-94. Louvain: Peeters.

  44. Pinborg, Jan. 1975. "Classical Antiquity: Greece." In Current Trends in Linguistics. Vol 13: Historiography of Linguistics, edited by Sebeok, Thomas A., 69-126. La Haye: Mouton.

  45. Schenkeveld, Dirk Marie. 1984. "Stoic and Peripatetic Kinds of speech Act and the Distinction of Grammatical Moods." Mnemosyne no. 37:291-353.

    Studies in the History of Ancient Linguistics II.

  46. ———. 1990. "The Stoic texnh ΠΕΡΙ ΦΩΝΗΣ." Mnemosyne no. 43:86-108.

    Studies in the History of Ancient Linguistics III.

  47. ———. 1990. "Developments in the Study of Ancient Linguistics." Mnemosyne no. 43:289-306.

    Studies in the History of Ancient Linguistics IV.

  48. ———. 1993. "Scholarship and Grammar." In La philologie grecque à l'époque hellénistique et romaine. Sept exposés suivis de discussions (Vandoeuvres - Genève, 16-21 août 1993), edited by Montanari, Franco, 263-301. Genève: Fondation Hardt.

  49. ———. 2001. "Philosophical Prose." In Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period, 330 B.C. - A.D. 400, edited by Porter, Stanley E., 195-264. Leiden: Brill.

  50. ———. 2002. "The invention of the whole-and-part figure and the Stoics on solecism: ancient interpretations of Il. 24.58." Mnemosyne no. 55:513-537.

  51. Schenkeveld, Dirk Marie, and Barnes, Jonathan. 1999. "Language." In The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, edited by Algra, Keimpe, Barnes, Jonathan, Mansfeld, Jaap and Schofield, Malcolm, 177-225. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  52. Schmidt, Rudolf T. 1839. Stoicorum grammatica. Halis Eduardum Anton.

  53. ———. 1979. Die Grammatik der Stoiker. Braunschweig/Wiesbaden: Friedr. Vieweg & Sohn.

    Introduction, translation and editing from the Latin edition (1839) by Karlheinz Hülser. With an annotated bibliography of the Stoic linguistics (dialectic) by Urs Egli (pp. 182-216).

  54. Sluiter, Ineke. 1990. Ancient Grammar in Context. Contributions to the Study of Ancient Linguistic Thought. Amsterdam: VU University Press.

    Contents: VII-X; Preface XI-XII; General Introduction 1; I. The Stoa 5; II.Apollonius Dyscolous 39; III. Causal ina 143; IV. The Interjection 173; Abbreviations 247; Bibliography 248; Selective Index Locorum 263; Selective Indices: I. Greek 266; II. Latin 268; III. Subject 268-270.

  55. Telegdi, Zsigmond. 1982. "On the formation of the concept of 'linguistic sign' and on Stoic language doctrine." In Hungarian Linguistics, edited by Kiefer, Ferenc, 537-588. Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

  56. Versteegh, Cornelis H. M. 1980. "The Stoic Verbal System." Hermes no. 108:338-357.

    "The difficulties one meets in studying Stoic grammatical theory may well be illustrated by the verbal system, whose reconstruction has been undertaken in various ways. It is our aim in this paper to study first the data provided by the Greek grammarians, and to determine the influence of Stoic theories on this corpus with the help of the direct quotation in the scholia (scholia Dyonisios Thrax 250, 26 - 251, 25). Then we will analyse the data from Varro (De Lingua Latina VIII - X) and from the Latin Corpus Grammaticorum, in connection with the direct quotation by /Priscianus (Inst. 414, 21 sqq.). Finally, we will compare the various reconstructions which have been proposed, and give our own proposal." (p. 338)