Allen James. "The Stoics on the Origin of Language and the Foundation of Etymology." In Language and Learning. Philosophy of Language in
the Hellenistic Age. Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium Hellenisticum, edited by Frede, Dorothea and Inwood, Brad. 14-35. Cambridge: Cambridge University
"James Allen shows that this assumption explains the Stoics' preoccupation with etymology as part of their concern with a time 'when
language was still young' and the product of a primordial wisdom. Since they held a naturalist rather than a conventionalist view the Stoics assumed that there
had been a primary stock of words that somehow 'imitate' the nature of the objects in question and could therefore be used as a natural standard of
correctness. Since they assumed that there had been a high level of rationality among humans at a primordial stage, the Stoics saw nothing unnatural in
proposing the notion of an original 'name-giver' as a hypothetical construct. Such a construct escapes the sceptic's ridicule because it merely assumes that
the human need and the ability to converse rationally with each other, which manifests itself in every individual at a certain age, must also have been part of
the nature of the (assumed) first generation of human beings. The 'naturalness' of names consists, then, in their suitability for communication with others;
though it presupposes a mimetic relation between words and certain kinds of objects, it is not confined to onomatopoetics; instead it makes use of other means
to augment language by associations and rational derivations of further expressions that are gradually added to the original stock of words. This explanation,
as Allen points out, may make the etymologies less interesting and relevant in our eyes; but though the Stoics did not assume mechanical laws of derivation
that would allow them to recover the 'cradle of words', attempts at rational reconstruction of the relation between different expressions provided them with a
means to discover and to correct later corruptions of thought and so to play a crucial role in philosophical progress. Despite certain similarities of concern
with the naturalist position in the Cratylus, the Stoic position therefore differs in more significant ways from the Platonic position than is usually
acknowledged." From the Introduction by Dorothea Frede and Brad Inwood, pp. 4-5
Amsler Mark. Etymology and Grammatical Discourse in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages. Philadelphia: John Benjamins,
See Chapter 1. Etymology and Discourse in Late Antiquity, pp. 15-56.
Atherton Catherine. The Stoics on Ambiguity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
"The subject of this book is some of the most impressive and original work on ambiguity to survive the wreck of western antiquity: that of
At some point in the long history of their school Stoics constructed at least one definition of ambiguity, the earliest to survive in the
western philosophical tradition, and remarkable in any case for its complexity, subtlety, and precision. It shows that its authors saw themselves as defining a
linguistic phenomenon, amphibolia, which can easily be recognised today as familiar to users of most, if not all, natural languages: that one and the
same linguistic item can mean or signify two or more different things. (This rough-and-ready characterisation will serve for the moment.) Two Stoic
classifications of types of ambiguity, neither explicitly associated with the definition, are also extant; as these seem to differ from each other in small but
important ways, they make it probable that at least one other definition was also arrived at, and this too may have survived, albeit in a mutilated form, and
not explicitly attributed to the Stoa.
Three chapters of this book will be devoted to close analysis of these three main pieces of evidence. They will reveal that Stoic
philosophers had identified a range of linguistic and semantic concepts and categories with which ambiguity is intimately connected, and which serve to delimit
or define it. Brief as they are, the texts to be examined will repay detailed study not only by students of ancient philosophy, at whom this book is primarily
aimed, but also by workers in a variety of modern disciplines, above all by philosophers of language, theoretical and comparative linguists, and philosophical
logicians: although they may all need to be convinced of the fact.
What these texts do not reveal, in a general, explicit way, is what originally prompted Stoic interest in ambiguity. No ancient authority
says in so many words why Stoics, as self- professed philosophers, found it worth while to define and classify ambiguity. If their motivations and anxieties
are to be comprehensible, their conceptions of the purpose, structure, and contents of philosophy, of its internal and external boundaries, of the goal of
human existence, and of the right way to achieve that goal, must all be determined. Stoic interest in ambiguity was the inevitable consequence of the basic
doctrines about human nature, language, and rationality on which the whole Stoic system was based. Once ambiguity's place in the Stoic scheme of things is
clear, it will be possible to trace the ways in which the form and content of Stoic work on ambiguity were shaped and constrained by its origins; and judgement
by the school's own lights can be passed on its success in the projects it set itself.
This interpretative and evaluative task is one of the two chief purposes of this book. It prepares the way for its companion, which is to
assess, as far as possible, the merits and defects of Stoic work from other appropriate perspectives, including those of relevant modern concerns and
interests, both inside and outside philosophy. To do so it will be necessary to abandon the special viewpoints of both the Stoics' own philosophical teachings
and their philosophical and intellectual milieu. One result of this shift will be a questioning of the lines of division which moderns (philosophers,
logicians, linguists, and others) and ancients (Stoics and rival philosophers, as well as non-philosophical professionals such as grammarians and rhetoricians)
alike draw between what they conceive of as different disciplines or sciences, including philosophy itself.
Given that part of the purpose of this book will be to try to analyse and explain some of the differences, in conception and method, between
a range of modern and ancient perspectives on ambiguity, then restricting our inquiry to the particular contributions, however rich, which Stoics made to what
are now called grammar, semantics, and epistemology, and to the other ancient disciplines or theories comparable with modern endeavours, would be a false
economy even were the details of the Stoic enterprise not hopelessly distorted or understanding of them severely curtailed in the process. For the exegetical
need for these larger contexts also reflects the fact that Stoic ideas of what philosophy was like, and what it was for, are vastly different from those which
dominate the field today. The Stoic motivation for studying ambiguity might be called pragmatic, but not in the sense that it contributed to some narrowly
practical goal, whether writing good Greek or understanding the classics, arguing in court or doing grammar -- or even doing logic, if that is conceived of as
just another intellectual discipline, or as a tool of philosophy or of the sciences. The point was that seeing or missing an ambiguity could make a difference
to one's general success as a human being." pp. 1-3
Auroux Sylvain, ed. La Naissance Des Metalangages En Orient Et En Occident. Liège: Mardaga, 1989.
Histoire des idéèes linguistiques, Vol. 1.
Chapitre III. La naissance de la réflexion linguistique occidentale: Marc Baratin: Section 3. La constitution de la grammaire et
de la dialectique 186; Section 4: La maturation des analyses grammaticaes et dialectiques p. 207; Section 45. Les difficultés de l'analyse
syntaxique pp. 228-242.
Ax Wolfram. Laut, Stimme Und Sprache. Studien Zu Drei Grundbegriffen Der Antiken Sprachtheorie. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck &
Zweiter Teil: Die philosophischen Grundlagen, 3. Stoa pp. 138-211.
Baratin Marc. "Les Origines Stoiciennes De La Théorie Augustinienne Du Signe." Revue des Études Latines 59 (1981): 260-268.
———. "L'identité De La Pensée Et De La Parole Dans L'ancien Stoïcisme." Langages 16 (1982): 9-21.
———. "La Constitution De La Grammaire Et De La Dialectique." In Histoire Des Idées Linguistiques. I. La Naissance Des Métalangages En
Orient Et En Occident, edited by Auroux, Sylvain. 186-206. Liège: Mardaga, 1989.
———. "Aperçu De La Linguistique Stoïcienne." In Sprachtheorien Der Abendländischen Antike, edited by Schmitter, Peter. 193-217.
Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 1991.
Geschichte der Sprachtheorie. Band II.
Baratin Marc, and Desbordes Fraçoise. L'analyse Linguistique Dans L'antiquité Classique. 1. Les Théories. Paris: Klincksieck,
Avec la participation de Philippe Hoffman et Alain Pierrot.
Berrettoni Pierangiolo. "An Idol of the School: The Aspectual Theory of the Stoics." Rivista di Linguistica 1 (1989): 33-68.
———. "Further Remarks on the Stoic Theory of Tenses." Rivista di Linguistica 1 (1989): 251-275.
———. "La Formazione Di Un Paradigma Stoico-Alessandrino Nella Teoria Dei Tempi Verbali." Quaderni dell'Istituto di Glottologia
dell'Università di Chieti 8 (1997): 5-28.
"The article seeks to identify the philosophical premises of the theory of tense developed by the Stoics in the formation of a propositional
logic and a temporal logic. It also indicates the presence of a number of suggestions derived from mathematical theories."
Blank David Leslie. Ancient Philosophy and Grammar. The Syntax of Apollonius Dyscolus. Chico: Scholars Press, 1982.
———. "Remarks on Nicator, the Stoics and the Ancient Theory of Punctuation." Glotta 61 (1983): 48-67.
Blank David Leslie, and Atherton Catherine. "The Stoic Contribution to Traditional Grammar." In The Cambridge Companion to Stoics,
edited by Inwood, Brad. 310-327. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Brunschwig Jacques. "Remarques Sur La Théorie Stoïcienne Du Nom Propre." Histoire Épistemologie Langage 6 (1984): 3-19.
Répris dans: J. Brunschwig, Études sur les philosophies hellénistiques: Epicurisme, stoïcisme, scepticisme, Paris, Presses
Universitaires de France, 1995.
Caujolle-Zaslawsky Françoise. "La Scholie De Stéphanos. Quelques Remarques Sur La Théorie Des Temps Du Verbe Attribuée Aux Stoiciens."
Histoire Épistemologie Langage 7 (1985): 3-19.
"Although this testimony is isolated, the historians of ancient grammar, who are aware of the part played by the Stoics in the formation of
an independent grammatical field, unreluctantly take for granted the indications of a scholium by Stephanos -- the commentator on Dionysios Thrax -- which
imply the existence of stoic theory of verbal tenses; yet none of the reconstructions of this theory as the basis of the scholium can be taken as conclusive,
for want of complementary documents. This paper offers neither a new reconstruction nor a critical survey of former ones, but tries to follow another path; it
investigates whether elements which, in the scholium, are undoubtedly of stoic origin, did not stand up to the scholiast's skill in his attempt to integrate
them within a framework which may be foreign to them."
Dinneen Francis P. "On Stoic Grammatical Theory." Historiographia Linguistica 12 (1985): 149-164.
Egli Urs. "The Stoic Concept of Anaphora." In Semantics from Different Points of View, edited by Bäuerle, Rainer, Egli, Urs and
Stechow, Arnim von. 266-283. New York: Springer, 1979.
———. "Stoic Syntax and Semantics." In The History of Linguistics in the Classical Period, edited by Taylor, Daniel J., 281-306,
Also published in: Historiographia Linguistica, 13, 1986 and in J. Brunschwig (ed.), Les Stoiciens et leur logique, Paris,
Vrin, 1986, pp. 135-147 (2nd edition 2006, pp. 131-148).
"Let me now summarize the main points of my exposition of Stoic syntax:
1. Stoic loquia (lekta) are designated by expressions of a normalized Greek. They have the same structure as these Greek
expressions. Thus in most technical uses they serve approximately the same purpose as "semantic structures" or "semantic representations" in modem linguistics
and philosophy of language.
2. There is an infinity of loquia derived by a finite number of recursive rules of four types, lexical, inclusion, combination and
transformation rules. Semantic categories like statement, predicate and subject are used in the formulation of these rules which enable us to build complex
loquia of the various categories from atomar ones (asuntheta). The structure of a compound loquium may be revealed by using Chomsky
or Montague analysis trees.
3. This infinity of loquia is related with real things by an analogue of modern model theory. General terms are said to denote
individuals according to a variant of multiple denotation theory. Deictic subjects are assigned values, like their modern analogues: individual variables by an
assignment (deixis). Statements are either true or false. Complex expressions are valuated in function of their syntactic composition and the values
of their parts.
4. Denotations of Greek expressions are determined indirectly. E.g. appellatives signify appellative subjects, which refer to
individuals. Thus appellatives indirectly denote these individuals too.
5. All this would have to be refined by taking into account tense.
6. By neglecting tense, plural and subjectivization, Stoic loquium theory becomes an analogue of modern first order predicate logic
a) the introduction of n place predicates with arbitrary n,
b) the introduction of a means to handle relative clauses
Stoic syntax and related model theory thus proves interesting and comparable to modern treatments." Les Stoiciens et leur logique,
2nd edition 2006, pp. 144-145.
———. "Anaphora from Athens to Amsterdam." In Reference and Anaphoric Relations, edited by Heusinger, Klaus von and Egli, Urs. 17-29.
Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000.
"Excavating the prehistory of dynamic predicate logic in the Stoic theory of methodical arguments makes us aware of an interrupted tradition,
in a way that is possible only by philological reconstruction and the use of similar facts independently invented in modern times. That such interrupted
traditions can become important has been shown by the use of ancient temporal logic and its resurrection in Kripke's (1963) semantics of modal logic. Kripke
combined Prior's reconstruction of the Diodorean system of time-logical modality with ideas from Carnap on modal logic in order to get his semantic
characterization of the Lewis systems of modal logic. Modern developments offer scholars of classical logic a modern foil that can help them
to understand ancient texts and to see interesting developments in them which otherwise would be incomprehensible.
The modern representatives of this tradition also gain an advantage from such research, in that they can build on a tradition which helps to
strengthen confidence in the new methods.
The adherents of Stoicism gave their logic high priority, saying that if the Greek gods had a logic, then it must be that of Chrysippus. As
we have seen, this logic was a form of dynamic predicate logic. It is equivalent to classical predicate logic and contains it as the static part. Classical
predicate logic is according to Hilbert's thesis a privileged form of logic, and according to Quine it is the right regimentation of language. Perhaps the
Stoic saying was not so false after all. But we can also learn something about our own form of predicate logic, classical and dynamic, because the Stoic
developments can be considered as a finalized whole. Even if the Stoic version of dynamic predicate logic is no logic of the gods, it still is an important
logic for human beings." p. 28
Frede Michael. "Some Remarks on the Origin of Traditional Grammar." In Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology, and
Philosophy of Science, edited by Butts, Robert E. and Hintikka, Jaakko. 51-79. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1977.
Reprinted with the title: The Origins of Traditional Grammar in: M. Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1987, pp. 338-359.
———. "Principles of Stoic Grammar." In The Stoics, edited by Rist, John M., 27-75. Berkeley: University of California Press,
Reprinted in: M. Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987, pp. 301-337.
"Historians of grammar have usually proceeded as if their subject had a continuous history starting in the fifth century B.C., with the
Sophists. But even if one is willing to credit Sophists like Protagoras and Prodicus, and later philosophers like Plato and Aristotle, with a theory of
language, It is obvious that their theories were not grammatical theories: they were not interested in finding out how a particular language, Greek, actually
works in such detail as to be in a position even to attempt to start formulating the canons for correct Greek. Hence to treat them as part of one continuous
tradition along with the later grammarians is to invite neglect of important questions. We may, for example, assume that those who actually started grammar had
certain notions concerning the nature of language, and that these and other philosophical views influenced the way they set up their subject and thus also its
later development. We may also assume that they had certain reasons for starting this enterprise and that these reasons influenced the way they went about it
and hence, indirectly, the outlines of later grammar. For reasons of this sort it is important that we should have a better notion of the actual origins of the
Now our question concerning the Stoics is important, since it has been claimed that it was the Stoics themselves who first formulated
traditional grammar, To substantiate this claim it will not be sufficient to show that traditional grammar is Influenced in many respects by Stoic notions. For
such a state of affairs would be completely compatible with the assumption that the Stoics still formed part of the earlier philosophical tradition, though
they contributed more to this tradition than their predecessors, but that grammar itself only began among the classical scholars of Alexandria, who exploited
the available philosophical tradition and the Stoic contributions to it. To substantiate the claim that grammar originated with the philosophers we have to
show that it formed a definite part of Stoic philosophy (the evidence seems to rule out the other schools of philosophy as plausible candidates). But the
origin of traditional grammar is not the concern of this paper. Even if grammar originated with the Alexandrians, it would be important to know whether in
matters of language the Stoics still formed part of the earlier philosophical tradition or whether they were already engaged in doing grammar. For the evidence
on the Stoic theory of language is so fragmentary that the context of the fragments and testimonies makes an enormous difference to their interpretation and
———. "The Stoic Doctrine of the Tenses of the Verb." In Dialektiker Und Stoiker. Zur Logik Der Stoa Und Ihrer Vorläufer, edited by
Döring, Klaus and Ebert, Theodor. 141-154. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1993.
———. "The Stoic Notion of a Grammatical Case." Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 39 (1994): 13-24.
Gourinat Jean-Baptiste. " La Théorie Stoïcienne Et Ses Enjeux." In Théories De La Phrase Et De La Proposition De Platon À Averroés,
edited by Buttgen, Philippe, Dieble, Stéphane and Rashed, Marwan. 133-150. Paris: Éditions Rue d'Ulm, 1999.
———. "Épistémologie, Rhétorique Et Grammaire." In Lire Les Stoïciens, edited by Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste and Barnes, Jonathan. 23-39.
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009.
Hadot Pierre. "La Notion De "Cas" Dans La Logique Stoïcienne." In Le Langage. Actes Du Xiii Congrés Des Sociétés De Philosophie De Langue
Française. Genève, 2-6 Août 1966. 109-112. Neuchâtel: La Baconnière, 1966.
Hagius Hugh. "The Stoic Theory of the Parts of Speech." 1979.
Ph. D. Dissertation, Columbia University available at: ProQuest Dissertation Express n. 8008733.
Contents: Preliminary remarks IV--IX; Chapter I. Chrysippus 1; Chapter II. The Techne concerning sounds of Diogenes of Babylon 101;
Chapter III. Aristarchus and the Aristarcheans 171; Chapter IV. The Dialectica of Augustine 249; Concluding remarks 260; Appendix I 265; Appendix II
280; Bibliography 283-290.
Abstract: "This dissertation relates the history of the theory of the parts of speech from its origin in the Stoic school of dialectics
through its passage into the Alexandrian school of literary criticism in the second century B.C.
It pays especial attention to the way in which the theory was transformed in that passage. The Stoics had used it as part of their general
system of dialectics, intended to give an account of the truth of true sentences and the validity of valid deductions. The Alexandrians, whose main activity
was textual criticism, used the parts of speech as a system of naming and classifying the forms of Greek. The dissertation argues that for each of these
purposes a different theory is required, and that in the Alexandrian grammarians' application of the theory two different ways of analyzing language were
The chief figures in this history are the Stoics, Chrysippus of Soloi (c. 281 to 208 B.C.) and his student, Diogenes of Babylon (c. 238 to
150 B.C.), and the Alexandrian, Aristarchus of Samothrace (c. 216 to 144 B.C.). One chapter is devoted to each of them.
The first chapter is a reconstruction of Chrysippus's version of the theory of the parts of speech. It discusses the terminology which he
inherited, such as "element of logos," the forerunner of our phrase "part of speech," as well as the notions of noun, verb, conjunction and article. It
examines Chrysippus's theory of the significate (alternatively called the lekton), which was described as being what "the barbarians, although hearing
the sound, do not understand," and also as being "just what is true or false." The several parts of speech were distinguished according
to their association with significates.
The second chapter is a reconstruction of a lost work of Diogenes of Babylon, his Techne Concerning Sound. This was a handbook which
treated language as a single topic, beginning with acoustics and proceeding to the parts of speech. Diogenes's Techne probably was the vehicle by
which the theory of the parts of speech reached Alexandria.
The third chapter discusses Aristarchus's adaptation of the parts of speech to the purposes of textual criticism, and some of the ways in
which he used it in his own edition of the Iliad. It also considers the difficulty which the confusion within the theory caused for Aristarchus's
successors. Finally it compares the grammatical theory of the Alexandrians with that of the great Indian grammarian Panini and his commentators.
The fourth and final chapter is devoted to a post-classical Latin text which has come down to us as the De Dialectica of Augustine.
Its sources are obscure, but it appears to represent a development of Stoic theory later than Diogenes. It considers questions of metalanguage, and draws a
distinction between use and mention very like the one made by Panini. This stage of Stoic theory did not pass into the grammatical tradition, but the De
Dialectica was read during the medieval and Renaissance periods in Europe.
The dissertation contains two appendices. The first is a collection of fragments upon which the reconstruction of Diogenes's Techne
Concerning Sound was based. The second discusses Aristarchus's pupil Dionysius Thrax, and the grammar attributed to him."
Hennigfeld Jochem. Geschichte Der Sprachphilosophie. Antike Und Mittelalter. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1994.
Chapter V. Die Stoa. Laut und Bedeutung pp. 104-124.
Householder Fred Walter. The Syntax of Apollonius Dyscolus. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1981.
Translated and with Commentary.
Ildefonse Frédérique. La Naissance De La Grammaire Dans L'antiquité Grecque. Paris: Vrin, 1997.
Chapitre II: Les Stoïciens - pp. 119-251.
———. "Petite Histoire De La Metabasis." Histoire Épistemologie Langage 20 (1998): 63-80.
"I will try to illustrate the dynamics of the passage as described by metabasis in a few stoic texts and several grammatical analysis of
Apollonius Dyscolus. I believe the concept of « décrochement », which I borrow from Claude Lévi-Strauss, helps to clarify it. The adjective metabatikos
qualifies the type of human representation, logical representation, which, in as much as it is « transitive », allows an information to open into another, as
well as their mutual articulation, therefore founding the conception of the sign « if this, then this » and the possibility of the conditional « if it is day,
there is light ». According to the grammarian Apollonius Dyscolus, metabasis intervenes in the analysis of the transitive diathesis and in the definition of
the person. I will procède to show the part played by metabasis in the grammatical treatment of conjunction and how it allows to throw some light upon the
obscure part of the definition of conjunction in the Technè Grammatikè attributed to Dionysus the Trhax."
Lallot Jean. "Origines Et Développement De La Théorie Des Parties Du Discours En Grèce." Langages 23 (1988): 11-23.
Lohmann Johannes. "Über Die Stoische Sprachphilosophie." Studium Generale 21 (1968): 250-257.
Summarizes in particular the important unpublished Dissertation by Hans-Erich Müller (1943).
Long Anthony Arthur. "Stoic Linguistics, Plato' Cratylus, and Augustine's De Dialectica." In Language and Learning.
Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age. Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium Hellenisticum, edited by Frede, Dorothea and Inwood, Brad. 36-55.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
"Anthony Long also elaborates on the influence of Plato's Cratylus on Stoic theory. But he goes much further than Allen with his
hypothesis that the Stoics not only made use of Plato's dialogue, but did so in a way that justifies he presentation of many central features of their
linguistic theory as being he result of a revisionary reading of the Cratylus. It is a reading that makes Socrates' suggestions about the 'natural'
relation of names to things much more coherent than they are in the dialogue itself. This also applies to their etymological explanation of the names of the
gods that they suggested as a revision of a corrupted tradition and a return to the original name-givers' comprehension of the true nature of the universe.
Given their `synaesthetic' reconstruction of the relation between phonetics and semantics, the Stoics could avoid the Cratylus' more absurd features
of onomatopoetics, as Long shows by analysing different forms of 'naturalism', including 'formal and phonetic naturalism', and their application by the Stoics
that not only ins hides names but also the famous lekta or 'sayables'. Long contends that the Stoics not only found a better balance between the
phonetic and the formal constituents of meaningful discourse than emerges from Plato's dialogue itself, but restricted their use of etymology as a back-up to
their theology, i.e. the naturalistic reconstruction of the names of the gods. As an additional witness to the sophistication of the Stoic linguistic theory
Long adds an appendix on the four-fold semantic distinction (between dicibile, res, verbum, and dictio) in St Augustine's De
dialectica, which he takes to be largely of Stoic origin.
The Epicureans also held that language is part of the natural emergence of human culture. But here the similarity between the Stoic and the
Epicurean theory of language ends. For instead of an early stage of rationality and inspired `name-givers', the Epicureans proposed a quite different account
of the evolution of language as part of their mechanical reconstruction of the order in nature, which includes an animal-like primitive stage of human beings.
Unfortunately the information on this early stage in the development of humans as cultural beings in Epicurean theory is extremely meagre; attempts to
reconstruct it have to rely on a few lines in Epicurus' Letter to Herodotus and in Lucretius' poem." From the Introduction by Dorothea Frede
and Brad Inwood, pp. 5-6
Luhtala Anneli. On the Origin of Syntactical Description in Stoic Logic. Münster: Nodus Publikationen, 2000.
"This study examines the dialectical origin of syntactical description in our traditional grammar. Two famous texts take pride of place in
containing the first descriptions of a 'clause' in Greek literature, namely Plato's Sophist and Aristotle's Peri hermeneias. These
descriptions arose in the context of a more general inquiry into the nature of truth and language which gave rise to the first speculations on the form of the
logical proposition in Greek Antiquity. By establishing as the unit of propositional analysis a combination of two linguistic items, Onoma (`name',
'noun') and rhema (`verb', 'predicate') these philosophers laid the foundation for the doctrine of the parts of speech which later constituted the
core of ancient grammar. Their concern was to establish the two functional constituents of the proposition, roughly the subject and the predicate, by means of
which true and false statements could be made. The object of their concern -- the minimal statement consisting of a noun and a verb -- came to figure as the
point of departure for syntactical analysis when it began to be pursued in independent grammatical treatises. In the grammar of Apollonius Dyscolus (2nd
century A.D.), which is our first extant grammatical treatise on syntax, syntactical description proceeds from the minimal self-sufficiency
(autoteleia) of the linguistic expression. But the description of the minimal sentence by Apollonius bears witness to the distinctly Stoic origin of
the notion of self-sufficiency." p. 11
Müller Hans-Erich. "Die Prinzipien Der Stoischen Grammatik." 1943.
Unpublished dissertation (University of Rostock).
Ophuijsen Johannes M.Van. "Parts of What Speech? Stoic Notions of Statement and Sentence; or, How the Dialectician Knew Voice and
Began Syntax." In Syntax in Antiquity, edited by Swiggers, Pierre and Wouters, Alfons. 77-94. Louvain: Peeters, 2003.
Pinborg Jan. "Classical Antiquity: Greece." In Current Trends in Linguistics. Vol 13: Historiography of Linguistics, edited by
Sebeok, Thomas A., 69-126. La Haye: Mouton, 1975.
Schenkeveld Dirk Marie. "Stoic and Peripatetic Kinds of Speech Act and the Distinction of Grammatical Moods." Mnemosyne 37 (1984):
Studies in the History of Ancient Linguistics II.
———. "The Stoic Techne Peri Phones." Mnemosyne 43 (1990): 86-108.
Studies in the History of Ancient Linguistics III.
———. "Developments in the Study of Ancient Linguistics." Mnemosyne 43 (1990): 289-306.
Studies in the History of Ancient Linguistics IV.
———. "Scholarship and Grammar." In La Philologie Grecque À L'époque Hellénistique Et Romaine. Sept Exposés Suivis De Discussions
(Vandoeuvres - Genève, 16-21 Août 1993), edited by Montanari, Franco. 263-301. Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1993.
———. "Philosophical Prose." In Handbook of Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 330 B.C. - A.D. 400, edited by Porter,
Stanley E., 195-264. Leiden: Brill, 2001.
———. "The Invention of the Whole-and-Part Figure and the Stoics on Solecism: Ancient Interpretations of Il. 24.58."
Mnemosyne 55 (2002): 513-537.
Schenkeveld Dirk Marie, and Barnes Jonathan. "Language." In The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, edited by Algra,
Keimpe, Barnes, Jonathan, Mansfeld, Jaap and Schofield, Malcolm. 177-225. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Schmidt Rudolf T. Die Grammatik Der Stoiker. Braunschweig/Wiesbaden: Friedr. Vieweg & Sohn, 1979.
Introduction, translation and editing from the Latin edition (1839) by Karlheinz Hülser. With an annotated bibliography of the Stoic
linguistics (dialectic) by Urs Egli (pp. 182-216).
Sluiter Ineke. Ancient Grammar in Context. Contributions to the Study of Ancient Linguistic Thought. Amsterdam: VU University Press,
Contents: VII-X; Preface XI-XII; General Introduction 1; I. The Stoa 5; II.Apollonius Dyscolous 39; III. Causal ina 143; IV. The
Interjection 173; Abbreviations 247; Bibliography 248; Selective Index Locorum 263; Selective Indices: I. Greek 266; II. Latin 268; III. Subject 268-270.
Telegdi Zsigmond. "On the Formation of the Concept of 'Linguistic Sign' and on Stoic Language Doctrine." In Hungarian Linguistics,
edited by Kiefer, Ferenc. 537-588. Philadelphia: J. Benjamins, 1982.
Versteegh Cornelis H.M. "The Stoic Verbal System." Hermes 108 (1980): 338-357.
"The difficulties one meets in studying Stoic grammatical theory may well be illustrated by the verbal system, whose reconstruction has been
undertaken in various ways. It is our aim in this paper to study first the data provided by the Greek grammarians, and to determine the influence of Stoic
theories on this corpus with the help of the direct quotation in the scholia (scholia Dyonisios Thrax 250, 26 - 251, 25). Then we will analyse the data from
Varro (De Lingua Latina VIII - X) and from the Latin Corpus Grammaticorum, in connection with the direct quotation by Priscianus
(Inst. 414, 21 sqq.). Finally, we will compare the various reconstructions which have been proposed, and give our own proposal." p. 338