Selected bibliography on Ancient Islamic Logic and Ontology

This part of the section Intercultural logic includes the following pages:

History of Islamic Logic

Islamic (Arabic and Persian) Logic and Ontology

Bibliography on Language and Logic in Ancient Islam (Current page)

N.B. For Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina (Avicenna) separated bibliographies are under construction.

1. Adamson, Peter, and Key, Alexander. 2015. "Philosophy of Language in the Medieval Arabic Tradition." In Linguistic Content: New Essays on the History of Philosophy of Language, edited by Cameron, Margaret and Stainton, Robert J., 74-99. New York: Oxford University Press.

2. Ahmed, Asaq Q. 2008. "The Jiha/Tropos-Mādda/Hūlē Distinction in Arabic Logic and its Significance for Avicenna’s Modals." In The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition: Science, Logic, Epistemology and their Interactions, edited by Rahman, Shahid, Street, Tony and Tahiri, Hassan, 229-254. Dordrecht: Springer.

3. ———. 2011. "Systematic growth in sustained error: a case study in the dynamism of post-classical Islamic scholarship." In The Islamic Scholarly Tradition. Studies in History, Law, and Thought in Honor of Professor Michael Allan Cook, edited by Ahmed, Asaq Q., Sadeghi, Behnam and Bonner, Michael, 343-378. Leiden: Brill.

4. ———. 2013. "Logic in the Khayrābādī School of India: A Preliminary Exploration." In Law and Tradition in Classical Islamic Thought: Studies in Honor of Professor Hossein Modarressi, edited by Cock, Michael, Haider, Najam, Rabb, Intisar and Sayeed, Asma, 227-243. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

   Abstract: "This chapter presents, in an exploratory fashion, the history of Arabo-Islamic logic in India between the tenth/sixteenth and fourteenth/twentieth centuries, with special focus on the formation of the Khayrābādī School in this discipline. Given its

   exploratory nature, the chapter does not promote any thesis that elaborates on the causes behind historical developments; however, it does point out that the study of logic passed through India in four distinct stages via Multān, Delhi, Lahore, the Awadh (generally), and Tonk. The aim of the chapter is simply to chart the trajectory of the scholars and works associated with logical studies in the specified period and region, so as to lay the groundwork for further technical research in Arabo-Islamic logical texts of the subcontinent."

5. Akgunduz, Ahmed. 2011. "Sa‘īd Nūrsī’s Approach to the Principles of Reasoning Vis-à-vis Analogical Inductive Reasoning." Journal of Islam in Asia no. 8:157-179.

   Abstract: "Analogical inductive reasoning (al-qiyās al-tamthīlī) is to some scholars a controversial issue related to Islamic law and logic. It is argued that this kind of qiyās can only afford non-certain knowledge in Islamic law. Bedi‘uzamān Said

   Nūrsī (1876-1960) however, evaluated this kind of qiyās and argued that there also exists al-qiyās al-tamthīlī which affords certain knowledge. This problem may not be appreciated unless information regarding the proofs (al-’adillah wa al-Íujaj) and the ways of inference (isÏinbāt) and argumentation (istidlāl) in logic and Islamic law is discussed. For that matter stand of great scholars like Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728) and Ibn al-Qayyim (d. 751) have been shared in. They have actually gone the same way with different nuances."

6. Akrami, Musa. 2017. "From Logic in Islam to Islamic Logic." Logica Universalis no. 11:61-83.

   Abstract: "Speaking of relations between logic and religion in Islamic world may refer to logic in two respects: (1) logic in religious texts, from doctrinal sacred texts such as Qur'an and sayings of the Prophet (as well as Imāms, in Sh'ıism) to the Qur'anic commentaries and the texts related to the principles and fundamentals of jurisprudence, all of which make use of some reasoning to persuade the audiences or to infer the rules and prescripts for religious behavior of the members of religious community; and (2) logic as a discipline that is studied and applied both independently and as a tool for reasoning in (a) schools of Islamic theology (from Ash’arīs to Mu’tazilīs and Shī'īs), (b) systems of Islamic philosophy (from Peripatetics to Illuminationists), and (c) other types of knowledge in medieval Islamic world, all being strongly influenced by religious doctrines of Islam. Accordingly, this paper speaks of (i) the different manifestations of using logical reasoning, particularly analogy, in Qur'anic arguments, e.g. for the existence of God and resurrection after death; (ii) some contradictions or paradoxes reported by different opponents in the verses of Qur'an; (iii) the place of logic in the classification of disciplines and the courses taught at the schools and seminaries; (iv) the influence of the attitudes of different religious sects on logic; (v) the instrumental role of logic for both religious and secular reasonings; (vi) the relation between reason and dogmatic religious doctrines, and, finally, (vii) the reflection of this relation on progress or recession of logic in medieval Islamic world."

7. ———. 2020. "Logic in Islam and Islamic Logic." In Beyond Faith and Rationality: Essays on Logic, Religion and Philosophy, edited by Silvestre, Ricardo Sousa, Göcke, Benedikt Paul, Béziau, Jean-Yves and Bilimoria, Purushottama, 276-300. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.

8. Ali, Mufti. 2005. "Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī against logic and kalām. Analysis and significance of Ṣawn al-manṭiq wa'l-kalām ʿan fannay al-manṭiq wa'l-kalām." Hamdard Islamicus: Quarterly Journal of Studies and Research in Islam:23-44.

9. ———. 2008. "A Statistical Portrait of the Resistance to Logic by Sunni Muslim Scholars Based on the Works of Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti (849-909/1448-15)." Islamic Law and Society no. 15:250-267.

   Abstract: "On the basis of my analysis of four works composed by al-Suyūṭi, I argue that hostility to logic was a predominant feature of Sunni scholarship, especially during the 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries. Logic was condemned by distinguished Sunni scholars in Valencia, Fez, Aleppo, Iraq, and Mecca, but especially in Egypt and Syria. This conlusion confirms Goldziher's argument that resistance to logic started already in the 2nd/8th century and increased in the 13th and 14th centuries; and disconfirms al-Rouayheb s argument that opposition to logic was never predominant among Muslim Sunni scholars."

   References

   I. Goldziher, "Die Stellung der alten Orthodoxie zu den antiken Wissenschaften," in Gesammelte Schriften (1970) vol. 5, 357-400 (originally published in Abhandlungen der konig. Preuss. Akademie der Wissenschaften [1915-1916], 3-46).English translation by Merlin L. Swartz, "The Attitude of Orthodox Islam toward the Ancient Sciences,"' in Studies on Islam (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 185-215.

   Khaled el-Rouayheb, "Sunni Muslim Scholars on the Status of Logic, 1500-1800," Islamic Law and Society 11,2 (2004), 213-232.

10. ———. 2008. "How did al-Suyūṭī abridge Ibn Taymiyya's Naṣīḥat ahl al-Īmān fī radd ʿalā Mantiq al-Yūnān?" Al-Jāmiʿah: Journal of Islamic Studies no. 46:279-301.

    Abstract: "Al-Radd ‘ala ’l-Mantiqiyyin (an alternative title for Nasihat Ahl al-Iman) is a work composed by Ibn Taymiyya to demolish each principle of logic as well as to unravel the depravity of their foundation. Probably due to Ibn Taymiyya’s being genius, when he destroys those principles, he could not avoid himself to discuss digressively irrelevant topics dealing with theological as well as metaphysical issues. In a number of passages in al-Radd, he could not even hinder himself to make a good deal of repetitions. Therefore, al-Radd ‘ala’l-Mantiqiyyin is complex and difficult to use. The coherence of arguments that Ibn Taymiyya formulated is not solid and comprehensive. His criticism of logic is not penetrating as well. On the basis of my analysis of al-Suyuti’s method of abridgement of Ibn Taymiyya’s al-Radd, I argue that al-Suyuti succeeded in rendering Ibn Taymiyya’s sequence of ideas superior to that found in the original work of the latter. The result of this study confirms Hallaq’s argument that the overall result of al-Suyuti’s abridgement of Ibn Taymiyya’s al-Radd is ‘a more effective critique of logic than that originally formulated by Ibn Taymiyya."

11. ———. 2008. "How Did Al-Suyūtī abridge Ibn Taymiyya's Nasīhat ahl al-īmān fī al-Radd 'Alā Manṭiq al-Yūnān?" Al-Jāmi‘ah no. 46:279-302.

    Abstract: "Al-Radd ‘ala ’l-Manṭiqiyyīn (an alternative title for Naṣīḥat Ahl al-Īmān) is a work composed by Ibn Taymiyya to demolish each principle of logic as well as to unravel the depravity of their foundation. Probably due to Ibn Taymiyya’s being genius, when he destroys those principles, he could not avoid himself to discuss digressively irrelevant topics dealing with theological as well as metaphysical issues. In a number of passages in al-Radd, he could not even hinder himself to make a good deal of repetitions.

    Therefore, Al-Radd ‘ala ’l-Manṭiqiyyīn is complex and difficult to use.

    The coherence of arguments that Ibn Taymiyya formulated is not solid and comprehensive. His criticism of logic is not penetrating as well. On the basis of my analysis of al-Suyūṭī’s method of abridgement of Ibn Taymiyya’s al-Radd, I argue that al-Suyūṭī succeeded in rendering Ibn Taymiyya’s sequence of ideas superior to that found in the original work of the latter. The result of this study confirms Hallaq’s argument that the overall result of al-Suyūṭī’s abridgement of Ibn Taymiyya’s al-Radd is ‘a more effective critique of logic than that originally formulated by Ibn Taymiyya."

12. ———. 2009. "Al-Suyūṭī's al-Qawl al-Mushriq against logic." Bibliotheca Orientalis no. 66:40-70.

13. Alper, Ömer Mahir 2015. "Intellecting the Intellected: An Examination on the Interpretation of “the Second Intelligibles” in Islamic Tradition of Logic and its Reception during the Ottoman Period." Nazariyat: Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences no. 1:35-68.

    Abstract: "The interpretation of the “second intelligibles” (al-ma‘qūlāt al-thāniya/al-ma‘qūlāt al-thawānī), as a term which is highly sophisticated and closely related to many philosophical disciplines, began with al-Fārābī and continued to expand its content especially in the literature of logic until the modern times. In this process, following al-Fārābī several philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā, ‘Umar al-§āwī, Fakhr al-dīn al-Rāzī, ‘Umar al-Kātibī, Shams al-dīn al-Samarqandī, Qutb al-dīn al-Rāzī and Sayyid Sharīf Jurjānī became salient igures in interpreting the second intelligibles. he accumulated tradition including various approaches and transformations on the subject was transmitted directly to the Ottoman period, during which the second intelligibles were widely discussed with new concepts and issues. As it had been before, these interpretations and discussions found place in the literature of logic during the Ottoman period. In this article, I will examine the interpretations on the second intelligibles from al-Arabi to Jurjānī while marking moments of change and development. hen I will examine how Ottoman philosophers and logicians approached the second intelligibles by comparing the commentaries of Burhān al-dīn Bulgārī, Kul Ahmed (Ahmed b. Muhammad b. Khıdr), §adr al-dīn-zāda Mehmed Emin Shirwānī and Kara Khalil b. Hasan al-Tirawī on Mullā Fanārī’s famous book on logic, al-Fawā’id al-Fanāriyya."

14. Alwishah, Ahmed, and Sanson, David. 2009. "The early arabic liar: the liar paradox in the Islamic world from the mid-ninth to the mid-thirteenth centuries CE." Vivarium no. 47:97-127.

    Abstract: "We describe the earliest occurrences of the Liar Paradox in the Arabic tradition. The early Mutakallimùn claim the Liar Sentence is both true and false; they also associate the Liar with problems concerning plural subjects, which is somewhat puzzling. Abhari (1200-1265) ascribes an unsatisfiable truth condition to the Liar Sentence - as he puts it, its being true is the conjunction of its being true and false - and so concludes that the sentence is not true. Tūsī (1201-1274) argues that self-referential sentences, like the Liar, are not truth-apt, and defends this claim by appealing to a correspondence theory of truth. Translations of the texts are provided as an appendix."

15. Aoude, Safia. 2011. "Classical logic in Islamic philosophy: Creating dichotomy or catalyst?" Tidsskrift om Islam & Kristendom no. 14:29-38.

    "Introduction

    Using classical Greek logic to explain the concept of a metaphor to his readers, the famous Islamic scholar Ibn Sina wrote in his book “Qiyâs”:

    “So and so is beautiful. Everything beautiful is a moon. Therefore so and so is a moon.”

    On the other hand, the equally famous Islamic scholar Imam al-Shafi'i is quoted to have said:

    "People did not become ignorant, nor differed except after their abandonment of the Arabic language and their inclination to the language of Aristoteles!"1

    The words of Ibn Sina and Imam al-Shafi´i present each two opposites; one is using the methodology of classical Aristotelian logic to elaborate a metaphysical Islamic concept, the other one is claiming Aristotelian logic has ruined the basics of Islamic creed by the limitation of its semantics. Obviously, classical logic did play an important role in the development of philosophical ideas among Muslim scholars and philosophers, but there seems to be a dichotomous difference in approach.

    The aim of my paper is to look into the views of some of the well known thinkers in Islamic philosophy, extracting their specific opinions towards Aristotelian classical logic. What use did Muslim philosophers have for Aristotelian logic in the development of their own ideas?" (p. 29)

16. Arnaldez, Roger. 1991. "Mantik [Logic]." In Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edition, 442-452. Leiden: Brill.

17. Azazy, Hany. 2017. "The Genesis of Arabic Logical Activities: From Syriac Rhetoric and Jewish Hermeneutics to āl-Śāfi‘y’s Logical Techniques." Studia Humana no. 6:65-95.

    Abstract: "This paper tries to outline a history of development of informal logic in Semitic languages and especially in Arabic. It tries to explain how the first definite formulation of rules of this logic appeared at āl-Śāfi‘y’ Risāla, a work on ’uswl āl-fiqh or methodology of law. It attempts also to provide new theories and hypotheses about the translation movement in the Arabic and Islamic medieval world."

18. Bäck, Allan. 2008. "Islamic Logic?" In The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition: Science, Logic, Epistemology and their Interactions, edited by Rahman, Shahid, Street, Tony and Tahiri, Hassan, 255-279. Dordrecht: Springer.

    Abstract: "A current ideology has it that different cultural traditions have privileged sources of insight and ways of knowing. Prizing one tradition over another would reek of cultural imperialism. In this vein we have those pushing for a unique status for Islamic philosophy—and no doubt alongside Chinese philosophy, Indian philosophy, African philosophy…. I begin by examining what could be meant by ‘Islamic philosophy’. I argue that embracing a multiculturalism that makes the philosophic enterprise relative to particular cultural traditions ignores a quite important part of the Islamic philosophical tradition itself: the quest for a transcultural, universal objectivity. The major Islamic philosophers embraced this ideal: al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), for instance. They held that some cultures are better than others at attaining philosophical wisdom, and some languages better than others at expressing it. They advocated selecting critically features from the different cultures for constructing a general theory. I illustrate their method by considering their treatment of paronymy and the copula. I end by advocating a return to this Islamic tradition."

19. ———. 2016. "Demostration and Dialectic in Islamic Philosophy " In The Routledge Companion to Islamic Philosophy, edited by Taylor, Richard C. and López-Farjeat, Luis Xavier, 93-104. New York: Routledge.

20. Baffioni, Carmela. 1991. "Probable Syriac influences in the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā''s logical epistles?" Aram Periodical no. 3:7-22.

21. ———. 2013. "Logic in Islam." In Encyclopedia of Sciences and Religions, edited by Runehov, Anne L. C., Oviedo, Lluis and Azari, Nina P., 1174-1180. Dordrecht: Springer.

22. Baqir, Zainal Abidin. 1998. The Problem of Definition in Islamic Logic: A Study of Abū al-Najā al-Farīd's Kasr al-mantiq in Comparison with Ibn Taimiyyah's Kitāb al-radd alā al-manṭiqiyyīn. Kuala Lumpur: International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization.

23. Bellosta, Hélène. 1991. "Ibrāhīm Ibn Sinān: On Analysis ansd Synthesis." Arabic Sciences and Philosophy no. 1:211-232.

24. bin Ismail, Mohd Zaidi. 1996. "Logic in AL-Ghazali's Theory of Certitude." Al-Shajarah: Journal of the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC) no. 1:1-2.

25. Black, Deborah L. 1990. Logic and Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy. Leiden: Brill.

26. ———. 1991. "Aristotle's ‘Peri hermeneias’ in Medieval Latin and Arabic Philosophy: Logic and the Linguistic Arts." Canadian Journal of Philosophy no. Supplementary volume 21:25-83.

27. ———. 1998. "Logic in Islamic Philosophy." In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Craig, Edward, 706-713.

28. Brock, Sebastian. 1993. "The Syriac Commentary Tradition." In Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: the Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin Traditions, edited by Burnett, Charles, 3-18. London: The Warburg Institute.

29. Brumberg-Chaumont, Julie. 2016. "The Legacy of Ancient Logic in the Middle Ages." In The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Logic, edited by Novaes, Catarina Dutilh and Read, Stephen, 19-44. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

30. Brunschvig, Robert. 1970. "Logic and Law in Classical Islam." In Logic in Classical Islamic Culture, edited by von Grunebaum, Gustave E., 9-20. Wiesbaden: Ottto Harassowitz.

31. Burnett, Charles. 2004. "The Translation of Arabic Works on Logic into Latin in the Middle Ages and Renaissance." In Handbook of the History of Logic, Volume 1: Greek, Indian and Arabic Logic, edited by Gabbay, Dov M. and Woods, John, 597-606. Amsterdam: Elsevier North-Holland.

32. Calverley, Edwin E. 1933. "al-Abharī's Īsāghūjī fī-l manṭiq." In The Macdonald presentation volume: A Tribute to Duncan Black Macdonald, 75-85. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

33. Chatti, Saloua. 2014. "Syncategoremata in Arabic logic, al-Fārābi and Avicenna." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 35:167-197.

34. ———. 2019. Arabic Logic from al-Fārābī to Averroes: A Study of the Early Arabic Categorical, Modal, and Hypothetical Syllogistics. Cham (Switzerland: Birkhäuser.

35. Chejne, Anwar G. 1984. "Ibn Hazm of Cordova on Logic." Journal of the American Oriental Society no. 104:57-72.

36. Daşdemir, Yusuf. 2019. "The Problem of Existential Import in Metathetic Propositions: Qutb al-Din al-Tahtani contra Fakhr al-Din al-Razi." Nazariyat Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences no. 5:81-118.

    Abstract: "This paper addresses discussions in post-Avicennan Arabic logic on various characterizations of metathetic propositions and their status vis-à-vis the existential import condition by focusing on the arguments made by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) and the counter-arguments by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī al-Taḥtānī (d. 766/1365), both of whom established their positions in a framework drawn by Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, d. 428/1037), the most prominent figure in the tradition of classical Arabic logic. In his logic texts, Avicenna thoroughly discusses the problem of the existential import in metathetic propositions (ma‘dūla), and seems to have presumed the existential import to be a truth-condition for affirmative propositions, and therefore, for a irmative metathetic propositions as well. For Avicenna, in other words, an affirmative metathetic proposition presumes its subject-terms’s possibly existent referent(s). However, the theologian-philosopher Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who lived about a century and half after Avicenna, criticized his views on metathetic propositions and their existential import among other things, thereby igniting a wave of debates in the tradition, in which Quṭb al-Dīn al-Taḥtānī participated in the following century. By studying this contained problem, this paper seeks to address a wider scholarly concern regarding the vitality of post-classical Arabic logic, and to establish that this period witnessed the flourishing of philosophical debate among Arabic logicians."

37. Di Vincenzo, Silvia. 2018. "Early Exegetical Practice on Avicenna's Śifā': Faẖr al Dīn al Rāzi's Marginalia to Logic." Arabic Sciences and Philosophy no. 28:31-66.

    Abstract: "Nine manuscripts preserving Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Šifāʾ share a set of identical marginal glosses to the section of Logic. One of these manuscripts reports, at the end of each of the glosses, a certificate of transmission ascribing them to the theologian and philosopher Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606H/1210), which provides some material evidence of the existence of a flourishing exegetical activity on the Kitāb al-Šifāʾ during the twelfth-thirteenth century, in spite of the apparent lack of commentaries on the text in that period. The present paper provides an edition of the so far unknown ḥāšiyāt to Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Šifāʾ by al-Rāzī, with an attempt at reconstructing their tradition and contextualizing them within al-Rāzī’s exegetical and teaching activity."

38. Druart, Thérèse-Anne. 2016. "Logic and Language." In The Routledge Companion to Islamic Philosophy, edited by Taylor, Richard C. and López-Farjeat, Luis Xavier, 69-81. New York: Routledge.

39. Dunlop, Douglas Morton. 1955. "Philosophical Predecessors and Contemporaries of Ibn Bājjah." The Islamic Quarterly no. 2:101-116.

40. El-Rouahyeb, Khaled. 2011. "Logic in the Arabic and Islamic World." In Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy, edited by Lagerlund, Henrik, 686-692.

    Abstract: "The Arabic logical tradition emerged from the Graeco-Arabic translation movement from the eighth to the tenth centuries. In its initial stages it was closely linked to the activity of translating and commenting upon Aristotle’s Organon. By the early tenth century, a circle of Aristotelian scholars had emerged in Baghdad who saw themselves as a continuation of the Alexandrian tradition. Its most prominent representative was undoubtedly al-Fārābī (d. 950), who wrote esteemed commentaries on Aristotle’s logical works, as well as a number of treatises introducing logic (manṭiq) to an environment that often viewed the Greek sciences with suspicion. The influence of the Baghdad circle eventually reached Islamic Spain, where Aristotelian philosophy and logic flourished in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, culminating in the monumental commentaries on Aristotle by Averroes (d. 1198). In other parts of the Islamic world, however, the influence emanating from Avicenna (d. 1037) eventually superseded that of Aristotle. Avicenna was less concerned with getting the interpretation of Aristotle right, and more willing to make radical departures from the Aristotelian tradition. By the thirteenth century, his works had replaced those of Aristotle as the point of reference for most logicians writing in Arabic. The prominent theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210) approached the Avicennian tradition with the same irreverence with which Avicenna had himself approached the Aristotelian tradition. He also decisively reoriented the scope of logic toward a focused study of terms, propositions, and syllogisms, rather than the entirety of topics covered in the Organon. A number of thirteenth-century logicians working in the wake of Avicenna and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī produced sophisticated and original summas of formal logic. They also produced a number of condensed handbooks that formed the basis of logical studies at Colleges throughout the Islamic world until modern times."

41. El-Rouayheb, Khaled. 2004. "Sunni Muslim Scholars on the Status of Logic, 1500-1800." Islamic Law and Society no. 11:213-232.

    Abstract: "In the present article, I discuss Goldziher's contention (echoed in more recent literature) that fromt he thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Sunni Muslim scholars ('ulama') became increasingly hostile to rational sciences such as logic. On the

    basis of discussions and fatāwā by Sunni scholars in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, I show that this idea is radically mistaken. Mainstream scholars in the Maghrib, Egypt and Turkey considered logic to be not only permissible but actually commendable or even a religious duty incumbent on the Muslim community as a whole (i.e. a farḍ kifāyah). Though there were dissenting voices in the period, such as the Qāḍizādelīs, this seems to have been the mainstream opinion of Sunni scholars until the rise of the Salafiyyah movement in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries."

    References

    Ignáz Goldziher, "Stellung der alten islamischen Orthodoxie zu den antikken Wissenschaften," Abhandlung der Koniglichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 8 (1915): 3-46. In what follows, all references and quotations will be to and from the English translation "The Attitude of Orthodox Islam Toward the Ancient Sciences," in M.L. Swartz (transl. and ed.), Studies on Islam (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 185-215.

42. ———. 2005. " Was There a Revival of Logical Studies in Eighteenth-Century Egypt?" Die Welt des Islams no. 45:1-19.

43. ———. 2006. "Opening the Gate of Verification: The Forgotten Arab-Islamic Florescence of the 17th Century." International Journal of Middle East Studies no. 38:263-281.

44. ———. 2009. "Impossible antecedents and their consequences: Some thirteenth-century Arabic discussions." History and Philosophy of Logic:209-225.

    Abstract: "The principle that a necessarily false proposition implies any proposition, and that a necessarily true proposition is implied by any proposition, was apparently first propounded in twelfth century Latin logic, and came to be widely, though not universally, accepted in the fourteenth century. These principles seem never to have been accepted, or even seriously entertained, by Arabic logicians. In the present paper I explore some thirteenth century Arabic discussions of conditionals with impossible antecedents. The Persian-born scholar Afdal al-Dīn al-Khūnajī (d.1248) suggested the novel idea that two contradictory propositions may follow from the same impossible antecedent, and closely related to this point, he suggested that if an antecedent implied a consequent, then it would do so no matter how it was strengthened. These ideas led him, and those who followed him, to reject what has come to be known as ‘Aristotle’s thesis’ that nothing is implied by its own negation. Even these suggestions were widely resisted. Particularly influential were the counter-arguments of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūṣī (d.1274)."

45. ———. 2010. Relational Syllogisms and the History of Arabic Logic, 900-1900. Leiden: Brill.

46. ———. 2011. "Logic in the Arabic and Islamic World." In Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy. Philosophy Between 500 and 1500, edited by Lagerlund, Henrik, 686-692. Dordrecht Springer.

47. ———. 2012. "Post-Avicennan Logicians on the Subject Matter of Logic: Some Thirteenth- and Fourteenth-Century Discussions." Arabic Sciences and Philosophy no. 22:69-90.

    Abstract: "In the thirteenth century, the influential logician Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khnajī (d. 1248) departed from the Avicennan view that the subject matter of logic is “second intentions”.

    For al-Khūnajī, the subject matter of logic is “the objects of conception and assent”. His departure elicited intense and sometimes abstruse discussions in the course of subsequent centuries. Prominent supporters of Khūnajī’s view on the subject matter of logic included Kātibī (d. 1277), Ibn Wāṣil (d. 1298) and Taftāzānī (d. 1390). Defenders of Avicenna’s view included Tūsī (d. 1274), Samarqandī (d. 1303) and Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1365). This article presents the outline of the development of this discussion down to the end of the fourteenth century and attempts to reconstruct the major arguments of both sides."

48. ———. 2016. "Does a Proposition Have Three Parts or Four? A Debate in Later Arabic Logic." Oriens no. 44:301-331.

    Abstract: "!The present article traces the controversy on propositions and their parts, intensively discussed by logicians writing in Arabic in the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. From the beginning of the Arabic logical tradition to the end of the thirteenth century, the dominant view among Arabic logicians was that a categorical proposition consists of three parts: subject, predicate and nexus between them indicated (in most languages) by the copula. A number of influential logicians from the fourteenth century suggested that the parts are strictly four: the subject, the predicate, the nexus between them, and the judgment. This thesis was criticized in the late fifteenth century, most influentially by the Persian scholar Dawānī (d.1502). His criticism and the ensuing discussion came to be intertwined with another controversial issue: can some objects of conception (taṣawwur) also be objects of assent (taṣdīq)?"

49. ———. 2016. "Arabic Logic after Avicenna." In The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Logic, edited by Novaes, Catarina Dutilh and Read, Stephen, 67-93. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

50. ———. 2016. "Theology and Logic." In The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology, edited by Schmidtke, Sabine, 408-431. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Abstract: "In the ninth and tenth centuries, Arabic ‘logicians’ (manṭiqiyyūn) and Islamic ‘theologians’ (mutakallimūn) constituted distinct and rival groups. The former advocated the use of Aristotelian and Stoic formal modes of inference, whereas the later had a very different and broadly analogical model of argumentation and disputation. In the course of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, a number of prominent Islamic theologians such as al-Ghazali (d. 1111) and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 1210) began to adopt Greek-derived formal logic and to concede that the older analogical forms of argumentation were inappropriate to the discipline of theology. Despite an opposition to this process by such figures as Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328), this blending of logic and Islamic theology became predominant by the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Henceforth, opposition to logic tended to be confined to Islamic religious circles that were also fiercely opposed to the discipline of theology (kalam)."

51. ———. 2018. "Takmīl al-Manṭiq: A Sixteenth-Century Arabic Manual on Logic." In Illuminationist Texts and Textual Studies: Essays in Memory of Hossein Ziai, edited by Gheissari, Ali, Walbridge, John and Alwishah, Ahmed, 199-256. Leiden: Brill.

52. ———. 2019. The Development of Arabic Logic (1200–1800). Basel: Schwabe Verlag.

53. ———. 2019. "Books on Logic (manṭiq) and Dialectics (jadal)." In Treasures of Knowledge: An Inventory of the Ottoman Palace Library (1502/3–1503/4). Volume I, 891-906. Leiden: Brill.

54. Feldman, Seymour. 1964. "Rescher on Arabic Logic." Journal of Philosophy no. 61:724-733.

55. Gabbay, Dov, and Woods, John, eds. 2004. Greek, Indian, and Arabic Logic. Amsterdam: Elsevier North Holland.

    Handbook of the History of Logic, Vol. I.

    See the chapters: Arabic Logic, by Tony Street (pp. 523-596) and The Translation of Arabic Works on logic into Latin in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, by Charles Burnett (pp. 597-605).

56. Garro, Ibrahim. 1978. "Al Kindi and mathematical logic." International Logic Review no. 9:145-149.

57. Germann, Nadja, and Harvey, Steven, eds. 2020. The Origin and Nature of Language and Logic: Perspectives in Medieval Islamic, Jewish, and Christian Thought. Acts of the XX International colloquium of the Société internationale pour l'étude de la philosophie médiévale, Freiburg im Breisgau, 20-22 August 2014. Turnhout: Brepols.

58. Giolfo, Manuela E. B., and Hodges, Wilfrid. 2016. "The System of the Sciences of the Arabic Language by Sakkākī: Logic as a Complement of Rhetoric." In Approaches to the History and Dialectology of Arabic in Honor of Pierre Larcher, edited by Sartori, Manuel, Giolfo, Manuela E.B. and Cassuto, Philippe, 242-266. Leiden: Brill.

59. Goldenberg, Gideon. 2007. "Subject and Predicate in Arab Grammatical Tradition." In The Early Islamic Grammatical Tradition, edited by Baalbaki, Ramzi, 301-336. Aldeshot: Ashgate.

60. Goldziher, Ignaz. 1981. "The Attitude of Orthodox Islam Toward the “Ancient Sciences”." In Studies on Islam, 185-215. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    English translation of Ignáz Goldziher, "Stellung der alten islamischen Orthodoxie zu den antikken Wissenschaften," Abhandlung der Koniglichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 8 (1915): 3-46.

61. Grunebaum, Gustav Edmund von, ed. 1970. Logic in Classical Islamic Culture. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.

    Giorgio Levi Della Vida Biennial Conference Proceedings.

    Contents: G. E. von Grunebaum: Presentation of Award to First Recipient, Robert Brunschvig 1; G. E. von Grunebaum: Introduction 5; Robert Brunschvig: Logic and Law in Classical Islam 9; Josef van Ess: The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology 21; Muhsin Mahdi: Language and Logic in Classical Islam 51; Seeger A. Bonebakker: Poets and Critics in the Third Century A. H. 85; Abraham L. Udovitch: The “Law Merchant” of the Medieval Islamic World 113; Index 131-142.

62. Guerrero, Rafael Ramón. 2013. "Aristotle and Ibn Ḥazm. On the Logic of the Taqrīb." In Ibn Ḥazm of Cordoba: The Life and Works of a Controversial Thinker, edited by Adang, Camilla, Fierro, Maribel and Schmidtke, Sabine, 403-416. Leiden: Brill.

63. Gutas, Dimitri. 1993. "Aspects of Literary Form and Genre in Arabic Logical Works." In Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: the Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin Traditions, edited by Burnett, Charles, 29-76. London: The Warburg Institute.

64. ———. 1998. Greek Thought, Arabic Culture: The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early ‘Abbāsid Society (2nd-4th/&h-10th centuries). London: Routledge.

65. Gyekie, Kwame. 1971. "The Terms "Prima intentio" and "Secunda intentio" in Arabic Logic." Speculum no. 46:32-48.

    "The more passages one examines in the translations from Arabic to Latin and from Arabic to English and other modern languages, the more mistakes one comes across in the translation of the Arabic expression ala al-qasd al awwal (or, 'ala al-qasd al thani). The mistakes stem from the failure to distinguish between two senses of the expression, one an adverb, and the other a famous philosophic concept. Failing to distinguish between the two senses, the translators translated the phrase literally, often with unsatisfactory results. In this paper, I shall indicate a Greek word which was rendered by the Arabic 'la al-qasd al-awwal. I shall refer to some English translations from the Arabic and show how wrong they are. I shall suggest that in Arabic philosophy itself al-Farabi, rather than Avicenna, may have been the origin of the philosophic concepts of "first and second intentions." I shall point out that although these concepts may have been introduced into Latin scholasticism by Raymond Lull, he could not have derived theni from the Logic of al-Ghazali, as has been alleged."

66. ———. 1972. "The term Istithnā' in Arabic Logic." Journal of the American Oriental Society no. 27:88-92.

67. ———. 1979. Arabic Logic: Ibn al-Tayyb's Commentary on Porphyry's Eisagoge. Albany: State University of New York Press.

68. Hallaq, Wael B. 1987. "A Tenth-Eleventh Century Treatise on Juridical Dialectic." The Muslim World no. 77:197-206.

69. ———. 1990. "Logic, Formal Arguments and Formalization of Arguments in Sunnī Jurisprudence." Arabica no. 37:315-358.

70. ———. 1993. Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

71. Halper, Yehuda. 2016. "Dialecticians and Dialectics in Averroe's Long Commrntary on Gamma 2 of Aristotle's Metaphysics." Arabic Sciences and Philosophy no. 26:161-184.

    Abstract: "While Averroes’ work is often considered to represent the culmination of the method of Aristotelian demonstration in Arabic philosophy, a short passage of his Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Γ.2 emphasizes the prominence of dialectic and calls for a re-examination of dialectic and demonstration in Averroes’ philosophical works. In this passage Averroes describes dialectic as an acceptable form of philosophy and the dialectician as a kind of scientist. In putting dialectic and demonstration on an equal, or nearly equal footing, Averroes seems to go against his own account of the dialectical and demonstrative classes of people in the Decisive Treatise. Moreover, this interpretation of Metaphysics Γ.2 also contradicts Averroes’ explanation of the same passage in the Middle Commentary on the Metaphysics as well as Aristotle’s own description of dialectic throughout the Metaphysics. That is, in the Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, Averroes departs from his earlier views, and describes dialectic as a necessary part of metaphysics, even though the centrality of dialectic argumentation could call into question the entire project of metaphysics and consequently of the sciences whose demonstrations rely on metaphysical ground, i.e., all sciences. Averroes does not emphasize this view, but its presence is nevertheless unambiguous."

72. Hasnawi, Ahmad. 2001. "Topic and Analysis: the Arabic Tradition." In Whose Aristotle? Whose Aristotelianism?, edited by Sharples, Robert W., 28-62. Aldershot: Ashgate.

73. Hasnawi, Ahmad, and Hodges, Wilfrid. 2016. "Arabic Logic up to Avicenna." In The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Logic, edited by Novaes, Catarina Dutilh and Read, Stephen, 45-66. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

74. Hodges, Wilfrid. 2018. "Two early Arabic applications of model-theoretic consequence." Logica Universalis no. 12:37-54.

    Abstract: "We trace two logical ideas further back than they have previously been traced. One is the idea of using diagrams to prove that certain logical premises do—or don’t—have certain logical consequences. This idea is usually credited to Venn, and before him Euler, and before him Leibniz.We find the idea correctly and vigorously used by Abū al-Barakāt in 12th century Baghdad. The second is the idea that in formal logic, P logically entails Q if and only if every model of P is a model of Q. This idea is usually credited to Tarski, and before him Bolzano. But again we find Abū al-Barakāt already exploiting the idea for logical calculations.

    Abū al-Barakāt’s work follows on from related but inchoate research of Ibn Sīnā in eleventh century Persia. We briefly trace the notion of model-theoretical consequence back through Paul the Persian (sixth century) and in some form back to Aristotle himself."

75. Hodjati, Seyyed Mohammad Ali. 2008. "Kātibī on the Relation of Opposition of Concepts." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 29:207-221.

    Abstract: "According to a rule of traditional logic concerning the relation between general (or universal) concepts, if a given concept is more general than a second one, then the opposition (or contradictory) of the first concept is more specific than the opposition (or contradictory) of the second one. Kātibī, one of the Muslim logicians in the 13th century, has raised a question against this rule and, by giving some counterexamples, claims that it results in contradiction. Some Muslim logicians have replied to Kātibī, and in this paper I have examined their replies. Also, by using rules of modern logic, we may easily show that either Kātibī’s argumentation is fallacious or it does not result in contradiction; however, it seems that if modern logic rules had been

    represented to Muslim logicians, some of those rules would have been rejected by them."

76. Ighbariah, l Ahmad. 2016. "Grammatical features in Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ's Categories." Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam no. 43:251-271.

77. Inati, Shams. 1996. "Logic." In History of Islamic Philosophy, edited by Nasr, Seyyed Hossein and Leaman, Oliver, 802-823. New York: Routledge.

78. Ismail, Mohd Zaidi bin. 1996. "Logic in al-Ghazālī's theory of certitude." Al-Shajarah: Journal of the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC) no. 1:95-125.

79. Jacobsen Ben Hammed, Nora. 2020. "Meno's Paradox and First Principles in Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī." Oriens no. 48:320-344.

    Abstract: "This article examines Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's (d. 606/1210) epistemology and his understanding of syllogistic reasoning through a consideration of Meno's paradox. It focuses on later works, namely, al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliya, Kitāb al-Jabr, and al-Tafsīr al-kabīr as well as his treatment of the subject in al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī l-ḥikma. Informed by the theories of epistemology developed through the philosophical tradition of Meno's paradox and first principles, Rāzī views all knowledge formed through syllogistic reasoning as dependent on axiomatic truths (al-badīhiyyāt), a concept with roots in both the philosophical and theological traditions. These first principles are formed immediately upon the presence of the requisite concepts in the mind, and thus comprise Rāzī's implicit response to the paradox in that all subsequent knowledge does indeed require previous fundamental knowledge that is not sought nor acquired voluntarily. Finally, the article discusses a separate paradox implicit in Rāzī's works, namely that he both asserts in sections treating divine determinism that no knowledge can in fact be acquired whatsoever while elsewhere emphasizing the fundamental importance of knowledge acquisition."

80. Janssens, Jules. 2016. "Abu al-Barakat al-Baghdadı and His Use of Ibn Sına‘s al-Hikma al-‘Arudiyya (or another work closely related to it) in the Logical Part of His Kitab al-Mu‘tabar." Nazariyat Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences no. 3:1-22.

    Abstract: "The last four sections of the first book of Abū al-Barakāt al-Baghdādī’s summa, entitled Kitāb al-Mu‘tabar, deal with dialectics, sophistical refutations, rhetoric, and poetics in full line with Aristotle’s Organon. However, they are not so much based on Aristotle’s works, but on a work of the young Ibn Sīnā, namely al-Hikma al-‘Arūdiyya. Both texts have much in common not only in their structure, but also in their very wording. The article presents a basic survey of the correspondences for all four sections and also highlights the most significant differences. However, important part of these differences has a counterpart in an (incomplete) logical text, which is present in the manuscript Nuruosmaniye 4894 and which is, in turn, very close to, albeit not identical, with Ibn Sīnā’s al-Hikma al-‘Arūdiyya as conserved in the unique manuscript Uppsala 364. Therefore, it is obvious that Abū al-Barakāt takes over many formulations and, at once, many ideas from Ibn Sīnā. However, he adds clearly personal elements that often seem to have been religiously inspired and, on occasion, consciously returns to Aristotle’s wording."

81. Kalbarczyk, Nora. 2019. "In the Footsteps of Ibn Sīnā? The Uṣūlī Debate on the Argumentum e Contrario." In Philosophy and Jurisprudence in the Islamic World, edited by Adamson, Peter, 53-65. Berlin: de Gruyter.

82. Karabela, Mehmet Kadri. 2010. The Development of Dialectic and Argumentation Theory in Post-classical Islamic Intellectual History, McGill University.

83. Karimullah, Kamran I. 2017. "Influence of Late-Antique (ca. 200–800 A.D.) Prolegomena to Aristotle’s Categories on Arabic Doctrines of the Subject Matter of Logic: Alfarabi (d. ca. 950 A.D.), Baghdad Peripatetics, Avicenna (d. 1037 A.D.)." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 99:237-299.

    Abstract: "In this article, I explore how Avicenna’s (d. 1037) views about the subject matter of logic relate to earlier debates about Aristotle’s Categories among Aristotle’s Platonist commentators and the Baghdad Peripatetics, chief among them being Alfarabi (d. ca. 950). I argue that Alfarabi invents the idea of secondary intelligibles (or “second intentions”). I show, however, that under the influence of the middle and late Platonist commentary tradition on the Categories, he insists that primary intelligibles, not secondary intelligibles, are the subject matter of logic. While Avicenna thus takes over the idea of secondary intelligibles

    from Alfarabi, I show that Avicenna rejects Alfarabi’s view that primary intelligibles are the subject matter of logic. I conclude that what motivated Avicenna to hold that secondary intelligibles are the subject matter of logic was his belief that logic is a discipline of philosophy and not merely an instrument of it."

84. Kassem, Omar. 2016\. "Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī on intensional logic, freedom and justice." Journal of Islamic Philosophy no. 10:19-61.

85. Kemal, Salim. 1997. "Al-GhazalI, Metaphor and Logic." In Across the Mediterranean Frontiers: Trade, Politics and Religion, 650-1450, edited by Agius, Dionisius A. and Netton, Ian Richard, 205-223. Turnhout: Brepols.

86. Key, Alexander. 2021. "Notes around Ambiguity: Ibn Sīnā’s Logic, ʿAbd al-Qāhir al-Jurjānī’s Poetics, Rāghib’s Two-Meanings-at-One-Time, and the Figures of Ibhām, Istikhdām, and Tawriya." In Philosophy and Language in the Islamic World, edited by Germann, Nadja and Najafi, Mostafa, 77-99. Berlin: de Gruyter.

87. King, Daniel. 2013. "Grammar and logic in Syriac (and Arabic)." Journal of Semitic Studies no. 58:101-120.

    Abstract: "In order to advance the debate surrounding the origins and background of the Arabic grammatical tradition, we offer an exploration of the Syriac grammatical tradition with a focus on the interdisciplinarity it shared with the study of logic. The essay demonstrates that the essentialist view of grammar adopted by many Greek thinkers led to the working assumption that logic and grammar were virtually the same discipline, and that the Syrians shared this view of things and transmitted it to Arab scholasticism. A number of philosophers and grammarians are explored with a view to demonstrating this point.

    Scholasticism in the Late Antique Near East was a cross-linguistic phenomenon which never respected the boundaries we like to draw between Greek, Syriac, Hebrew, and Arabic worlds. Arabic grammar grew out of this background, while being driven by its own internal genius."

88. ———. 2015. "Logic in the Service of Ancient Eastern Christianity: An Exploration of Motives." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 97:1-33.

    Abstract: "The present article explores the motives behind the so-called ‘appropriation’ of Aristotelian logic by the Syriac-speaking community in the Near East from the sixth to the ninth centuries. While it is often assumed that the Syrians adopted Greek logic for religious, and polemical, ends, we aim to show rather that the underlying reasons given for the study of logic and its propagation through educational institutions were much the same among Syriac as they were for Greek practitioners of philosophy in Late Antiquity. There was a marked continuity between the late ancient Greek centres of learning and the Syriac monasteries.

    Syriac theologians rarely, if ever, sought to use Aristotle as a crutch in sectarian religious debates. There are implications for our understanding of how and why the Arabic renaissance in logic came about."

89. Kleven, Terence. 2015. "Ibn Bāğğa's Commentaries on al-Fārābī's Letter and Five Aphorisms." Quaestio. Journal of the History of Metaphysics no. 15:275-286.

    Abstract: "The purpose of this study is to provide evidence that Ibn Bāǧǧa’s commentaries on al- Fārābī’s logical writings reveal a perpetuation of al-Fārābī’s logic in Andalusia and that they also assist us in the recognition of the nature and achievement of this logic. Ibn Bāǧǧa’s Introduction or Eisagoge is a commentary on al-Fārābī’s introductory Letter (Risāla) and the Five Aphorisms (Khamsa Fuṣūl), as well as subsequent logical treatises of al-Fārābī. Ibn Bāǧǧa, in agreement with al-Fārābī, presents logic as consisting of five syllogistic arts, rhetoric, poetry, dialectic, sophistry and demonstration. These arts are constituted by both the form and matter of logic, the matter referring to the five syllogistic arts in which the form of logic is employed. Ibn Ḫaldūn later testifies to this comprehensive account of the five syllogistic arts articulated primarily by al-Fārābī but also in some measure by Ibn Sīnā, and says that, by his time, this account of the syllogistic arts had been replaced by a more limited account of logic. Ibn Ḫaldūn explains that this revised logic separates the form of logic from its matter, discards the matter of logic, and destroys the pillars of logic. This revised notion of logic, Ibn Ḫaldūn says, is in conformity with the methods of kalām and he observes in this version that “the books and methods of the ancients [Aristotle and his commentators] are avoided, as if they had never been, although they are full of the results and useful aspects of logic, as we have stated”. Ibn Bāǧǧa’s commentaries attest to a continuation of the older, more comprehensive, and more Aristotelian account articulated by al-Fārābī, and Ibn Bāǧǧa provides key insights into the recovery of the nature and excellence of al-Fārābī’s logic."

90. ———. 2016. "Rhetoric, Poetics, and the Organon." In The Routledge Companion to Islamic Philosophy, edited by Taylor, Richard C. and López-Farjeat, Luis Xavier, 82-99. New York: Routledge.

91. Klinger, Dustin D. 2019. "A New Take on Semantics, Syntax, and the Copula: Note on Qutb al-Din al-Razi al-Tahtani’s Analysis of Atomic Propositions in the Lawāmi‘ al-asrār." Nazariyat Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences no. 5:59-80.

    Abstract: "In logic, Quṭb al-Dīn al-Razī was broadly an orthodox Avicennan. However, in his enormously influential commentary on al-Urmawī’s logic handbook Maṭāliʿ al-anwār, he explicitly criticizes Avicenna and advances a novel analysis of atomic propositions. As a later addition that only survives in two manuscripts shows, Quṭb al-Dīn was troubled by traditional accounts of the syntax and semantics of atomic propositions. For him, the main problem was a confused understanding of the copula. In atomic propositions of the form “A is B,” the copula is the word that indicates that B is predicated of A (“is” in English, “esti” in Greek, but not usually expressed in Arabic). Avicenna had maintained, for lack of an Arabic equivalent to Aristotle’s “esti,” that the Arabic pronoun “huwa” should be used to form complete atomic propositions (e.g., “Jīm huwa bā’”). Quṭb al-Dīn considers this to be mistaken on several levels. To straighten out the mistake, he disambiguates the predicative nexus of a proposition from its judgment, formulates a unified notion of unsaturatedness for predicates, and gives an account of the judgment-nexus. An upshot of this novel analysis is a reinterpretation of the Aristotelian distinction between secundum adiacens and tertium adiacens propositions."

92. Kraemer, Joel L. 1991. "Maimonides on the Philosophic Sciences in his Treatise on the Art of Logic." In Perspectives on Maimonides: Philosophical and Historical Studies, edited by Kraemer, Joel L., 77-104. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

93. Kukkonen, Taneli. 2005. "“The Impossible, insofar as it is possible”: Ibn Rushd and Jean Buridan on Logic and Natural Theology." In Logik und Theologie. Das Organon im arabischen und im lateinischen Mittelalte, edited by Perler, Dominik and Rudolph, Ulrich, 447-467. Leiden: Brill.

94. ———. 2010. "Al-Ghazālī on the Signification of Names." Vivarium no. 48:55-74.

    Abstract: "Al-Ghazālī’s most detailed explanation of how signification works occurs in his treatise on The Beautiful Names of God. Al-Ghazālī builds squarely on the commentary tradition on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias: words signify things by means of concepts and correspondingly, existence is laid out on three levels, linguistic, conceptual, and particular (i.e. extramental). This framework allows al-Ghazālī to put forward what is essentially an Aristotelian reading of what happens when a name successfully picks

    out a being: when a quiddity is named by some kind term, its referent in the mind is formally identical to the quiddity of an individual existent which belongs to that natural kind. Al-Ghazālī then proceeds to tease out the implications of this scheme for the special problem of signifying God. It turns out that the Peripatetic theory, which al-Ghazālī appropriates from Ibn Sīnā, is ill equipped for the task as al-Ghazālī envisions it."

95. Lagerlund, Henrik. 2008. "The Assimilation of Aristotelian and Arabic Logic up to the Later Thirteenth Century." In Handbook of the History of Logic, Volume 2: Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic, edited by Gabbay, Dov M. and Woods, John, 281-346. Amsterdam: Elsevier North-Holland.

96. ———. 2009. "Avicenna and Tūsī on Modal Logic." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 30:227-239.

97. ———. 2010. "Al-Ghazālī on the form and matter of the syllogisms." Vivarium:193-214.

98. ———. 2011. "Logic, Arabic, in the Latin Middle Ages." In Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy, edited by Lagerlund, Henrik, 692-695.

    Abstract: "C. Prantl argued in the mid-nineteenth century that the part of western logic nowadays called logica modernorum, that is, the so called theories of the properties of terms, entered into the Latin world from translations of Byzantine and Arabic logical works. This was, as M.L. de Rijk showed in the 1960s, completely wrong. He argued convincingly that this part of medieval logic was partly due to Aristotle’s Sophistici elenchi but foremost it was due to the creative minds of late twelfth-century logicians. His judgment of earlier views was so harsh, however, that Arabic logic in the Latin tradition has hardly been studied at all.

    Most scholars are of the opinion that Arabic logic had very little, if any, influence on western logic, but although Arabic logic did not revolutionize western logic as was once thought, it certainly is part of the western logical tradition and as such it had quite a significant influence, though not in the way previously thought."

99. Lameer, Joep. 1993. "Aristotelian rhetoric and poetics as logical arts in medieval Islamic philosophy." Bibliotheca Orientalis no. 5:563-582.

100. ———. 1996. "The Organon of Aristotle in the Medieval Oriental and Occidental Traditions." Journal of the American Oriental Society no. 116:90-98.

     Abstract: "In this review article of Charles Burnett's edition of Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin Traditions, the focus will be on the two contributions which concern the medieval Arabic tradition, whereas my comments on the Syriac and medieval Latin sections will be of a more succinct and marginal character. In his "Remarques sur la tradition arabe de L'Organon d'apres le manuscrit Paris, Bibliotheque Nationale, ar. 2346," Henri Hugonnard-Roche argues, against Richard Walzer, that a significant part of the marginal and interlinear glosses and notes to the Arabic translations of the Organon as contained in this famous manuscript are not merely philological, but constitute evidence of a difference in understanding the logic of Aristotle. Challenging though it is in proposing a new perspective, the majority of the examples given by Hugonnard-Roche do not support this thesis, as I will venture to show. My comments on Dimitri Gutas' "Aspects of Literary Form and Genre in Arabic Logical Works" are of a more complementary character, with a special emphasis on al-Farabi. A complete listing of the surviving copies of epitomes of Ibn al-Tayyib's commentaries on the Organon is also given."

101. ———. 2013. "Ibn Ḥazm' Logical Pedigree." In Ibn Ḥazm of Cordoba: The Life and Works of a Controversial Thinker, edited by Adang, Camilla, Fierro, Maribel and Schmidtke, Sabine, 417-428. Leiden: Brill.

102. ———. 2019. "Deontic Modalities in Ibn Ḥazm." In Philosophy and Jurisprudence in the Islamic World, edited by Adamson, Peter, 113-128. Berlin: de Gruyter.

103. Langermann, Y. Tzvi. 2017. "From My Notebooks

     Isaac Israeli (the Elder): Some Interesting Remarks on the Posterior Analytics in his Book on Fevers." Aleph: Historical Studies in Science and Judaism no. 17:147-166.

104. Larkin, Margaret. 1982. "Al-Jurjani's Theory of Discourse." Alif: Journal of Comparative Poetics no. 2:76-86.

105. Laughlin, Burgess. 1995. The Aristotle Adventure: A Guide to the Greek, Arabic, and Latin Scholars who Transmitted Aristotle's Logic to the Renaissance. Flagstaff: Hale.

106. Leaman, Oliver. 1997. "Logic and language in Islamic philosophy." In Companion Encyclopedia of Asian Philosophy, edited by Carr, Brian and Mahalingam, Indira, 950-954. London: Routledge.

107. ———. 2000. "Islamic Philosophy and the Attack on Logic." Topoi no. 19:17-24.

108. ———. 2006. "Logic and Islamic Philosophy." In The Biographical Encyclopedia of Islamic Philosophy, edited by Leaman, Oliver, 290-302. New York: Bloomsbury Academic.

109. Mahdi, Muhsin. 1970. "Language and Logic in Classical Islam." In Logic in Classical Islamic Culture, edited by von Grunebaum, Gustave E., 51-83. Wiesbaden: Ottto Harassowitz.

     Reprinted in Ramzi Baalbaki (ed.), The Early Islamic Grammatical Tradition, Aldershot: Ashgate 2007 and New York: Routledge 2016.

110. Mahmmoud, Yagoubi. 2020. "The Status of Conditional Syllogism in Syllogistics." Studia Humana no. 9:12-18.

     Abstract: "The form of the conditional syllogism resembles that of the categorical syllogism, while its subject matter is at least a conditional premise, but its conclusion is always conditional conjunctive or disjunctive. This mixed structure to which we apply the rules of the categorical syllogism, is a structure of which Aristotle did not have an idea, and which the Stoics did not conceive, and which the non-Arabian logicians did not know until in modern times. But

     what we have to notice here is the putting of a conditional matter in the form of the categorical syllogism, and it is this kind of hybridization, if we dare to say, which generated this mixed structure which appeared for the first time in the history of logic in the treatise on the logic of Ibn Sina and which can be

     considered a discovery by this author until proof to the contrary, and that the ancient Arabian logicians have taken the habit of exhibiting in their treatises."

111. ———. 2020. "Theory of Syllogisms with Categorical, Conditional and Disjunctive Connectives Developed by Arabian Logicians." Studia Humana no. 9:19-27.

     Abstract: "In this paper we are trying yo ummarize the peak of achievement of the Arabian logicians of the fifteeenth century by making a classification and sketching in familiar terms the conditional and subjunctive syllogisms in Muḥammad Ibn Yusūf al Sinūsi's (1426-1490) work, i.e. in his explanation of Kitāb al-Muḫtaşar fi al-Mantiq of al-Imām Muhammad Ibn 'Arafa (1316-1401)."

112. Maman, Aharon. 2013. "Ibn Janāḥ: between logic and grammar and his classification of the parts of speech." In Judaeo-Arabic culture in al-Andalus. Proceedings of the 13th Conference of the Society for Judaeo-Arabic Studies Cordoba 2007, edited by Ashur, Amir, 111-120. Cordoba: CNERU-CSIC.

113. Margoliouth, David Samuel. 1905. "The Discussion between Abu Bishr Matta and Abu Sa'id al-Sirafi on the Merits of Logic and grammar." Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society:79-129.

114. Marmura, Michael E. 1975. "Ghazali's attitude to the secular sciences and logic." In Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science, edited by Hourani, Albert, 100-111. Albany: State University of New York Press.

115. ———. 1990. "The Fortuna of the "Posterior Analytics" in the Arabic Middle Ages." Acta Philosophica Fennica no. 48:85-103.

     "The entry of the "Posterior Analytics" (translated to Arabic early in the 10th century) into medieval Islam marked a turning point in the development of Arabic philosophy. Its precepts became part of the texture of Arabic philosophical discourse as the world came to be perceived through the medium of logical connections, expressed in the language of middle terms. Al-Farabi (d. 950), developed his essentially Platonic political philosophy within the framework of Aristotle's demonstrative ideal. It had immense influence on Avicenna (d. 1037), who expanded on its precepts.

     But it was also influenced by its new Islamic cultural environment. Avicenna included among the premises of demonstration, statements of individual historical events known through innumerable corroborative reports, deemed certain by the Islamic theologians; and the theologian Ghazali (d. 1111), sought to render its canons operative within his non-Aristotelian (occasionalist) world view."

116. Mas, Ruth. 1998. "Qiyās: a Study in Islamic Logic." Folia Orientalia no. 34:113-128.

117. Miller, Larry B. 1985. Islamic Disputation Theory: The Uses and Rules of Argument in Medieval Islam, Princeton University.

118. ———. 1989. "A Brief History of the Liar Paradox." In Of Scholars, Savants, and their Texts: Studies in Philosophy and Religious Thought. Essays in Honor of Arthur Hyman, edited by Link-Salinger, Ruth, 173-182. Bern: Peter Lang.

119. Movahed, Zia. 2010. "De re and de dicto modality in the Islamic traditional logic." Sophia Perennis no. 2:5-19.

120. Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. 1978. "Metaphysics, Poetry and Logic in Oriental Traditions." Sophia Perennis no. 3:119-128.

121. Opwis, Felicitas. 2019. "Syllogistic Logic in Islamic Legal Theory: al-Ghazālī’s Arguments for the Certainty of Legal Analogy (Qiyās)." In Philosophy and Jurisprudence in the Islamic World, edited by Adamson, Peter, 93-99. Berlin: de Gruyter.

122. Ouyang, Wen-Chin. 2016. "Literature and Thought: Re-reading al-Tawḥīdī’s Transcription of the Debate between Logic and Grammar." In The Heritage of Arabo-Islamic Learning: Studies Presented to Wadad Kadi, edited by Pomerantz, Maurice A. and Shahin, Aram A., 444-460. Leiden: Brill.

123. Özturan, Mehmet. 2015. "On Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī’s Risala fī taqsīm al-‘ilm: Analysis and Critical Edition." Nazariyat Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences:95-124.

     Abstract: "This research focuses on the previously unpublished treatise by Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī, Risala fī taqsīm al-‘ilm. the research is based on comparative evaluation of available manuscipts and is composed of a critical edition of the treatise and its analysis. The treatise is about the division (taqsīm) of taṣawwur (conception) and taṣdīq (assent) as divisions of knowledge. Al-Jurjānī presents views from diferent schools of logic. In the analysis section, I discuss the treatise’s philosophical background and show that the aforementioned division is the first step of a chain of propositions on what the goal and methods of logic are focusing on the possibility of learning.

     Remaining sections focus on the references in the treatise to various views and summarise them. Finally al-Jurjānī’s position in this scene is made explicit through his critical analysis of competing views advocated by these diferent schools.

     For al-Jurjānī, division of knowledge can be analysed formally and informally. Formally, the division should be restrictive and informally, it should emphasize methods of logic, that are proof (ḥujja) and definition (ta‘rīf). The article shows that the goal of al-Jurjānī’s discussion on the division of knowledge as conception and assent is basically to take the discussion out the context of traditional discussions on quiddity but rather build it on the division formally and the goals of the division informally."

124. ———. 2018. "An Introduction to the Critique of the Theory of Definition in Arabic Logic: Is Complete Definition Circular?" Nazariyat: Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences:85-117.

     Abstract: "This study focuses on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s thesis of the impossibility of giving a complete definition (al-ḥadd al-tāmm) and discusses its impact, the parties to the debate, and especially the positive argument contra al-Rāzī by the Ottoman savant Ṭāşköprīzāde. The negative argument of al-Rāzī postulates that the complete definition is strictly circular, for the totality of parts that makes up the defined object are included in the definition, and the object is identical to the sum of its parts. Therefore, complete definition strictly commits the fallacy of definining a thing by itself. Ṭāşköprīzāde argues against this view by defending the possibility of complete definition. According to him, although in complete definition the defined object and the defining features include the same set of things, the modes of their presentation to the mind are different. Thus, a complete definition becomes circular only if both the content of the defined object and its mode of presentation to the mind are the same. If it can be shown that the contents of the definiendum and definiens have distinct modes of presentation, then the charge of circularity is discarded. In this article, I illustrate the two opposing approaches by distinguishing between form and content, or sense and reference. Both parties take for granted that the contents of the definiens and the definiendum are the same when it comes to the complete definition. The main point of contention lies in the modes of apprehending the contents. This article analyzes the arguments of two opposing semantic theories particular to the complete definition and shows that the question emerges as a result of the theories of constant form and variable form concerning meaning. In the period between al-Rāzī and Ṭāşköprīzāde, Ṭūsī bolstered the complete definition whereas al-Ījī refuted it. Both Ṭūsī’s and al-Ījī’s arguments will be discussed, though briefly, in the body of paper as well."

125. Parildar, Sümeyye. 2017. "Applying gradational ontology to logic: Mullā Ṣadrā on propositions." In Philosophy and the Intellectual Life in Shiʿah Islam, edited by Ahmad, Saiyad Nizamuddin and Rivivi, Sajjad H., 135-157. London: The Shīʿah Institute Press.

126. Porcasi, Germana. 2008. "On the Islamic judicial logic in al-Ghazālī'sʾasās al-qiyās." Journal of Islamic Philosophy:68-111.

127. Pournamdar, Amir Hossein. 2017. "Šaḫṣ: Its Origin and Development as a Logical Term." Studia graeco-arabica no. 7:277-290.

     Abstract: "Abundantly used as a technical term in the Arabic classical texts of logic and philosophy, the word šaḫṣ will be studied in detail as a preamble to a thorough analysis of a turning point which occurred in its meaning, during the Graeco-Arabic translation movement (starting from the 8th century). Through discovering the genuine meaning of šaḫṣ in the context of the Arabic language at the time of the emergence of Islam and its following two or three centuries, it will be ascertained that this term, in its common usage in the intellectual tradition of Islam, i.e. ‘a thing or a person belonging to a species’, has imposed itself upon the non-specialized, ordinary language of the Arabs as the result of the dominance of the logico-philosophical literature. Šaḫṣ was never used to serve such a meaning before the transmission of the philosophical works to the Arab world, and it was the attempts of the translators that made this word signifying ‘a speciic entity or individual’, in contrast to its real meaning, viz. ‘body’, ‘material appearance’. In the second part, by taking into account one of the oldest extant logical works in the Islamic tradition, i.e. al-Manṭiq attributed to Ibn al-Muqafaʿ, it is suggested that this change of meaning could be regarded as a case of Arabic borrowings from Persian."

128. Rahman, Shahid, and Young, Walter Edward. 2022. "Argumentation and ArabicPhilosophy of Language : Introduction." Methodos. Savoirs et textes no. 22:1-15.

129. Ravitsky, Aviram. 2018. "Yaʿqūb al-Qirqisānī on human intellect, legal inference, and the meaning of the Aristotelian syllogism." Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy no. 26:149-173.

     Abstract: "In the fourth treatise of his legal-theological work Kitāb al-Anwār wa-al-Marāqib, Yaqūb al-Qirqisānī analyzes a criticism of the Aristotelian syllogism and its epistemological foundations. Qirqisānī defends Aristotelian logic by quoting a passage from an unknown commentary on Aristotle in which the Aristotelian theory of syllogism is explicated. This paper focuses on the historical, theological, and philosophical meanings of the criticism of the syllogism in Qirqisānī's discussion and analyzes his interpretation of the syllogism as a source of knowledge that should be applied in the realm of legal reasoning and in the interpretation of biblical law."

130. Rayan, Sobhi. 2010. "Ibn Taymiyya’s Criticism of Aristotelian Definition." American Journal of Islam and Society no. 27:68-91.

     Abstract: "Aristotle wrote of two “points of definition”: one posited in negative and the other in positive terms. The negative formulation argues that concepts can be comprehended only through definition, while the positive point stresses the consequences of definition by focusing on the benefits to the sciences achieved through those “concepts.” Ibn Taymiyya criticizes these ideas on the grounds that definition neither necessarily leads to the revelation of the facts and truths of things and their quiddities, nor

     does it necessarily help in developing the sciences. We notice that his main criticism is directed at specific metaphysical elements of definition, such as genus, species, differences (differentia/divisions), quiddity, and universality. He argues that these elements are purely mental and do not necessarily correspond to existence.

     Ibn Taymiyya differentiates between metaphysics and the concrete physical world for, in his opinion, not all that comes to mind necessarily corresponds to existing objects in the concrete physical world. Therefore, human knowledge should be established

     on concrete rules subject to experiment. He therefore refutes the logic of quiddity, which depends upon pure intellect, and calls for an experimental logic devoid of metaphysics."

131. ———. 2011. "Ibn Taymiyya’s Criticism of the Syllogism." Der Islam no. 86:93-121.

     Abstract: "The purpose of this study is to examine Ibn Taymiyya’s criticism of Aristotelian logic, and to test the arguments he raises against it, as well as the theory he proposes as an alternative.

     Ibn Taymiyya tries to prove that Aristotelian logic cannot contribute to knowledge because it is based on metaphysical foundations. He raises arguments that are intended to expose the contradictions of Aristotelian logic. These arguments are based partly on the principles of relativity and skepticism, and partly on empirical presuppositions.

     Ibn Taymiyya proposed the use of analogical reasoning (qiyās al-tamthīl) which is a type of evaluation and measurement based on the comparison between particulars, or the relations between two similar or dissimilar things. It can be seen that the most

     important and decisive thing in this relation is the common attribute that links two particular occurrences. Therefore, this inference deals with the relations between things and the causal connections between them. This is expressed in the research method used in the Islamic juridical sciences, which are causal methods, such as: the coextensiveness and coexclusiveness (tard wa-^eaks), coextensiveness-cum-coexclusiveness (dawarān), and classification and successive elimination (al-sabr wa l-taqsīm)."

132. ———. 2012. "Criticism of Ibn Taymiyyah on the Aristotelian Logical Proposition." Islamic Studies no. 51:69-87.

     Abstract: "This article deals with Ibn Taymiyyah's criticism of the Aristotelian logical proposition. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, all universal judgments are in fact particular judgments. Therefore, the transition is from the particular to the universal.

     The basis for the axioms of proof is particular and not universal, and is founded upon experience and not on the intellect. This means that a person arrives at the particular proposition before the universal one."

133. ———. 2016. "Translation and Interpretation in Ibn Taymiyya's Logical Definition." British Journal for the History of Philosophy no. 19:1047-1065.

     Abstract: "This article deals with the concepts of translation and interpretation in Ibn Taymiyya’s Theory of Definition. Translation is replacement of one name by another or of one named object by another, while, Interpretation is replacement of one name by a named object or of a named object by a name. The relationship between the definition and the definiendum is decided by the law of al-Tard wa al-’Aks (coextensiveness-cumcoexclusiveness) that looks at objects from all sides and decides the traits of the definiendum. It also aims at deciding the signification of the name and this is also the aim of the definition.

     Since the ‘name’ is a linguistic matter, the definition is related to the signification of the name and its language."

134. Reçber, Mehmet Sait. 2015. "On al-Ghazālī and Necessary Truths." In 900 Jahre al-Gazālī im Spiegel der islamischen Wissenschaften, edited by Ucar, Bülent and Griffel, Frank, 117-126. Osnabrück: V&R unipress.

135. Rescher, Nicholas. 1962. "Some Arabic Technical Terms of Syllogistic Logic and their Greek Originals." Journal of the American Oriental Society no. 82:202-204.

136. ———. 1963. "Al-Kindi's Sketch of Aristotle's Organon." The New Scholasticism no. 37:44-58.

     Reprinted as Chapter 2 in N. Rescher, Studies in the History of Logic, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2006, pp. 15-27.

137. ———. 1963. "Averroes’ Quaesitum on Assertoric (Absolute) Propositions." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 1:80-93.

138. ———. 1963. "A Tenth-Century Arab-Christian Apologia for Logic." Islamic Studies no. 2:1-16.

139. ———. 1964. The Development of Arabic Logic. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

     Contents: Preface 7; Introduction 11;

     Part I. Survey of Arabic Logic

     1. The First Century of Arabic Logic 15; 2. The First Flowering of Arabic Logic 33; 3. The Century of Avicenna 48; 4. The Century of Averroes 55; 5. The Clash of the Schools 64; 6. The Period of “Reconciliation” and The Age of Schoolmasters 73; Conclusion 82;

     Part II. Register of Arabic Logicians

     Contents [166 names] 87; The Register 93;

     General Bibliography 256; Index 259-262.

140. ———. 1964. Studies in the History of Arabic Logic. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

     "In the ten essays brought together in this volume, the author discusses different aspects and problems related to the intellectual history of Islam and centered around logical and philosophical issues. The guiding line is that Arabic logic is entirely Western and has nothing to do with "oriental philosophy." Six of the essays have appeared in different journals. The first essay, written especially for this volume, gives a brief account of the history of Arabic logic. The other essays deal with particular texts and problems related to the writings of such thinkers as al-Farabi, al-Kindi, Avicenna, Abu 'l-Salt of Denia, Averroes. The book contains extensive bibliographical references, documentary and critical notes."

141. ———. 1967. Temporal Modalities in Arabic Logic. Dordrecht: Reidel.

142. ———. 1968. Studies in Arabic Philosophy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

143. ———. 2006. Studies in the History of Logic. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

     Table of Contents: Preface; 1. On Aristotle’s Apodeictic Syllogisms 1; 2. Al-Kindi’s Sketch of Aristotle’s Organon 15; 3. A Ninth-Century Arabic Logician on: Is Existence A Predicate? 29; 4. Avicenna on the Logic of “Conditional” Propositions 33; 5. Avicenna on the Logic of Questions 47; 6. The Arabic Theory of Temporal Modal Syllogistic 55; 7. Choice Without Preference: The Problem of “Buridan’s Ass” 91; 8. Leibniz’s Interpretation of his Logical Calculi 141; 9. Russell and Modal Logic 159; 10. Default Reasoning 173; Index of Names 185-190.

144. Rescher, Nicholas, and vander Nat, Arnold. 1975. "The Arabic Theory of Temporal Modal Syllogistic." In Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science, edited by Hourani, Albert, 189-221. Albany: State University of New York Press.

145. Rundgren, Frithiof. 2007. "On the Greek Influence on Arabic Grammar." In The Early Islamic Grammatical Tradition, edited by Baalbaki, Ramzi, 75-100. Aldeshot: Ashgate.

146. Sabra, A. I. 1965. "A twelfth-century defence of the fourth figure of the syllogism." Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes:14-28.

     Reprinted as Essay XII in A. I. Sabra, Optics, Astronomy and Logic Studies in Arabic Science and Philosophy, Aldershot: Variorum 1994.

147. Sanson, David, and Alwishah, Ahmed. 2016. "Al-Taftāzānī on the Liar Paradox." Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy no. 4:100-124.

148. Schleifer, Aliah. 1990. "Ibn Khaldun’s Theories of Perception, Logic and Knowledge: An Islamic Phenomenology." Islamic Quarterly no. 34:225-231.

149. Schöck, Cornelia. 2008. "Name (ism), Derived Name (ism mushtaqq) and Description (waṣf) in Arabic Grammar, Muslim Dialectical Theology and Arabic Logic." In The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition: Science, Logic, Epistemology and their Interactions, edited by Rahman, Shahid, Street, Tony and Tahiri, Hassan, 329-360. Dordrecht: Springer.

150. ———. 2016. "Major Issues and Controversies of Arabic Logic: Preface." Oriens no. 44:179-180.

151. Shehaby, Nabil. 1975. "he Influence of Stoic Logic on AI-Jaṣṣāṣ's Legal Theory." In The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning, edited by Murdoch, John Emery and Sylla, Edith Dudley, 61-80. Dordrecht: Reidel.

     Discussion, pp. 80-85.

152. Spevack, Aaron. 2010. "Apples and Oranges: The Logic of the Early and Later Arabic Logicians." Islamic Law and Society:159-184.

     Abstract: "In a recent article in Islamic Law and Society, Khaled El-Rouayheb proposed that opposition to logic was probably never the predominant view of Sunni Muslim scholars.

     El-Rouayheb also expressed doubt in the position of later scholars who argued that there existed two approaches to the study of logic, one whose permissibility was debated, and another whose permissibility was agreed upon. In response to El-Rouayheb,

     Mufti Ali argued in his own article that opposition to logic was the predominant view of Sunni Muslim scholars between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries. In this article, I argue, pace Ali, that there is merit to the claim that neither opposition to, nor support for, logic achieved predominance, especially between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, even if favorable opinions came to be viewed as the soundest position in later centuries. I also argue, pace El-Rouayheb, that there is merit to the proposition that there are two distinct approaches to logic, one that mixes objectionable elements from Greek philosophy, and one that, in varying degrees, may have rid itself of these elements. Additionally, I argue that the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries may have marked a transitional period during which the two approaches became more distinct, although some jurists who ruled on logic did not always notice, or acknowledge, the distinction."

153. Street, Tony. 1995. "Ṭūsī on Avicenna's logical connectives." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 16:257-268.

154. ———. 2000. "Towards a History of Syllogistic after Avicenna: Notes on Rescher's Studies on Arabic Modal Logic." Journal of Islamic Studies no. 11:209-228.

155. ———. 2004. "Arabic Logic." In Handbook of the History of Logic, Volume 1: Greek, Indian and Arabic Logic, edited by Gabbay, Dov M. and Woods, John, 523-596. Amsterdam: Elsevier North-Holland.

156. ———. 2005. "Logic." In The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy, edited by Peter, Adamson and Taylor, Richard C., 247-265. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

157. ———. 2005. "Faẖraddìn ar-Ràzì’s Critique of Avicennan Logic." In Logik und Theologie. Das Organon im arabischen und im lateinischen Mittelalte, edited by Perler, Dominik and Rudolph, Ulrich, 99-116. Leiden: Brill.

158. ———. 2008. "Rescher on Arabic Logic." In Rescher Studies: A Collection of Essays on the Philosophical Work of Nicholas Rescher, edited by Almeder, Robert, 309-324. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

159. ———. 2014. "Afḍal al-Dīn al-Khunājī (d. 1248) on the conversion of modal propositions." Oriens no. 42:454-513.

160. ———. 2016. "Al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī (d. 1325) and the Early Reception of Kātibī’s Shamsīya: Notes towards a Study of the Dynamics of Post-Avicennan Logical Commentary." Oriens no. 44:267-300.

     Abstract: "Al-Risāla al-Shamsīya fī l-qawāʿid al-manṭiqīya by Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī (d. 1277) is one of the most widely-read textbooks on logic ever written. Its first readers, however, were less enthusiastic about it than later generations proved to be. In the earliest commentary written on the Shamsīya, al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī (d. 1325) expressed serious reservations about a number of Kātibī’s decisions, decisions which developed ideas first put forward by Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210). In the following article, I

     examine how the commentary Ḥillī wrote on the Shamsīya, al-Qawāʿid al-jalīya fī sharḥ al-Risāla al-Shamsīya, fits in with his other works on logic, and how it responds to Kātibī’s logical program in general and to the syllogistic in particular. When set against the preceding two centuries of commentary on Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Ishārāt wa-ltanbīhāt, Ḥillī’s response to the Shamsīya—and indeed Kātibī’s writing of the Shamsīya itself—can be seen as seamlessly carrying forward a commentary tradition in which Rāzī and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 1274) figure prominently. The first appendix to the article examines the transformation of a lemma in the Ishārāt into the corresponding lemma in the Shamsīya through 150 years of commentatorial debate; the second appendix presents translations of a number of texts on syllogistic from al-Qawāʿid aljalīya."

161. ———. 2021. "The Reception of Pointers 1.6 in Thirteenth-Century Logic: On the Expression’s Signification of Meaning." In Philosophy and Language in the Islamic World, edited by Germann, Nadja and Najafi, Mostafa, 101-128. Berlin: de Gruyter.

162. ———. 2021. "Abū l-Barakāt al-Baġdādī and the Traditions of Arabic Logic." Studia graeco-arabica no. 11:41-66.

     Abstract: "In the anonymous al-Nukat wa-l-fawāʾid, a summa of Avicennan philosophy written around 1200, a partisan of Avicenna accuses Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210) of having come under the influence of the reprehensible Leader of the Jews, Abū l-Barakāt al-Baġdādī (d. c. 1165). The reasons for the anonymous author’s antipathy toward Abū l-Barakāt relate to the way Avicenna’s contribution to logic is both pillaged and pilloried in stretches of al-Kitāb al-muʿtabar. The claim that Abū l-Barakāt exercised direct influence over Faḫr al-Dīn is, at least in logic, unlikely to be true. Nonetheless, Abū l-Barakāt’s presentation and methods highlight significant changes in the methods of the later traditions of Arabic logic."

163. Talmon, Rafael. 2005. "Ġāya, ṣifa and al-kalām al-wāṣif in Ibn Muqaffaʿ's manual of logic: new considerations about the beginning of Arabic grammar." Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam no. 30:506-520.

164. Thom, Paul. 2003. Medieval Modal Systems: Problems and Concepts. Aldershot: Ashgate.

     Chapter 5: Averroes.

     Reprint New York: Routledge 2017.

165. ———. 2010. "Abharī on the Logic of Conjunctive Terms." Arabic Sciences and Philosophy no. 20:105-117.

     Abstract: "The Persian philosopher Aṭīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. 1265), in his Revealing Thoughts, sketches out several different logics of propositions containing complex terms such as ‘writing man’. I will outline his results and the criticisms of them made by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī (d. 1274) in his Setting the Scale for an Evaluation of “Revealing Thoughts”, and I will compare Abharī’s various logics of complex terms with modern treatments."

166. ———. 2016. "The Syllogism and Its Transformations." In The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Logic, edited by Novaes, Catarina Dutilh and Stephen, Read, 290-315. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

167. ———. 2019. "Averroes' Logic." In Interpreting Averroes: Critical Essays, edited by Adamson, Peter and Di Giovanni, Matteo, 81-95. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

168. Towpek, Yaman, and Salleh, Kamarudin. 2016. "The Objectives and References of Mi‘yar al-‘Ilm fi Fann al-Mantiq." International Journal of Islamic Thought no. 9:72-86.

     Abstract: "Mi‘yar al-‘Ilm fi Fann al-Mantiq of al-Ghazali is the first book written specifically on Muslim logic. But the comprehensive and exclusive study on the essence of its scientific contents of the book and its significance in developing scientific thinking has never been done. Thus this study investigates the objectives and referral sources of Mi‘yar writing. This qualitative study uses content analysis method. The data which were collected using the documentation has been analyzed using the inductive, deductive, and comparative methods. The process of analysis of logic in Mi‘yar be done using textual analysis or textual content analysis and constant comparison method. It is because of this study is a textual study. This study found that Mi‘yar written by two objectives. Firstly; to provide an understanding on the methodologies of thinking and researching, and explain the rules of constructing syllogisms and analogies. Secondly; to review the matters which have been written in Tahafut. The study also found that al-Ghazali wrote Mi‘yar based on three books, a book of his own, namely Maqasid, and two books of Ibn Sina, namely al-Isharat and al-Risalah fi al-Hudud. Therefore Mi‘yar should be a fundamental source of learning logic and methods of thinking of Muslims either at high school or university. Hence the constant and deep study on the content of Mi‘yar is very significant and has high impact. But the dissemination of the findings of this study is the next action that should be realized."

169. Towpek, Yaman, and Sallen, Kamarudin. 2017. "Analysis on logic in Miʿyār al-ʿIlm fī Fann al-Manṭiq." Jurnal Hadhari no. 9:177-191.

     Abstract: "Miʿyār al-ʿIlm fī Fann al-Manṭiq of al-Ghazālī is the first book on Islamic logic.

     But a specific, comprehensive and exclusive study on its essence of the scientific contents and its importance in developing scientific thinking has never been done yet. Therefore, this study investigated qualitatively the background of Miʿyār and its contents using content analysis. In this study, the data which were collected using documentation method has been analyzed using the inductive, deductive and comparative methods. The process of analysis on logic in Miʿyār also been done using textual analysis method or textual content analysis method. This is because it is textual study. This study found that the theories, methods and thoughts on logic in Miʿyār have several similarities and differences with the logic of Aristotle. This study also found that many reforms, improvements, purifications and reconciliations have been made in Miʿyār which uplifted the theories on logic in Miʿyār as the theories of Islamic logic. In addition, this study found that the examples of logic application in Miʿyār are highly relevant to the life of a Muslim. Miʿyār should be a basic source of learning on logic and thinking methods of Muslims either in secondary schools or universities. Hence the constant and deep study on the content of Miʿyār is very significant and has high impact. But the dissemination of the output of this study is the next action that should be realized."

170. ———. 2017. "The Writing Methodology of Miʿyār al-ʿIlm fī Fann al-Manṭiq." Journal of Usuluddin no. 45:123-154.

     Abstract: "Miʿyār al-ʿIlm fī Fann al-Manṭiq of al-Ghazālī is the first book on Islamic logic. But the specific, comprehensive and exclusive study on the essence of its scientific contents and its significance in developing scientific thinking has never been done. Thus this study investigates the methodology of Miʿyār writing. This qualitative study uses content analysis method. The data which were collected using the documentation has been analyzed using the inductive, deductive, and comparative methods. The process of analysis of logic in Miʿyār be done using methods of textual analysis or textual content analysis and constant comparison. It is because of this study is a textual study. This study found that Miʿyār written by two objectives. Firstly; to provide an understanding on the methodologies of thinking and researching, and explain the rules of constructing syllogisms and analogies. Secondly; to review the matters which have been written in Tahāfut. The study also found that al-Ghazālī wrote Miʿyār using at least 18 methodologies of writing. Therefore Miʿyār should be a fundamental source of learning logic and methods of thinking of Muslims either at high school or university. Hence the constant, thorough and deep study on the content of Miʿyār is very significant and has high impact. But the dissemination of the findings of this study is the next action that should be realized."

171. Troupeau, Géerard. 2007. "The logic of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ and the origins of Arabic grammar." In The Early Islamic Grammatical Tradition, edited by Baalbaki, Ramzi, 27-35. Aldeshot: Ashgate.

172. Türker, Sadik. 2007. "The Arabico-Islamic Background of al-Farabi's Logic." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 28:183-255.

173. Vagelpohl, Uwe. 2010. "The Prior Analytics in the Syriac and Arabic tradition." Vivarium no. 48:134-158.

     Abstract: "The reception history of Aristotle’s Prior Analytics in the Islamic world began even before its ninth-century translation into Arabic. Three generations earlier, Arabic authors already absorbed echoes of the varied and extensive logical teaching tradition

     of Greek- and Syriac-speaking religious communities in the new Islamic state. Once translated into Arabic, the Prior Analytics inspired a rich tradition of logical studies, culminating in the creation of an independent Islamic logical tradition by Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037), Ibn Rušd (d. 1098) and others. This article traces the translation and commentary tradition of the Prior Analytics in Syriac and Arabic in the sixth to ninth centuries and sketches its appropriation, revision and, ultimately, transformation by Islamic philosophers between the ninth and eleventh centuries."

174. van Ditmarsch, Hans P. 2008. "Logical Fragments in Ibn Khaldūn’s Muqaddimah." In The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition: Science, Logic, Epistemology and their Interactions, edited by Rahman, Shahid, Street, Tony and Tahiri, Hassan, 281-294. Dordrecht: Springer.

     Abstract: "In this short contribution we briefly present life and times of Ibn Khaldūn, his magistral accomplishment in the Muqaddimah, and present Muqaddimah fragments related to logic and epistemology from the perspective of modern modal logic."

175. Versteegh, Cornelis H.M. 1977. Greek Elements in Arabic Linguistic Thinking. Leiden: Brill.

     Table of Contents: Preface VII-XI; I. The first contact with Greek grammar 1; II. Articulated sound and its meaning 19; III. The theory of grammatical categories 38; IV. The usul an-nahw and Greek empiricist medicine 90; V. The period of the two schools 107;

     VI. The influence of Greek logic 113; VII. The use of logic in grammar 128; VIII. The Mu'tazila 149; IX. The origin of speech 162; X. The Stoic component in the theory of meaning 178; Diagram of the most important Arabic grammarians 192; List of abbreviated titles 196; Arabic, Greek, Hebrew, Latin authors quoted 205; Originals of the Arabic and Greek texts quoted in English translation 209; Indexes: Personal names 230; Arabic terms 234; Greek terms 238; Latin terms 242; Hebrew and Syriac terms 243.

176. Versteegh, Kees. 2000. "Grammar and Logic in the Arabic Grammatical Tradition." In History of the Language Sciences: An International Handbook on the Evolution of the Study of Language from the Beginnings to the Present. Vol. I, edited by Auroux, Sylvain, Koerner, E.F.K., Niederehe, Hans-Josef and Versteegh, Kees, 300-306. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

177. Veylan, Ass. Hadi Ensar. 2010. "Ghazali‟s Account Of Signification." Journal of Islamic Research no. 3:98-114.

178. von Grunebaum, Gustave E., ed. 1970. Logic in Classical Islamic Culture. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.

179. Vural, Mehmet 2010. "Classic Logic of Al-Ghazali Methodology." Journal of Islamic Research no. 3:143-148.

180. Walbridge, John. 2000. "Logic in the Islamic Intellectual Tradition: The Recent Centuries." Islamic Studies no. 39:55-75.

181. ———. 2003. "A Nineteenth-Century Indo-Islamic Logic Textbook." Islamic Studies no. 42:687-693.

182. ———. 2011. God and Logic in Islam: The Caliphate of Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

183. Widigdo, Mohammad Syifa Amin. 2018. "Aristotelian Dialectic, Medieval Jadal, and Medieval Scholastic Disputation." The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences no. 35:1-24.

     Abstract: "This article argues that medieval Christian and Muslim scholarship employed Greek dialectic to differing purposes. Greek dialectic aims to defeat an opponent by exposing logical contradictions; Christian scholarship claims to use the dialectic to search for the truth in a pedagogical setting; and Muslim scholarship employs it to arrive at the truth with a degree of certainty. As a result, this article further argues, Greek dialectic in Christian and Muslim contexts undergoes some modifications. In the Christian context, dialectic serves a didactical purpose, which is to find the truth that resides in the mind of the teacher. In the Islamic context, Greek dialectic is employed to find epistemological (qaṭ^cī) or psychological (ghalabat al-ẓann) certainty in religious knowledge."

184. Wisnovsky, Robert. 2009. "Arabic logicians on perfect and imperfect syllogisms: a supplement to Patzig's 'historical excursus'." In Avicenna and His Legacy: A Golden Age of Science and Philosophy, edited by Langermann, Y. Tzvi, 257-273. Turnhout: Brepols.

185. Wittingham, Martin. 2015. "Al-Ghazālī on Syllogistic Logic as a Source of Certainty about the Qurʾān." In 900 Jahre al-Gazālī im Spiegel der islamischen Wissenschaften, edited by Ucar, Bülent and Griffel, Frank, 127-138. Osnabrück: V&R unipress.

186. Young, Walter Edward. 2016. "Mulāzama in Action in the Early Ādāb al-Baḥth." Oriens no. 44:332-385.

     Abstract: "By presenting and analyzing an early ādāb al-baḥth commentary’s illustrative dialectical sequences, the current study: (1) reveals a set of distinct strategies employed in mulāzama justification; (2) sheds light on a number of additional argument types in regular use; and (3) provides a scripted impression of how a disputation governed by the ādāb al-baḥth would, in practice, have sounded. These general patterns, impressions, and particular argument identifications, together with those of future microstudies,

     may, it is hoped, inform the analytical foundation for both exploring the ādāb al-baḥth’s argumentative genealogy, and assessing its formative influence in “postclassical” Islamic rational disciplines."

187. Zonta, Mauro. 2015. "Shakhṣ "person, individual" in Arabic logic. A comparative history of the term and its meanings found in other languages of culture in the Near, Middle and Far East." Studi Magrebini no. 12-13:549-560.