Ancient Islamic Logic. Selected bibliography of studies in English: Marm - Sto

This part of the section Intercultural logic includes the following pages:

History of Islamic Logic

Islamic (Arabic and Persian) Logic

Bibliography of Studies in English on Language and Logic in Ancient Islam:

A - B

C - Gye

Hal - Mari

Marm - Sto (Current page)

Str - Z

Bibliography

Marmura, Michael E. 1975. "Ghazali's attitude to the secular sciences and logic." In Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science, edited by Hourani, Albert, 100–111. Albany: State University of New York Press.

"Religious zealots were prone to condemn such secular, “foreign” sciences [logic, mathematics, and physics] as contrary to Islamic teaching. What if these sciences were demonstrably true? Would not such condemnation result in detriment to religious principle? To what extent, if at all, did each of these sciences have an actual bearing on religion? It is to such questions that Ghazali in his Tahāfut al-Falāsifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) and other related writings addressed himself.

The criterion Ghazali employed in answering such questions was that of demonstrability. A science whose conclusions are not demonstrably true and which are in conflict with the literal assertions of scripture must be rejected. On the other hand, if what is demonstrably true contradicts the literal sense of scriptural language, then the latter must be interpreted metaphorically. Ghazali shared with the majority of medieval thinkers the rationalist view that God cannot enact what is self-contradictory. The Islamic philosophers’ cardinal metaphysical doctrines, he tried to show in detail, failed to satisfy the conditions of demonstrative proof. Some, he argued, in fact were self-contradictory. Moreover, since these doctrines were not consistent with scriptural language, or its intent, as Ghazali understood it, he condemned many of them as heretical innovations (bidā^c), some as constituting outright Islamic unbelief (kufr).

Unlike metaphysics, Ghazali held mathematics to be demonstrably true. But, he argued, it has no bearing on religious matters, nor, for that matter, is the study of it necessary for understanding metaphysics, contrary to what the philosophers claim.(2)

The two sciences that concern us most are logic and physics. As we shall see, Ghazali insisted that the philosophers’ logic is a doctrinally neutral tool of knowledge and can be used to advantage in the defense of religion.(3)" (p. 101)

(2) Tahāfut al-Falāsifa, pp. 14-15.

(3) ibid. pp. 15-16,
———. 1990. "The Fortuna of the "Posterior Analytics" in the Arabic Middle Ages." In Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy. Vol I, 85–103. Helsinki: Acta Philosophica Phennica.

"In terms of the history of the transmission of Greek thought to medieval Islam, the Posterior Analytics was a relatively late arrival. A complete Syriac version was made by the Nestorian scholar Ishaq Ibn Hunayn (d. 910) and then, based on this Syriac version, another Nestorian scholar, the logician Abu Bishr Malta (d. 940) made the Arabic translation that has survived. The work became the object of intensive study by the tenth-century Baghdadi school of logicians that included the philosopher Alfarabi (al-Fārābī) (d. 950).(2)

There are indications, however, that such earlier philosophers as Kindi (al-Kindī) (d. ca. 870) and his student al-Sarakhsī (d. 899) had some knowledge of the work.(3)

But, properly speaking, the credit for its introduction to the main stream of Arabic philosophy belongs to the school of Baghdadi logicians.

Its entry into medieval Islam marked a turning point in the development of Arabic philosophy. It provided the conceptual framework within which philosophical and scientific investigations operated. Its precepts became part of the texture of Arabic philosophical discourse, as the world came to be perceived through the medium of logical connections, expressed in the language of middle terms. Its influence, moreover, went beyond philosophy to reach Islamic speculative theology, kalām. Thus, in the eleventh century, as will be indicated more fully, Ghazali (al-Ghazalf) (d. 1111), a leading member of the then dominant school of kalām, the Ash^carite, suggested ways for retaining the Aristotelian requirements for demonstration within a non-Aristotelian occasionalist view of the world." (pp. 85-86, notes omitted)
Maróth, Miklós. 2003. "Logic and Stylistics." In Problems in Arabic Philosophy, edited by Maróth, Miklós, 25–35. Piliscsaba: The Avicenna Institute of Middle Eastern Studies.
———. 2003. "Greek Logic and Arabic Stylistics." In Problems in Arabic Philosophy, edited by Maróth, Miklós, 87–107. Piliscsaba: The Avicenna Institute of Middle Eastern Studies.
———. 2010. "Subject and Predicate in Arabic Linguistics and Logic." Studia Slavica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae no. 55:381–388.
Mas, Ruth. 1998. "Qiyās: a Study in Islamic Logic." Folia Orientalia no. 34:113–128.

"We will trace the introduction of the syllogism and the problems posed by its practical application to three thinkers: the philosopher Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī (d. 950), the theologian/jurist Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), and the Hanbali jurist TaqI ai-Din Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1263). al-Fārābī is considered the first and greatest commentator on Aristotelian logic, a logician in his own right. Because he is instrumental in helping to introduce Aristotelian thought to Islamic literature, his work will proffer a point of departure for our other two thinkers who, themselves, provide the focal points of this discussion.

Following al-Fārābī, al-Ghazālī recognized the dichotomy existing between logical and onto-logical realms, and attempted to relate Ash'arite theology and jurisprudence to Greek syllogistics without relying too heavily on the notion of causality. The uncomfortable discrepancy that arose in Ghazālī's thought was unavoidable. Finally, we shall turn to Ibn Taymiyya who is perhaps the most polemical thinker of the three. His astute attack on the Aristotelian syllogism and the metaphysical contents which accompanied it were echoed several centuries later by the Scottish philosopher David Hume (d. 1776), albeit in a different metaphysical context." (pp. 114-115)
Mazlum, Farhad, and Azizi, Hassan. 2015. "The Nature of Language: Three Muslim Thinkersʼ Perspectives." The Polish Journal of the Arts and Culture no. 1:77–89.

Abstract: "One of the key issues attracting thinkers throughout the history of science was to set and define criteria for studying language – whether that of man or God – and to study its relation to the mind on the one hand and to the external world on the other. The purpose of this paper is to investigate three Muslim thinkers’ [Al-Farabi, Fakhr ad-Din ar-Razi, Al-Ghazali] views about the nature and ‘whatness’ of language by focusing on their works. The rationale to choose these three thinkers is the fact that their views and ideas cover the issues inherent in the purpose of this study extensively. The issues addressed in paper include:

1. What are the constituent elements of language?

2. How does it affect mind and thought?

3. What is its semantic function?

Our findings indicate that the ‘whatness’ and nature of language of both God and men are the same. The elements are written and spoken, gestures and entity that serve to communicate meaning. As for the second question, language elements act like signs which evoke meaning and assist communication. As far as the semantic functions of language elements are concerned, when the communication of meaning is undertaken, the truth of kalam (speech, word) is different from the ‘whatness’ of meaning and the mutakallim (the one who makes words and speech). As a result of this discrepancy, language communicates something (i.e. meaning) different from the mutakallimʼs inner world.

Although the constituent elements of language and how they affect mind and thought have been thoroughly investigated in Western philosophy (e.g. Wittgenstein), there has been little attention to such issues in Eastern philosophy. This paper is believed to be one of the few investigations that adopt a new perspective in attempting to provide a definition for language based on three Muslim thinkersʼ dialectics and logics. The paper contributes to the field by defining language in a way that all its functions, particularly the religious function – that explains the relation between man and God – are taken into account."
Miller, Larry Benjamin. 1989. "A Brief History of the Liar Paradox." In Of Scholars, Savants, and their Texts: Studies in Philosophy and Religious Thought. Essays in Honor of Arthur Hyman, edited by Link-Salinger, Ruth, 173–182. Bern: Peter Lang.

"The liar paradox or antinomy, the statement: "Whal I am saying is false", has occupied the attention of Russell, Wittgenstein, Tarski and many other modern philosophers. As is well-known, it has a long history stretching back to the very beginnings of Western logic.(1) Aristotle, for example, alludes to it in his Sophistical Refutations, while other ancient authors associated it with Epimenides of Megara and Eubulides of Miletus, a pupil of Euclid.

It is less well-known that medieval Islamic scholars wrote highly sophisticated and independent discussions of the liar paradox. Virtually no work at all has been done on the subject, and to make matters worse, none of the major works on the paradox has been published.

In what follows, I should like to give a brief sketch of the history of the liar paradox in Islamic thought from the tenth through sixteenth centuries highlighting a few important discussions. I should also like to suggest that Islamic philosophers anticipated modern solutions to the paradox.

The first known reference to the liar paradox in Islamic philosophy appears as early as the tenth century. The Christian philosopher Yaḥyā ibn 'Adi mentions the paradox in a treatise on sophisms deriving from Aristotle's Sophistical Refutations.(2) But in theology, authors of the ninth century make use of it in religious disputations. A theological polemic of the early tenth century uses the paradox, in an argument propounded by the theologian Ibrahim al-Nazzām (d. 836), to refute Manichaean dualists." (p. 173)

(1) The above formulation comes from Cicero, Academica, 2,29 si te mcntiri dicis idque verum dicis, mentiris an verum dicis? A similar formulation is found in Alexander of Aphrodisias, CAG, Comm. in Soph. El, p. 171, lines 17 ff. Other references are given in Pranll, Geschichre der Logik (1955 Reprint of 1855 Edition] 1.50-51 and footnote 83; Bochenski, A History of Formal Logic, trans. I. Thomas (South Bend, 1961) pp. 237 ff.

(2) Gerhard Endress, The works of Yaḥyā ibn 'Adi [an analytic inventory] (Wiesbaden, [Rickert] 1977) p. 44.
———. 2020. Islamic Disputation Theory: The Uses & Rules of Argument in Medieval Islam. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.

"Readers who, in the current volume, are first learning of this work and its author may be surprised to hear Larry Benjamin Miller’s doctoral dissertation pronounced one of the more important contributions to Islamic Studies from the latter half of the twentieth century. This itself is a symptom of the considerable disciplinary void occasioned by its not being published—as it most certainly ought to have been—close after its acceptance in October 1984 by the Department of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University." (Foreword by Walter Edward Young. p. VII)

(...)

"Why is this such a seminal work? The reasons are many, and stem from the importance of the field which Miller explores as well as the qualities and insights of his exploration. Though a handful of respected Islamicists had scouted certain shallows and bays of the vast ocean of Islamicate dialectical theory and practice,(1) Miller was the first to sound its depths and sketch its coastlines in systematic fashion. His broad survey (though it was, and remains, impossible to be fully comprehensive), coupled with his logical analyses, revealed a series of rich and evolving genres of dialogical argument, directing us towards what, in the end, has proven to be a large and influential body of theory traditions cultivated in hundreds of treatises, commentaries, supercommentaries, and glosses." (Foreword, pp. VII-VIII)

(1) See Josef van Ess, “Disputationspraxis in der Islamischen Theologie. Eine Vorläufige Skizze,” Revue des Études Islamiques 44 (1976): 23−60; idem “The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology,”

in Logic in Classical Islamic Culture, ed. G. von Grunebaum (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1970): 21−50; George Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981); idem “Dialectic and Disputation. The relation between the Texts of Qirqisani and Ibn ʿAqil,” in P. Salmon (ed.): Mélanges d’islamologie. Volume dédié à la mémoire de Armand Abel, (Leiden: 1974−78), vol. I, pp. 201−206; Wolfhart Heinrichs, “Ǧadal bei aṭ-Ṭūfī, eine Interpretation seiner Beispielsammlung,” in Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, Supplement III, 1. (Wiesbaden: 1977), pp. 463−473; and G. Vajda, “Etudes sur Qirqisānī V: Les règles de la controverse dialectique,” in Revue des Etudes Juives 122 (1963): pp. 7−74.
Mlika, Hamdi. 2020. "Perspectives on the Notion of Truth in Arabic Philosophy." Studia Humana no. 9:28–39.

Abstract: " In the present paper, I assume that the notion of “truth” in philosophy would not have been clarified and tackled properly, if philosophers did not take into account earlier Arabic Medieval research contributions and build upon previous research findings. In the first place, I embark on the scrutiny of the rich aspect (or nature) of the Arabic Lexicon in terms of the “truth” meaning.

In the second place, I take on the assumption that Arabic linguistic traditions imply different kinds of truths, depending on various spheres of human thoughts and actions based on the logical approach to “truth” (from Al-Kindi up to Averroes via Al-Farabi and Avicenna) and the term “al-haqiqha” as transliterated from Arabic, remain central. In conclusion, I take on an approach to “truth” that gives worth to logical perspectives at the very heart of Medieval Arab traditions in the light of what I would label as the “Omni-cultural Universality of Logic and Science”."
Mohaghegh, M., and Izutsu, Toshihiko, eds. 1974. Collected Texts and Papers on Logic and Language. Tehran: Tehran University Press.

Contents: T. Izutsu: Basic Problems of "Abstract Quiddity" 1; I. Madkour: La logique d' Aristotle chez les Motakallemin 29; M. Khānsārī Ghazzali et le Mi'yar al- 'Ilm 49; A-Badawi: Un commentaire inconnu sur "l'Organon" d'Aristote 65; M. Paradis: Relativité linguistique et philosophie 85-105.
Moqbel, Tareq. 2025. "The Logic of Divine Discourse: Fakhr ad-Dīn ar-Rāzī’s Application of Logic to Qurʾānic Interpretation." In Logic, Soul, and World: Essays in Arabic Philosophy in Honor of Tony Street, edited by Ahmed, Asad Q., Zarepour, Mohammad Saleh and Strobino, Riccardo, 271–299. Leiden: Brill.

"This article proposes to show in what way ar-Rāzī made use in Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb of views stated in the works of logic—in other words, how the theory of logic finds its way into his tafsīr. On the one hand this article shows us, through ar-Rāzī, what help logic can offer the exegete of the Qurʾān. On the other hand, it offers some hints for assessing the practical implications of ar-Rāzī’s logical project and, by extension, the reach of his philosophic oeuvre. I will proceed by briefly cataloguing the ways by which ar-Rāzī incorporates logic in his tafsīr.

The main part of the article will then illustrate this application by way of concrete cases. I should also add that the aim of this article is not purely to show how logic was used in Qurʾānic interpretation, but it also has a forward-looking dimension: by taking ar-Rāzī as a model, it envisions how fresh and contemporary interpretations of the Qurʾān can be modelled after ar-Rāzī through incorporating logical modes into the interpretation of the Qurʾān. More generally, ar-Rāzī’s daring hermeneutical manoeuvres—within the knowledge of his day and age—can inspire readers today to think about novel ways for reading the Qurʾān including, but not limited to, logic." (pp. 271-272)
Movahed, Zia. 2010. "De re and de dicto modality in the Islamic traditional logic." Sophia Perennis no. 2:5–19.

Abstract: "In Islamic traditional textbooks modal operators sometimes come before propositions, sometimes before the predicates and sometimes at the end of propositions. This makes the interpretation of modality in each case as de re or de dicto difficult. Given Ibn Sinā's discussion of and sensitivity to this distinction, in this paper by examining the position of modality in the contradictories and converses of modal categorical propositions as well as their positions in modal syllogisms I will try to find a reasonable answer to this important issue."
———. 2010. "Suhrawardi on Syllogisms." Sophia Perennis. The Semiannual Journal of Sapiential Wisdom and Philosophy no. 2:5–18.

Abstract: "Shihāb al- Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 1194), in his most important book, Hikmat al-Ishrāq, claims that he has simplified the Aristotelian theory of syllogisms by reducing its many rules to a few by which the validity of all moods can be proven. This is done by reducing all negative and particular categorical propositions to universal affirmative propositions and introducing two meta-language rules, one for the second and the other for the third figure. This is an exposition of the non-modal part of his syllogism and an examination of his claim to simplifying the Aristotelian theory of syllogism."
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. 1978. "Metaphysics, Poetry and Logic in Oriental Traditions." Sophia Perennis no. 3:119–128.

"The definitions given in Oriental civilizations for logic and poetry would be easily understood by Western students of these subjects, well versed in the knowledge of Western culture and its roots, whether these definitions came from a Nagarjuna on the one hand, or an Ibn Sina (Avicenna) on the other. Logic in Eastern doctrines deals with the laws governing the movement of the human mind in its journey from the known to the unknown, whatever might be the epistemological foundations which make the attainment of logical certitude possible, and whatever differences may exist between let us say Nyaya logic and Aristotelian logic. As for poetry, it deals with human language as molded by the principles of harmony and rhythm, which also govern the cosmos. These two disciplines or activities of the human mind and soul have nearly completely parted ways in the modem West while they have preserved their complementarity and close association in theory and practice wherever the Oriental traditions still survive. There has always been in the Orient a logical aspect to poetry and a poetic aspect to the great expressions of logical thought. Still today, in many Oriental languages, works of a logical nature are studied in a poetic form which facilitates their mastery(2) while there is an innate logic to traditional poetry to the extent that this type of poetry is often used instead of a strictly logical argument, to prove a logical point." (p. 120)

(2) This is particularly evident in Islamic civilization where to this day many scientific disciplines are first taught as poems, for example the al-Urjūzah fl' l-ṭibb of lbn Sina in medicine, the Alfiyyah of lbn Mālik in grammar and al-Sharḥ, al-manzūmah of Ḥajjī Mullā Hādī Sabziwārī in logic and metaphysics.
Ndoye, Moussa, and Rahman, Shahid. 2025. Necessity and the Logical Turn in Arabic Debate Theory: Ādāb al-Baḥth Encounters Avicenna’s Logic of Causation. STL - Savoirs, Textes, Langage - Université de Lille: 1–13.

Preprint.

Abstract: "Recent scholarship by Rahman and collaborators, inspired by Suhrawardī’s Illuminationism, has undertaken a dialectical expansion of Avicenna’s logic, opening new avenues for exploring both its potentials and limitations. This project is particularly significant in light of Avicenna’s dismissal of dialectical reasoning within Islamic debate theory (Risāla fī taʿaqqub al-mawḍiʿ al-jadalī), revealing what he took to be a tension between the formal rigor of logic and the, according to him, vague features of Islamic debate practice.

This tension becomes most visible in the “logical turn” in adāb al-baḥth, where debate theorists drew upon Avicennian modal logic to articulate the principles of legal causation. In this process, Avicenna’s syllogistic framework was not merely applied but imaginatively reworked: its elements were woven into systematic structures that both extended and transformed his logic (see Young, 2021a,b,c). The turn thus operates on two levels at once, functioning as both a critique of Avicenna’s skepticism toward juridical dialectics and a constructive reconfiguration of his logical legacy.

This paper examines this intersection, with particular attention to how the logical turn in debate theory coincided with efforts to produce a streamlined taxonomy of argumentative moves. This dual movement illuminates the interplay between formal reasoning and rhetorical practice, showing how classical logic was simultaneously preserved, adapted, and creatively reinvented to meet the demands of juridical and scholarly discourse. By tracing these developments, the paper highlights the inventive strategies through which scholars negotiated inherited theoretical structures alongside emerging methods of argumentation, offering a fresh perspective on the enduring and adaptable legacy of Avicennian thought."

(2) Di Vincenzo, S. (2025). “Avicenna on the Forms of Argumentation of the Mutakallimūn: An Analysis of the Risāla fī taʿaqqub al-mawḍiʿ al-jadalī» Talk at the Workshop Avicenna and the kalām III: Epistemology and Natural Science”, 5-6 March 2025 | Université Paris Cité, France.

(3) Young, W. E. (2021a). “The Formal Evolution of Islamic Juridical Dialectic: A Brief Glimpse.” In New Developments in Legal Reasoning and Logic: From Ancient Law to Modern Legal Systems. Ed. by Shahid Rahman, Matthias Armgardt, Hans Christian Nordtveit Kvernenes. Dordrecht; New York; Cham: Springer, 2021, 83-114. Young, W. E. (2021b), “Dialectic in the Religious Sciences.” In. K. Fleet, G. Krämer, D. Matringe, J.Nawas, and E. Rowson (eds), Encyclopaedia of Islam Three. Eds. Leiden: Brill. https://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam- 3/dialectic-in-the-religious-sciences-COM_27351. Young, W. E. (2021c),. On the Protocols for Dialectical Inquiry (Ādāb al-Baḥth): A Critical Edition and Parallel Translation of the Sharḥ al-Risāla al-Samarqandiyya by Quṭb al-Dīn al-Kīlānī (fl. ca. 830/1427), Prefaced by a Critical Edition and Parallel Translation of its Grundtext: The Risāla fī Ādāb al-Baḥth by Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (d.722/1322). 2021. Forthcoming.
Opwis, Felicitas. 2019. "Syllogistic Logic in Islamic Legal Theory: al-Ghazālī’s Arguments for the Certainty of Legal Analogy (Qiyās)." In Philosophy and Jurisprudence in the Islamic World, edited by Adamson, Peter, 93–99. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"Logic as a science, in particular Aristotelian syllogistic reasoning, has been known among Muslim scholars since at least the early third/ninth century. Most Greek works on logic were translated into Arabic by the end of the third/ninth century. Al-Fārābī (d. 339/950) commented extensively on them (EI2 [Encyclopaedia of islam, Second edition], “Manṭiḳ”), and Ibn Sīnā’s (d. 428/1037) writings on logic were well-absorbed in Islamic scholarship, not only in philosophy but also in theology (Rescher 1964, 15–18, 29, 40, 46, 51–53). Nevertheless, in jurisprudential writings, Aristotelian syllogistic logic was somewhat of a late-comer, not making itself felt much before the fifth/eleventh century. This is not to say that Islamic law was illogical or irrational nor that Greek logic had no impact on the articulation of legal theory prior to the late fifth/eleventh century. Al-Shāfiʿī’s (d. 204/820) discussion of analogy (qiyās) was influenced by Aristotle’s Topics (EI2, “Manṭiḳ”). Yet, by the end of the fourth/tenth century, one finds little use made of logic in legal arguments beyond the conjunctive and disjunctive syllogism (Hallaq 1990, 316–318)." (p. 95)
Ouyang, Wen-Chin. 2016. "Literature and Thought: Re-reading al-Tawḥīdī’s Transcription of the Debate between Logic and Grammar." In The Heritage of Arabo-Islamic Learning: Studies Presented to Wadad Kadi, edited by Pomerantz, Maurice A. and Shahin, Aram A., 444–460. Leiden: Brill.

"I will focus on one duality associated with al-Tawḥīdī, that he is both faylasūf al-udabāʾ wa-adīb al-falāsifa, and a story he tells on the eighth night of al-Imtāʿ wa-l-muʾānasa of the debate between Mattā b. Yūnus (d. 328/940) and Abū Saʿīd al-Sīrāfī (d. 368/978) on the “superiority” of Greek logic or Arabic grammar. I begin by showing the way in which the debate recounted in this story has come to be “mythologized” in past and present discourses as an antagonism between Greek philosophy and the Arabic language crystallized in the munāẓara between “logic” and “grammar.” “Myth” according to Roland Barthes is an old “sign” emptied of its original “historical” context and replanted in a completely new historical context. The significance of the sign is now derived from this new “historical” context.(11) The debate between Mattā and al-Sīrāfī, as transcribed by al-Tawḥīdī, is often extracted as an autonomous, coherent text and interpreted outside the context of al-Imtā wa-l-muʾānasa, which is in turn a text, onto which the very same debate, similarly an extract, is grafted. In both cases, in al-Imtāʿ wa-l-muʾānasa, and later “texts” (e.g., Muʿjam al-udabāʾ by Yāqūt), the same debate is given a new context. For example, while Yāqūt situates this debate as the crown in the jewels of al-Sīrāfī’s learnedness, contemporary discourses on medieval Islam structure various moments of the ‘tension’ between Greek philosophy and Arabic sciences before and after the debate around this seminal event.(12)" (p. 449)

(11) Roland Barthes, “Myth Today,” in Mythologies, trans. Anette Lavers (New York: Hill and Wang, 1987), 109–158.

(12) See, for example, Gerhard Endress, “The Defense of Reason: The Plea for Philosophy in the Religious Community,” Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenchaften 6 (1990): 1–49. See also, Taha Abderrhamane, “Discussion entre Abū Saʿīd al-Sīrāfī, le grammairien et Mattā b. Yūnus, le philosophe,” Arabica 25.3 (1978): 310–323; Gerhard Endress, “The Debate between Grammar and Greek logic,” Journal for the History of Arabic Sciences 2.2 (1977): 106–118; and D.S. Margoliouth, “The Discussion between Abū Bishr Mattā b. Yūnus and Abū Saʿīd al-Sīrāfī on the Merits of Logic and Grammar,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1905): 79–129.
Owen, A. David K. 2016. "The Poetic Syllogism: Foray into an Inductive Research Proposal." In Essays in Islamic Philology, History, and Philosophy, edited by Korangy, Alireza, Thackston, Wheeler M., Mottahedeh, Roy P. and Granara, William, 240–247. Berlin: de Gruyter.

"This essay on the poetic syllogism (qiyās[-i] shi‘rī) takes as its point of departure two prominent treatments of our topic from the literature on Arabic philosophy.(2)" (p. 240)

(...)

"But what is a “poetic syllogism”?(5) The ‘poetic syllogism’ is a tool for (a) the regimentation of statements and (b) the analysis of images and (c) the formalization of inferences as these three occur in rhetorical and poetic speech. The poetic syllogism resembles the theoretical and practical syllogisms, but rarely, if ever, leads to a deductively valid inference. What a ‘poetic syllogism’ is, is intimated by Farabi in his reflections on the analysis of poetic imagery in Qawānīn al-shi‘r, the Ars Rhetorica commentary, al-Qawl fī al-tanāsub, inter alios; and is most explicitly formalized by Ibn Sina in his treatment of qiyās (roughly speaking, ‘semi-formal inference’) in the manṭiq (logic) section of his magnum opus al-Shifā’ (The Healing)." (p. 242)

(2) Deborah Black, Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic philosophy (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990); Aouad, “Le syllogisme poétique selon al-Fārābī: un syllogisme incorrect de la deuxième figure,” in Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 12 (2002), [pp. 185-196].

(5) 5 Black (p. 212) paraphrases an example from Avicenna:

m. So and so is handsome S – M

M. Everything handsome is a moon M – P

Therefore, So and so is a moon S – P.
Özturan, Mehmet. 2015. "On Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī’s Risala fī taqsīm al-‘ilm: Analysis and Critical Edition." Nazariyat Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences:95–124.

Abstract: "This research focuses on the previously unpublished treatise by Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī, Risala fī taqsīm al-‘ilm. the research is based on comparative evaluation of available manuscipts and is composed of a critical edition of the treatise and its analysis. The treatise is about the division (taqsīm) of taṣawwur (conception) and taṣdīq (assent) as divisions of knowledge. Al-Jurjānī presents views from diferent schools of logic. In the analysis section, I discuss the treatise’s philosophical background and show that the aforementioned division is the first step of a chain of propositions on what the goal and methods of logic are focusing on the possibility of learning.

Remaining sections focus on the references in the treatise to various views and summarise them. Finally al-Jurjānī’s position in this scene is made explicit through his critical analysis of competing views advocated by these diferent schools.

For al-Jurjānī, division of knowledge can be analysed formally and informally. Formally, the division should be restrictive and informally, it should emphasize methods of logic, that are proof (ḥujja) and definition (ta‘rīf). The article shows that the goal of al-Jurjānī’s discussion on the division of knowledge as conception and assent is basically to take the discussion out the context of traditional discussions on quiddity but rather build it on the division formally and the goals of the division informally."
———. 2018. "An Introduction to the Critique of the Theory of Definition in Arabic Logic: Is Complete Definition Circular?" Nazariyat: Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences:85–117.

Abstract: "This study focuses on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s thesis of the impossibility of giving a complete definition (al-ḥadd al-tāmm) and discusses its impact, the parties to the debate, and especially the positive argument contra al-Rāzī by the Ottoman savant Ṭāşköprīzāde. The negative argument of al-Rāzī postulates that the complete definition is strictly circular, for the totality of parts that makes up the defined object are included in the definition, and the object is identical to the sum of its parts. Therefore, complete definition strictly commits the fallacy of definining a thing by itself. Ṭāşköprīzāde argues against this view by defending the possibility of complete definition. According to him, although in complete definition the defined object and the defining features include the same set of things, the modes of their presentation to the mind are different. Thus, a complete definition becomes circular only if both the content of the defined object and its mode of presentation to the mind are the same. If it can be shown that the contents of the definiendum and definiens have distinct modes of presentation, then the charge of circularity is discarded. In this article, I illustrate the two opposing approaches by distinguishing between form and content, or sense and reference. Both parties take for granted that the contents of the definiens and the definiendum are the same when it comes to the complete definition. The main point of contention lies in the modes of apprehending the contents. This article analyzes the arguments of two opposing semantic theories particular to the complete definition and shows that the question emerges as a result of the theories of constant form and variable form concerning meaning. In the period between al-Rāzī and Ṭāşköprīzāde, Ṭūsī bolstered the complete definition whereas al-Ījī refuted it. Both Ṭūsī’s and al-Ījī’s arguments will be discussed, though briefly, in the body of paper as well."
Pacheco, Juan Antonio. 2012. "Ibn 'Arabī and Aristotelian Logic." Ishraq: Islamic Philosophy Yearbook no. 3:201–219.

Abstract: "An inquiry into the works of Ibn ‘Arabī reveals them to be like a web with indefinite frontiers between reason and faith, because his thought is primarily a thought and it must be linguistic or symbolic in character; that is, it must presuppose communication, and above all, understanding. In the vast and fecund wealth of ideas which was the intellectual background of Ibn ‘Arabī, the originality of his rational thought grows from a broad and solid logical foundation as a product of his conviction that rational and mathematical elements must provide proof of spiritual achievements. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the presence of logic in two of his works, The Book of Alif and Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam, as a paradigm of truth values that by means of its evident and rational principles can aid the Sufis’ efforts to gain a correct understanding of the Truth."
Parildar, Sümeyye. 2017. "Applying gradational ontology to logic: Mullā Ṣadrā on propositions." In Philosophy and the Intellectual Life in Shiʿah Islam, edited by Ahmad, Saiyad Nizamuddin and Rivivi, Sajjad H., 135–157. London: The Shīʿah Institute Press.
Porcasi, Germana. 2008. "On the Islamic judicial logic in al-Ghazālī'sʾasās al-qiyās." Journal of Islamic Philosophy:68–111.
Pournamdar, Amir Hossein. 2017. "Šaḫṣ: Its Origin and Development as a Logical Term." Studia graeco-arabica no. 7:277–290.

Abstract: "Abundantly used as a technical term in the Arabic classical texts of logic and philosophy, the word šaḫṣ will be studied in detail as a preamble to a thorough analysis of a turning point which occurred in its meaning, during the Graeco-Arabic translation movement (starting from the 8th century). Through discovering the genuine meaning of šaḫṣ in the context of the Arabic language at the time of the emergence of Islam and its following two or three centuries, it will be ascertained that this term, in its common usage in the intellectual tradition of Islam, i.e. ‘a thing or a person belonging to a species’, has imposed itself upon the non-specialized, ordinary language of the Arabs as the result of the dominance of the logico-philosophical literature. Šaḫṣ was never used to serve such a meaning before the transmission of the philosophical works to the Arab world, and it was the attempts of the translators that made this word signifying ‘a specific entity or individual’, in contrast to its real meaning, viz. ‘body’, ‘material appearance’. In the second part, by taking into account one of the oldest extant logical works in the Islamic tradition, i.e. al-Manṭiq attributed to Ibn al-Muqafaʿ, it is suggested that this change of meaning could be regarded as a case of Arabic borrowings from Persian."
Rahman, Shahid, and Seck, Alioune. 2025. "As-Suhrawardī’s Stance on Modalities and the Logic of Presence." In Logic, Soul, and World: Essays in Arabic Philosophy in Honor of Tony Street, edited by Ahmed, Asad Q., Zarepour, Mohammad Saleh and Strobino, Riccardo, 227–270. Leiden: Brill.

"The objective of this paper is to contribute to a more unified interpretation of as-Suhrawardī’s thought, although the focus is primarily on the development of the elements of his modal logic initiated by Tony Street.(3) In more precise terms, we will do so by examining three crucial points as-Suhrawardī explicitly makes concerning the meaning of modalities. These are:

(1) Modalities are to be understood as the different ways a predicate temporally relates to its subject.

(2) Proving that a necessarily contingent relation holds requires relating every presence of the subject term—i.e. every instance of the subject—with a capacity or potentiality (neither necessarily nor impossibly actualised), expressed by the predicate.

(3) The dependence of presences witnessing the actualisation of the predicate term upon those of the subject term constitutes the foundation of as-Suhrawardī’s logic." (p. 228)

(3) See Tony Street, “Suhrawardī on Modal Syllogism”. See also Zia Movahed, “Suhrawardī’s Modal Syllogisms,” Sophia Perennis 2, no. 4 (2012): 5–17; who follows the general lines of Street’s interpretation—namely the embedding of a de re necessary or contingent modality in a de dicto necessary modality.
Rahman, Shahid, and Young, Walter Edward. 2022. "Argumentation and Arabic Philosophy of Language: Introduction." Methodos. Savoirs et textes no. 22:1–15.

"With this in mind, the main objective behind this special volume of Methodos was to p rovide a venue for studies of hermeneutics, linguistic analysis, and deductivereasoning in the theory / practice of argumentation relevant to the Arabic philosophy oflanguage, including contributions on:

1. theories which are geared towards argument (e.g., dialectical justifications and objections, linguistic fallacies, strategies and protocols for engagement on particular issues, etc.);

2. the dynamic of argument in shaping concepts and theories (e.g., explaining how systematic argument fashioned certain scholars’ solutions); and

3. theories “in action” (e.g., argument analyses of the historical, scholarly dialectic on a certain problem).
———. 2023. "Outside the Logic of Necessity: Deontic Puzzles and ‘Breaking’ Compound Causal Properties in Islamic Legal Theory and Dialectic." In Fallacies in the Arabic, Byzantine, Hebrew and Latin Traditions, edited by Cesalli, Laurent, Gazziero, Leoe, Manekin, Charles, Rahman, Shahid, Street, Tony and Trizio, Michele, 153–185. Turnhout: Brepols.

Abstract: "This study examines an Islamic dialectical objection called kasr, or ‘breaking’, as treated by the dialecticians and legal theorists Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083 CE) and Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī (d. 1081 CE). Kasr has both legitimate and illegitimate applications, and we confront the fallacious modes denounced by our theorists with deontic paradoxes and puzzles falling under the rubric of logical extrapolation fallacy. Our primary claim is that, whereas logical extrapolation produces fallacies or paradoxes by unsafely applying inference rules of standard alethic and/or logical necessity to the deontic realm, the fallacies generated by illegitimate modes of kasr in Islamic legal theory (wherein logical rules are expressed dialectically) constitute a genuine source for reflecting on what patterns of reasoning should be endorsed for determining causality in legal – and, perhaps, natural – epistemological contexts. Ultimately, this is the first step towards a larger study of kasr, which will compare it with other dialectical objections and treat relevant critical discourses from later Muslim legal theorists and dialecticians."
Rahman, Shahid, Zidani, Farid, and Young, Walter Edward. 2022. "Ibn Ḥazm on Heteronomous Imperatives. A Landmark in the History of the Logical Analysis of Norms." In Agency, Norms, Inquiry, and Artifacts: Essays in Honor of Risto Hilpinen, edited by McNamara, Paul, Jones, Andrew J. I. and Brown, Mark A., 139–171. Cham (Switzerland): Springer.

Abstract: "Ibn Ḥazm of Córdoba’s (994–1064) defence of logic has lasting consequences for the logic of norms. His book Facilitating the Understanding of the Rules of Logic and Introduction Thereto, with Common Expressions and Juristic Examples is a demonstration of how Aristotelian logic may be applied in the religious sciences, especially law. Among other things, he thoroughly investigates deontic notions and their modal counterparts, assuring him a place among the fathers of the logic

of norms. The basic units of Islamic deontic logic qualify the performance of actions as subject to either reward, or sanction, or neither; and they might therefore be called, indulging in terminological anachronism, heteronomous imperatives.

With remarkable insight, Ibn Ḥazm pairs these with the natural modalities of necessity, possibility, and impossibility. Employing some features of Martin-Löf’s Constructive Type Theory (CTT) to shape the logic of heteronomous imperatives thus emerging from Ibn Ḥazm’s insights, the authors formulate a new approach to the logical analysis of deontic categories."
Ramon, Rafael. 2010. "The Beginning of Logic in Al-Andalus: Ibn Hazm of Cordoba." Revista de Hispanismo Filosofico no. 15:31–42.

Abstract: "The earliest texts of logic began to be known in the Arab world of the Middle East at the late eighth century. However, the development of logic did not occur until the tenth century. This took place with the work of logicians Christians and Muslims. It is not known in what time the logic was introduced in Muslim Spain. It is said that it occurred in the second half of the tenth century. The extant first text is dated at the beginning of the eleventh century. It is the work of Ibn Hazm of Cordoba titled Approximation to the Definition of Logic."
Ravitsky, Aviram. 2018. "Yaʿqūb al-Qirqisānī on human intellect, legal inference, and the meaning of the Aristotelian syllogism." Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy no. 26:149–173.

Abstract: "In the fourth treatise of his legal-theological work Kitāb al-Anwār wa-al-Marāqib, Yaqūb al-Qirqisānī analyzes a criticism of the Aristotelian syllogism and its epistemological foundations. Qirqisānī defends Aristotelian logic by quoting a passage from an unknown commentary on Aristotle in which the Aristotelian theory of syllogism is explicated. This paper focuses on the historical, theological, and philosophical meanings of the criticism of the syllogism in Qirqisānī's discussion and analyzes his interpretation of the syllogism as a source of knowledge that should be applied in the realm of legal reasoning and in the interpretation of biblical law."
Rayan, Sobhi. 2010. "Ibn Taymiyya’s Criticism of Aristotelian Definition." American Journal of Islam and Society no. 27:68–91.

Abstract: "Aristotle wrote of two “points of definition”: one posited in negative and the other in positive terms. The negative formulation argues that concepts can be comprehended only through definition, while the positive point stresses the consequences of definition by focusing on the benefits to the sciences achieved through those “concepts.” Ibn Taymiyya criticizes these ideas on the grounds that definition neither necessarily leads to the revelation of the facts and truths of things and their quiddities, nor does it necessarily help in developing the sciences. We notice that his main criticism is directed at specific metaphysical elements of definition, such as genus, species, differences (differentia/divisions), quiddity, and universality. He argues that these elements are purely mental and do not necessarily correspond to existence.

Ibn Taymiyya differentiates between metaphysics and the concrete physical world for, in his opinion, not all that comes to mind necessarily corresponds to existing objects in the concrete physical world. Therefore, human knowledge should be established on concrete rules subject to experiment. He therefore refutes the logic of quiddity, which depends upon pure intellect, and calls for an experimental logic devoid of metaphysics."
———. 2011. "Ibn Taymiyya’s Criticism of the Syllogism." Der Islam no. 86:93–121.

Abstract: "The purpose of this study is to examine Ibn Taymiyya’s criticism of Aristotelian logic, and to test the arguments he raises against it, as well as the theory he proposes as an alternative.

Ibn Taymiyya tries to prove that Aristotelian logic cannot contribute to knowledge because it is based on metaphysical foundations. He raises arguments that are intended to expose the contradictions of Aristotelian logic. These arguments are based partly on the principles of relativity and skepticism, and partly on empirical presuppositions.

Ibn Taymiyya proposed the use of analogical reasoning (qiyās al-tamthīl) which is a type of evaluation and measurement based on the comparison between particulars, or the relations between two similar or dissimilar things. It can be seen that the most important and decisive thing in this relation is the common attribute that links two particular occurrences. Therefore, this inference deals with the relations between things and the causal connections between them. This is expressed in the research method used in the Islamic juridical sciences, which are causal methods, such as: the coextensiveness and coexclusiveness (tard wa-^eaks), coextensiveness-cum-coexclusiveness (dawarān), and classification and successive elimination (al-sabr wa l-taqsīm)."
———. 2012. "Criticism of Ibn Taymiyyah on the Aristotelian Logical Proposition." Islamic Studies no. 51:69–87.

Abstract: "This article deals with Ibn Taymiyyah's criticism of the Aristotelian logical proposition. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, all universal judgments are in fact particular judgments. Therefore, the transition is from the particular to the universal.

The basis for the axioms of proof is particular and not universal, and is founded upon experience and not on the intellect. This means that a person arrives at the particular proposition before the universal one."
———. 2016. "Translation and Interpretation in Ibn Taymiyya's Logical Definition." British Journal for the History of Philosophy no. 19:1047–1065.

Abstract: "This article deals with the concepts of translation and interpretation in Ibn Taymiyya’s Theory of Definition. Translation is replacement of one name by another or of one named object by another, while, Interpretation is replacement of one name by a named object or of a named object by a name. The relationship between the definition and the definiendum is decided by the law of al-Tard wa al-’Aks (coextensiveness-cumcoexclusiveness) that looks at objects from all sides and decides the traits of the definiendum. It also aims at deciding the signification of the name and this is also the aim of the definition.

Since the ‘name’ is a linguistic matter, the definition is related to the signification of the name and its language."
Reçber, Mehmet Sait. 2015. "On al-Ghazālī and Necessary Truths." In 900 Jahre al-Gazālī im Spiegel der islamischen Wissenschaften, edited by Ucar, Bülent and Griffel, Frank, 117–126. Osnabrück: V&R unipress.

"Al-Ghazālī is well-known for his criticism of the Muslim philosophers (al-Falāsifa), predominately due to the mission he sets for himself in Tahāfut al-falāsifa." (p. 117)

(...)

"Instead, it will concentrate on the particular subject of necessary truths, which plays a significant role in al-Ghazālī’s own philosophical agenda and reveals an essential character of his philosophical and theological thought.

Necessary truths primarily denote the propositions of logic and mathematics that are considered to be true no matter what, as they are analytic or true by definition. They are traditionally considered to be a priori as they are knowable independently of sense-experience. What has caused controversy, however, is the question regarding the ground of necessary truths: what sort of facts are supposed to be responsible for making certain propositions necessarily true? There have been various philosophical approaches on this issue, among the most notable of which are (Platonic) realism and varieties of conventionalism. In any case, the idea that necessary truths cannot conceivably be false has some considerable methodological implications on a system of thought inasmuch as they are not just responsible for its structural properties but also have semantic, metaphysical as well as epistemological implications.! (pp. 117-118)

(...)

"It is well-known that al-Ghazālī attached a great significance to logic. Considering that one’s knowledge of logic is a precondition for a person’s, so to speak, epistemic reliability, he introduced the study of logic – that is, the logico-inguistic categories and various methods of deductive reasoning – as a preliminary introduction to the study of the other sciences. This is not to mention the books he devoted exclusively to logic. Considering that it is logic that provides the elements of valid reasoning which underlie sound thinking in religious matters, the motivation for such an initiative ought to be appreciated." (pp. 118-119)
Rescher, Nicholas. 1962. "Some Arabic Technical Terms of Syllogistic Logic and their Greek Originals." Journal of the American Oriental Society no. 82:202–204.

"We shall be concerned with the meaning in Arabic logical texts of three technical terms of syllogistic logic : qarīnah (" connection ") ,jāimi'ah (" union "), and ṣan'ah (" construction "). None of these words are treated satisfactorily in even the specialized lexicons of philosophical Arabic.(1) Particular interest and importance attaches to the third of these terms." (p. 202)

(1) M. Horten, Die Spekulative und Positive Theologie des Islams (Leipzig, 1912) ; A. M. Goichon, Lexique de la Langue Philosophique d'lbn Sinā (Paris, 1938). Miss Goichon gives an adequate explanation of only the first of our terms: qarīnah (p. 303).
———. 1963. "Al-Kindi's Sketch of Aristotle's Organon." The New Scholasticism no. 37:44–58.

Reprinted as Chapter 2 in N. Rescher, Studies in the History of Logic, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag 2006, pp. 15-27.

"In the present discussion, our sole concern will be with al-Kindī as a logician, more accurately as a student of logic. For he was, unlike his successor al-Fārābī, no specialist in logic. His encyclopedic interests embraced all of Greek science and philosophy, and his concern with logic was derivative in nature, resulting almost as a by-product from the fact that logic was not only an integral but even a fundamental branch of Greek philosophico-scientific knowledge. (p. 15 of the reprint)

(...)

"It is a matter which cannot but cause regret to students of the history of logic that none of these logical works of al-Kindī’s have survived.

In view of these losses, it is a piece of good fortune that we possess, in Arabic, a treatise by al-Kindī bearing the title “On the quantity of the books of Aristotle and what is needful of them for the attainment of philosophy”, the text of which was published by M. Guidi and R. Walzer in 1940.(5) This treatise contains a sketch, amounting to roughly a third of the whole, of Aristotle’s Organon which qualifies as the oldest extant Arabic logical text.(6)" (p. 16 of the reprint)

(5) Guidi-Walzer (1940) gives the editio princips of our text, together with an Italian translation. The Arabic text is also printed in Abū Rīdah (1950).

(6) This statement requires slight qualification. In two instances the “old” Arabic translations of Aristotelian logical texts—antedating the work of Hunain ibn Ishāq and his associates—have survived: that of Anal. Pr. by one “Theodore” and that of Soph. Elen. by ‘Abd-al-Mashīh ibn Nā’imah al-Himsī. But in these two cases the surviving versions were “modernized” in the school of Hunain. See R. Walzer, “New Light on the Arabic Translations of Aristotle,” Oriens, vol. 6 (1953), pp. 91-142.

References

Guidi-Walzer (1940). Michelangelo Guidi and Richard Walzer. “Studi su al-Kindī: I. Uno scritto introduttivo allo studio di Aristotele,” Atti della Reale Accademia dei Lincei, Memorie della classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche, ser. 6, VI, fasc. 5 (Rome, 1940) pp. 375-405.

Abū Rīdah (1950-1953). Muhammad ‘Abd-al-Hādī abū Rīdah (editor). Rasā’il al-kindī al-falsafiyyah. Two vols. (Cairo, 1950; 1953). (A collection of the extant treatises of al-Kindī. Arabic text only.)
———. 1963. "Averroes’ Quaesitum on Assertoric (Absolute) Propositions." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 1:80–93.

"Until 1962 only one logical work of Averroes existed in print in the original Arabic(1) this late date, D. M. Dunlop published the Arabic text of the short tract by Averroes on the modality of propositions with which we shall be concerned here.(2)

The text published by Professor Dunlop forms part of a collection of treatises by Averroes which has long been known to exist in the immensely valuable collection of Arabic manuscripts of the Escorial Library, near Madrid.' The collection is simply entitled Masā'il (Questions),' faithfully reflected in the rubric of Quaesita under which several of these treatises are given in Latin versions in the sixteenth-century editions of Aristotelis Opera cure Averrois Commentariis.

The particular treatise published by Prof. Dunlop deals with the problem of the relationship of assertoric propositions to the modalities of possibility and necessity." (p. 80, two note omitted)

(1) Maurice Bouyges, ed., Averroes: Talkhiç Kitāb al-Maqoulāt ("Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Categoriae") Beyrouth, 1932 (Vol. IV of Bibliotheca Arabica-Sholasticorum, Série Arabe).

(2) M. Dunlop, "Averroes (Ibn Rushd) on the Modality of Propositions," Islamic Studies (Journal of the Gentral Institute of Islamic Research, Karachi), Vol. I (1962), 23-34.
———. 1963. "A Tenth-Century Arab-Christian Apologia for Logic." Islamic Studies no. 2:1–16.

"The existence of widespread distrust towards Greek science, philosophy, and logic within the three major religious communities upon which Greek learning made its impact in the 6/12th centuries -the Christians,(1) Muslims,(2) and Jews(3)-is a well-known phenomenon.

An entire genre of literature-the defense raisonnée of the religious acceptability of philosophical studies-is known to have developed on account of this antagonism. My present concern is with a portion of an almost unexplored sector of this tradition-the apologia for logic." (p. 1)

(1) E. Gilson has graphically described the unremitting opposition with which, since the days of Tertullian, some Christian circles combated philosophical speculation in general, and dialectical techniques in particular. Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages (N.Y. 1938), pp. 5-15 (especially pages 6 and 11).

(2) See the classic study of Ignaz Goldziher, "Stellung der Alten Islamischen Orthodoxie zu den Antiken Wissenschaften," Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Philosophisch-historische Klasse) Berlin, 1916 (Jahrgary 1915). Already al-Kindi, the first notable Muslim philosopher, included in his treatise on metaphysics a chapter "That religion does not conflict with philosophy" ( fī anna-' l-dīn Iā yata 'āriḍ ma' al-falsafah). See pp. 82-3 of A.F. al-Ahwani (ed.), Kitāb al-Kindi fl' l-falsafah al-ūlā, Cairo 1948.

(3) Cf. Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe, Ill.) p. 20. Note also his comment that, "As late as 1765 Moses Mendelssohn felt it necessary to apologize for recommending the study of logic, and to show why the prohibition against the reading of extraneous or profane books does not apply to works on logic" (ibid.)
———. 1964. The Development of Arabic Logic. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Contents: Preface 7; Introduction 11; Part I. Survey of Arabic Logic; 1. The First Century of Arabic Logic 15; 2. The First Flowering of Arabic Logic 33; 3. The Century of Avicenna 48; 4. The Century of Averroes 55; 5. The Clash of the Schools 64; 6. The Period of “Reconciliation” and The Age of Schoolmasters 73; Conclusion 82; Part II. Register of Arabic Logicians; Contents [166 names] 87; The Register 93; General Bibliography 256; Index 259-262.

"While much has been written about Arabic medicine, astronomy, mathematics, philosophy, etc., the story of the evolution of logical studies in Islam has never even been attempted, with the result that this important chapter in intellectual history remains almost wholly unopened. Although this terrain cannot yet be mapped with the precision of an aerial photograph, enough materials are now available to make it possible to draw a rough sketch of the area. This limited objective is our aim here.

This book falls into two parts. Part I is devoted to an exposition of the structure of Arabic work in logic, describing its main features, giving generalized accounts of the trends and tendencies of its development, and attempting to identify major contributions.

Part II gives a register of Arabic logicians, placing each contributor into his context in the tradition, and identifying his personal contribution to the development of Arabic logic.

Much of the discussion will perforce have to be devoted to considering the substantive contents of Arabic logic in general outline, rather than with a view to individual details and to the particular content of specific theories and doctrines. In part, but in part only, is this due to the chosen character of the present work as a general and synoptic survey. To a regrettably large extent it is attributable to the paucity of preparatory investigations of points of detail and the deplorably large mass of yet unexamined manuscript material. At least another generation’s worth of work will have to be done before the historian of Arabic logic can traverse his ground with the sure foot needed for the accurate appraisal of specific contributions. A sampling—though one that is admittedly minuscule—of the sort of detailed investigations needed on a vastly increased scale is given in a companion piece to the present work, the writer’s Studies in the History of Arabic Logic (University of Pittsburgh Press, 1963)." (Introduction, p.11)
———. 1964. Studies in the History of Arabic Logic. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Contents: Preface 7; Introduction 11; I. Arabic Logic: A Brief Account 13; II. Al-FarabI on Logical Tradition 21; III. Al-Kindi's Sketch of Aristotle's Organon 28; IV. Al-FarabI on the Question: Is Existence a Predicate? 39; V. An Interpretation of Aristotle's Doctrine of Future Contingency and Excluded Middle 43; VI. A Tenth-Century Arab-Christian Apologia for Logic 55; VII. The Logic-Chapter of Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Khwarizml's Encyclopedia, Keys to the Sciences 64; VIII. Avicenna on the Logic of "Conditional" Propositions 76; IX. Abu-'l-Salt of Denia on Modal Syllogisms 87; X. Averroes' Quaesitum on Assertoric (Absolute) Propositions 91; Index 107-108.

"Six of these studies have appeared as articles in learned journals. (See the Preface for detailed citations.) Four papers—numbers I, V, VI, and IX—are here published for the first time.

Chapters II -X deal with selected special topics in the history of Arabic logic. The first chapter, presenting a "Brief History" of Arabic logic, is of a different character. Written especially for this volume, this historical survey presents the requisite background for the more specialized studies that follow. Each of the contributors to Arabic logic subsequently dealt with is here put into his proper context in the historical development of the subject. While it is hoped that these studies will provide information useful to the historian of philosophy and the student of the intellectual history of Islam, their author hopes fondly that their perusal will provide an incentive to others to carry further the work which he has here taken in hand and has carried forward, as he knows full well, but very little." (Introduction, p. 11)
———. 1967. Temporal Modalities in Arabic Logic. Dordrecht: Reidel.

"In the wake of A. N. Prior's book on Time and Modality(1) an active interest has sprung up among logicians in the logical theory of chronological propositions generally, and particularly in the relationships that obtain between such propositions and modal concepts. This phenomenon is not surprising, because the issue is one that ramifies widely into various topics of logico-philosophical interest: the theory of tensed discourse, the problem of determinism, and the puzzle of future contingency, among others. The modern discussions have gone forward wholly oblivious to the fact that medieval Arabic logicians had given extensive attention to the development of a theory of temporal modalities, and had developed an extensive and subtle machinery for dealing with problems in this area. The aim of the present monograph is one of "intellectual archeology" - to present the Arabic contributions to this branch of logic in such a way that their linkage with ideas and concepts of present-day interest can be assessed and appreciated." (p. 1)

(1) Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1957.
———. 1968. Studies in Arabic Philosophy. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Contents: Preface V; I. Al-Kindī's Epistle on the concentric structure of the universe 1: II. Al-Kindī's Treatise on Platonic solids 15; III. Yaḥyā ibn'Adi's tratise "On the Four Scientific Questions Regarding the Art of Logic" 38; IV. Avicenna on the logic of questions 48; V. Ibn al Ṣalāh on Aristotle on causation 54; VI. The concept of existence in Arabic logic and philosophy 69; VII. The theory of temporal modalities in Arabic logic and philosophy 81; VIII. Ibn al 'Assāl' discourse on logic 111; IX.Nicholas of Cusa on the Qur'ān 137; X. The impact of Arabci philosophy on the West 147; Index 159-162.
———. 2006. Studies in the History of Logic. Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.

Table of Contents: Preface; 1. On Aristotle’s Apodeictic Syllogisms 1; 2. Al-Kindi’s Sketch of Aristotle’s Organon 15; 3. A Ninth-Century Arabic Logician on: Is Existence A Predicate? 29; 4. Avicenna on the Logic of “Conditional” Propositions 33; 5. Avicenna on the Logic of Questions 47; 6. The Arabic Theory of Temporal Modal Syllogistic 55; 7. Choice Without Preference: The Problem of “Buridan’s Ass” 91; 8. Leibniz’s Interpretation of his Logical Calculi 141; 9. Russell and Modal Logic 159; 10. Default Reasoning 173; Index of Names 185-190.
———. 2006. "Logic in the Islamic World." In Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Second Edition, edited by Borchert, Donald M., 417–420. New York: Thomson Gale.

Arabic logic, like the rest of medieval Arabic science and philosophy, is entirely Western and has nothing to do with Oriental philosophy. It developed wholly in the wake of the classical Greek tradition as preserved in and transmitted through late Greek Aristotelianism. The present account briefly traces the evolution of Arabic logic from its inception in the late eighth century to its stultification in the sixteenth century, mentioning only the most important trends, figures, and achievements. Information on individual writers can be found in Carl Brockelmann’s monumental Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur, cited hereafter as GAL (2 vols.—I, II—Weimar, 1890; Berlin, 1902; 2nd ed., Leiden, 1943–1949; 3 supp. vols.—SI, SII, SIII—Leiden, 1937–1942)." (p. 417)

With an Addendum by Tony Street, p. 421.

"For more on everything in the entry, see especially Hans Daiber’s Bibliography of Islamic Philosophy (1999). Few scholars would now accept that Arabic logic is “entirely Western”; it grew out of Greek texts, but developed differently from both Hellenistic and Latin logic." (p. 421)

References

Brockelmann, Carl. History of the Arabic Written Tradition, trans. by Joep Lameer, Handbook of Oriental Studies, 5 volumes in 6 tomes,(Leiden: Brill, 2016-19.

Daiber, Hans. A Bibliography of Islamic Philosophy. Leiden: Brill, 1999.
Rescher, Nicholas, and van der Nat, A. 1974. "The Theory of Modal Syllogistic in Medieval Arabic Philosophy." In Studies in Modality, edited by Rescher, Nicholas, Manor, R., vander Nat, A. and Z., Parks., 17–56. Oxford: Blackwell.

"The aim of the present discussion is one of “intellectual archeology” —to present the Arabic contributions to this branch of logic in such a way that their linkage with ideas and concepts of present-day interest can be assessed and appreciated.

The logic of modality was a relative latecomer to the domain of Arabic logic. Only after the time of Abu Bishr Matta ibn Yunus (ca. 870-940), translator of Posterior Analytics, did the study of Aristotle’s modal syllogistic come to be taken up.(2)" (p. 17)

(...)

"The present essay seeks to present in systematic form the theory of modal temporal syllogistic as it is presented in tracts by two authors, al-Qazwīnī and al-Shirwānī. It goes perhaps without saying, that although we base our discussion in the main upon the treatises of these two authors, the exposition will draw upon a wider range of Arabic logicians, including such more prominent figures as Avicenna and Averroes. In particular, we shall see that al-Qazwīnī al-Kātibī follows and draws upon Avicenna. Details of this reliance will be obvious at many points to anyone who compares al-Qazwīnī’s treatment with the corresponding treatment of Avicenna’s Kitāb al-ishārāt wa-l- tanbīhāt, which is fortunately accessible to European scholars in an excellent French version: A. M. Goichon (tr.), Ibn Sinā'. Livre des Directives et Remarques (Beyrouth and Paris, 1951). al-Qazwīnī’s dependence upon Avicenna is strikingly evidenced by the close parallelism in organization, mode of treatment, and substance between the two treaties." (p. 19)

(2) “Al-Farabi on Logical Tradition” in N. Rescher, Studies in the History of Arabic Logic (Pittsburgh, 1963), pp. 21-27-
Rescher, Nicholas, and van der Nat, Arnold. 1975. "The Arabic Theory of Temporal Modal Syllogistic." In Essays on Islamic Philosophy and Science, edited by Hourani, Albert, 189–221. Albany: State University of New York Press.

"Arabic manuscript codex OR 12405 of the British Museum contains a logical treatise entitled Sharḥ Al-takrmīl fī 'l-manṭiq, whose author is one Muhammad ibn Fayḍ Allah ibn Muḥammad Amīn al-Shirwānī.

(...)

"Al-Shirwānī's treatise is of some interest because it enables us to confirm and extend in significant ways our information regarding the Arabic theory of temporal modal syllogistic as available from other sources.(4) This paper seeks to present the new light this source affords for our knowledge of Arabic logic. On the information now available it would seem that the theory of temporal modalities represents the most significant addition made by the medieval Arabic logicians to the body of logical material that they received from the Greeks. The entire subject has only begun to be studied in recent years, and until many more texts have been studied and analyzed our conclusions must remain provisional and tentative. Much work remains to be done before our feet can be set on firm ground. But already at this early juncture a claim can be entered with considerable assurance regarding the value and interest of such further work." (p. 189, a note omitted)

[On this essay see Tony Street, Rescher on Arabic Logic, (2008) note 3 p. 309.
Rezakhany, Hassan. 2023. "A Forgotten Mereological Paradox." In Fallacies in the Arabic, Byzantine, Hebrew and Latin Traditions, edited by Cesalli, Laurent, Gazziero, Leoe, Manekin, Charles, Rahman, Shahid, Street, Tony and Trizio, Michele, 187–207. Turnhout: Brepols.

Abstract: "From the thirteenth century to the nineteenth, philosophers of the eastern Islamic world (Iraq to India) studied a mereological paradox of great philosophical interest.

Here are documented many of the important formulations of the paradox, solutions, and objections to those solutions. After the philosophical contributions to the literature are summarized, there follows a section analyzing their merits and shortcomings as well as a section plotting their historical evolution and trajectory. In addition to the article’s intrinsic philosophical interest, it is also a touchstone for evaluating historical hypotheses regarding the intellectual decline of the post-classical Islamic world. In the ‘Historical Development’ section, it is briefly argued that the paradox is functionally equivalent to Russell’s. The study ends with an appendix of translations."
Rundgren, Frithiof. 2007. "On the Greek Influence on Arabic Grammar." In The Early Islamic Grammatical Tradition, edited by Baalbaki, Ramzi, 75–100. Aldershot: Ashgate.

"Arab tradition generally considers Abu 1-Aswad al-Du'aliī (d. - according to al-Mada'inī - 688 in Basra) to have been the originator of Arabic national grammar.(1)" (p. 75)

(...)

"The Arabic language, the language of the Qur'ān, was at first the only tie that bound the different ethnic groups of the rapidly growing empire together. The Arabic language spoken in 'Iraqi war camps was by no means homogeneous and often deviated considerably from the standards set by ancient poetry and, gradually,(5) the Qur'ān. Moreover, the Qur'ān was considered to be the unattainable paragon of the art of language and had to be recited absolutely correctly. Therefore people had to master the rules established subsequently for the Arabic dialect of the Qur'ān." (p. 76)

(...)

"However that may be, the concept of grammatical errors presupposes an existing understanding of correct speech of the kind that had been found among the Greeks since Antiquity and was now beginning to evolve among the Arabs. Thus it is not too far-fetched to assume that the προσῳδίᾱ of Greek philology can in some way be found behind the Arabic term. After all, Arabic philology evolved among the qurra' who devoted themselves to the correct recitation of the Qur'ān,. It is safe to assume that these were the circles where laḥn first assumed the definitive meaning of 'melody of speech, manner of speech'. According to Mujahid (d. ca. 720) there is a tradition: wa marra 'Umaru bi-qawmin, yatanāḍalūna fa-laḥana aḥaduhum fa-qāla 'Umaru: su'u l-laḥni aqbaḥu min su'i l-ramyi (Chester Beatty Collection, MS Arab. 705, ed. P Kahle, The Cairo Geniza,² 1959, p. 346). In the phrase su'u l-laḥni, laḥn probably had the meaning 'manner of speech' in general." (p. 77)

(1) A. Spitaler might possibly prefer the term national-Arabic grammar here, cf. Orientalistische Literaturzeitung 63/1968 p. 50ff.

(5) P. Kahle, The Cairo Geniza² (1959) p. 141ff.
Sabra, Abdelhamid I. 1965. "A twelfth-century defence of the fourth figure of the syllogism." Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes:14–28.

Reprinted in A. I. Sabra, Optics, Astronomy and Logic: Studies in Arabic Science and Philosophy, Aldershot: Variorum 1994. (Essay XVI).

"It was widely believed until recently that the fourth figure, omitted by Aristotle in his systematic treatment of the syllogisms, was invented by Galen in the second century a.d. This view is known to have been first circulated in the West through the work of Averroes.(1) It is, however, contradicted by Galen himself in the Introduction to Logic, the only complete logical work of his that has survived in Greek. Galen says in this work that there cannot be more than three figures for the categorical syllogisms, adding that he has shown this in his book On Demonstration.(2) A new light was thrown on this question when J. Lukasiewicz drew attention to a published Greek scholium which may be taken to explain how the doctrine of four figures came to be attributed to Galen. The unknown scholiast divides categorical syllogisms into simple and compound. In accordance with Aristotle, he divides simple syllogisms consisting of three terms into three figures. Then he continues: ‘Galen, however, says in his Apodeictic that there are four figures, because he looks at the compound syllogisms consisting of four terms, as he has found many such syllogisms in Plato’s dialogues.(3) It would thus appear that someone who misunderstood the relevant passage in Galen’s book, or who had simply heard about ‘Galen’s four figures’, assumed that Galen’s doctrine applied to simple, not compound syllogisms.(4)

It is known that Galen’s Demonstration was translated into Arabic in the second half of the ninth century.(...)" (p. 14, a note omitted)

(...)

"It is, therefore, only natural to turn to the Arabic sources for more light on the historical problems connected with the fourth figure. The present article is a first attempt in this direction. It is based on a twelfth-century Arabic work, entitled ‘On the fourth figure of the categorical syllogism, which is the figure attributed to Galen’. The author, Najm al-Din Abu-l-Futuh Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn al-Sari, also known as Ibn al-Salah, was educated at Baghdad where he studied logic, mathematics and medicine; he later settled in Damascus where he died in a.h. 548 = a.d. 153-54.)(..)" (p. 15)

(....)

"In Part II of this article I shall give a translation of the prologue to Ibn al-Sariì treatise, followed in Part III by a commentary on the translated text. Part IV will be devoted to an analysis of Ibn al-Sari’s arguments contained in the bodv of his treatise." (p. 16)

(1) Averroes ascribes the fourth figure to Galen both in his Expositio media (Bk. I, Chaps. 8 and 23) and Epitome (Ch. i) of the Prior Analytics; he does not indicate his source in either place.(...)

(2) Galeni Jnstitutio Logica (ed. C. Kalbfleisch), Leipzig, 1896, p. 26; German translation in Jurgen Mau, Galen: Einführung in die Logik. Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar mit deutscher Ŭbersetznng, Berlin, 1960, p. 14 (of the separately bound translation). See William and Martha Kneale, The Development of Logic, Oxford, 1962, p. 183.

(3) Jan Lukasiewicz, Aristotle's Syllogistic, 2nd enlarged ed., Oxford, 1957, p. 39. (1st ed., 1951.)

(4) Ibid., pp. 41-42.
Sanson, David, and Alwishah, Ahmed. 2016. "Al-Taftāzānī on the Liar Paradox." Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy no. 4:100–124.

"Saʿad al-Dīn Masūd ibn ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Taftāzānī (1322–1390) was a Persian polymath who wrote on a wide range of subjects— grammar, logic, theology (kalām), jurisprudence (fiqh), and literature.

Here we translate and discuss his remarks on the Liar Paradox, in which he (a) presents the first example of a Liar Cycle or Deferred Liar in the tradition, (b) gives the paradox a puzzling name—the fallacy of the “irrational root” (al-jadhr al-aṣamm)—which became the standard name for the paradox in the tradition, and (c) suggests a connection between the paradox and what it tells us about the nature of truth and falsehood, and related puzzles concerning reason and the nature of goodness and badness." (p. 100)
Schleifer, Aliah. 1990. "Ibn Khaldun’s Theories of Perception, Logic and Knowledge: An Islamic Phenomenology." Islamic Quarterly no. 34:225–231.

"Ibn Khaldūn’s theories about perception, logic and knowledge are clearly influenced by Aristotelian thought; however being somewhat eclectic, he adds, synthesizes and arrives at his own perspective. In addition, however novel Ibn Khaldūn’s conclusions may be, there is the underlying awareness of the Source of all knowledge: “Knowledge comes only from Allah, the Strong, the Wise.”’ His philosophy, guided by the Qur’ān and the Sunnah and sparked by his own genius and capacity for speculative thought, sometimes has much in common with Scholastic Realism, and indeed might be classified as Islamic Phenomenology." (p. 225)

(...)

"In summary, Ibn Khaldūn presents man as the focal point of the Universe.

But, man before he reaches the stage of discerning intellect, is simply matter in as much as he is ignorant of all knowledge. Through knowledge, however, he reaches the perfection of his form. It is the discerning intellect, the god given ability to think which enables man to arrange actions in an orderly, logical manner. The experimental intellect represents man’s ability to acquire useful knowledge from his fellow men. The speculative intellect is man’s ability to perceive existent things, whether present or absent. Thus, with the help of the soul and by Allah’s mercy, man may acquire knowledge of a spiritual nature." (p. 230)
Schöck, Cornelia. 2016. "Major Issues and Controversies of Arabic Logic: Preface." Oriens no. 44:179–180.

"The project “Major issues and controversies of Arabic logic and philosophy of language,” co-funded by the British Arts and Humanities Research Council (ahrc) and the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (dfg), is an attempt to fill some gaps in our knowledge regarding fundamental research questions to do with Arabic logic and philosophy of language. Against the twofold background of the late antique commentaries on Aristotle’s Organon and of the debates on issues pertaining to logic and philosophy of language in the formative period of the Arabic-Muslim sciences, the focal points of the project are:

(a) the relationship of Arabic logic and philosophy of language with Arabic-Muslim theories of science and argumentation theory, including the ultimate reception of Greek-derived theories in Muslim jurisprudence, rhetoric, theology, and

(b) the development of Arabic logic and philosophy of language after Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037).

(...)

Over the last five years, a number of papers first presented and discussed at the project workshops at Cambridge have been published in Oriens. The papers published in the issues 44.3–4 (2016) of Oriens focus on problems of Arabic logic and on argumentation theory.
Schoeck, Cornelia. 2025. "‘Subtraction’ (raf)as Method for Finding First Principles of Demonstrations and for Establishing or Destroying: From Aristotle to al-Fārābī." In Logic, Soul, and World: Essays in Arabic Philosophy in Honor of Tony Street, edited by Ahmed, Asad Q., Zarepour, Mohammad Saleh and Strobino, Riccardo, 46–113. Leiden: Brill.

"The method of “subtracting,” “taking away,” or “removing” (Arab. rafʿ; pass. irtifāʿ) is omni-present in Ibn Sīnā’s logic, in particular in the Topics (K. al- Jadal), the Isagoge (K. al-Madkhal) and the Demonstration (K. al-Burhān) of his Shifāʾ, but also in the Metaphysics (al-Ilāhiyyāt) of his Shifāʾ where he explains the ontological aspect of this method. And in the Canon of Medicine (al-Qānūn fī aṭ-Ṭibb) he applies this method. I intend to give an overview on how this method works in Aristotle up to al-Fārābī and to explain its philosophical and logical background and its function. I also refer to some influential passages in Alexander of Aphrodisias, Galen, Sextus Empiricus, Proclus, Philoponus, but I disregard influential testimonies from ancient medicine and from Philodemus.(2). The aim is to provide the background before we should study Ibn Sīnā’s theory of ‘taking away’ and consequence (luzūm), including his semantic theory of the signification of linguistic expressions (dalālat al-alfāẓ)." (pp. 46-47)
Schoeler, Gregor. 2013. "The ‘Poetic Syllogism’ Revisited." Oriens no. 41:1–26.

Abstract: "The term ‘poetic syllogism’ appears in the late antique Greek commentary and scholia literature.

Arabic philosophers, however, are the first to explain how this kind of syllogism is constructed; al-Fārābī introduces one type and Avicenna adds two more. Each syllogism that follows one of these three types includes among its premises or its conclusion at least one figurative statement. The poetic syllogism plays a key role in Arabic ‘philosophical’ poetics, which contains an important theory of figurative language.—A treatise on Poetics by Ibn˙Tumlūs discusses the relationship between the three types. The present study closely analyses Ibn ˙Tumlūs’s reasoning. Furthermore, it clarifies previously unexplained or misunderstood terms such as ‘poetic statement’, ‘poetic premise’ and ‘poetic definition’.

It finally points to an example for a specific type of sophistical inference Aristotle introduces in his Sophistical Refutations which Avicenna and other Arabic philosophers cite as a poetic syllogism. Commentators, perhaps as early as late antiquity, could have taken this type of inference to be the poetic syllogism they failed to find in Aristotle’s Poetics."
Shehaby, Nabil. 1975. "The Influence of Stoic Logic on AI-Jaṣṣāṣ's Legal Theory." In The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning, edited by Murdoch, John Emery and Sylla, Edith Dudley, 61–80. Dordrecht: Reidel.

Discussion, pp. 80-85.

"My aim in writing this paper was to clarify some of the most obscure, and at the same time crucial, passages in al-Jaṣṣāṣ's Usūl al-Fiqh. These passages reveal part of the logical apparatus that Muslim legal theorists used in building up their systems. In many instances this apparatus reflects a striking resemblance to Stoic views on logic, even though there is no proof that Stoic writings were available to Muslims. Some of this logic was also employed by the mutakallimūn (theologians); and it is for this reason that the above reflections may prove to have a wider significance by helping to decipher certain methods used in kalām. What I would like to add here is that the Stoic material in al-Jaṣṣāṣ's book does not come from the Aristotelian commentators. As I have shown in my recent The Propositional Logic of Avicenna, the Stoic material in Avicenna's treatment of conditional propositions and syllogisms in contrast bears the stamp of the Peripatetic philosophers." (p. 75)
Spevack, Aaron. 2010. "Apples and Oranges: The Logic of the Early and Later Arabic Logicians." Islamic Law and Society:159–184.

Abstract: "In a recent article in Islamic Law and Society, Khaled El-Rouayheb proposed that opposition to logic was probably never the predominant view of Sunni Muslim scholars.

El-Rouayheb also expressed doubt in the position of later scholars who argued that there existed two approaches to the study of logic, one whose permissibility was debated, and another whose permissibility was agreed upon. In response to El-Rouayheb,

Mufti Ali argued in his own article that opposition to logic was the predominant view of Sunni Muslim scholars between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries. In this article, I argue, pace Ali, that there is merit to the claim that neither opposition to, nor support for, logic achieved predominance, especially between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, even if favorable opinions came to be viewed as the soundest position in later centuries. I also argue, pace El-Rouayheb, that there is merit to the proposition that there are two distinct approaches to logic, one that mixes objectionable elements from Greek philosophy, and one that, in varying degrees, may have rid itself of these elements. Additionally, I argue that the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries may have marked a transitional period during which the two approaches became more distinct, although some jurists who ruled on logic did not always notice, or acknowledge, the distinction."
———. 2022. "Defending Definitions: The Tools of Disputation in Logic of al-Fanārī." Methodos. Savoirs et textes no. 22:1–30.

Abstract: "Al-Abharī’s (d.1265) Isagoge (al-Īsāghūjī) is an introductory primer in logic which has received numerous commentaries, each geared towards students of various levels of familiarity with this instrumental science. Al-Fanārī’s (d. 1431) advanced commentary on the Isagoge, called al-Fawāʾid al-Fanāriyya, has confounded students of logic for centuries due to its terse and dense style as well as the presumption that the reader knows well the science of disputation along with the subtle interpretive disagreements discussed in other texts and commentaries."
Stodolsky, Muhammed Volkan Yildiran. 2023. "What is a Kalima, What is a Definition: The Relationship between Logic and Grammar in theLater Arabic Linguistic Tradition." The American Society of Islamic Philosophy and Theology Online Journal:1–31.

"The purpose of the discipline of naḥw (Arabic syntax) has been defined as making one familiar with the endings of the kalima, meaning the case endings of nouns and moods of verbs. Hence, defining what a kalima is constitutes one of the most fundamental subjects of naḥw. This study will discuss and compare three explicit definitions of kalima by al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144), Ibn al-Ḥājib (d. 646/1249), and Ibn Hishām al-Anṣārī (d. 761/1360), in light of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jāmī’s (d. 898/1492) analysis and evaluation of the definitions of al-Zamakhsharī and Ibn al-Ḥājib in his commentary on the latter’s al-Kāfiya. The articulation and evaluation of different definitions of kalima depend on selecting the criteria through which one definition becomes preferable to another.(2) This article will also study the different criteria Muslim grammarians and logicians have used in their conceptualization of the best definition in the context of Ibn Hishām’s attempt to fully use the criteria of logic in his grammatical

definition of kalima." (p. 1, a nte omitted)

(2) For an overview of the concept of definition, see Takashi Yagisawa, “Definition,” in Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, edited by Robert Audi, 2d ed. (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

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