Angelelli, Ignacio, and Cerezo, María, eds. 1996. Studies on the History of Logic. Proceedings of the III. Symposium on the History of
Logic. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Contents: Preface V; List of Contributors XI; Mario Mignucci: Aristotle's theory of predication 1; Robin Smith: Aristotle's regress argument
21, Hermann Weidemann: Alexander of Aphrodisias, Cicero and Aristotle's definition of possibility 33; Donald Felipe: Fonseca on topics 43; Alan Perreiah: Modes
of scepticism in medieval philosophy 65; Mikko Yrjönsuuri: Obligations as thoughts experiments 79; Angel d'Ors: Utrum propositio de futuro sit determinate
vera vel falsa (Antonio Andrés and John Duns Scotus) 97; Earline Jennifer Ashworth: Domingo de Soto (1494-1560) on analogy and equivocation 117; Allan
Bäck: The Triplex Status Naturae and its justification 133; William E. McMahon: The semantics of Ramon Llull 155; Paloma Pérez-Ilzarbe: The doctrine
of descent in Jerónimo Pardo: meaning, inference, truth 173; Jeffrey Coombs: What's the matter with matter: Materia propositionum in the post-medieval
period 187; Rafael Jiménez Cataño: Copulatio in Peter of capua (12th century) and the nature of the proposition 197; Lynn Cates: Wyclif on sensus
compositus et divisus 209; Mauricio Beuchot: Some examples of logic in New Spain (Sixteenth-Eighteenth century) 215; Adrian Dufour: necessity and the
Galilean revolution 229; Guy Debrock: Peirce's concept of truth within the context of his conception of logic 241; Pierre Thibaud: Peirce's concept of
proposition 257; Jaime Nubiola: Scholarship on the relations between Ludwig Wittgenstein and Charles S. Peirce 281; José Miguel Gambra: Arithmetical
abstraction in Aristotle and Frege 295; Herbert Hochberg: The role of subsistent propositions and logical forms in Russell's 1913 Philosophical logic
and in the Russell-Wittgenstein dispute 317; Alfonso García Suárez: Are the objects of the Tractatus phenomenological objects? 343; María Cerezo: Does
a proposition affirm every proposition that follows from it? 357; Javier Legris: Carnap's reconstruction of intuitionistic logic in the Logical syntax of
language 369; Albert C. Lewis: Some influences of Hermann Grassmann's program on modern logic 377; Juan Carlos León: Indeterminism and future contingency
in non-classical logics 383; Christian Thiel: Research on the history of logic at Erlangen 397; Index 403.
Bar-Am, Nimrod. 2003. "A Framework for a Critical History of Logic." Sudhoffs Archiv no. 87:80-89.
Abstract: "The view that science has evolved while using the critical method (dialectics) is undisputed these days. Initially, the
traditional view that scientific knowledge is sound and unshakable knowledge, has hindered the view of its development as a critical process. In this respect
the history of logic suffered more than other branches of knowledge because the view of logic as developing belongs essentially to the last 150 years. Even
today, there is no critical history of logic (the telling of its development by the critical method). This paper is a preliminary attempt in this
"Let us sum up then: At the heart of traditional logic lies the traditional question, what is a sound inference? Modern logic took its
first step by criticizing this question (Hume, Bolzano and Boole) and, by replacing it with the modern question, what is a valid inference?
(Boole, Russell and Tarski). This was not a technical novelty. It was a type 6 novelty, an upheaval, a meta-logical revolution which
determined future agenda for years to come. Key figures, such as Whewell and Frege, did not take part in this revolution. This discovery is an interesting
result of the use of our framework: Their achievements were made despite them being fence-sitters. On the one hand, they still clung to judgments, viewing as
useless the merely valid inferences. On the other hand, they postponed the task of securing empirical science by means of logic." (p. 89)
Barth, Else M. 1974. The Logic of the Articles in Traditional Philosophy. A Contribution to the Study of Conceptual Structures.
Revised translation from the original Dutch (1971) by E. M. Barth and T. C. Potts.
Table of Contents: Preface XIX; Preface to the original edition XXI; On the use of symbols and graphical types XXIII-XXV; Part 1. The
problem. I. Introduction: problems and sources 3; II. Naming what is 34; III. The semantics of the logical constants 50; Part 2. Historical survey. IV. From
the history of the logic of indefinite propositions 75; V. From the history of the logic of individual propositions 141; VI. Singular - General - Indefinite
180; VII. The identity theories of the copula 204; Part 3. Descent. VIII. Argument by analogy 291; IX: The problem of the logic of relations and its connection
with the logic of the articles 337; Part 4. X: Introduction of indefinite propostions by ekthesis 381; XI. Conjunction, potentiality, and disjunction 417; XII.
Summary and conclusion 457; Bibliography 482; Index of proper names 502; Index of subjects 509.
"As anybody may verify, both in German, French and other continental philosophical literature, as well as in English philosophical
literature written in the continental philosophical tradition, very frequent use is made of the articles - “der”, “die”, “das” in German, “le” and “la” in
French, “de” and “het” in Dutch, “-en”, “-a”, “-et” in Scandinavian languages and so on - that is, of the definite articles as grammarians call them.
Sentences which in German would begin with a definite article are frequently translated into English by indefinite articles, and often also
occur without any preceding article or other operator. In any case, the choice between a definite and an indefinite prenex article in English philosophical
literature can seldom be said to be philosophically significant." (p. 4)
"It is certainly no accident that sentences with definite articles, or, as is often the case in English, indefinite articles, and
general sentences with no prenex articles or other prenex operators at all, were found earlier much more frequently in scientific literature, too, than today.
The development on this point which introduction: problems and sources has taken place in the social sciences can be illustrated by the following
quotation: “The emphasis has shifted from the attempt to discover the characteristics of the leader, to an understanding of the
leader-follower relationship” (Klineberg 1954/466). Due to the development of a logic of relations by De Morgan and Peirce, from 1860 onwards, in combination
with Frege’s revision of the logic of “all’’ and “some”, the language form exemplified by “the state” and “die Sprache” gradually disappeared from theoretical
logic. The development in the social sciences to which Klineberg refers is not necessarily directly connected with that theoretical logic, but it could be. In
any case the similarity between these developments is an interesting symptom of a generally felt need." (p. 5, a note omitted)
Klineberg, O., 1954 , Social Psychology. Second revised edition. New York.
Bochenski, Joseph. 1961. A History of Formal Logic. Notre Dame: Indiana University Press.
Translated from the German edition "Formale Logik" (1956) by Ivo Thomas.
Reprinted New York, Chelsea Publishing Co., 1970.
"As an introduction to the present state of research and to justify the arrangement of this book, a summary presentation of results is
now needed. The view we present is a new one of the growth of formal logic, stated here for the first time. It is a view which markedly diverges not only from
all previous conceptions of the history of logic, but also from opinions that are still widespread about the general history of thought. But it is no
'synthetic a priori judgment', rather is it a position adopted in accordance with empirical findings and based on the total results of the present book. Its
significance seems not to be confined within the boundaries of the history of logic: the view might be taken as a contribution to the general history of human
thought and hence to the sociology of knowledge." (p. 10)
"The history of western logic can be divided into five periods: 1. the ancient period (to the 6th century A.D.); 2. the high Middle Age
(7th to 11th centuries); 3. the Scholastic period (11th to 15th centuries); 4. the older period of modern 'classical' logic (16th to 19th centuries); 5.
mathematical logic (from the middle of the 19th century). Two of those are not creative periods - the high Middle Age and the time of 'classical' logic, so
that they can be left almost unnoticed in a history of problems. The hypothesis that there was no creative logical investigation between the ancient and
Scholastic periods might very probably be destroyed by a knowledge of Arabian logic, but so far little work has been done on this, and as the results of what
research has been undertaken are only to be found in Arabic, they are unfortunately not available to us." (p. 11)
———. 1974. "Logic and Ontology." Philosophy East and West no. 24:275-292.
Abstract: "The scope of this article is to present a broad survey of the relations between logic and ontology as they have been
conceived of in the history of Western thought. While it is true that Hindu philosophy offers a similar field of research, the impression is that we are not
yet prepared to handle it in any synthetic way. We simply do not know enough about the details of the Hindu doctrines."
———. 1981. "The general sense and character of modern logic." In Modern Logic - A Survey. Historical, Philosophical, and
Mathematical Aspects of Modern Logic and Its Applications, edited by Agazzi, Evandro, 3-14. Dordrecht: Reidel.
"By 'Modem Logic' (abridged as 'ML') the class of studies is meant which were originated by Leibniz, developed, among others, by Boole,
Peirce, Frege, Peano, Lesniewski and their followers; in other terms the class of studies listed in Alonzo Church's Bibliography and in The Journal of
"The aim of the paper is to describe - as the title selected by the organizers of the conference indicates - the general sense and
character of ML thus understood. In other terms an attempt will be made to find the fundamental characteristics of ML-al studies.
The method used will be comparative. We are going to ask: How does ML compare with three fields with which it is usually linked: logic,
mathematics and philosophy? Is ML Logic and, if so, how does it differ from
other types of logic? Is it a mathematical discipline and, if that is the case, what is the difference between it and other mathematical
sciences? Is it philosophy and, this being admitted, what is its place among the other philosophical disciplines?
The present paper will be mostly concerned with the first class of problems, the comparison between ML and the other types of logic; the
other two classes of problems will be treated only marginally. As far as the
main problems are concerned, the method will necessarily be historical: for, contrary to mathematics and philosophy, all other forms of logic
with which ML may be compared belong to the past." (p. 3)
Brumberg-Chaumont, Julie, and Rosental, Caude, eds. 2021. Logical Skills: Social-Historical Perspectives. Cham (Switzerland):
"The volume wishes to address a variety of questions arising when logic is approached by overriding compartmentalization, by adopting an
interdisciplinary viewpoint, and by taking into account its fully social and historical dimensions. By raising the question of logical skills, it aims at
pausing and stepping aside from an approach essentially centered on the doctrinal history of logical theories." (Preface, p. V)
"This volume differs from many psychology publications in that it does not seek to highlight the acquisition, possession, or lack of
logical skills in anonymous and interchangeable “subjects” according to a reference logic. It deals with socio-historically situated actors and groups and
analyzes the conceptions of logic that are mobilized to valuate their skills and to devise educational “politics of logic.”
The volume is also different from various philosophical works that offer a reflection on the (il)logical ways of thinking and acting of
societies—or of the individuals who compose them. On the contrary, such reflections are taken as an object of social historical study in its own right.
Furthermore, it differs from histories of ideas in the field of logic. It does not set out from a definition of logic that would serve as a
once-and-for-all fixed reference, which would lead to select some approaches to logic and exclude others from the scope of our study. It develops a social
historical approach to logic. By focusing on logical skills, it shows the many ways in which logic can be understood. Logic does not simply appear as a set of
theories and doctrines, but also as a tool that individuals and groups use for numerous purposes in various institutional, political, and social contexts.
Generally speaking, logic is seen as a social practice." (Preface, p. VI)
Carruccio, Ettore. 1964. Mathematics and Logic in History and in Contemporary Thought. Chicago: Aldine.
Original Italian edition: Matematica e logica nella storia e nel pensiero contemporaneo, Torino: Gheroni 1958.
"The history of mathematics, understood in this sense, should as far as possible be studied directly from documents and from originals;
what is required is not so much erudition as an effort to enliven the texts by interpretation and by relating them to their own times. The field which the
historian of mathematics should cover in tracing the development, ancient and modern, of the subject, and its relationship with other aspects of life and
culture, is broad enough to daunt the student; but while obviously no one can cover the whole of it in detail, each student must choose what best suits his own
The subjects treated in this book have been chosen mainly to show the development of the most important fundamental concepts of mathematics,
and particularly the contribution made by mathematical thought to the evolution of logic. This will allow us to cover the entire history of mathematics from
ancient times to our -own day, observing the changes that have taken place in the conception of the structure of a rational theory, until we reach the
delicate, and often lively and disconcerting,
problems of contemporary logic. Though narrowed down like this, our field of enquiry is still too vast to be treated all in one piece. Yet,
as our object is essentially formative rather than informative, we prefer to leave occasional gaps, in order to emphasize subjects which seem fundamental in
the training of those who will do research in the history and philosophy of mathematics.
At this point the reader may wish for a precise definition of what we mean by the terms 'mathematics' and 'logic'. But the meaning of the
terms themselves, as we shall see, keeps changing in the course of the history of thought. To understand adequately what thinkers have meant by these terms we
need, therefore, a broad idea of the historical development of mathematics and logic. To understand clearly what is meant by such terms today we need too, I
think, a knowledge of the evolution of the ideas in question, and it is this evolution that we shall follow in this book." (pp. 10-11)
Church, Alonzo. 1956. Introduction to Mathematical Logic. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Third reprint 1996. See in particular the Historical notes: Chapter II. The propositional calculus (continued) § 29 pp.
155-166; Chapter IV. The pure functional calculus of First Order 49 pp. 288-294.
Cresswell, Max, Mares, Edwin, and Rini, Adriane, eds. 2016. Logical Modalities from Aristotle to Carnap: The Story of Necessity.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres.
Contents: List of Figures and Tables VII; List of Contributors IX, List of Abbreviations XIII; Max Cresswell, Edwin Mares, and Adriane Rini:
Introduction 1; 1Adriane Rini: Aristotle on the Necessity of the Consequence 11; 2 Marko Malink: Aristotle on One-Sided Possibility 29; 3 Robin Smith: Why Does
Aristotle Need a Modal Syllogistic? 50; 4 Vanessa de Harven: Necessity, Possibility, and Determinism in Stoic Thought 70; 5 Paul Thom: Necessity in Avicenna
and the Arabic Tradition 91; 6 Christopher J. Martin: Modality without the Prior Analytics: Early Twelfth Century Accounts of Modal Propositions 113;
7 Calvin G. Normore: Ockham and the Foundations of Modality in the Fourteenth Century 133; 8 Jack MacIntosh: Theological and Scientific Applications of the
Notion of Necessity in the Mediaeval and Early Modern Periods 154; 9 Peter R. Anstey: Locke and the Problem of Necessity in Early Modern Philosophy 174; 10
Brandon C. Look: Leibniz’s Theories of Necessity 194; 11 Jonathan Westphal: Leibniz and the Lucky Proof 218; 12 Nicholas F. Stang: Divine Necessity and Kant’s
Modal Categories 232; 13 Catherine Legg and Cheryl Misak: Charles Sanders Peirce on Necessity 256; 14 Edwin Mares: The Development of C. I. Lewis’s Philosophy
of Modal Logic 279; 15 Max Cresswell: Carnap’s Modal Predicate Logic 298; Bibliography 317; Index 339-348.
"Interest in the metaphysics and logic of possible worlds goes back at least as far as Aristotle, but few books address the history of
these important concepts. This volume offers new essays on the theories about the logical modalities (necessity and possibility) held by leading philosophers
from Aristotle in ancient Greece to Rudolf Carnap in the twentieth century. The story begins with an illuminating discussion of Aristotle’s views on the
connection between logic and metaphysics, continues through the Stoic and mediaeval (including Arabic) traditions, and then moves to the early modern period
with particular attention to Locke and Leibniz. The views of Kant, Peirce, C. I. Lewis and Carnap complete the volume. Many of the essays illuminate the
connection between the historical figures studied and recent or current work in the philosophy of modality. The result is a rich and wide-ranging picture of
the history of the logical modalities." (p. I)