John, Buridan. 1995. Johannes Buridanus Summulae de Praedicabilibus. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.
Introduction, critical edition and indexes by L.M. De Rijk.
"The present edition contains the second tract [of Buridan's Summulae], De praedicabilibus, which deals with the five
'predicables', introduced by the Neoplatonist commentator of Aristotle, Porphyry (c. 233-c. 304 A.D.) in his introductory book (Isagoge) to
the Stagirite's Categories, viz. 'genus', 'species', 'differentia', 'proprium', and 'accidens'. From as early as the eleventh century, medieval
authors commented upon Boethius' (480-524) translation of, and commentary upon, this work.
Buridan's discussion of the predicables is mainly based on the corresponding tract of Peter of Spain's manual. His comments are preceded by
the complete text of the lemma from Peter to be discussed. It should be no surprise that Buridan's quotations should go back to an adapted version of Peter's
Buridan's work consists of elementary exegesis as well as extensive objections and dubitationes in which specific questions are
dealt with, mostly in an original fashion." (pp. XVII and XXI)
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1995. "Teaching and inquiry in 13th and 14th century logic and metaphysics." In Vocabulary of
Teaching and Research between Middle Ages and Renaissance. Proceedings of the Colloquium London, Warburg Institute, 11-12 March 1994, edited by Weijers,
Olga, 83-95. Turnhout: Brepols.
!The Medievals have ably expanded the logico-semantic approach to Reality they inherited from the Ancients, especially in their so-called
'logica modernorum', which was thus baptised by the Medieval logicians themselves in contradistinction to Aristotelian-Boethian logic, the so-called ‘logica
Coming now to the proper subject of my contribution of this afternoon I shall conhne myself to three items which seem to be the most
appropriate to afford a quick understanding of how the deliberate and thoughtful use ot linguistic devices by the Medievals in their teaching and inquiry could
contribute to the development of philosophy. These items are:
 the far-reaching distinction made in the ‘logica modernorum’ between signification, supposition, and connotation
 Abelard’s solution to the famous problem of universals
 a particular case taken from Buridan’s commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, which may clarify the innovatory power of the
distinction between supposition and connotation and, by the same token, of logico-semantics as practised in medieval teaching and inquiry." (p. 85, a note
———. 1995. "Ockham as the Commentator of His Aristotle. His treatment of Posterior Analytics." In
Aristotelica et Lulliana: magistro doctissimo Charles H. Lohr septuagesimum annum feliciter agenti dedicata, edited by Domínguez Reboiras, Fernando,
Imbach, Ruedi, Pindl, Theodor and Walter, Peter, 77-127. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
1. Introduction; 2. Preliminary: Aristotle on demonstrative or epistemonic proof; 2.1 On the three requrements 'kata pantos', kath'
'hauto', 'kath' holou', 2.2 On the notion of necessity; 2.3 On the four types of questions. On 'Middle' and 'Definiens'; 2.3.1 Subject and attribute. The
Middle; 2.3.2. On definition and the four question-types; 2.3.3 The role of definitions in epistemonic proof; 2.3.4 Recipes for the discovery of definitions;
2.4 The 'kath' holou' requirement revisited; 2.5 Particulars and the proper objects of Aristotle's epistemonic proof; 3. Ockham as a Commentator of
Posterior Analytics; 3.1 Ockham's treatment of the four basic question-types; 3.2 Ockham's view of the 'kath' holou' requirement; 3.3 The
impact of Ockham's ontology upon his theory of demonstration; 3.3.1 Ockham's problem concerning the First Subject; 3.3.2 Ockham's introduction of 'Non-First
Subject'; 3.3.3 'Demonstratio particularis' in Ockham; 3.3.4 Ockham's view of necessity; 3.5 'Dici per se' and 'propositio per se
vera' in Ockham; 3.5.1 Two kinds of 'per se' assignment; 3.5.2 The 'propositio per se (vera)' in Ockham; 3.5.3 The strict and strictest
senses of 'per se'; 4. Conclusion.
"The present paper aims to clarify the attitude towards Aristotle adopted by one of the leading lights of fourteenth century
philosophical and theological thought, William of Ockham, by investigating (a) how in some of the vital subjects of Aristotelian doctrine, the Venerable
Inceptor understood and interpreted the Master, (b) how and why on specific occasions, he deliberately took the liberty to stray from Aristotle's teachings. It
goes without saying that in such an undertaking, one has to confine oneself to certain doctrinal themes the choice of which might seem quite arbitrary. The
present author has picked out the Aristotelian doctrine of demonstrative proof as interpreted by Ockham." (p. 78)
———. 1995. "Ockham's horror of the Universal. An assessment of his view of individuality." Mediaevalia.Textos e Estudos
Quodlibetaria: miscellanea studiorum in honorem prof. J. M. da Cruz Pontes anno iubilationis suae, Conimbrigae MCMXCV.
"The aim of this paper is to properly assess Ockham' s view of individual being, from the historical as well as from the doctrinal
point of view. Regarding the doctrinal assessment, the present author will not refrain from using a phantom sketch, which, admittedly, will prove more useful
to clarify what definitely was not Ockham' s doctrine than to identify the Venerable Inceptor' s real philosophical vis age.
So much for this paper's finis propinquus. Its finis remotus is of at least equal importance: to honour the author' s
fellow-septuagenarian, an exemplary medievalist whose merits go far beyond those regarding our common favourite author, his renowned compatriot Petrus
Hispanus Portugalensis." (p. 473)
"Returning now to Ockham, we have to acknowledge that our phantom sketch reduces the philosopher Ockham to little more than his own
shadow. However, in trying to identify bis thought and philosophical
involvement by means of the phantom sketch, we may, in some sense, hit the mark. He surely had the courage to rule out certain things from
rational thought because to his mind, they were not susceptible of conceptualization and rational penetration, while not brushing them aside as non-existent or
not worthwhile either.(29)
To some extent, Ockham fought a battle against, if not the arrogance of reason, most surely its inflated ego. His entia non sunt
multiplicanda sine necessitate was a logical too!, or better still a disputational rule, and did not aim to narrow the horizon of what is."
(29) For Ockham's attitude to metaphysics see De RijK 1987.
De Rijk, L. M. "War Ockham ein Antimetaphysiker? Eine semantische Betrachtung" in Philosophie im Mittelalter.
Entwicklungs!inien und Paradigmen. Wolfgang K1uxen zum 65. Geburtstag, hrsg. von
J.P. Beckmann, L. Honnefelder und G. Wieland. Hamburg 1987, 313-328 [reprinted in de Rijk 1989].
De Rijk, L. M. Through Language to Reality. Studies in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics, edited by E.P. Bos. Collected Studies
Series, 302. Variorum Reprints. Northampton 1989.
———. 1996. "The key role of the Latin language in medieval philosophical thought." In Media Latinitas: A Collection of Essays
to Mark the Occasion of the Tetirement of L. J. Engels, edited by Nip, R.I.A., 129-145. Turnhout: Brepols.
"Everyone embarking on the theme 'Medieval Latin and Philosophy' should realise that this theme involves more than just a juxtaposition
of two separate items which are quite interesting in themselves. On the contrary, Medieval Latin and philosophy had a great mutual impact and thus were most
closely related. To put it differently, in Medieval philosophical teaching and inquiry linguistic analysis was considered by the Medievals themselves really
Like the Ancients, the Medieval thinkers firmly believed that, ultimately, the outside world is not-chaotic. In their view it has a
'logical' or intelligible structure, which, as such, is accessible to the human mind, insofar as the latter has the same 'logical' structure'. In other words,
in the view of the Medievals there is an isomorphic relationship between the realms of thought and of being. (**)
The Medievals have largely expanded the logico-semantical approach they had inherited from the Ancients, especially in their so-called
'logica modernorum', which has its root in the logico-grammatical discussions found as early as in the eleventh century.
Coming now to the proper subject of my contribution I should like to discuss three extremely important themes that featured in Medieval
philosophy, viz.  the 'Object-Thought' issue,  the problem of the Universals, and  the metaphysics of 'Accidental Being'. Our discussion will focus on
the linguistic aspects of the solutions to each one of these problems. Three things in particular will be considered: [a] the semantical development of a
terminology which was already common usage (e.g. 'idea', 'ratio'), [b] the introduction of new philosophical tools (e.g. 'suppositio', 'appellatio',
'connotatio'), and [c] the role of (artificial) word-order. I shall argue that for the Medievals, the Latin language was not only the vehicle of philosophical
thought, but also an inspiring source of pioneering philosophical insight." (pp. 129-130)
(*) For a broader discussion see L.M. de Rijk, 'Teaching and Inquiry in 13th-14th Century Logic and Metaphysics'
(**) In this connection the word 'logical' should be associated with the Greek 'logos', rather than the discipline of logic.
———. 1996. "On Aristotle's semantics in De Interpretatione 1-4." In Polyhistor: Studies in the History and
Hhistoriography of Ancient Philosophy Presented to Jaap Mansfeld on His Sixtieth Birthday, edited by Algra, Keimpe, Van der Horst, Pieter and Runia,
David, 115-134. Leiden: Brill.
"By and large, in De interpretatione Aristotle is concerned with our capability to speak about all that presents itself to our
mind. From chapter 4 onwards, he deals with the statement-making expressions (affirmation and negation), which are the main tools for conveying our thoughts
about things. This discussion is prepared (chapters 1-3) by some important observations concerning the basic elements of such expressions, viz. onoma
and rhema. The present contribution contains some comments on Aristotle's view of the proper nature of statement-making as put forward in De
interpretatione. First, I would like to highlight Aristotle's, what Sir David Ross has called 'frankly 'representative' view of knowledge' by discussing
the terms omoioma and pragma. Next, I will discuss what is meant by a term's 'time-connotation', and finally I will examine the semantics of
onoma, rhema and logos." (p. 115)
———. 1996. "Burley's so-called Tractatus primus, with an edition of the additional Quaestio 'Utrum contradictio sit maxima
oppositio'." Vivarium no. 34:161-191.
"The extensive list of works by Walter Burley contains a collection of some eagerly disputed questions concerning natural philosophy,
which in most of the manuscript catalogues goes under the blank title Tractatus primus. (...)
In the shorter version of his Expositio super librum Sex principiorum, written after he had left Paris in 1327, he deals with the
position concerning the specific sameness of whiteness and blackness he had argued for ín the fourth quaestio, and refers to his 'primus tractatus
de formis accidcntalibus"
This reference seems to imply that the title 'De formis accidentalibus' covers both the Tractatus primus and the
Tractatus secundus, which was afterwards called 'De intensione et remission formarum.' I think it would be better to call the first treatise
'De formis accidentalibus, pars prima,' with the subtitle 'De quattuor conclusionibus circa formas accidentales'. The second treatise, then,
which contains a discussion of a closely related subject matter, should go under the title 'De formis accidentalibus, pars secunda,' with the subtitle
'De causa intrinseca susceptionis magis et minus'. Later on, its current tide became De intensione et remissione formarum." (pp.
Giraldus, Odonis. 1997. Giraldus Odonis O.F.M. Opera philosophica. Vol I. Logica. Leiden: Brill.
Edited by L. M. de Rijk.
Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Introduction 1; List of manuscripts 63; Bibliography 65; TEXT 69; Argumentum 71; Liber Primus: De sillogismis
85; Annexum I: De natura oppositionis contradictorie 186; Liber secundus: De suppositionibus 231; Annexum II: De tribus dubiis 293; Liber tertius: De
principiis scientiarum 325; Annexum III: De primo subiecto in logica 467; Index locorum 493; Index nominum 498; Index verborum et rerum notabilium 500-543.
From the Introduction: "It may be useful to say something about the general nature of Girald's Logica, Libri I-III, which now
appear in print for the first time as a whole. Generally speaking, the work is well-composed and written in a lucid style. The Addenda even contain
rather passionate passages, when Girald is rejecting opponent views, especially in those cases where Walter Burley is (anonymously) under attack. The
characteristic given by Brown (1) of De suppositionibus seems to be well to the point for the entire Logica: Girald's treatise is structured
in his own individual way, but all with its personal stamp, especially emerging in De suppositionibus." (p. 25)
"As we have remarked before, Girald's tract on "the two most common and well-founded principles of knowledge" is the most
original part of his Logica. To assess its place in Girald's thought requires an investigation into the proper nature of the two principles
and what the Medieval commentators used to call the 'conditions' ('specific properties') of these principles, as well as what to Girald's mind plays the key
role in such an inquiry, the proper subject of logic. I shall deal with these themes here briefly; they will be extensively discussed in our
Introduction to the edition of Girald's metaphysical works." (p. 37)
(1) Stephen F. Brown "Gerard Odon's De suppositionibus" in: Franciscan Studies 35 (1975), 5-44 cfr. p. 10.
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1997. "Le "Guide de l'étudiant" et les exigences particulières de la preuve demonstrative
selon Aristote." In L'enseignement de la philosophie au XIII siècle. Autour du 'Guide de l'étudiant' du ms. Ripoll 109., edited by Lafleur,
Claude and Carrier, Joanne, 353-366. Turnhout: Brepols.
"Les Seconds Analytiques, qui constituent sans doute la pièce maîtresse de l'oeuvre logique d'Aristote et dont l'importance
philosophique surpasse de beaucoup le domaine de la logique proprement dite, étaient considérés dès le Moyen Âge comme un texte extrêmement difficile. On y
traite de la théorie de la démonstration poursuivant la connaissance certaine, stable et nécessaire, fondée sur des prémisses elles-mêmes nécessaires.
Après quelques remarques générales sur la nécessité de connaissances préexistantes', sur la nature de la science et de la démonstration,
suivies par une énumération des opinions erronées à ce propos, le Stagirite aborde la question des conditions requises pour construire des prémisses
nécessaires, qui s'appellent condiciones principiorum dans le vocabulaire médiéval." (p. 353)
———. 1997. "Guiral Ott (Giraldus Odonis) O.F.M. (1273-1349): his view of statemental Being in his commentary on the Sentences." In
Vestigia, Imagines, Verba. Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (XIIIth-XIVth Century), edited by Marmo, Costantino, 355-369. Turnhout:
Acts of the 11th Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, San Marino, 24-28 May 1994.
"The fourteenth-century Franciscan master Giraldus Odonis (Guiral Ot) who at the time he was Patriarch of Antiochia died of the plague
in 1349, in Catania, Sicily, is mainly known as the unfortunate successor of the deposed Michael of Cesena as Master General of his Order and a faithful
adherent of Pope John XXII in the debate on the beatific vision" p. 355
It is the intention of the present contribution to discuss the author's second question [in his commentary on the Sentences] which
deals with esse tertio adiacens, or what is nowadays mostly called 'copulative being', but I would prefere to label it 'statemental being' ". (p.
"7. Conclusion. To Odonis' mind, statemental being is a kind of being sui generis, so to speak, which, no doubt, is something
more than a kind of being that entirely owes its existence to the soul's activity. Rather Odonois' statemental being should be regarded as the metaphysical
indivision (in as far as, on the statemental level, affirmative sentences are concerned), or division (in the case of negative sentences) which exist in the
realm of the natura communis. Thus, statemental being is the basic precondition for the existence of both real being and conceptual being, to the
extent that within the domain of the natures communis it specifically concerns the ontological (whether essential or incidental) relationships of
indivision and division that exist between the common natures. When defending against his numerous opponents the real character of statemental being, Odonis
has the metaphysical reality of the realm of the common natures in mind, rather than the reality of the actual world. To put it briefly, like his doctrine of
the nature of the universal, Odonis' view of statemental being clearly betrays a Platonic flavour, which makes him join the camp of the extreme realists."
———. 1997. "Gerardus Odonis O.F.M. on the principle of non-contradiction and the proper nature of demonstration." Franciscan
Studies no. 54:51-67.
"One of the most original works by the Franciscan Master Gerardus Odonis (Guiralt Ot) is the third part of his Logica, De
principiis scientiarum. This treatise is not just a commentary on Aristotle's Posterior Analytics, nor is it a specialized treatment of its
subject matter, which is demonstrative (or rather epistemonic) knowledge, as is found in Ockham's Sum of Logic. Rather, Odonis took his treatise to be
a supplement to the Aristotelian work, where the demonstrative principles proper to the different 'sciences' (principia propria) as well as those they
all have in common (principia communia) are extensively discussed by Aristotle, but less attention is paid to the most common principles of the
intellect (principia communissima intellectus), such as the twofold principle of noncontradiction. What Odonis means to do, then, is to discuss the
well-known seven requirements concerning the proper and the common principles insofar as they apply to the principle of non contradiction (henceforth
Accordingly, the author has divided his treatise into ten chapters, the first of which deals with the subject matter of PNC and its
constituents or terms. This chapter presents first ten basic assumptions (suppositiones), next twelve theses (conclusiones) together with the
discussion of a number of notable statements (notabilia) and corollaries, and finally the refutation of objections (dubia).
In the present paper the conclusiones 6-11 concerning the nature of being as involved in PNC will be
discussed." (pp. 51-53, notes omitted).
———. 1997. "Foi chrétienne et savoir humain. La lutte de Buridan contre les theologizantes." In Langages et
philosophie. Hommage à Jean Jolivet, edited by Libera, Alain de, Elamrani-Jamal, Abdelali and Galonnier, Alain, 393-409. Paris: Vrin.
"Introduction. Pendant tout le Moyen Age, comme durant la période patristique, les penseurs chrétiens se sont beaucoup intéressés aux
rapports entre la raison et la foi. On sait que le principal thème de recherche et de discussion, en ce domaine, était l'harmonisation de la foi et de la
raison, ce qui revenait au début à faire une apologie du le caractère rationnel de la foi, mais ce qui, chez des géants comme Anselme ou Abélard, a conduit à
une élaboration de la théologie grâce à l'emploi de ce que notre collègue, Jean Jolivet, dans son étude de pionnier sur la théologie d'Abélard, a si
heureusement appelé les « arts du langage (1) ». D'autre part, les penseurs médiévaux ont toujours reconnu l'importance du « dépôt de la foi » en tant que
collection des vérités garanties, si bien que l'on prenait ces vérités pour des renseignements supplémentaires sur les phénomènes terrestres. Le simple «
Soleil, arrête-toi » de Josué (Livre de Josué 10, 12) a suffi pour maintenir le système géocentrique.
A partir de la deuxième moitié du XIIIe siècle, c'est surtout la toutepuissance divine et la contingence radicale de tout le créé qui
conduisent certains penseurs à regarder le monde d'un point de vue tout différent. La nouvelle attitude a dû stimuler, d'une manière générale, l'intérêt des
philosophes pour les implications épistémologiques de la toute-puissance divine, en particulier pour celles qui concernent les limites de la connaissance
Jean Buridan (né en Picardie, peut-être à Béthune, vers l'an 1300, mort vers 1361) a bien fait face à ces problèmes épistémologiques. En
rendant à César ce qui est à César, et à Dieu ce qui est à Dieu, il a pu déterminer sa propre attitude devant la foi et la théologie. Le philosophe picard a
trouvé les theologizantes sur sa route. La lutte de Buridan contre leur point de vue n'était qu'un corollaire de ses idées optimistes (et bien
fondées) sur les possibilités et la validité du savoir humain." (p. 393)
(1) J. Jolivet, Arts du langage et théologie chez Abélard, Paris, Vrin (Études de philosophie médiévale, LVII), 1969.
———. 1997. "The Commentaries on Aristotle's Metaphysics." In L'enseignement des disciplines à la Faculté des Arts
(Paris et Oxford, XIIIe-XVe siècles). Actes du Colloque International, edited by Weijers, Olga and Holz, Louis, 303-312. Turnhout: Brepols.
"Considering the rich survey Professor Lohr has presented this afternoon of Medieval commentaries on Aristotle's philosophical works
including Metaphysics, there is no point in discussing in general terms the vicissitudes of this Aristotelian work at the Parisian Faculty of Arts. On
top of that, in the lettre d'invitation of the organizers we were asked to say something about our own recent research in the field under discussion.
Therefore I shall confine myself to John Buridan's (c. 1290-c. 1360) commentaries on Metaphysics. Fortunately, Buridan's activity as a commentator on
Metaphysics may to a large degree be regarded as representative of the period. As we learn from Lohr's survey, from the fourteenth century only some
five commentaries on this important Aristotelian writing are extant, quite unlike the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, from which a considerable amount of
such works have survived. (*)" (p. 303)
(*) For the reception of the Metaphysics into the curriculum of the Parisian Faculty of Arts see A. L. Gabriel, Metaphysics in
the Curriculum of Studies of the Mediaeval Universities. in P. Wilpert ed., Die Melaphysik im Mittelalter. lhr Ursprung and Ihre Bedeutung
(Miscellanea Mediuevalia 2) Berlin, 1963, pp. 92-102 ; G. Leff, Paris and Oxford Universities in the XIIIth and XIVth Centuries, New York, 1988, p.
Johannes, Venator. 1999. Johannes Venator Anglicus. Logica. Stuttgart, Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog.
First critical edition from the manuscripts edited by L. M. de Rijk.
Vol. I: Tractatus I-II, Vol. II: Tractatus III-IV. Grammatica speculativa.
"Properly speaking, nothing is known about our author's life with all due certainty. In recent times, he is commonly
identified with the English logician John Hunt(e)man listed by Emden, who was from York diocese and a master in Oxford still in the 1390's, when Paul of Venice
stayed there. He is reported as a fellow of Oriel College as early as in 1373 and still being there in January 1383. He was Robert Rygge's Junior Proctor of
Oxford University in 1382-3, and, like Rygge, he was delated in 1382 for sympathising with the heretic views held by John Wyclif. In 1390, he was Chancelor of
Lincoln, and on June 14, 1414, he was appointed Vicar General of the Bishop of Durham. These dates of the John Huntman are all well compatible with his
identification with the author Johannes Venator. It is interesting in this connection that the Vatican manuscript does ascribe the Logica to an
English author ("Johannes Venator doctor anglicus"). Unfortunately, there is no other positive evidence so far for this plausible
identification." (p. 7)
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 2000. "Logica Morelli. Some notes on the semantics of a Fifteenth century Spanish logic." In
Medieval and Renaissance Logic in Spain. Acts of the 12th European Symposium on medieval logic and semantics, held at the University of Navarre (Pamplona,
26-30 May 1997), edited by Angelelli, Ignacio and Pérez-Ilzarbe, Paloma, 209-224. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag.
"The present paper, which is presented as a modest contribution to the general theme of our Symposium on the History of Spanish Logic,
intends to highlight some interesting topics discussed in a fifteenth century introductory Sum of Logic which is extant in (at least) two Spanish
When visiting Spanish libraries in the Autumn of 1971 I came across a copy of a Sum of Logic in the Biblioteca Capitular Colombina
at Sevilla (cod. 7-3-13). This work attracted my attention because of its clear design and lucid execution. Another copy of this work turned up in the
Biblioteca del Cabildo Metropolitano at Zaragoza (cod. 15-57), under the name "Logica Morelli", and was dated 1476.
The work consists of five parts:
(1) the logic of terms, including the well-known properties of terms, supposition, ampliation, and appellation.
(2) the logic of propositions, including their various "probationes" (in the wake of Richard Billingham, Speculum, and
the widespread adaptations of this work)
(3) the theory of argumentation
(4) the doctine of the predicables and the categories
(5) the doctrine of the so-called "obligations".
This treatise seems to nicely testify to fifteenth-century logical education in Spain. We owe a survey of the contents of this work together
with a description of the two manuscripts to our colleague Joke Spruyt." (pp. 209-210)
[A printed edition of the work is now available: Logica Morelli - Edited from the manuscripts with an introduction, notes and
indices by Joke Spruyt - Turnhout, Brepols, 2003]
John, Buridan. 2001. Summulae VIII: De demonstrationibus. Groningen: Ingenium Publishers.
"ll.3 Treatise VIII. De demonstrationibus: on its general structure and contents
The present edition contains the eighth tract, De demonstrationibus, by far the greater part of which deals with demonstrative
argument, and for the sake of this prefaces it with a discussion of the standard lore concerning division and definition.
II.3.1 The general structure of De demonstrationibus
The main division of the work clearly appears from the opening lines (1.1 in the present edition), in which Buridan proposes to
deal with demonstration, but thinks it indispensable to discuss first the doctrine of division and definition which lies at the bottom of that concerning
demonstrative argument, despite the fact that 'auctor noster' did not pay any attention to this important part of logic ('pars logicae magis
nobilis et final is').
The author next remarks that the present tract is the eighth one according to what was said in the general introduction to the whole work
('secundum dicta a principio'). It strikes the reader firstly that our author does not say 'octavus et ultimus tractatus', and, for that matter, in doing so,
is quite in line with what he had outlined before in his general division of his Summulae (section 1.1.1 of the planned edition), notwithstanding the
fact that in all the extant manuscript versions of the work the author lets us know that in the present 'lectura' he does not intend to read on the ninth and
conclusive treatise on sophisms. The other noticeable thing is that in this passage, each treatise is announced with the phrase 'it will be about' ('erit de')
the respective subject matter, with the exception of the present treatise on demonstration, of which it is said that it 'will be added' ('octavus apponetur'):
Summulae I, De introductionibus, I. I. I
Our treatise quite understandably consists of three main parts ('tres materiae principales'), one about division, one about definition, the
third about the proper subject matter, demonstration. There are good reasons for assuming that in an earlier version, the two parts on division and definition
were not yet integral parts of the eighth treatise. As a matter of fact, unlike all other manuscripts, our two most reliable
manuscripts, E and T start a fresh numeration for the ten chapters of the 'tertia materia de demonstrationibus', whereas
the others continue the initial numbering of the preceding parts on division and definition, counting the ten chapters on demonstration as 'capitulum quartum,
quintum, sextum', and so on.
Thus, in its final version, the work is divided into twelve chapters, so that the two first parts ('materiae) in fact are the two first
chapters of the work. Each chapter is divided into 'partes' and the latter are subdivided into 'clausulae' in the usual way. (Introduction, pp. XXI-XXII)
Nicolas, d'Autrecourt. 2001. Correspondance, articles condamnés. Paris: Vrin.
Texte latin établi par L. M. de Rijk; introduction, traduction et notes par Christophe Grellard.
French translation of: Nicholas of Autrecourt. His correspondence with Master Giles and Bernard of Arezzo.
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 2002. Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology. Volume I: General introduction. The Works on Logic. Leiden:
"In this book I intend to show that the ascription of many shortcomings or obscurities to Aristotle resulted from persistent
misinterpretation of key notions in his work. The idea underlying this study is that commentators have wrongfully attributed anachronistic perceptions of
'predication', and statement-making in general to Aristotle. In Volume I, what I consider to be the genuine semantics underlying Aristotle's expositions of his
philosophy are culled from the Organon. Determining what the basic components of Aristotle's semantics are is extremely important for our
understanding of his view of the task of logic -- his strategy of argument in particular.
In chapter 1, after some preliminary considerations I argue that when analyzed at deep structure level, Aristotelian statement-making does
not allow for the dyadic 'S is P' formula. An examination of the basic function of `be' and its cognates in Aristotle's philosophical investigations shows that
in his analysis statement-making is copula-less. Following traditional linguistics I take the 'existential' or hyparctic use of `be' to be the central one in
Greek (pace Kahn), on the understanding that in Aristotle hyparxis is found not only in the stronger form of 'actual occurrence' but also in
a weaker form of what I term 'connotative (or intensional) be' (1.3-1.6). Since Aristotle's 'semantic behaviour', in spite of his skilful manipulation of the
diverse semantic levels of expressions, is in fact not explicitly organized in a well-thought-out system of formal semantics, I have, in order to fill this
void, formulated some semantic rules of thumb (1.7).
In chapter 2 I provide ample evidence for my exegesis of Aristotle's statement-making, in which the opposition between 'assertible' and
`assertion' is predominant and in which 'is' functions as an assertoric operator rather than as a copula (2.1-2.2). Next, I demonstrate that Aristotle's
doctrine of the categories fits in well with his view of copula-less statement-making, arguing that the ten categories are 'appellations' ('nominations')
rather than sentence predicates featuring in an 'S is P' formation (2.3-2.4). Finally, categorization is assessed in the wider context of Aristotle's general
strategy of argument (2.5-2.7).
In the remaining chapters of the first volume (3-6) I present more evidence for my previous findings concerning Aristotle's 'semantic
behaviour' by enquiring into the role of his semantic views as we find them in the several tracts of the Organon, in particular the Categories De
interpretatione and Posterior Analytics. These tracts are dealt with in extenso, in order to avoid the temptation to quote selectively
to suit my purposes." (Preface, PP. XV-XVI)
———. 2002. Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology. Volume II: The Metaphysics, Semantics in Aristotle's Strategy of Argument. Leiden:
"The lion's part of volume two (chapters 7-11) is taken up by a discussion of the introductory books of the Metaphysics (A-E)
and a thorough analysis of its central books (Z-H-O). I emphasize the significance of Aristotle's semantic views for his metaphysical investigations,
particularly for his search for the true ousia. By focusing on Aristotle's semantic strategy I hope to offer a clearer and more coherent view
of his philosophical position, in particular in those passages which are often deemed obscure or downright ambiguous.
In chapter 12 1 show that a keen awareness of Aristotle's semantic modus operandi is not merely useful for the interpretation of his
metaphysics, but is equally helpful in gaining a clearer insight into many other areas of the Stagirite's sublunar ontology (such as his teaching about Time
and Prime matter in Physics).
In the Epilogue (chapter 13), the balance is drawn up. The unity of Aristotelian thought is argued for and the basic semantic tools of
localization and categorization are pinpointed as the backbone of Aristotle's strategy of philosophic argument.
My working method is to expound Aristotle's semantic views by presenting a running commentary on the main lines found in the
Organon with the aid of quotation and paraphrase. My findings are first tested (mainly in Volume II) by looking at the way these views are applied in
Aristotle's presentation of his ontology of the sublunar world as set out in the Metaphysics, particularly in the central books (ZHO). As for the
remaining works, I have dealt with them in a rather selective manner, only to illustrate that they display a similar way of philosophizing and a similar
strategy of argument. In the second volume, too, the exposition is in the form of quotation and paraphrase modelled of Aristotle's own comprehensive manner of
treating doctrinally related subjects: he seldom discussed isolated problems in the way modern philosophers in their academic papers, like to deal with special
issues tailored to their own contemporary philosophic interest." From the Preface to the first volume, pp. XVI-XVII)
———. 2002. "Il Medioevo: periodo tipicamente medievale?" In Medioevo in discussione. Temi, problemi e interpretazioni del
pensiero medievale, edited by Brigaglia, Gianluca. Milano: Unicopli.
———. 2003. "Boethius on De interpretatione (ch. 3): is he a reliable guide?" In Boèce ou la chaîne des savoirs. Actes
du Colloque International de la fondation Singer Polignac (Paris, 8-12 juin 1999), edited by Galonnier, Alain, 207-227. Paris: Peeters Publishers.
"There can be no doubt whatsoever about Boethius's exceptional merits for transmitting Aristotle's logic to us. But while
'Aristotelian' logic is in many respects synonymous with 'Aristotelico-Boethian' logic, the question can be raised whether Aristotle himself was an
'Aristotelian'. To give just one example: from Lukasiewicz onwards there has been much debate among scholars about the telling differences between traditional
syllogistic and that of the Prior Analytics. (1)
In this paper I intend to deal with two specimens of Boethius's way of commenting upon Aristotle's text. They are found in his discussion of
De interpretatione, chapters 2 and 3, which present Aristotle's views of ónoma and rhema. (2) One concerns the semantics of
indefinite names, the other that of isolated names and verbs." (p. 207)
Returning now to Boethius' manner of commenting upon Aristotle's texts, the following points can be made:
 In the wake of Ammonius, (3) Boethius explains [De int.] 16b22-25 on the apophantic level, i.e. in terms of statement-making,
instead of framing significative concepts, i.e. on the onomastic level.
 Whereas in Ammonius' report of the predecessors, Alexander and Porphyry, as well as his own exposition of the issue, there are many
clues to the previous alternative reading and interpretation on the onomastic level, Boethius does not even refrain from cleansing the text (including his
'quotations'), by changing, at any occurrence, 'ens' into 'est'.
 In doing so, Boethius decisively influenced the commentary tradition on account of the purport of De int. 3, 16b19-25. He
effectively contributed to the common verdict on this paragraph in terms of 'a curious medley'.
 As far as the semantics of the indefinite verb (3, 16b14-15) is concerned, Boethius' apparently adhering to the so-called 'Ammonii
recensio' was far less desastrous for the common understanding of Aristotle on this score, and, in effect, merely provided us with some stimulating Medieval
discussions of the semantics of term infinitation.
 Finally by way of speculative surmise, it might be suggested that both the fact that Boethius dealt with the 'Ammonii recognise' without
reading it in his lemma of 16b14-15, as well as his rather ruthlessly interfering in the quotations of the pre-Ammonian sources, should make it more plausible
that Boethius had extensive, but incomplete marginal notes to his Greek text of Aristotle at his disposal, rather than a full copy of Ammonius' commentary (or
those of other Greek commentators).
To comment upon Aristotle's work naturally includes developing his lore. But nothing can ever guarantee that this will happen ad metem
auctoris. (4)" (p. 227)
(1) Jan Lukasiewicz, Aristotle's Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic, Oxford, 1951. G. Patzig, Aristotle's
Theory of the Syllogism. A logico-philological study of Book A of the Prior Analytics, Dordrecht, 1969.
(2) Rhema properly stands for 'what is said of', including not only our 'verb' but also adjectives, when used in attributive
position. One should realise, however, that 'verb' refers to a word class, rather than a semantic or syntactical category, as rhema does.
(3) It is unmistakably plain that in De int. ch. 3, Boethius is strongly influenced by what he read in Ammonius (or in marginal
notes on Ammonius' view).
(4) Cf. the interesting paper on this subject by Frans A.J. de Haas, "Survival of the Fittest? Mutations of Aristotle's Method of
Inquiry in Late Antiquity" (forthcoming). [Conference: The Dynamics of Natural Philosophy in the Aristotelian Tradition (and beyond), Nijmegen,
16-20 August 1999.]
———. 2003. "The logic of indefinite names in Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, and Radulphus Brito." In Aristotle's Peri
hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages: Essays on the Commentary tradition, edited by Braakhuis, Henk A.G. and Kneepkens, Corneli Henri, 207-233. Groningen:
"Aristotle's doctrine of indefinite names (nouns) was handed down to the Middle Ages together with Boethius' comments and explanations.
Boethius' view of the matter has two characteristic features. For one thing, there is a certain ambiguity on his part concerning the precise semantic value of
such terms; for another, Boethius deviates considerably from Aristotle in that he explicitly assigns the property of 'holding indifferently of existents and
non-existents' not only to the indefinite rhéma (as it is found in Aristotle, De interpr. 3, 16b15) but to the indefinite name (onoma) as
Until the end of the 12th century the logic and grammar (1) of indefinite terms (nouns and verbs) was a much debated issue. Although
assiduously echoing the well-known auctoritates Medieval thinkers did not always go the whole way with their predecessors. For example, Abelard and
Scotus, starting from their own philosophical tenets, more or less inconspicuously corrected some dubious elements in Boethius' interpretation of Aristotle's
doctrine of the indefinite name. Peter Abelard, especially, took great pains to precisely define the meaning of indefinite terms. He focussed his attention on
the proper meaning of indefinite terms rather than on the question whether they are 'holding indifferently of existents and non-existens'. In contrast,
13th-century scholars like Duns Scotus and Radulphus Brito based their discussion of the proper meaning of the indefinite name upon the question 'Utrum
nomen infinitum aliquid ponat' ("Whether an infinite name posits something"), which calls to mind Boethius' claim that indefinite names 'hold
indifferently of existent and non-existents'.
Abelard's discussion of the proper meaning of the indefinite name is also interesting in that it helps us to gain a good understandiiip of
what Boethius had in mind in claiming that the indefinite name 'siginifes an infinite number of things' ('significat infinita'). For, thanks to
Äbelard's expositions, it becomes clear that the phrase 'significare infinita', which, on the face of it, may be taken as referring to the extensional
of the indefinite name, on closer inspection proves to concern its intension, because the controversy between Abelard and Boethius turns out to be about two
different views of the indefinite name's intension rather that about any opposition of intension as against extension." (pp. 207-208.)
(1) For the grammatical approaches to the problem of the indefinite term in the 12th century, see C.H. Kneepkens, "Orléans 266 and the
Sophismata Collection: Master Joscelin of Soissons and the infinite words in the early twelfth century", in St. Read (ed.) Sophisms in Medieval Logic
and Grammar. Acts of the Ninth European Symposium for Medieval Logic and Semantics, held at St Andrews, June 1990 (Nijhoff International Philosophy
Series, 48; Dordrectt/Boston/London 1993), 64-85.
———. 2003. "The Aristotelian background of medieval transcendentia: a semantic approach." In Die Logik des
Transzendentalen. Festchrift für Jan A. Aertsen zum 65. Geburstag, edited by Pickavé, Martin, 3-22. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
1. Aristotle's notion of 'connotative' or 'intensional be'; 2. The so-called 'termini transcendentes' in the Middle Ages; 2.1. How to bring
the general notions 'be' and 'one' into focus; 2.2. On the peculiar use of the label 'transcendens' in prioristic syllogistic; 3. On the use of 'transcendens'
to bring general, extra-categorial ontic notions in focus; 3.1. The commonness of the general ontic notions; 3.2. The epistemological aspect: the emergence of
the idea of conceptual primacy 3.3. On the contaminative shift to Platonic transcendence; 4. The (Aristotelian) semantic sense underlying 'transcendentia'
retained; 5. Concluding remarks."
"1. As I have argued for elsewhere, the Greek notion 'ES-' or 'be' as coming to the fore in its several grammatical appearances - the
infinitive einai, the articular participle to on, and the verbal noun ousia - not only refers to what is actually there ('exists') or
actually is the case, but can also represent a form of 'be' that does not, as such, include actual existence, and indeed indicates the general ontic condition
that underlies, and is in fact connoted by, any categorial designations. To Aristotle in particular, each and every noun includes what I have termed
'connotative' or 'intensional' be-ing. (...)" The semantic view that every nominal or verbal sememe by connotation contains the fundamental notion of
be-ing is at the basis of Aristotle's argument against Plato. To Plato, transcendent Being is the fullness of Forms (later called 'plenitude formarum'),
whereas particular forms existing in the outside world are merely as many shares of such-and-such be-ing in virtue of which the outside things share in the
transcendent Source of Beingness. In Aristotle, things are quite different: there is no being-ness other that what is found in particular beings. It is their
immanent forms which are constitutive of their (modes of) be-ing, rather than some putative transcendent Source (on the contrary, as it is worded later on:
'forma dat esse'). By itself, 'be' even is a categorially empty notion The fact that to Aristotle, 'be-ing' is a categorially empty notion by no means implies
that Aristotle should be unaware of the fundamental importance of the notion of be-ing when it comes to metaphysical investigation. It need not come as a
surprise that it is in his "Metaphysics" that the notion of 'be-ingness' (ousia) is the very nucleus of the metaphysical search for the quiddity of
things: this search concerns true 'ousia' or true 'being-ness'. All things considered, despite his obstinately arguing for the (categorial!) emptiness of the
notion 'be', Aristotle recognizes the basic sememe of 'be-ing' present in each and every categorial notion, and at the same time he is, to some extent, aware
that there are also some other general ontic notions, which are equally fundamental to metaphysics." (pp. 3-4)
Giraldus, Odonis. 2005. Giraldus Odonis O.F.M. Opera philosophica. Vol II. De intentionibus. Leiden: Brill.
Edited by L. M. de Rijk.
Contents: Acknowledgements XIII; L. M. de Rijk: Introduction 1; A study on the medieval intentionality debate up to ca. 1350 (pp.
Chapter I. Preliminary matters p. 19; Chapter II. The common doctrine of Cognition ca 1260 p. 41; Chapter III. The "epistemological
turn" around 1270 p. 79; Chapter IV. The intentionality issue before Faversham and Radulphus Brito p. 113; Chapter V. Simon Faversham on Second Intentions
p. 165; Chapter VI. Radulphus Brito on intentionality p. 191; Chapter VII. Hervaeus Natalis's Treatise De secundis intentionibus p. 251 Chapter VIII.
Giraldus Odonis's Treatise De intentionibus p. 303; Chapter IX. Conclusion p. 333; Bibliography p. 359; List of manuscripta referred to p. 373; Text
of De intentionibus p. 377-596;
Appendices p. 597; A. William of Ware (Guillelmus Guarro) p. 607; B. James of Metz (Jacobus Mettensis) p. 619; C. Hervé Nédellec (Hervaeus
Natalis) p. 625; D. Durand of St. Pourçain (Durandus de S. Porciano) p. 635; E. Raoul le Breton (Radulphus Brito) p. 643; F. Pierre d'Auriole (Petrus Aureolus)
p. 695; G. Franciscus de Prato p. 749; H. Stephan of Rieti (Stephanus de Reate) p. 777;
Indices p. 823; A. Indices locorum p. 825; B. Index nominum p. 839; C. Index verborum rerumque notabilium p. 845-894.
"The torso of Girald’s De intentionibus as we have it extant consists of three Partes: I: De intentione in communi,
in five articuli; II: Quid sit prima intentio et quid secunda, in an articulus unicus, and III: Quid sit intentio transcendens et quid
non-transcendens, which comprises (in our incomplete text) four questiones disputate, consisting of four, two, three, and one articulus, respectively.
"All things considered, the present work is markedly polemical, which particularly comes to the fore in the (at times venomous)
criticism of Hervaeus Natalis. It might be suggested, therefore, that the elaborated version too originated in the context of academic disputation,(22) which
is highlighted by the prologue of De intentionibus, in which the questiones disputatae on transcendent intentions are presented as the proper theme of
the treatise." (pp. 12-13)
(22) 22 See Weijers (2002), 25–51.
Weijers, O. (2002), La ‘disputatio’ dans les Facultés des arts au moyen âge. Studia Artistarum. Etudes sur la Faculté des arts dans les
Universités médiévales (sous la direction de Olga Weijers, La Haye & Louis Holtz, Paris). Brepols Turnhout.
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 2005. "Girald Odonis on the Real Status of Some Second Intentions." Documenti e Studi sulla
Tradizione Filosofica Medievale no. 16:515-551.
"The Franciscan Friar Giraldus Odonis (Guiral Ot) was a friend and protégé of Pope John XXII. After Michael of Cesena had been deposed
as Minister General of the Order and excommunicated at the Papal Court at Avignon in 1328, Odonis led the Order from 1329 until 1342, when he was appointed
patriarch of Antioch. He was quite a prolific author, but with the exception of his views on ethics and physics, his doctrinal positions were, and still are,
hardly known." (p. 515)
"However, there is at least one other branch of philosophy in which Girald’s unconventional views come to light, to wit the complex
domain of what was later on diversified into logic, metaphysics, and epistemology. Indeed, Girald’s views of the real (i.e. mind-independent) status of some
second intention's (intentiones secundae) are peculiar, and even the man himself considered them exceptional. In the present paper I intend to discuss
Girald’s view of the matter. To facilitate the evaluation of his remarkable stand on the general issue of the status of first and second intentions, which was
so eagerly debated in the first quarter of the 14th century, I will first try to globally assess the ins and outs of this issue within the framework of
contemporary scholastic philosophy." (pp. 515-516)
"The medieval issue of intentional being (esse intentionale) had three sources(4) : first, Aristotelian semantics, as found in
his De interpretatione (or Perihermeneias, as it was usually called in the Middle Ages) in particular; second, St. Augustine’s discussion (in
his Quaestio de Ideis) of the relationship between God and the exemplary Ideas; and third, the species debate in the context of Arabic optics. As for
the second and third sources, they were extremely effective in putting intention on the table as a truly inescapable (theological and cognitive, respectively)
problem(5)." (P. 516)
(4) See L. Μ. de Rijk, Giraldus Odonis O.F.M., Opera philosophica. Vol. 2 : De intentionibus. Critical Edition from the
Manuscripts, Brill, Leiden - Köln 2005, sect. 1.3.
(5) For the role of St. Augustine’s Quaestio de Ideis (= De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIH. 9· 46), see e.g. L. Μ. de Rijk,
Some Notes on an Important Chapter of Platonism, in Kephalaion. Studies offered to C. J. de Vogel, eds. J. Mansfeld - L. Μ. de Rijk,Van
Gorcum, Assen 1975, pp. 204-213. For the other source, the fundamental study : K. H. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics,
Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250-1345, Brill, Leiden -Köln 1988 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 22), is
———. 2006. "Giraldus Odonis, Godfrey Fontaines, and Peter Auriol on the Principle of Individuation." In "Ad Ingenii
Acuitionem". Studies in honour of Alfonso Maierù, edited by Caroti, Stefano, Imbach, Ruedi, Kaluza, Zénon, Stabile, Giorgio and Sturlese, Loris,
403-436. Louvain-la-Neuve: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales.
"Everyone interested in the history of philosophy knows that the problem of the universal has played a predominant role. Ockham may
indeed have tried to highlight the importance of this problem by nullifying its counterpart, the problem of individuation, to the great majority of Medieval
thinkers, however, the problem area surrounding the principle of individuation remained of serious interest. Against the background of the phenomenon of
universality as strictly required for obtaining genuine knowledge, they kept regarding the individuality issue as a source of philosophic and theological
perplexity which could not be underestimated with impunity. The purport of this paper is to evaluate Girald Odonis's treatment of the individuation issue (In
II Sent., dist. 6, q. 4, and, in addition, In III Sent., dist. 1, qq. 1-3) in the context of what others brought forward on the subject, particularly Godfrey
of Fontaines and Peter Auriol.
As Russel Friedman has rightly observed, from the beginnings of 14th century onwards, the Sentences commentary came into its own as
a preferred medium of scholastic theological and philosophical discourse, certainly rivaling in this respect, and often outshining, other vehicles of
theological expression (e. g. Quodlibetal questions, Summae, Biblical commentaries). The Franciscan Master, Giraldus Odonis (c. 1280-1349) was among
the numerous scholars who were beginning to use the Sentences commentary as a vehicle for mature thought about a gamut of controversial philosophic as
well as theological issues. Therefore the occurrence of this philosophically hotly debated item in his Sentences commentary cannot come as a
In the sixth Distinctio of the Second Book, Gerald comes (in the fourth question) to speak about the individuation problem, asking
what it is in virtue of which there is a multiplication of individuals within one species. He proposes to deal with this question by firstly summing up a
number of previous or current opinions, then to advance his own position, and thirdly to reply to the ins and outs, including the backgrounds of the rival
positions." (pp. 403-404, notes omitted).
Johannes, Buridanus. 2008. Lectura Erfordiensis in I-VI Metaphysicam, together with the 15th-century Abbreviatio caminensis.
Introduction, critical edition and indexes by L. M. de Rijk.
"John Buridan’s intensive activity as a commentator on Aristotle’s Metaphysics and his ongoing influence as a philosopher at
fourteenth and fifteenth century universities nicely come to the fore in two Eastern
European codices. One of them (Erfurt, Amplon. F 322) appears to contain part of an early (possibly the earlierst) version of his
Questions on Metaphysics, the other (nowadays Warsow, Narodowa ii 8057) presents
an abbreviation of these early questions, including also a later continuation of this Buridanian questions-commentary which strikingly
parallells the redaction of Buridan’s questions as found in the second part of the Erfurt manuscript. The aim of this edition is to make these interesting
texts available for the investigation of the academic activities concerning Aristotle’s Metaphysics during the period of ca. 1330 – ca. 1430."
(Prefece, P. VII)
"Buridan wrote many commentaries on Aristotle, including his Metaphysics.
Metaphysics was an important academic discipline in the Medieval Arts Faculty. Only advanced students who had completed their bachelor’s
training in grammar and logic and the basics of natural philosophy
had access to the programme of metaphysics. In Buridan’s days, metaphysica or first philosophy (prima philosophia) mainly involved
the speculative study of the physical world. However, in line with the Ancient
tradition, the notion of prima philosophia was closely connected to theologia in the sense of the philosophical study of
‘supernatural’ or ‘divine’ things. This connection continued to somewhat obscure its academic position, even though from the middle of the thirteenth century
onwards the focus of metaphysics unmistakably shifted from the study of questions on the nature of God and divine being to ontological questions in general
centered around the basic notions of ‘essence’ and the so-called termini transcendentes, ‘ens’, ‘verum’, ‘bonum’, ‘res’, ‘aliquid’.(6) The influence
of these ambiguous roots is still manifest in the later development of the discipline of metaphysics, not only in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries but
after the Middle Ages as well." (Introduction, pp. Xi-XII)
(6) Beckmann in Auty et al., 6, cols. 570–576. Zupko (2003), 140–141.
Beckmann, J.P., (1985), in R. Auty et al. (eds.), Lexikon des Mittelalters, vol. 6.
Zupko, Jack, (2003), John Buridan. Portrait of a Fourtheenth-Century Arts Master. University of Notre Dame Press. Notre Dame
Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 2011. Hervaeus Natalis. De quattuor materiis, sive Determinationes contra magistrum Henricum de Gandavo. Vol.
I. Turnhout: Brepols.
Plan of the work: Vol I: De formis (together with his De unitate formae substantialis in eodem suppositio); Vol. II:
De esse et essentia. De materia et forma; Vol. III: De intellectu et specie; Vol. IV: De voluntate et intellectu.
"Hervaeus’ extensive work going under the title De quattuor materiis has so far not drawn much attention of the scholarly
world. Its four parts contain the author’s critical study of a number of focal philosophical and theological issues discussed in Henry of Ghent’s
Their subject matter is a series of controversial themes, including the plurality of forms, the relationship between being and essence, the
role of the intelligible species, and the different roles of the intellect and the
will. All these themes were hotly debated during the end of the thirteenth and the ?rst decades of the fourteenth centuries. The De
quattuor materiis sive Determinationes contra magistrum Henricum de Gandavo are
illustrative of these ontological and epistemological debates around 1300." (Foreword, p. VII)
"Harvey’s critical study of a series of controversial issues as dealt with in Henry of Ghent’s Quodlibeta consists of four
main tracts to which two short ones are added, each one of which discusses just one single question cognate to the foregoing. The collection has the following
components and deals with controversial themes of the period, which were also examined in the author’s Commentary on the Sentences:
I De formis. This tract is devoted to the controversy about the plurality of forms. It deals with 13 questions selected by
Harvey from Henry’s Quodlibeta. First these questions are taken over from Henry’s text in an
abbreviated form, most of the time with some critical remarks about Henry’s verbosity or lack of clarity. Then follows Harvey’s refutation
of Henry’s positions and his arguments, which is prefaced by an exposition
of the doctrinal background upon which the diverse positions are based.
In this context, the ?rst three questions are dealt with by Harvey without explicitly articulating them. Finally the author proceeds to
discuss the remaining ten questions more explicitly, one after the other.
II De esse et essentia. In this tract the author deals with another vexed issue so divisive of the academic ranks of the period,
viz. the hotly debated controversy about the proper ontological relationships between
being and essence. Five questions preliminarily come up for discussion in a way similar to the one found in the previous tract. Then these
questions are extensively dealt with, likewise preceded by an exposition of
some fundamental viewpoints decisive for correctly evaluating the different positions on the matter at issue." (p. XXIV)
———. 2012. "Harvey Nedellec. Ire and Resentrnent in the Strategy of Argument. Harvey Nedellec in discussion with Henry of Ghent."
In Portraits de maîtres: offerts à Olga Weijers, edited by Angotti, Claire, Brînzei, Monica and Teeuwen, Mariken, 197-201. Porto: Fédération
Internationale des Instituts d'Études Médiévales.
"Every student of Medieval polemic literature is familiar with the rich armoury the disputants had at their disposai for settling upon
an efficacious strategy of argument.
Not only education, erudition and acumen, and the array of the entire coloration of one's ingenuity were part of the kit of the well-trained
scholar, but one's ability to attack the opponent in person was apparently regarded as an adequate polemical skill too.
Harvey Nedellec (Hervaeus Natalis, ca. 1250-1323) is no exception to the rule, as appears inter alia from his discussions with Henry of Ghent
( ca. 1220-1293) about some controversial matters of theology and philosophy that were dominating the scholarly scene from the last decades of the thirteenth
century up to about the l 320s and 1330s.
The issues under discussion were fondamental enough. First the cluster of problems concerning the plurality of substantial forms together
with the doctrinally kindred one about the ontological relationship between being and existence and the correlation of matter and form were in order. Besides,
the ins and outs of cognition (both sensitive and intellective) were hotly debated, with the intentionality issue as their focal subject matter. Finally, the
priority of the will to the intellect, including the role of the free will (liberum arbitrium) and related matters of contention continued to arouse scholarly
These four subject matters form the lion's share of Harvey's De quattuor materiis contra Henricum de Gandavo (1). Interestingly, it
is precisely in this collection of tracts that the practice of ire and resentment as strategic tools is exemplified. That is to say, in the short tract De
formis, our author does not refrain from profusely interspersing his arguments with nasty remarks (and sometimes he even seems unable to advance genuine
argumentative momentum). Things are conspicuously different in the other tracts of De quattuor materiis, as, what is more striking still, is likewise
the case in Harvey's more extensive treatise on the forms disputes, De unitate formae substantialis in eodem supposito." (p. 197)
(1) Edited for the first time by the present author in the reputable series Studia Artistarum directed by the person celebrating her
jubilee (together with Dr. Lorns Holtz).(...)
———. 2013. Hervaeus Natalis. De quattuor materiis, sive Determinationes contra magistrum Henricum de Gandavo. Vol. II. Turnhout:
De esse et essentia. De materia et forma. A Critical Edition by L. M. de Rijk from Selected Manuscripts."
"This second volume had been finished by the editor, L. M. de Rijk, just before his sudden death on July 30, 2012. The final version
has been read by Joke Spruyt and Olga Weijers.
The third and last volume of the edition of Hervaeus’ work, already well advanced by the editor, will be finished by two of his main
disciples: Henk Braakhuis and Onno Kneepkens. Thus we will have kept our promise, in respect and friendship for our master." (From the Preface by Olga
Weijers, p. IX)
This second volume presents a critical study of Hervaeus Natalis’s De quattuor materiis, and compares it with the rival systems of
the metaphysics of creation that were upheld by Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent.
This second volume of Hervaeus Natalis’s polemical work, De quattuor materiis contains his De esse et essentia. In this
work the author criticizes the rival systems of the metaphysics of creation that were upheld by Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent, and presents an exposition of
his own notion of being. To explain Harvey’s antagonistic attitude to Henry of Ghent and his simultaneous rejection of Giles’s positions (the rigid Aegidian
real distinction between essence and existence in particular) it was necessary to provide a thorough investigation of the ontological positions of both Henry
and Giles. Hence the lion’s part of the Introduction is devoted to these two rivals of Harvey’s.
The selection of the manuscripts used for the present edition of De esse et essentia as well as the ratio edendi,
orthography, punctuation and headings employed, are explained in the General Introduction to volume one, De formis." (Foreword, p. XI)
———. 2013. "Semantics and Ontology. An Assessment of Medieval Terminism." In Medieval Supposition Theory Revisited: Studies in
Memory of L. M. de Rijk, edited by Bos, Egbert Peter, 13-59. Leiden: Brill.
Abstract: "This paper aims to assess medieval terminism, particularly supposition theory, in the development of Aristotelian thought in
the Latin West. The focus is on what the present author considers the gist of Aristotle's strategy of argument, to wit conceptual focalization and
categorization. This argumentative strategy is more interesting as it can be compared to the modern tool known as 'scope distinction'."