History of Logic from Aristotle to Gödel by Raul Corazzon | e-mail: rc@ontology.co

Annotated bibliography on Aristotle's De Interpretatione (Peri Hermeneias)


For the studies on the Chapter 9 ("The Problem of Future Contingents") see: The Master Argument: The Sea Battle in De Intepretatione 9, Diodorus Cronus, Philo the Dialectician

  1. Arens, Hans, ed. 1984. Aristotle's Theory of Language and Its Tradition. Texts from 500 to 1750. Amsterdam: Benjamins.

    Selection, translation and commentary by Hans Arens.

    Contents: Preface 1; 1. The extraordinary fate of Peri hermeneias 6; 2. Aristotle's text (Peri hermeneias 16a1 - 17a7) 16; 3. Commentary to Aristotle 24; 4. Ammonius Hermeiu: Commentary to Aristotle's Peri hermeneias 58; 5. Commentary to Ammonius 124; 6. Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius: Commentaries to Aristotle's Peri hermeneias. Second edition. 159; 7. Commentary to Boethius 205; 8. Peter Abaelard: Glosses on Peri hermeneias 231; 9. Commentary to Abaelard 303; 10. Albertus Magnus: Perihermeneias. Paraphrase 339; 11. Commentary to Albert 376; 12. Thomas Aquinas: Exposition of Aristotle's Perihermeneias 397; 13. Commentary to Thomas 434; 14. Martinus de Dacia: Quaestions concerning Peri hermeneias 458; 15. Commentary to Martin 471; 16. Johannes a S.Thoma: Artis logicae prima pars 484; 17. Commentary to John of St.Thomas 507; 18. James Harris, an Aristotelian of the 18th century 514; References 523; Concordance 527; Index of Persons 530-532.

    "It is a very small particle of the philosophic and scientific cosmos that bears Aristotle's name, in fact, it is little more than one page of the whole corpus that I am going to consider, that one page out of 1500 where, in the frame of his logic, he formulates his general views on language. Yet, here, in the first four chapters of Peri hermeneias, he is not primarily interested in language, which is a natural - and therefore self-evident - instrument of expression and communication: he considers it only as the indispensable means of forming a proposition, which is part of a syllogism. The linguistic theory sketched here without any pretence to originality would not claim our serious attention and careful examination if those 48 Greek words in ch. 1 had not proved of such incredibly far-reaching influence in the development of linguistic thought. This influence was rendered possible by the steady tradition of the text, and this book is intended as its documentation. As far as I know there exist no modern translations of all the old commentaries I present, and so I hope to do some pioneer work in the field. As the list in ch. 1 shows, I offer only a selection: the works of eminent authors available in modern editions.

    Up to Martinus de Dacia the material consists of explanations of the Philosopher's words, and it is obvious that the same words must often lead to the same explanations, the more so as the explainers did not want to criticize him, but to prove him right. This attitude was bound to lead to many parallelisms between the different texts. I could not omit all those repetitions if I did not want to present mere fragments to the reader. Fortunately the writers are different personalities with different styles and ways of handling the matter so that the reader does not only get acquainted with the medieval ways of thinking and argumentation, but also with the different forms of that sort of literature: the commentary, the exposition, the glosses,the paraphrase, and the questions. At the same time he can follow the development of the scholastic method. And with all the burden of formalism, traditionalism, and dependence on authority which the authors carry along, they have ideas of their own - more or less, of course - and all these chapters add up to a book on linguistic logic or the logic of language, which makes an interesting section in the history of linguistics, being a museum of past views on language. And my serious advice is to wander through it and see what is there, so as to avoid presenting thoughts as new and progressive which are in fact very old - it is always a poor sight and a little ridiculous too.

    I had to content myself with presenting the Greek and Latin material in English and adding my comment where I thought it necessary or at least desirable. I am not giving a philosophical exegesis, but an interpretation from the linguistic point of view. The grammatica speculativa and the grammaire générale or universal grammar could not be included, though I end with the latter (James Harris). From Aristotle on, the translation is always more or less an interpretation, sometimes not really possible, because there is no exact equivalent, for instance, of onoma and rhema. And the interpretation is a hazardous enterprise because of the distance of time (1500 years between us and our first commentator) and the lack of an elaborate terminology, which manifests itself in the polysemy of the essential terms, especially in the Latin commentaries, for instance: forma, vox, intellectus, ratio. And, also from Aristotle on, one often cannot be sure that the text is correct or whether by an error of the author, of the scribe, of the editor or, lastly, of the printer, there is something wrong with it - sometimes the only thing one knows (or thinks one knows). For all these reasons, and because I am neither an expert medievalist nor a logician, I can, despite several revisions of my text, not guarantee that my translation is always correct." (From the Preface)

  2. Aubenque, Pierre. 1991. "Herméneutique Et Ontologie. Remarques Sur Le Peri Hermeneias D'Aristote." In Penser Avec Aristote, edited by Sinaceur, Mohammed Allal, 93-105. Toulouse: Éditions Érès.

    Reprinted in: P. Aubenque - Problèmes aristotéliciens. Philosophie théorique - Paris, Vrin 2009 pp. 101-116

  3. ———. 1992. "Das Verhältnis Von Hermeneutik Und Ontologie Am Beispiel Des 'Peri Hermeneias' Von Aristoteles." Perspektiven der Philosophie no. 18:27-46.

  4. Ax, Wolfram. 1979. "Zum Isolierten Rhéma in 'Aristoteles' De Interpretatione 16b19-25." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 61:271-279.

  5. ———. 2007. "Psophos, Phoné Und Dialektos Als Grundbegriffe Aristotelischer Sprachreflexion." Glotta no. 56:245-271.

  6. Barnes, Jonathan. 1991. "Ammonius and Adverbs." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy.Supplementary volume:145-163.

  7. ———. 1993. "Meaning, Saying and Thinking." In Dialektiker Und Stoiker. Zur Logik Der Stoa Und Ihrer Vorläufer, edited by Döring, Klaus and Ebert, Theodor, 47-62. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

  8. Belardi, Walter. 1975. Il Linguaggio Nella Filosofia Di Aristotele. Roma: Kappa Libreria Editrice.

  9. ———. 1981. "Riconsiderando La Seconda Frase Del De Interpretatione." Studi e Saggi Linguistici no. 21:79-83.

  10. Black, Deborah. 1992. "Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias in Medieval Latin and Arabic Philosophy: Logic and the Linguistic Arts." In Aristotle and His Medieval Interpreters, edited by Bosley, Richard and Tweedale, Martin, 25-83. Calgary: University of Calgary Press.

    Supplementary volume 17 to Canadian Journal of Philosophy.

    "This paper compares the views of a number of Arabic and thirteenth-century Latin commentators on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias on the status of logic as a linguistic art and its relation to grammar. The discussion considers the commentators' general positions on the logician's treatment of linguistic topics, and their attempts to reconcile the dual claim of logic to be both a linguistic and a rational art. These general principles are then traced through the treatment of a number of particular themes in the Peri Hermeneias's linguistic sections: The definition of the noun,the cases of the noun, and the indefinite or infinite noun (i.e., of the form non-X). The article concludes that, although there are basic differences between the Latin and Arabic traditions stemming from the presence in the Latin world of a philosophical theory of grammar, authors in both traditions are adamant that a balance must be maintained between the linguistic and rational characterizations of logic."

  11. Bluck, Richard. 1963. "On the Interpretation of Aristotle, De Interpretatione 12-13." Classical Quarterly no. 13:214-222.

  12. Bobzien, Susanne. 2007. "Aristotle's De Interpretatione 8 Is About Ambiguity." In Maieusis. Essays in Ancient Philosophy in Honour of Myles Burnyeat, edited by Scott, Dominic, 301-321. New York: Oxford University Press.

    "My goal in this paper is to shows that contrary to the prevalent view, in his De Interpretatione 8, Aristotle is concerned with homonymy; more precisely, with homonymy of linguistic expressions as it may occur in dialectical argument. The paper has two parts. In the first I part argue that in Soph. el. 175 b 39 - 176 a 5, Aristotle indubitably deals with homonymy in dialectical argument; that De Interpretatione 8 is a parallel to Soph. el. 175 b 39 - 176 a 5; that De Interpretatione 8 is concerned with dialectical argument; that, hence, De Interpretatione 8, too, deals with homonymy in dialectical argument. In the second part I discusse objections that have been put forward against the view that De Interpretatione 8 is about homonymy and shows that they do not succeed." p. 301

  13. Braakhuis, Henk Antonius, and Kneepkens, Corneille Henri, eds. 2003. Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages. Essays on the Commentary Tradition. Groningen: Ingenium Publishers.

    Table of Contents V; Preface VII; Introduction IX-XLI; Yukio wakuma: William of Champeaux and the Introductiones 1; Sten Ebbesen: Questions and Sophismata: tracking Peter of Auvergne 31; Alan Perreiah: Orality and literacy in the De interpretatione tradition 51; Robert Andrews: The Modistae and John Duns Scotus's Quaestiones super Perihermeneias 67; Claude Panaccio: Debates on mental language in the early Fourteenth century 85; Joël Biard: Le statut des énoncés dans les commentaires du Peri hermeneias de Gautier Burley 103; M. Kaufmann: The discussion on the nature of the concept in Ockham's Perihermeneias Commentary 119; Mieczyslaw H. Markowski: Der Kommentar des Peter Wysz von Polen zu De interpretatione des Aristoteles 135; Gino Roncaglia: Mesino de Codronchi's discussion on Syncategoremata and mental language in his Quaestiones on De interpretatione 149; Irène Rosier: Variations médiévales sur l'opposition entre signification "ad placitum" et signification naturelle 165; L. M. de Rijk: The logic of indefinite names in Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus and Radulphus Brito 207; Judith Dijs: Radulphus Brito's use of Intentio in Quaestio 9 of his In Peri hermeneias 235; Christian Strub: Propositio una / multiplex in Abelard: a note on the relationship of dialectic and grammar 257; Joke Spruyt, The semantics of complex expressions in John Duns Scotus, Peter Abelard and John Buridan 275; F. Beets: Theories of prediction from Boethius to Thomas Aquinas 305; Allan Bäck: Aquinas on predication 321; Andrea Tabarroni, The 10th Thesis in Logic condemned at Oxford in 1277 339; C. H. Kneepkens, Aristotle's transposition and the Twelfth-century commentaries on De interpretatione, 20b1-12: an exploratory study 363; Simo Knuuttila: Truth and falsity as modal notions: some medieval comments on De interpretatione, 12, 22a13 413; Elizabeth Karger: John Buridan's theory of the logical relations between general modal formulae 429; Indices 445; Index locorum 447; Index nominum 462; Index rerum 468; Manuscripts mentioned 483; Bibliography 485-509.

    "The majority of the twenty essays of the present volume were originally delivered at the Xth European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics held at Nijmegen, 22 - 26 June, 1992, that was devoted to the tradition of Aristotle's Peri hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages. Circumstances made it impossible to publish the proceedings immediately after the symposium. Since the editors were, nevertheless, aware that the material presented was extremely important for further studies on the history of medieval logic, semantics and philosophy of language, they decided, some time ago, to ask the contributors to update, revise or rewrite their essays in preparation for the publication of this collection. Although some authors have partially drawn on material found in this collection for publications elsewhere, most of the information contained in these essays remains new, including the many detailed descriptions and editions of unedited works that will constitute a greatly appreciated resource in the study of medieval philosophy." (From the Preface)

  14. Brunschwig, Jacques. 1969. "La Proposition Particulière Et Les Preuves De Non-Concluance Chez Aristote." Cahiers pour l'Analyse no. 10:3-26.

    Repris dans: Albert Menne, Niels Öffenberger (eds.) - Über den Folgerungsbegriff in der aristotelischen Logik - Hildesheim, Georg Olms, 1982, pp. 182-205.

    "Je me propose ici d' étudier une incidence particulière avec quelque détail: le problème que posent le sens et l'usage de la proposition particulière, notamment en rapport avec le rôle qu'elle joue dans les procédures par lesquelles est démontrée la non-concluance des couples de prémisses autres que ceux des modes syllogistiques valides. J'espère en effet montrer que les textes relatifs à ces questions manifestent une modification significative de l'attitude d'Aristote, et qu'ils permettent de saisir sur le vif le travail du logicien, d'abord victime des équivoques du langage naturel, prenant ensuite de ces équivoques une conscience progressive, sous la poussée interne des problèmes eux-mêmes, et parvenant enfin à les maîtriser. Au terme de cette évolution, la proposition particulière abandonne celles de ses connotations usuelles qui perturbent son maniement logique, et n'est plus définie que par sa place dans un système d'oppositions, avec toutes les conséquences que cela comporte."

  15. ———. 2008. "Le Chapitre 1 Du De Interpretatione. Aristote, Ammonius Et Nous." Laval Théologique et Philosophique no. 64:35-87.

    "As for this long paper itself, it would be difficult to summarize it: it is, or tries to be, exactly what it looks like, namely a detailed reading of Ammonius' commentary to the famous Chapter One of the De Interpretatione. If this reading has any dose of originality, it will be due not so much to the lights the ancient commentary may shed (or not shed) on the letter and the interpretation of the Aristotelician text as to what it may teach concerning the methods, selections, and intellectual behaviour of its author himself, as well as with regard to his own philosophical and pedagogical reactions before such a text as Aristotle's own."

  16. Cauquelin, Anne. 1990. Aristote: Le Langage. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

  17. Cavini, Walter. 1985. "La Negazione Di Frase Nella Logica Greca." In Studi Su Papiri Greci Di Logic E Medicina, edited by Cavini, Walter, Donnini-Macciò, Maria Cristina, Funghi, Maria Serena and Manetti, Daniela, 7-126. Firenze: Olschki.

  18. Celluprica, Vincenza. 1987. "Logica E Semantica Nella Teoria Aristotelica Della Predicazione." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 32:166-187.

  19. Charles, David. 1994. "Aristotle on Names and Their Signification." In Language, edited by Everson, Stephen, 37-73. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Revised and reprinted as Chapter 4: The signification of names - in: D. Charles - Aristotle on meaning and essence - New York, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 78-109.

  20. Chiesa, Curzio. 1986. "Symbole Et Signe Dans Le De Interpretatione." In Philosophie Du Langage Et Grammaire Dans L'antiquité, edited by Joly, Henri, 203-218. Bruxelles: Ousia.

    Actes du Colloque International sur philosophie du langage et thérories liguistiques dans l'Antiquité. Grenoble 3-6 septembre 1985.

  21. Crivelli, Paolo. 2004. Aristotle on Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Contents: Acknowledgments IX; Notes on the text X; List of abbreviations of titles of Aristotle's works XI; Introduction 1; Part I. Bearers of truth or falsehood 45; 1. States of affairs. thoughts. and sentences 45; 2. Truth conditions for predicative assertions 77; 3. Truth conditions for existential assertions 99; Part II. 'Empty' terms 129; 4. Truth as correspondence129; 5. 'Vacuous' terms and 'empty' terms 152; Par III. Truth and time 183; 6. Truth and change 183; 7. Truth and determinism in De Interpretatione 9 198; Appendix I. Metaph. Theta 10 1051b 1: the text 234; Appendix 2. Metaph. Theta 10 1051b 2-3: the text 238; Appendix 3. Int. 7, 17b 16-18: the text 239; Appendix 4. The two place relations in Aristotle's definition of truth 254; Appendix 5. Aristotle's theory of truth for predicative assertions: formal presentation 258; Appendix 6. The failure of Bivalence for future-tense assertions formal presentation 266; References 284; Index of names 313; Index of subjects 319; Index of passages 321.

  22. ———. 2009. "Aristotle on Signification and Truth." In A Companion to Aristotle, edited by Anagnostopoulos, Georgios, 81-100. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.

    "Aristotle discusses signification and truth in passages from several works, mainly the Categories, de Interpretatione, Sophistici Elenchi, de Anima, the Metaphysics, and the Poetics. Signification and truth are not the main topic of these works: their discussions of these subjects are asides. This study reconstructs some views on signification and truth to which Aristotle can be plausibly taken to be committed by his scattered remarks." p. 81

  23. Cuypere, Ludovic de, and Willems, Klaas. 2008. "Meaning and Reference in Aristotle's Concept of the Linguistic Sign." Foundations of Science no. 13:307-324.

    "To Aristotle, spoken words are symbols, not of objects in the world, but of our mental experiences related to these objects. Presently there are two major strands of interpretation of Aristotle's concept of the linguistic sign. First, there is the structuralist account offered by Coseriu (Geschichte der Sprachphilosophie. Von den Anfängen bis Rousseau, 2003 [1969], pp. 65-108) whose interpretation is reminiscent of the Saussurean sign concept.

    A second interpretation, offered by Lieb (in: Geckeler (Ed.) Logos Semantikos: Studia Linguistica in Honorem Eugenio Coseriu 1921-1981, 1981) and Weidemann (in: Schmitter (Ed.) Geschichte der Sprachtheorie 2. Sprachtheorien der abendländischen Antike, 1991), says that Aristotle's concept of the linguistic sign is similar to the one presented in Ogden and Richards's (The meaning of meaning: A study of the influence of language upon thought and of the science of symbolism, 1970 [1923]) semiotic triangle. This paper starts off with an introductory outline of the so-called phýsei-thései discussion which started during presocratic times and culminated in Plato's Cratylus. Aristotle's concept of the linguistic sign is to be regarded as a solution to the stalemate position reached in the Cratylus. Next, a discussion is offered of both Coseriu's and Lieb's analysis. We submit that Aristotle's concept of the linguistic sign shows features of both Saussure's and Ogden and Richards's sign concept but that it does not exclusively predict one of the two. We argue that Aristotle's concept of the linguistic sign is based on three different relations which together evince his teleological as well empiricist point of view: one internal (symbolic) relation and two external relations, i.e. a likeness relation and a relation katà synthéken."

  24. d'Avino, Rita. 1988. "Un Proemio Esemplare: Aristotele, Peri Hermeneias, 16a 1-16." Studi e Saggi Linguistici no. 28:127-146.

  25. Denooz, Joseph. 1996. "L'étendue Du Lexique Chez Aristote." In Aristotelica Secunda. Mélanges Offerts a Christian Rutten, edited by Motte, André and Denooz, Joseph, 81-90. Liège: Université de Liège. Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres.

  26. Di Cesare, Donatella. 1980. La Semantica Nella Filosofia Greca. Roma: Bulzoni.

  27. ———. 1981. "Die Semantik Bei Aristoteles." Sprachwissenschaft no. 6:1-30.

  28. Diebler, Stéphane. 2002. "Les Canons De Proclus: Problèmes Et Conséquences De L'interprétation Syriano-Proclienne Du De Interpretatione." Dionysius no. 20:71-94.

    "Ammonius' commentary on the third section of Aristotle's De interpretatione offers insight into the hermeneutical and logical debates of the 5th-cent. Neoplatonic school in Athens. These debates reveal one of the rare cases of a theory that was developed by Proclus in contradiction to that of his teacher Syrianus, and in the course of which the authoritative status of De interpretatione as a carefully composed, syntagmatic work was itself put into question. Ammonius was concerned to establish the coherence of Int. 19 B 19-20 B 12. According to his interpretation, this section falls into two further sections, arranged around two types of logical sequences : the first section (19 B 19-20 A 6) is explained according to an interpretation that derives from Syrianus ; the second (20 A 20-20 B 13) recalls the canons of Proclus."

  29. DuLac, Henri. 1949. "The 'Peri Hermenias'. Its Place in Logic and Its Order." Laval Théologique et Philosophique no. 5:161-169.

    "Aristotle and St. Thomas commonly divide logic according to the three operations of the human intellect, because logic is the art which directs man in the very act of reasoning that he might proceed in good order, with ease, and without error. (1) The first two acts of the mind are properly called acts of intellect rather than of reason, because they are not acts of discourse. The first act is the understanding of what is indivisible or incomplex, and is therefore called simple apprehension. By this act the intellect grasps the essence of a thing. The Predicaments of Aristotle treats the part of logic pertaining to this operation. The second act of the intellect is that of composition or division, in which truth or falsity is found. Aristotle treated what pertains to this act in the Peri Hermeneias. The third operation of the mind is properly called an act of reason, because in it the mind moves from a knowledge of a known truth to a knowledge of a truth previously unknown. This is the act of discourse, that is, of going from one to another. The remaining books of the Organon treat of what pertains to this act - the Prior Analytics, the Posterior Analytics, the Topics, and the Sophistic Refutations. Just as the first of these acts is ordered to the second, and the second to the third, so the Predicaments is ordered to the Peri Hermeneias and the latter to the Prior Analytics and the books that follow."

    (1) At. Thomas, Expositio in Libros Posteriorum Analytitcorum, I, lect. 1 (ed. Leonina), nn. 1, 4.

  30. Fédier, François. 1985. "Interprétations." In. Paris: Press Universitaires de France.

  31. Fine, Gail. 1984. "Truth and Necessity in De Interpretatione." History of Philosophy Quarterly no. 1:23-47.

    "Aristotle's rebuttal at De int. IX of two arguments for fatalism do not, as is commonly believed, reflect the conviction that the fatalist's arguments are valid but unsound. Rather it can be shown that Aristotle judges the fatalist's arguments to be invalid."

  32. Garrido Fernández, Regla María. 1991. "La Categoría De Onoma Según Ammonio De Alejandría." Habis.Arqueología, filología clásica no. 22:313-327.

  33. ———. 1994. "Los Adverbios En Ammonio De Alejandría." Habis.Arqueología, filología clásica no. 25:297-307.

  34. ———. 1996. "Los Comentarios Griegos Y Latinos Al De Interpretatione Aristotélico Hasta Tomás De Aquino." Emerita.Boletín de Lingüística y Filología Clásica no. 64:307-323.

    "The authoress retraces the history of the Greek and Latin commentaries to Aristotle's De Interpretatione up to Thomas of Aquinas. For this purpose she analyses the mentions of other commentaries in those of Ammonius, of Alexander and Boethius, being that of Arnmonius the first extant one in Greek. From these two sources dependences and influences among the different

    cornmentaries are described."

  35. ———. 1998. La Reflexión Lingüística En El Último Neoplatonismo. Huelva: Universidad de Huelva.

    Introducción, traducción y notas del Comentario de Ammonio al tratado "Sobre la interpretación" de Aristóteles (Ammon. In int. 1-77,25 Busse)

  36. Graffi, Giorgio. 1986. "Una Nota Sui Concetti Di Rhema E Logos in Aristotele." Athenaeum no. 74:91-101.

  37. Gyekye, Kwame. 1974. "Aristotle on Language and Meaning." International Philosophical Quarterly no. 14:71-77.

  38. Hankinson, R.J. 1987. "Improper Names. On Intentional Double Ententes in Aristotle's De Interpretatione." Apeiron no. 20:219-225.

  39. Hintikka, Jaakko. 1962. "On the Interpretation of Aristotle, De Interpretatione 12-13." Acta Philosophica Fennica no. 14:5-22.

    Reprinted as Chapter III in: J. Hintikka - Time and necessity. Studies in Aristotle's theory of modality - New York, Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 41-61

  40. Hoffmann, Philippe. 1999. "Les Analyses De L'énoncé: Catégories Et Parties Du Discours Selon Les Commentateurs Néoplatoniciens." In Théories De La Phrase Et De La Proposition. De Platon À Averroès, edited by Buttgen, Philippe, Diebler, Stéphane and Rashed, Marwan, 209-248. Paris: Éditions Rue d'Ulm.

  41. Hugonnard-Roche, Henri. 2005. "Scolies Syriaques Au Peri Hermeneias D'Aristote." In Scientia in Margine. Études Sur Les Marginalia Dans Les Manuscrits Scientifiques Du Moyen Âge À La Renaissance, edited by Jacquart, Danielle and Burnett, Charles F., 27-55. Genève: Droz.

  42. Husson, Suzanne, ed. 2009. Interpréter Le De Interpretatione. Paris: Vrin.

    Table des matières: Jonathan Barnes: Avant-propos 7; Suzanne Husson: Introduction 11; Pierre Aubenque: Sens et unité du traité aristotélicien De l'interprétation 37; Maddalena Bonelli: Alexandre d'Aphrodise et le De interpretatione 51; Cristina Viano: Aristote contre les astrologues. Olympiodore sur le De interpretatione, chap. 9 69; Ali Benmakhlouf: La similitude entre les verbes et les noms dérivés 89; Irène Rosier-Catach: Sur le verbe substantif, la prédication et la consignification - Peri hermeneias 16 b 20-25 dans les traductions et les commentaires en latin 97; Jonathan Barnes: Le De interpretatione dans la philosophie moderne 141; Jean Baptiste Gourinat: Le traité De l'interprétation entre logique classique et logique non-classique 163; Bibliographie 193; Index des sources 205; Index des noms 211; Index des notions 215-222.

    "Pendant les années 2003-2005 les membres du Centre Léon Robin ont décidé de consacrer leurs heures de travail commun à une étude du De interpretatione. Chaque mois, un samedi matin a été consacré à une séance close où nous avons lu ensemble le texte d'Aristote; chaque mois, un vendredi après-midi s'est tenue une conférence publique sur le thème: "Le De interpretatione et sa réception". Le présent livre en rassemble, sous une forme revue, une sélection.

    Inutile de dire que le livre ne donne pas une histoire de la fortune du De interpretatione: une telle histoire remplirait deux volumes chacun de cinq cents pages. Inutile de dire que le livre n'offre pas de récit continu: les recueils de conférences ne sont pas comme cela. Mais il vaut la peine de dire que le livre possède une certaine cohérence, qu'il possède une unité thématique.

    Après une introduction générale de la main de Suzanne Husson qui a édité le recueil, le premier chapitre, écrit par Pierre Aubenque, ancien directeur du Centre Léon Robin, discute de la nature et de la spécificité du traité aristotélicien; ensuite, six chapitres présentent six échantillons, les résultats de six sondages pris dans l'histoire du De interpretatione. Deux des sondages ont été faits sur l'Antiquité, deux sur le Moyen Âge, deux sur l'époque moderne. Les échantillons font ressortir l'influence du traité sur l'histoire des sujets qu'il a abordés: sur la théorie des parties du discours, par exemple, ou sur la conception de la signification. Ils font également ressortir l'influence du traité sur des sujets apparemment éloignés de ses propres intérêts: sur les attaques contre l'astrologie, par exemple, ou sur le développement d'une logique qui reconnaît plus de deux valeurs de vérité. Ils démontrent comment ce ne furent pas seulement les doctrines professées dans le traité qui déterminèrent la pensée de ses lecteurs mais aussi les détails-parfois même des variantes textuelles ..." p. 9

  43. Irwin, Terence. 1982. "Aristotle' Concept of Signification." In Language and Logos. Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented to G. E. L. Owen, edited by Schofield, Malcolm and Nussbaum, Martha, 241-266. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  44. Isaac, Jean. 1953. Le Peri Hermeneias En Occident De Boèce À Saint Thomas. Histoire Littéraire D'un Traité D'Aristote. Paris: Vrin.

  45. Jacobi, Klaus. 1985. "Diskussionen Über Unpersönliche Aussagen in Peter Abaelards Kommentar Zu Peri Hermeneias." In Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics, edited by Bos, Egbert Peter, 1-63. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.

  46. Jacobs, William. 1979. "Aristotle and Nonreferring Subjects." Phronesis.A Journal for Ancient Philosophy no. 24:282-300.

  47. Joja, Athanase. 1969. "La Théorie De La Modalité Dans Le De Interpretatione." Revue Roumaine des Sciences Sociales.Série de Philosophie et Logique no. 13:323-342.

  48. Kirwan, Christopher. 1986. "Aristotle on the Necessity of the Present." Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy no. 4:167-187.

  49. Kneepkens, Corneille Henri. 1994. "From Eternal to Perpetual Truths: A Note on the Mediaeval History of Aristotle, De Interpretatione, Ch. 1 16a18." Vivarium.An International Journal for the Philosophy and Intellectual Life of the Middle Ages and Renaissance no. 32:161-185.

  50. Knuuttila, Simo. 2003. "Truth and Falsity as Modal Notions: Some Medieval Comments on De Interpretatione 12, 22a13." In Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages. Essays on the Commentary Tradition, edited by Braakhuis, Henk Antonius and Kneepkens, Corneille Henri, 413-427. Groningen: Ingenium Publishers.

  51. Kretzmann, Norman. 1974. "Aristotle on Spoken Sound Significant by Convention." In Ancient Logic and Its Modern Interpretations, edited by Corcoran, John, 3-21. Dordrecht: Reidel.

    "A few sentences near the beginning of De interpretatione (16a3-8) constitute the most influential text in the history of semantics. The text is highly compressed, and many translations, including the Latin translation in which it had its greatest influence, have obscured at least one interesting feature of it. In this paper I develop an interpretation that depends on taking seriously some details that have been neglected in the countless discussions of this text.

    The sentence with which De interpretatione begins, and which immediately precedes the text I want to examine, provides (as Ackrill remarks 1) the program for Chapters 2-6.

    ... we must settle what a name is [Chapter 2] and what a verb is [Chapter 3], and then what a negation [Chapters 5 and 6], an affirmation [Chapters 5 and 6], a statement [Chapters 4 and 5] and a sentence [Chapters 4 and 5] are. (16a1-2) (2)

    But Aristotle says "First we must settle what a name is ...", and that is what he does in Chapter 2. The remainder of Chapter 1, then, may be thought of as preparatory to the main business of those chapters. And since their main business is to establish definitions, it is only natural to preface them with a discussion of the defining terms. At the beginning of Chapter 2, for instance, Aristotle defines 'name' in these terms: 'spoken sound', 'significant by convention', 'time', and 'parts significant in separation'. These terms continue to serve as defining terms beyond Chapter 2, and the remainder of Chapter 1 (16a3-18) is devoted to clarifying them. The special task of the text I am primarily concerned with is the clarification of the proximate genus for the definitions in Chapters 2-6: "spoken sound significant by convention" (3)." p. 3

    (1) In the notes to his translation (J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1963; reprinted with corrections, 1966), p. 113.

    (2) I am using Ackrill's translation, the only one in English that shows an understanding of the text.

    (3) Cf. Ackrill, op. cit., Notes, p. 115: "'A spoken sound significant by convention' gives the genus under which fall not only names but also verbs (Chapter 3) and phrases and sentences (Chapter 4)".

  52. ———. 1987. "Boethius and the Truth About Tomorrow's Sea Battle." In Logos and Pragma. Essays on the Philosophy of Language in Honour of Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans, edited by Rijk, Lambertus Marie de and Braakhuis, Henk Antonius. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.

    Reprinted in: D. Blank, N. Kretzmann (eds.) - Ammonius on Aristotle On Interpretation 9 with Boethius on Aristotle On Interpretation 9 - London, Duckworth, 1998, pp. 24-52

  53. Larkin, Miriam Therese. 1971. Language in the Philosophy of Aristotle. The Hague: Mouton.

  54. Manetti, Giovanni. 1993. Theories of the Sign in Classical Antiquity. Bloomngton: Indiana University Press.

    Original Italian edition: Le teorie del segno nell'antichità classica - Milano, Gruppo Editoriale Fabbri, 1987.

    Translated by Christine Richardson.

    See Chapter Five: Language and signs in Aristotle - pp. 70-91

  55. Modrak, Deborah. 2001. Aristotle's Theory of Language and Meaning. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  56. Montanari, Elio. 1984. La Sezione Linguistica Del Peri Hermeneias Di Aristotele. Firenze: Università degli Studi.

    Vol. 1: Il Testo (1984); Vol. 2: Il Commento (1988).

  57. Monteil, Jean-François. 1996. "De La Traduction En Arabe Et En Français D'un Texte D'Aristote: Le Chapitre Vii Du Peri Hermeneias." Bulletin d'Etudes Orientales no. 48:57-76.

    "Les propositions indéterminées du chapitre VII de Peri Hermeneias sont des particulières traduites par des universelles fausses. La cause de cette bizarrerie est dans le maître, et non dans les traducteurs. Aristote mutile un système naturel de propositions dont l'intégrité est restaurée par l'hexagone de Robert Blanché. Celui-ci ajoute deux postes au carré: Y (quantité partielle) et U (exclusion de la quantité partielle). Le carré représente A (totalité) et E (quantité zéro), mais pas avec la tierce quantité Y. Or, la quantité partielle (Y) est essentielle: c'est celle des particulières naturelles contenant notoirement plus d'information que les particulières logiques. U (exclusion de la quantité partielle) est le signifié commun aux deux phrases qu'Aristote élimine du système naturel."

  58. ———. 2001. "Une Exception Allemande: La Traduction Du De Interpretatione Par Le Professeur Gohlke: La Note 10 Sur Les Indéterminées D'Aristote." Revues de Études Anciennes no. 103:409-427.

    "Professor Paul Gohlke (*) is the only translator to fully respect Aristotle's own conception of indeterminates. He was the first to perceive the linguistic problem raised by the indeterminate negative. All the other translators of De Interpretatione mistakenly render Aristotle's indeterminates, which are particulars, as universals. The origin of this mistake lies in one of the two Arabic translations."

    (*) Kategorien und Hermeneutik, Paderborn, Ferdinand Schöningh, 1951

  59. ———. 2004. "La Transmission D'Aristote Par Les Arabes À La Chrétienté Occidentale: Une Trouvaille Relative Au De Interpretatione." Revista Española de Filosofia Medieval no. 11:181-195.

    "Some men are not white and Some men are white versus No man is white are illegitimately identified to the two pairs of logical contradictories constituting the logical square: A versus O and I versus E, respectively. Thus, the level of natural language and that of logic are confused. The unfortunate Aristotelian alteration is concealed by the translation of propositions known as indeterminates. To translate these, which, semantically, are particulars, all scholars, except for Paul Gohlke, employ the two natural universals excluded by the Master! The work of Isador Pollak, published in Leipzig in 1913, [Die Hermeneutik des. Aristoteles in der Arabischen übersetzung des Ishiik Ibn Honain] reveals the origin of this nearly universal translation mistake: the Arabic version upon which Al-Farabi unfortunately bases his comment. In adding the vertices Y and U to the four ones of the square, the logical hexagon of Robert Blanché (*) allows for the understanding of the manner in which the logical system and the natural system are linked."

    (*) Structures Intellectuelles. Essai sur l'organisation systématique des concepts - Paris, Vrin, 1966; Raison et Discours. Défense de la logique réflexive - Paris, Vrin, 1967

  60. ———. 2005. "Isidor Pollak Et Les Deux Traductions Arabes Différentes Du De Interpretatione D'Aristote." Revue d'Études Anciennes no. 107:29-46.

    "Dans le chapitre VII du De interpretatione, Aristote mutile un système naturel de trois couples de contradictions naturelles. Il évince le couple où deux universelles naturelles "Les hommes sont blancs", "Les hommes ne sont pas blancs" s'opposent contradictoirement. Conséquence grave: les deux couples de contradictoires naturelles, qu'Aristote considère exclusivement, sont identifiés illégitimement aux deux couples de contradictoires logiques constituant le carré logique. Cette mutilation est dissimulée par la traduction des propositions dites "indéterminées". L'ouvrage d'Isidor Pollak, publié à Leipzig en 1913 (Die Hermeneutik des Aristoteles in der arabischen Übersetzung des Ishak Ibn Honain, Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, 13,1), révèle l'origine de cette faute de traduction quasi universelle: la version arabe sur laquelle al-Farabi fonde son commentaire."

  61. Nasti de Vincentis, Mauro. 1981. "L'affermazione Da Trasposizione in De Int. 10 E A. Pr. A 46." In Atti Del Congresso Nazionale Di Logica. Montecatini Terme, 1-5 Ottobre 1979, edited by Bernini, Sergio, 617-645. Napoli: Bibliopolis.

  62. Pépin, Jean. 1985. "Sumbola, Sèmeia, Homoiomata. A Propos De De Interpretatione 1, 16a3-8 Et Politique Viii 5, 1340a6-39." In Aristoteles Werk Und Wirkung. Paul Moraux Gewidmet. Band I: Aristoteles Und Seine Schule, edited by Wiesner, Jürgen, 22-44. Berlin: de Gruyter.

  63. Perreiah, Alan. 2003. "Orality and Literacy in the De Interpretatione Tradition." In Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages. Essays on the Commentary Tradition, edited by Braakhuis, Henk Antonius and Kneepkens, Corneille Henri, 51-66. Groningen: Ingenium Publishers.

  64. Polansky, Ronald, and Kuczewski, Mark. 1990. "Speech and Thought, Symbol and Likeness: Aristotle's De Interpretatione 16a 3-9." Apeiron:51-63.

  65. Purnelle, Gérald. 1996. "La Proportion Des Conjonctions De Subordination Dans Six Oeuvres D'aristotle." In Aristotelica Secunda. Mélanges Offerts a Christian Rutten, edited by Motte, André and Denooz, Joseph, 91-102. Liège: Université de Liège. Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres.

  66. Rapp, Christoph. 1991. "Esti Triton. Aristoteles, De Interpretatione 10, 19b 21-22." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 73:125-128.

  67. Rehn, Rudolf. 1986. "Zur Theorie Des Onoma in Der Griechischen Philosophie." In Sprachphilosophie in Antike Und Mittelalter, edited by Mojsisch, Burkhard, 63-119. Amsterdam: Grüner.

  68. Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. 1987. "The Anatomy of the Proposition. Logos and Pragma in Plato and Aristotle." In Logos and Pragma. Essays on the Philosophy of Language in Honour of Professor Gabriel Nuchelmans, edited by Rijk, Lambertus Marie de and Braakhuis, Henk Antonius, 27-61. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers.


    This study is written in honour of a scholar who, among many other things, has laid the solid basis for the study of what may be considered the kernel of the semantics of the statement-making utterance, viz. the definition of the bearers of truth and falsity.

    In the first section I present a survey of Plato's semantics of the statement-making expression and a number of key notions involved. Next, I explore Aristotle's views of the matter, starting with a discussion of Aristotle's notion of pragma including that of being qua truth and not-being qua falsehood. In search for the nature of Aristotle's logos, I discuss this notion as it occurs on the onomazein level as well as the way in which it acts on the legein level. Next, I investigate the important notions of synthesis and dihaeresis and the role of einai as a monadic functor and qua syncategorematic container of categorial being. Finally, I attempt to present a characterization of Aristotle's statement-making utterance.

    (...) p. 27


    We may summarize what we have found as follows:

    1 For Plato,

    1.1 a logos is a composite expression consisting of a name (onoma) and an attribute (rhêma) which as such is not yet a statement-making utterance

    1.2 a logos represents a state of affairs (pragma), i.e. an actual combination of some participata (dynameis) in the outside world

    1.3 a logos eirêmenos is a statement-making utterance; it asserts that the pragma represented by the logos is actually the case.

    2 For Aristotle,

    2.1 a logos is a composite expression consisting of an onoma and a rhêma which represents both a notional and an ontological state of affairs. It may be characterized as a 'statable complex'

    2.2 a pragma is a state of affairs either ontologically: state of affairs being part of the outside world or semantically: state of affairs conceived of and expressed by a logos

    2.3 a logos apophantikos ('statement-making utterance') is a logos actually stated (either asserted or denied)

    2.4 a logos may as such be used either on the onomazein level or on the legein level (qua logos apophantikos). Similarly, phasis (kataphasis, apophasis) may be used on either of these levels

    2.5 synthesis is either synthesis1, = the act of uniting an onoma and a rhêma into a logos (on the onomazein level) or synthesis2 = the assertion of such a union accomplished in a logos apophantikos, (on the legein level), while dihairesis is always the denial of such a union (on the legein level)

    2.6 the esti forming part of a logos apophantikos is not a copula, properly speaking. Rather, it is a sign of (it consignifies, to speak with De interp. 3,16b24-5) synthesis2. The onoma and rhêma are already united to make up a logos ('statable complex') by synthesis, and, then, the esti rather than acting as a dyadic copulative functor, is merely a monadic sign of the 'statable complex' being actually stated

    2.7 The propositional structure found in the logos apophantikos may be described as follows:

    linguistically: a logos expressing categorial being (i.e. syncategorematic being implemented by one or more of the ten categories of being) is stated (either affirmatively or negatively) by means of the monadic functor 'be' or 'not be'

    semantically: the pragma represented by the logos is said to be (or not to be, respectively) part of the outside world (or: 'be (not) the case')." pp. 53-54 (notes omitted).

  69. ———. 1996. "On Aristotle's Semantics in De Interpretatione 1-4." In Polyhistor. Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy Presented to Jaap Mansfeld on His Sixtieth Birthday, edited by Algra, Keimpe, Horst, Pieter van der and Runia, David, 115-134. Leiden: Brill.

    "By and large, in De interpretatione Aristotle is concerned with our capability to speak about all that presents itself to our mind. From chapter 4 onwards, he deals with the statement-making expressions (affirmation and negation), which are the main tools for conveying our thoughts about things. This discussion is prepared (chapters 1-3) by some important observations concerning the basic elements of such expressions, viz. onoma and rhema. The present contribution contains some comments on Aristotle's view of the proper nature of statement-making as put forward in De interpretatione. First, I would like to highlight Aristotle's, what Sir David Ross has called 'frankly 'representative' view of knowledge' by discussing the terms omoioma and pragma. Next, I will discuss what is meant by a term's 'time-connotation', and finally I will examine the semantics of onoma, rhema and logos." p. 115

  70. ———. 2002. Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology. Volume I: General Introduction. The Works on Logic. Leiden: Brill.

    From the Preface: "In this book I intend to show that the ascription of many shortcomings or obscurities to Aristotle resulted from persistent misinterpretation of key notions in his work. The idea underlying this study is that commentators have wrongfully attributed anachronistic perceptions of 'predication', and statement-making in general to Aristotle. In Volume I, what I consider to be the genuine semantics underlying Aristotle's expositions of his philosophy are culled from the Organon. Determining what the basic components of Aristotle's semantics are is extremely important for our understanding of his view of the task of logic -- his strategy of argument in particular.

    In chapter 1, after some preliminary considerations I argue that when analyzed at deep structure level, Aristotelian statement-making does not allow for the dyadic 'S is P' formula. An examination of the basic function of 'be' and its cognates in Aristotle's philosophical investigations shows that in his analysis statement-making is copula-less. Following traditional linguistics I take the 'existential' or hyparctic use of 'be' to be the central one in Greek (pace Kahn), on the understanding that in Aristotle hyparxis is found not only in the stronger form of 'actual occurrence' but also in a weaker form of what I term 'connotative (or intensional) be' (1.3-1.6). Since Aristotle's 'semantic behaviour', in spite of his skilful manipulation of the diverse semantic levels of expressions, is in fact not explicitly organized in a well-thought-out system of formal semantics, I have, in order to fill this void, formulated some semantic rules of thumb (1.7).

    In chapter 2 I provide ample evidence for my exegesis of Aristotle's statement-making, in which the opposition between 'assertible' and 'assertion' is predominant and in which 'is' functions as an assertoric operator rather than as a copula (2.1-2.2). Next, I demonstrate that Aristotle's doctrine of the categories fits in well with his view of copula-less statement-making, arguing that the ten categories are 'appellations' ('nominations') rather than sentence predicates featuring in an 'S is P' formation (2.3-2.4). Finally, categorization is assessed in the wider context of Aristotle's general strategy of argument (2.5-2.7).

    In the remaining chapters of the first volume (3-6) I present more evidence for my previous findings concerning Aristotle's 'semantic behaviour' by enquiring into the role of his semantic views as we find them in the several tracts of the Organon, in particular the Categories De interpretatione and Posterior Analytics. These tracts are dealt with in extenso, in order to avoid the temptation to quote selectively to suit my purposes."

  71. Riondato, Ezio. 1957. La Teoria Aristotelica Dell'enunciazione. Padova: Antenore.

  72. Rosier, Irène. 2003. "Variations Médiévales Sur L'opposition Entre Signification "Ad Placitum" Et Signification Naturelle." In Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias in the Latin Middle Ages. Essays on the Commentary Tradition, edited by Braakhuis, Henk Antonius and Kneepkens, Corneille Henri, 165-205. Groningen: Ingenium Publishers.

  73. Sadun Bordoni, Gianluca. 1994. Linguaggio E Realtà in Aristotele. Bari: Laterza.

  74. Sainati, Vittorio. 1968. Storia Dell' "Organon" Aristotelico. I: Dai "Topici" Al "De Interpretatione". Firenze: Le Monnier.

  75. Scarpat, Giuseppe. 1950. Il Discorso E Le Sue Parti in Aristotele. Arona: Paideia.

  76. Sedley, David. 1996. "Aristotle's De Interpretatione and Ancient Semantics." In Knowledge through Signs. Ancient Semiotic Theories and Practices, edited by Manetti, Giovanni, 87-108. Turnhout: Brepols.

    Revised version: Aristote et la signification, in: Philosophie Antique, 4, 2004, pp. 5-25.

    "Studies of ancient semantics are inclined to concentrate on the significations of individual words. But most ancient thinkers are likely to be misrepresented by such an approach. In Aristotle's classic treatment of the subject, I shall argue, the primary signifier is the sentence, and individual words are considered only secondarily, in so far as they contribute to the sentence's function. Moreover, this emphasis is to be found elsewhere in the Platonic tradition of which, in this respect, Aristotle is a part - not just in Plato himself, but also in the Stoics. In fact only the Epicureans, among ancient thinkers, can be seen to make individual word-meaning primary.

    This difference, if it can be established, should not cause surprise, since it merely reflects the general metaphysical outlook of the thinkers in question. Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics are teleologists, who regard the whole as ontologically prior to the part: the part can only be fully understood by reference to its function within the whole. (1) Epicurus by contrast is an atomist. He standardly treats parts as discrete items which, in coming together, generate larger complexes - be they atoms forming phenomenal bodies, or humans forming societies - but which in no sense have that as their pre-existing nature or function. Even bodily parts like hands and tongues came into being before any functions - including their communicative functions - were found for them. (2) On this same anti-teleological model, Epicurus regards the central core of language as an original set of naturally uttered "names" (probably nouns, adjectives and verbs), correlated to individual objects or contents of experience, and only at a later stage supplemented and inflected into a full-scale language. (3)

    In developing this contrast, I shall concentrate primarily on Aristotle's De interpretatione, whose opening chapters became in antiquity a locus classicus on signification. This is not because I believe that the De interpretatione must have directly influenced any of the other thinkers in the story. While we cannot positively exclude the possibility of its influence in the fourth and third centuries, perhaps even on Plato himself, I see no clear signs of it. The reason for my choice is that the De interpretatione is, if I am right, the most seriously misunderstood text in ancient semantics. If I can make out my case with regard to it, it will provide a valuable perspective on the other philosophers in question." pp. 87-88

    (1) See e.g. Plato, Laws X 903b-d, Aristotle, Pol. 1253a19ff., and, for the Stoics, Plutarch, St. Rep. 1054E-F.

    (2) Lucretius 4.823-57.

    (3) See Long and Sedley (The Hellenistic Philosophers, 1987, section 19).

  77. Sluiter, Inneke. 1997. "The Greek Tradition." In The Emergence of Semantics in Four Linguistic Traditions: Hebrew, Sanskrit, Greek, Arabic, edited by Koerner, Ernst Frideryk Konrad, 149-224. Philadelphia: Benjamins.

  78. Sorabji, Richard. 1980. Necessity, Cause, and Blame. Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

  79. Teixidor, Javier. 1996. "L'introduction Au De Interpretatione Chez Proba Et Paul Le Perse." In Symposium Syriacum Vii. Uppsala University, Department of Asian and African Languages, 11-14 August 1996, edited by Lavenant, René, 293-301. Roma: Pontificio Istituto Orientale.

  80. Verbeke, Gérard. 1956. "Ammonius Et Saint Thomas. Deux Commentaires Sur Le Peri Hermeneias D'Aristote." Revue Philosophique de Louvain no. 54:228-253.

    "La comparaison entre le commentaire d'Ammonius, dans la traduction latine de Guillaume de Moerbeke, et celui de saint Thomas, permet de préciser dans quelle mesure saint Thomas s'inspire d'Ammonius. Édition critique du texte latin du Peri hermeneias d'Aristote, dans la traduction de Moerbeke du commentaire d'Ammonius, avec références au texte des manuscrits grecs."

  81. ———. 1991. "Interprétation Et Langage Dans La Tradition Aristotélicienne." In Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Studien Zur Geschichte Der Philosophie Des Mittelalters, edited by Mojsisch, Burkhard and Pluta, Olaf, 1029-1045. Amsterdam: R. Grüner.

    "A la lumière des analyses qui précèdent, qu'en est-il maintenant du titre peri hermeneias? Ce titre correspond-il au contenu de l'ouvrage?

    La question posée ne vise pas directement l'authenticité Aristotélicienne de la formule: il est vrai cependant, qu'un titre qui ne traduirait pas bien le contenu du traité, aurait peu de chances d'avoir été rédigé par le Stagirite. Par contre, il est probable que l'ouvrage ait reçu un certain titre de la part de son auteur et si le titre traditionnel correspond au contenu de l'écrit, il peut très bien remonter à l'auteur lui-même. Quoi qu'il en soit de la question d'authenticité, nous croyons pouvoir conclure que le titre donné recouvre bien le contenu du traité, dont le sujet principal est l'énonciation catégorique et ses composants. En se basant sur les analyses de Boèce et d'Ammonius, on peut dire que tous ces éléments correspondent à l'idée d'interprétation telle qu'elle est expliquée dans le traité:

    1. L'énonciation y est conçue comme l'interprétation d'un contenu de pensée. Toutefois si le langage se rapporte directement à un objet pensé, il se réfère indirectement au réel: il en résulte que le discours énonciatif est aussi une interprétation de la réalité. Il l'est à un double niveau: le contenu particulier de chaque énonciation se rapporte à un sujet déterminé du monde et en exprime certaines caractéristiques; on peut donc le considérer comme un acte d'interprétation. Par ailleurs, il y a la structure même du jugement, qui, elle aussi, est une interprétation à un niveau plus fondamental de la physionomie du réel.

    2. Les noms et les verbes constituent à leur tour un acte d'interprétation. Selon Aristote, la signification des mots est conventionnelle: elle est le résultat de la vie en communauté, où les hommes sont amenés à se mettre d'accord sur des notions fondamentales de la vie morale et sociale. Ammonius croit que le sens des mots n'est pas purement artificiel, mais qu'il est adapté à la nature des choses. Quoi qu'il en soit, le fait d'appliquer au réel des noms et des verbes est un acte d'interprétation. Exprimer le réel dans les catégories du langage implique toujours un acte interprétatif.

    La doctrine aristotélicienne sur la nature du langage justifie donc le titre de peri hermeneias.".

  82. Visentin, Mauro. 1999. "La Sospensione Del Linguaggio Fra Verità E Realtà in Aristotele. Breve Commento Filosofico Del De Interpretatione." Annali dell'Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici no. 16:125-200.

  83. Wagner, Hans. 1971. "Aristoteles, De Interpretatione 3, 16 B 19-25." In Philomathes. Studies and Essays in the Humanities in Memory of Philip Merlan, edited by Palmer, Robert B. and Hamerton-Kelly, Robert, 95-115. The Hague: Nijhoff.

  84. Waterlow, Sarah. 1982. Passage and Possibility. A Study of Aristotle's Modal Concepts. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  85. Weidemann, Hermann. 1982. "Ansätze Zu Einer Semantischen Theorie Bei Aristoteles." Zeitschrift für Semiotik no. 4:241-257.

  86. ———. 1982. "Aristoteles Über Das Isolierte Aussagewort: De Int. 3, 16b 19-25." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 64:239-256.

  87. ———. 1991. "Grundzüge Der Aristotelischen Sprachtheorie." In Geschichte Der Sprachtheorie: 2. Sprachtheorien Der Abendländischen Antike, edited by Schmitter, Peter, 170-192. Tübingen: Narr.

  88. ———. 1995. "Aristoteles Über Attributive Und Prädikative Adjektive: (Peri Hermeneias 11)." Incontri Linguistici no. 18:61-67.

  89. ———. 2005. "Le Proposizioni Modali in Aristotele, De Interpretatione 12 E 13." Dianoia no. 10:27-41.

    Traduzione italiana di Luca Castagnoli

  90. Whitaker, C.W.A. 1996. Aristotle's De Interpretatione. Contradiction and Dialectic. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

  91. White, Michael J. 1979. "Aristotle and Temporally Relative Modalities." Analysis no. 39:88-93.

  92. Wolanin, Hubert. 1995. "Aristotle on the Word as a Vehicle of Semantic Function." Eos.Commentarii Societatis philologae Polonorum no. 83:251-263.

    "In order to understand Aristotle's perception and description of language at its most basic level, i.e. the semantics of the single word, some aspects of the Aristotelian conception of the word as unit of linguistic communication are analyzed. The Poetics and De interpretatione are particularly meaningful in this context."

  93. Zadro, Attilio. 1974. Interpretazione E Rappresentazione (Una Aporia Formale Classica E La Critica Della Tradizione). Padova: Liviana.

  94. ———. 1979. Tempo Ed Enunciati Nel De Interpretatione Di Aristotele. Padova: Liviana.