Arlig, Andrew W. 2005. A Study in Early Medieval Mereology: Boethius, Abelard, and Pseudo-Joscelin, Ohio State University.

Available at ProQuest Dissertation Express. Order number: 3161106.

Contents: 1. Introduction 1; 2. Introduction to mereology and the metaphysics of mereology 12; 3. Boethius and the early mereological tradition 62; 4. Abelard’s mereology and its role in metaphysics 141; 5. Pseudo-Joscelin and the Moderate critique of Abelard 243; 6. Conclusion 304; List of references 316-338.

Abstract: "The study of parts and wholes, or mereology, occupies two of the best philosophical minds of twelfth-century Europe, Abelard and Pseudo-Joscelin. But the contributions of Abelard and Pseudo-Joscelin cannot be adequately assessed until we come to terms with the mereological doctrines of the sixth century philosopher Boethius. Apart from providing the general mereological background for the period, Boethius influences Abelard and Pseudo-Joscelin in two crucial respects. First, Boethius all but omits mention of the classical Aristotelian concept of form. Second, Boethius repeatedly highlights a rule which says that if a part is removed, the whole is removed as well. Abelard makes many improvements upon Boethius. His theory of static identity accounts for the relations of sameness and difference that hold between a thing and its part. His theory of identity also provides a solution to the problem of material constitution. With respect to the problem of persistence, Abelard assimilates Boethius' rule and proposes that the loss of any part entails the annihilation of the whole. More precisely, Abelard thinks that the matter of things suffers annihilation upon the gain or loss of even one part. He also holds that many structured wholes, namely artifacts, are strictly dependent upon their parts. Yet Abelard insists that human beings survive a variety of mereological changes. Abelard is silent about objects which are neither artifacts nor persons. I argue that Abelard has the theoretical resources to provide an account of the persistence of these types of object, so long as some forms are ontologically robust. Pseudo-Joscelin rejects the thesis that the removal of any part entails the destruction of the whole. The annihilation of a whole follows only from the removal of essential parts. Pseudo-Joscelin employs two basic principles in his theory of persistence. First, forms and the functions encoded in them play a primary role in identity and persistence. He also makes use of a genetic criterion. Pseudo-Joscelin expands both principles and employs them when he vigorously defends the thesis that a universal is a concrete whole composed of particulars from Abelard's criticisms."
———. 2007. "Abelard's Assault on Everyday Objects." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 81:209–227.

Abstract: "Abelard repeatedly claims that no thing can survive the gain or loss of parts. I outline Abelard's reasons for holding this controversial position. First, a change of parts compromises the matter of the object. Secondly, a change in matter compromises the form of the object. Given that both elements of an object are compromised by any gain or loss of a part, the object itself is compromised by any such change. An object that appears to survive change is really a series of related, but non-identical, objects. I argue that, for Abelard, this series of objects is not itself an object. Finally, I examine an apparent exception to Abelard's claim that no thing can survive a gain or loss of parts, and I show that this specific case does not undermine his general thesis."
———. 2012. "Peter Abelard on Material Constitution." Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie no. 94:119–146.

Abstract: "Some scholars have suggested that Peter Abelard has a solution to Allan Gibbard’s [*] famous puzzle concerning a lump of clay and the statue that the clay composes.

Although Abelard does not explicitly address an analogue of this puzzle, I claim that an Abelardian solution can be constructed based on principles drawn from his discussions of sameness and difference in his later theological writings. In this study, I first summarize the puzzle and several standard solutions to it. I then present and analyze Abelard’s account of sameness and difference, with special emphasis on his description of the ways in which the matter of a statue is both the same as and different from the statue. I then show how we can reconstruct an Abelardian solution to the problem from these remarks. Finally, I consider whether this Abelardian solution is coherent and plausible. In doing so, I show how the Abelardian solution reveals an underlying tension in Abelard’s later ontology."

[*] Gibbard, A. 1975. “Contingent Identity”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 4, 187–221. Reprinted in Material Constitution: A Reader. Edited by Michael Rea, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997, pp. 93–125.
———. 2012. "Parts, Wholes, and Identity." In The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy, edited by Marenbon, John, 445–467. New York Oxford University Press.

"Abelard’s ingenious solution to the problem of whether a whole is numerically the same as its part is to ground numerical sameness and difference in the more basic relations of sameness and difference in essentia. In this part of Abelard’s works, a thing’s essentia should not be thought of as that thing’s quiddity, but rather its concrete being. (12) Thus, in Abelard’s view, my essentia just is the composite of all my

material bits and some forms. Given that my essentia is a composite, Abelard insists that we must keep track of these parts when we are determining whether some things are the same or different in essentia. Specifically, according to Abelard, A is the same in essentia as B if and only if the essentia of A coincides with the essentia of B. (13) Discrete things, such as Socrates and Plato, clearly fail to coincide mereologically, and hence, they are different in essentia. Yet, given that mereological coincidence is necessary for essential sameness, A and B can differ in essentia even if some parts are shared. For example, Socrates’s hand is different in essentia from Socrates.

This is true because, while Socrates’s hand is included along with the other parts ‘in the quantity of the whole’, the quantity of Socrates’s hand’s essentia does not exhaust the quantity of Socrates’s essentia." (p. 448)

(12) In Abelard’s works ‘essentia’ has a number of meanings. See De Rijk ( 1981, 19–24).

(13) Theologia Christiana IV, § 12 (Abelard 1969, 271).

References

Peter Abelard 1969. Theologia Christiana , ed. E. M. Buytaert. Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols (Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis, no. 12).

De Rijk, L. M. 1981. ‘Abailard’s semantic views in the light of later developments’. In English Logic and Semantics: From the End of the 12th Century to the Time of Ockham and Burleigh, ed. H. A. G. Braakhuis, C. H. Kneepkens and L. M. de Rijk, 1–58. Nijmegen, the Netherlands: Ingenium Publishers.
———. 2013. "Some Twelfth-Century Reflections on Mereological Essentialism." Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy no. 1:83–112.

Abstract: "Peter Abelard held two views that imply a form of Mereological Essentialism: first, a thing is nothing other than all its parts taken together and second, no thing has more parts at one time than it does at another. This paper situates Abelard’s theses within their historical context. The paper first examines Boethius’s suggestive remarks about the dependence of the whole upon its parts and it highlights several of the choices that were open to twelfth-century students of Boethius’s mereology. Then there is a brief survey of Abelard’s understanding of Mereological Essentialism. Finally, the paper examines some of the more interesting challenges to Mereological Essentialism that were posed by Abelard’s contemporaries. The paper focuses in particular on a set of fragments that have been attributed to the school of Joscelin of Soissons."
Astroh, Michael. 2001. "Petrus Abaelardus on Modalities De re and De dicto." In Potentialität und Possibilität. Modalaussagen in der Geschichte der Metaphysik, edited by Buchheim, Thomas, Kneepkens, Corneille Henri and Lorenz, Kuno, 79–95. Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog.

"The distinction between modalities de re and de dicto Abaelard discusses in his Glossae super Peri hermeneias (1) presents itself as a topic of traditional predication theory. The two varieties of alethic modality are bound to opposite forms of predication. In spite of their uniform linguistic appearance their basic structures are different. Modal propositions de dicto are semantically, not just grammatically, impersonal whereas modal propositions de re are truly personal constructions.(2) Nevertheless Abaelard explains the meaning, scope and purpose of according modal operators in so uniform a manner that he can set forth rules of inference between modal propositions de re and their logical correspondents de dicto.

A systematic presentation of Abaelard's theory pertains to all constitutive features of predication. The grammatical, but even more so the semantical, impersonality or personality of a categorical proposition, its quality and if appropriate its quantity, and finally its temporality and existential presupposition -- each of these features predetermines the manner in which modalities de re or de dicto contribute to a proposition's meaning and validity. These basic aspects of Abaelard's account of predication do not obstruct his intuitive conception of alethic modality as determining either de re or de dicto a predicate's inherence or remotion.(3)" (p. 79)

(1) The text of the relevant treatise will be quoted according to its critical edition by Klaus Jacobi and Christian Strub: Petrus Abaelardus, Glossae super Peri Hermeneias, Turnhout: Brepols (Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio mediaevalis), forthcoming [2010]. As this new edition presents the text with reference to the edition by L. Minio-Paluello: Twelfth Century Logic. Texts and Studies. Vol. 2: Abaelardiana Inedita, 1. Glosse Magistri Petri Abaelardi super Periermeneias Rome 1958, quotations will refer to the latter one (abbreviated with: G).

(2) For Abaelard's account of semantical impersonality cf. Klaus Jacobi, "Diskussionen über unpersonliche Aussagen in Peter Abaelards Kommentar zu Peri Hermeneias", in: E. P. Bos (ed.), Mediaeval Semantics and Metaphysics. Studies dedicated to L. M. De Rijk on the occasion of his 60th Birthday, Nijmegen 1985, 1-63.

(3) The usage of this distinction draws on Abaelard's terminology in Dialectica, cf. for example 191,6. The text of Dialectica is quoted with reference to the De Rijk edition: Petrus Abaelardus, Dialectica, ed. L. M. de Rijk, Assen 1970 (abbreviated with: D).
Beonio Brocchieri Fumagalli, Maria Teresa. 1970. The Logic of Abelard. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Translated from: La logica di Abelardo, Firenze: La Nuova Italia, 1964.

Second edition 1969, with a new foreword.

Contents: Premise V; Foreword to the Second Edition VII; Introduction 1; I. What Abelard Means by Logic 13; II. The Problem of Meaning 28; III. The Meaning of Universal Nouns 42; IV. The Meaning of the Proposition 71; V. The 'Argumentatio' 80; Appendix: Abaelardiana Inedita 90; Bibliography 100; Index of Names 101.

"The purely 'philosophical' importance of logical Abelardian research has been emphasized by Mario Dal Pra in his introduction to the edition of the Glosse Letterali. In this volume it seems important in my eyes to illustrate not only the interest of Abelardian dialectic techniques (which are at times penetrated by positions which are still realistic), but also, and above all, the importance of his total attitude towards the 'scientia scientiarum', stated in advance by a freer and braver mentality that is later to use this instrument for its rigorous definition of philosophical research.

When studying Abelardian dialectic I have preferred to follow the line of development of his inquiry, from meaning to syllogistic calculation. This line does not, however, coincide perfectly with the expositive progress of the various commentaries, from the Isagoge to the Boethian texts; the trail has thus been marked out for me by some of the Palatine Master's statements rather than by the order of the comments.

The perspective of this research is, generally speaking, given from the viewpoint of contemporary formal logic, a viewpoint that is nevertheless implicit, even, I think, if it is at work in inquiry. In fact, in an attempt to have a clearer picture of the historical importance of the author and his meaning in a dialogue which is mediaeval, I have tried, as far as possible, to keep the language constantly in the tone of those times, and I have tried to avoid certain equations - unprecise and sterile in my opinion - between Abelardian logical formulae and contemporary logical formulae. I hope that what will be of interest from a modern viewpoint is Abelard's total attitude." (Premise, p. V).
Binini, Irene. 2018. "‘My Future Son is Possibly Alive'. Existential Presupposition and Empty Terms in Abelard's Modal Logic." History and Philosophy of Logic no. 39:341–356.

Abstract: "The aim of this paper is to investigate the problem of existential import in Abelard's modal logic, and to ask whether the system of logical relationships that he proposes for modal propositions maintains its validity when some of the terms included in these propositions are empty. In the following, I first argue that, just as in the case of non-modal propositions, Abelard interprets modal propositions as having existential import, so that it is a necessary condition for the truth of propositions like ‘It is possible for my son to be alive’ or ‘it is necessary that all men are animals’ that their subjects’ referents exist. Then, I present the schemata of inferences that Abelard proposes to describe the logical behaviour of de rebus modal propositions. I argue that these systems of relations are valid only as long as all the terms contained in the formulas have an existing referent. I also claim that Abelard was aware of this difficulty (at least in the Logica Ingredientibus), and, accordingly, he explicitly decided to restrict the validity of his modal system to propositions that do not contain empty terms."
———. 2020. "Abelard’s Treatment of Logical Determinism in Its Twelfth-Century Context." Vivarium no. 58:1–28.

Abstract: "This article investigates Abelard’s defence of the compatibility between universal bivalence and the existence of future contingent events. It first considers the standard strategy put forward by twelfth-century commentators to solve Aristotle’s dilemma in De Interpretatione 9, which fundamentally relies on Boethius’ distinction between definite and indefinite truth values. Abelard’s own position on the dilemma is then introduced, focusing on a specific deterministic argument considered in his logical works that aims to demonstrate that, given the determinacy of present-tense propositions such as ‘“that Socrates will eat tomorrow” is true’, future contingent events such as that Socrates will eat tomorrow are determinate in advance. In addition to presenting Abelard’s reply to the argument, the article offers an analysis of his notions of contingency, determinacy, and future events, and a comparison between Abelard’s position and other twelfth-century discussions on future contingents."
———. 2020. "The Role of Differentiae in Abelard’s Arguments for the Identity and Persistence of Substances." In Mereology in Medieval Logic and Metaphysics, edited by Amerini, Fabrizio, Binini, Irene and Mugnai, Massimo, 109–134. Pisa: Edizioni della Normale.
———. 2021. "Some Further Remarks on Abelard’s Notion of Nature." In Women’s Perspectives on Ancient and Medieval Philosophy, edited by Chouinard, Isabelle, McConaughey, Zoe, Ramos, Aline Medeiros and Noël, Roxane, 239–251. Cham (Switzerland): Springer Verlag.

Abstract: "The notion of nature is central not only to Abelard’s theory of cognition and to his treatment of universals, but also to Abelard’s modal logic, to his discussion of future contingents and to his theory of conditionals. In this essay, I emphasize how the notion of nature—despite its pervasiveness in Abelard’s philosophy and despite the attention that has been paid to it—still raises puzzling questions to interpreters. One of these puzzles has to do with Abelard’s idea that different individuals may be “of a same nature (eiusdem naturae),” a claim that according to some is hardly compatible with the nominalist position he endorsed. Another interpretative issue is raised by Abelard’s claims in De Intellectibus that substances have more than one nature, and that we might consider things as being of a different nature depending on which of their properties we pay attention to. Given Abelard’s essentialist framework, his assertions on the multiplicity of natures associable to a single individual may sound perplexing. Other issues that I take into account are Abelard’s attribution of natures to non-existent things such as chimaeras or horned men, and his remarks concerning the accessibility of natures to our knowledge."
———. 2022. Possibility and Necessity in the Time of Peter Abelard. Leiden: Brill.

Contents: Acknowledgements XI; Introduction 1;

PART 1

Early 12th-Century Debates on Modal Propositions 14

1 The Received Views on Modalities 15; 2 The Grammar and Syntax of Modal Claims 45; 3 The Nature of Modalities and the Signification of Modal Terms 75;

PART 2

Abelard’s Modal Logic

4 Abelard on de re and de dicto Modalities 120; 5 The Existential Import of Modal Propositions 142; 6 The Logic of Modal Propositions 157; 7 Simple and Determinate Modal Propositions 177;

PART 3

Abelard on the Metaphysics and Epistemology of Modalities

9 Abelard on the Many Senses of Possibility 230; 10 Necessity, Determinacy, and Contingency 271;

Conclusion 308; Bibliography 311; Index 324-326.

"Part I of this book aims to present the logical and grammatical context in which Abelard’s modal theories originated, considering the debates on modalities that are put forward in published and unpublished treatises and commentaries of his time. I shall start by taking into consideration the sources on which Abelard and his contemporaries relied for construing their modal thought." (p 14)

(...)

"Having investigated Abelard’s and his contemporaries’ definitions of modes and their analysis of the syntactic structure of modal propositions in Part I, in the second part of this book I focus on Abelard’s modal theory by taking into consideration its logical core, namely, the system of relations of opposition and equipollence that he establishes among propositions about possibility, impossibility, and necessity." (p. 118)

(...)

"The last part of this book is dedicated to Abelard’s theory on the nature of modalities, and to the questions he raises concerning how we may come to know that something is possible or necessary." (p. 200)
———. 2022. "The De Re–De Dicto Distinction. A Twelfth-Century Logical Discovery." Vivarium no. 60:162–191.

Abstract: "The identification of two possible readings – de re and de dicto – of modal claims is considered one of the greatest achievements of Abelard’s logic. In the Dialectica and the Logica “Ingredientibus,” Abelard uses this distinction as a basis for his modal semantics and theory of modalities. Rather than focusing on Abelard’s own theory, the aim of this article is to pay attention to a number of sources that – like Abelard’s logical works – are datable to the first decades of the twelfth century, to investigate whether the de re–de dicto distinction was already adopted and debated in them. It argues that, even if there is no systematic theorization of the distinction in these sources, Abelard’s contemporaries put forward a number of questions concerning the syntax and the signification of modal claims that contributed to set the stage for the distinction’s identification and later development."
Bird, Otto. 1960. "The Logical Interest of the Topics as Seen in Abelard." The Modern Schoolman no. 37:53–57.

"Father Ong in his Ramus describes Peter of Spain as giving “short shrift” to the doctrine of places and explains this by saying: “The notion of the places is not scientific in any precise logical or psychological sense, since the exact application of the local analogy in play here is very difficult, if not impossible to determine.” (1) Leaving aside the analogy, the question may be raised whether there is any “precise logical” interest in the doctrine of places, or of “topics,” as I prefer to call them. There may be little in the Renaissance logics which are the main object of Father Ong’s study. But it is quite a different matter for medieval logic, as is evident from a consideration of perhaps the first great figure in the development of a specifically medieval logic. I refer to Peter Abelard, whose main work on the topics is now available in the recent, edition of the Dialectica by L. M. De Rijk, where it takes up 160 of the 548 pages of text. (2)?

What I propose to do here is to show from Abelard’s analysis that there is a precise logical interest in the topics and incidentally to indicate how at least some of the matters of traditional topical concern fall within the scope of modern logic.

Abelard begins his consideration of the topics (De Loci.s) immediately after that of the syllogism, as does Peter of Spain in his Siunmulae, which became the classical text in elementary logic from the thirteenth century on. In it he is still concerned with inference, the great object of the logician's interest. Rut in turning from the syllogism to the topics, he passes from what ho calls perfect to imperfect inference." (p. 53)

(1) Walter J. Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason, Chicago: The University of Chicago press 1958, p. 117.

(2) Petrus Abaelardus, Dialectica, First complete edition of the Parisian Manuscript by L. M. De Rijk, Assen: Van Gorcum 1956, Tractatus tertius - Topica - Liber primus - De locis, pp. 253-413.
Blackwell, Daniel F. 1988. Non-Ontological Constructs: The Effects of Abaelard's Logical and Ethical Theories on His Theology: A study in Meaning and Verification. Bern: Peter Lang.

Contents: Abbreviations III; Introduction V-XII; I. The Works and their Problems 1; II. The Logic of Affairs and Causes 72; III. Revelation, Verification, and Meaning in the Continuum 180; Appendix I: The Aristotelian texts available to Abaelard 309; Appendix II: Abelard and contemporary literature 311; Bibliography 317-327.

"In the Ingredientibus and the Dialectica Abaelard sees himself following in the tradition of Aristotle. Throughout the three Theologies he shows a marked respect for Platonic and neoPlatonic philosophy. While the origin of much of his thought lies in both traditions, significant is the use which he makes of his sources. For example, the content of much of the grammatical and logical texts is based on Aristotle. Yet, by rejecting just one fundamental Aristotelian logical principle-- namely, the logical significance of the notion that qualities 'inhere in' subjects qua substances— his grammatico-logical methodological presuppositions become so at odds with those of the Organon that he can be called an Aristotelian only in the broadest sense of the term.

(...)

The problem in which Abaelard was involving himself was that of sense and reference. Maintaining the position that the subjects of meaningful statements needn't refer to things, he had to find a verification principle for propositional statements which did not depend on an ontological inherence theory. Turning his attention to impersonal constructs, he notes that all statements of this type contain dicta, or descriptive assertions of facts about things.

(...)

Near the end of the Ingredientibus Abaelard notes that modal propositions (e.g. Possible est...) are also impersonal grammatical constructions. In fact, all existential statements imply a tacit 'verum est....' It is here that the grammatical origins of the logic become apparent: All existential statements may be transformed into impersonal constructions which contain dicta. 'That which is true' is the meaning described by the dictum. Truth is not concerned with the existence or non-existence of some substance, but with meaningful descriptions about some state of affairs in the world which happens to occur or not occur. Hence, it is the meaning of a statement which is its principle of verification.

Unlike existential statements, general statements of necessary truth cannot be verified by dicta because they do not describe individual states of affairs. The general or universal terms contained in conditional statements do not refer to things.

(...)

While much of Abaelard's theology in the TSB [Theologia Summi Boni] is concerned with definitions, he also stresses the importance of similies and analogical descriptions of divine Realities. Insofar as analogies are descriptive, they parallel propositional dicta. Although they do not describe worldly states of affairs, like dicta, the truth of analogical statements is closely associated with their meaning." (pp. V-IX)

"In one of the most sustained recent studies of Abelard’s thought, Non-ontological constructs. The effects of Abaelard's logical and ethical theories on his theology: a study in meaning and verification (Berne/Frankfurt/New York/Paris, 1988) (Basler und Berner studien zur historischen und systematischen Theologie 56), Daniel Blackwell gives an account of Abelard’s logic which gives pride of place to his theory of non-things and relates his approach to theology to it. Interesting though many of his observations are, the investigations of the preceding chapters would suggest that he has distorted the balance of Abelard’s thought; and his reconstruction of Abelard’s intellectual progress relies on a dating of the works which few scholars would now find acceptable." (John Marenbon, The Philosophy of Peter Abelard, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999, p. 209, n. 15)
Boler, John F. 1963. "Abailard and the Problem of Universals." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 1:37–52.

"The effect of Abailard's analysis on the later Middle Ages is considerable.

Nearly all writers after Abailard make use of the distinctions of two-fold signification, first and second imposition, word and term--in one form or another. But in some of these later writers, one finds what seems to be a return to the pre-Abailardian concern with things rather than terms. It is no surprise, really, for one wonders, even upon reading Abailard, whether he has been fair in his evaluations of his predecessors.

Coming, as it does, after a criticism of the earlier positions on universals, Abailard's remark that universality pertains to terms and not to things might lead us to believe that he intends to solve the problem of universals by speaking only of terms. It is true that, from the time of Porphyry, the problem of universals had been cast in the language of genus and species; but Abailard's proposal to take genus and species as second imposition -- laudable enough in itself--does not seem adequate to the problem which these men had, however imprecisely, suggested. Even through Abailard's presentation of their positions, one can see that they were concerned with the question of what it is for Peter and Paul to be the same as men; and neither second imposition nor "significatio de intellectibus" meets this problem head on.

(...)

What I have tried to suggest in the present paper is that, behind the "clear idea" that universality pertains to terms and not to things, there lies a proposal which, if it is not metaphysics, is also not logic: namely, that the understanding achieves a peculiar transformation in the process of arriving at the "status," where what is known is something different from the individual thing as individual. Abailard may be correct in holding this, but I do not find either a clear analysis or adequate justification for it in his writings. (34) Without such analysis, the statement that universality pertains to terms and not to things cannot serve as sufficient evidence of the character of Abailard's position on the problem of universals." (pp. 50-51)

(34) The lacuna which I find in Abailard's theory is, according to Geyer, more than adequately filled by Abailard's theory of abstraction. (See the articles cited in note 10, above. ["Die Stellung Abaelards in der Universalienfrage," Beiträge . . . . Suppl. I (1913), pp. 101-127]) I cannot help but feel, however, that Geyer is (at best) reading a thirteenth-century interpretation into Abailard.

And his insistence that the analysis of abstraction shows what a sharp psychologist Abailard was only serves to further disaffect me. A shift to psychology at this point in the problem would seem to me more unfortunate than laudable.
Brower, Jeffrey E. 1996. Medieval Theories of Relations before Aquinas: 'Categories' Commentaries, A.D. 510--1250 (Aristotle, Boethius, Peter Abelard, Saint Albertus Magnus), University of Iowa.

Available at ProQuest Dissertation Express. Order number: 9715116.

Table of Contents: Vol. I: List of Abbreviations X; I. Introduction 1; II. Aristotelian Background 49; III. Boethius's Commentary on Categories 100; IV. Abelard's Two Categories Commentaries 226; V. Albert's Commentary on Categories 7 176; Vol. II: Appendix A. Preface to translations 221; B. Boethius's Translation of Categories 7 228; C. Composite edition of Categories 7 246; D. Boethius in Categorias Aristotelis 264; E. Abelard's Logica Ingredientibus 346; F. Abelard's Dialectica 418; G. Albert's Liber de Praedicamentis 446; Bibliography 533-544.

From the Abstract: "In the dissertation I focus on the texts of three medieval philosophers writing before Aquinas: Boethius (480-524), Abelard (1079-1142), and Albert the Great (1200-1280).

These texts are all commentaries on Aristotle's short treatise, the Categories. In the Categories Aristotle identifies relations (or relatives, pros ti) as one of the ten irreducible kinds of beings (onta), and he devotes an entire chapter the seventh chapter of his treatise to

analyzing their nature and ontological status. I take Categories 1 as a starting point for my dissertation, and devote its first chapter to outlining Aristotle's discussion and identifying the important philosophical and interpretive questions to which it gives rise. In the remainder of the dissertation, however, I examine the medieval commentary tradition that grew up around the Categories during the years 510-1250 A.D.

(...)

None of the texts I consider in the dissertation has ever been translated into a modern language. As an aid to their recovery, I include (as appendices) English translations of all the following: (1) Boethius's Latin translation of Categories 7, (2) chapter 7 of the early medieval composite edition of the Categories (the so-cailed Editio Composita), and (3) all the relevant portions of Boethius's, Abelard's, and Albert's Categories commentaries." (Abstract, pp. V-VII)

Texts of Abelard translated:

[Latin Text: Logica ingredientibus in Peter Abaelards Philosophische Schriften, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Band XXI, 1-3, ed. Bernhard Geyer (Munich, 1919-1927), 200-223.], pp. 346-417.

[Latin Text: Dialectica, ed. L.M. de Rijk, 2nd ed. (Assen, 1956), 83-92.], pp. 418-445.
———. 1998. "Abelard's Theory of Relations: Reductionism and the Aristotelian Tradition." The Review of Metaphysics no. 51:605–631.

"In what follows I focus on the work of Peter Abelard (1079-1142), an influential medieval logician who developed his theory of relations in the course of commenting on Categories 7.(4) Like other Aristotelians, Abelard accepts the view that relations are reducible to the monadic properties of related things. On his theory, however, the relation between Simmias and Socrates is not to be explained by a set of peculiar monadic properties--say, being-taller-than-Socrates and being-shorter-than-Simmias. Rather it is to be explained by a pair of ordinary heights--say, being-six-feet-tall in the case of Simmias and being-five-feet-ten in the case of Socrates. Indeed, according to Abelard, the relation between Simmias and Socrates is nothing over and above the possession by these individuals of their respective heights.

Although Abelard commits himself to a form of reductionism about relations, we shall see that his theory is perfectly compatible with the advances made by twentieth-century logicians. Abelard is careful to distinguish questions about ontology from questions about logic, and to commit himself to reducing relations only at the level of ontology. Thus, he argues that Simmias's being taller than Socrates is nothing but Simmias, Socrates, and their respective heights. Nonetheless, he denies that relational statements of the form "Simmias is taller than Socrates" can be reduced to complex non-relational statements of the form "Simmias is six-feet-tall and Socrates is five-feet-ten."

The rest of the paper is divided into three parts. As will emerge, there is an important distinction to be drawn between Abelard's theory of relations and his account of relatives. hi the first part of the paper (sections I-II), I present and explain the account of relatives. Here I focus on one of Abelard's most important logical works, his Logica 'ingredientibus,' but since the relevant portion of this work follows the subject matter and arrangement of Categories 7, I begin with a brief sketch of Aristotle's text. In the second part of the paper (sections III-V), I indicate what Abelard's account of relatives tells us about his own theory of relations. Although, this requires some reconstruction on my part, it is possible to determine with some accuracy to what sort of theory he committed himself. In the third and final part of the paper (sections VI-VII), I turn to the defense of Abelard's theory. My purpose in this last part is to begin the project of rehabilitating a much denigrated tradition in the history of philosophy." (pp. 605-606)
Cameron, Margaret. 2007. "Abelard (and Heloise?) On Intention." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly no. 81:323–338.

Abstract: "For Abelard, the notion of “intention” (intentio, attentio) plays a central and important role in his cognitive and ethical theories. Is there any philosophical connection between its uses in these contexts? In recent publications, Constant Mews has argued that the cognitive and ethical senses of “intention” are related (namely, the cognitive sense evolves into the ethical sense), and that Abelard is repeatedly led to focus on intentions throughout his career due to the influence of Heloise. Here I evaluate Mews’s arguments by examining and comparing the cognitive and ethical senses of the term. Although the basis for Mews’s claim seems to be false, I argue that there is nonetheless an important philosophical relationship between cognitive and ethical intentiones in Abelard’s thought, the recognition of which leads to a new and more precise understanding of his ethical theory of intention."
———. 2011. "Abelard's Early Glosses: Some Questions." In Arts du langage et théologie aux confins des XIe et XIIe siècles, edited by Rosier-Catach, Irène, 647–662. Turnhout: Brepols.

"Peter Abelard’s first known glosses on Isagoge, Categories, On interpretation and On division – variously referred to as the « Editiones », the « Introductiones parvulorum », or literal commentaries – were supposedly written very early in his career, probably around 1102-1104 when he was in his early twenties.

(,,,)

The editiones are commonly considered to be Abelard’s « vocalist », or in voce, commentaries, thought to display more than anything else the influence of his former teacher, Roscelin of Compiègne, who has been long characterized by historians of philosophy as a nominalist, and more recently as a « vocalist ». These works are supposed to reflect the kind of teaching that Abelard would have received under Roscelin. Despite their important role in the narrative of Abelard’s career and of early medieval logic more broadly, the early glosses have not been examined in close detail.

Although they have been attributed to Abelard and treated as a set, serious questions need to be raised regarding the evidence used to defend these claims. The evidence is fivefold. First, the editiones were written in the same, twelfth century hand and are found in one manuscript. Second, the Isagoge, On interpretation and On division glosses bear titles that attribute the works to Abelard. Third, elsewhere in his corpus Abelard himself refers to « introductiones parvulorum » that he has written. Fourth, versions of the Isagoge and On interpretation glosses are found in another manuscript, manuscript Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, clm 14779, where there appear to be self-referential examples using the name « Petrus » given.

Finally, it has been argued that the Categories gloss, despite being untitled, bears strong similarities (namely, linguistic and doctrinal parallels) to Abelard’s commentary on Categories found in the Logica « Ingredientibus » collection.

Possibly none of the questions raised in this article on its own is sufficient to overturn the attribution, but taken together they raise serious difficulties for anyone who wishes to continue to defend that the editiones were written by Abelard. There do, however, seem to be extremely good reasons to break up the set of the editiones by excluding the gloss on Categories from the rest: unlike the others, it is an anonymous fragment, different in style and has required a special defence for its inclusion in the set. In what follows, I will examine each of the five pieces of evidence. I will argue that there are insufficient reasons to continue to attribute these works to Abelard or to consider that they form a set (1)." (pp. 647-648)

(1) In « A note on the Attribution of the Literal Glosses in Paris, BnF, lat. 13368 », Christopher Martin will examine the doctrinal content of the Isagoge, On interpretation and On division glosses and compare it with views Abelard is known to espouse elsewhere in his writings.
———. 2011. "When does a word signify? Debates from Peter Abelard's milieu and the early thirteenth century." Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age no. 78:179–194.

Abstract: "The shift of focus from spoken to mental language in medieval philosophy is well known.

What has not been noticed is the role played by the recognition of various paradoxes and problems of signification due to the physical character of spoken utterances.

This essay examines these paradoxes and their solutions in the work of Peter Abelard, his contemporaries, and some authors in the early thirteenth century."

"As is well-known, Abelard eventually shifted his attention away from consideration of the physicality of utterances towards their cognitive status.

Abelard concedes that the material nature (essentia) of utterances (voces) and significant words (sermones) is virtually the same, but they differ in origin (34): spoken utterances (voces), like the things signified by words, are due to nature, whereas significant utterances (sermones) are products of human institution. In his latest works, it is clear that Abelard has shifted altogether away from the analysis of utterances considered as physical, natural items and towards words considered as significant as a product of human institution, connected most closely with human understanding." (pp. 18-189)

(34) (34) Abelard, Logica nostrorum petitioni sociorum, ed. P. Geyer, Peter Abaelards philosophische Schriften. II. Die Logica « Nostrorum Petitioni Sociorum » : Die Glossen zu Porphyrius, Münster 1933, p. 522.17-22: « Quid enim aliud est nativitas sermonum sive nominum quam hominum institutio ? Hoc enim quod est nomen sive sermo ex hominum institutione contrahit. Vocis vero sive rei nativitas quid aliud est quam naturae creatio, cum proprium esse rei sive vocis sola operatione naturae consistat ? Itaque nativitatis vocis et sermonis diversitas, etsi penitus in essentia identitas ».
———. 2011. "The Development of Early Twelfth Century Logic: a Reconsideration." In Arts du langage et théologie aux confins des XIe et XIIe siècles: textes, maîtres, débats, edited by Rosier-Catach, Irène, 677–694. Turnhout: Brepols.

"It is important to evaluate the most recent account of the development of early twelfth century logic put forward, in separate works, but by way of mutual influence, by Y. Iwakuma and J. Marenbon. I will call their version « The Current Story ». According to it, Abelard developed a philosophical position called « Vocalism » upon aving argued with his former teacher William of Champeaux over universals. Prior to this confrontation, the young Abelard (and others associated with his teacher Roscelin of Compiègne) practiced what Marenbon has called « in voce exegesis» and what Iwakuma calls «proto-vocalism ». The inspiration for their account came in part from a series of arguments concerning the chronology of Abelard writings given by C. Mews (1985).

(...)

"In the end, I hope to show that the Current Story is wrong. To do so, I will first summarize it as it has been told by Marenbon and Iwakuma. I will try to sort out a basic confusion about the meaning of ontological neutrality upon which it relies. The evidence supporting the Current Story crucially depends on the dating and characterization of Abelard’s so-called earliest glosses, the «Introductiones parvulorum» (referred to as the «editiones» below). Elsewhere (see my article in this volume) I have argued that there is insufficient evidence to attribute these editiones to Abelard. Furthermore, as I will show, regardless of their supposed connection to Abelard, the editiones has been mischaracterized. I argue that there is a much more plausible and defensible way to understand the character and purpose of these early glosses and others like them. By altering our understanding of these glosses, however, we are forced to abandon the Current Story altogether." (pp. 677-679)

References

M. Cameron, Abelard's Early Glosses: Some Questions same volume, pp. 647-662.
———. 2012. "Meaning: Foundational and Semantic Theories." In The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy, edited by Marenbon, John, 342–362. New York Oxford University Press.

"What follows is a very brief overview of some of the major developments in semantic and hermeneutic theory, focusing especially on the issue of using names other than as they were imposed to signify.

One of the first efforts to account for this phenomenon can be seen in the early twelfth century during Peter Abelard’s milieu, during which they refined a notion of linguistic translation ( translatio ). As Rosier-Catach ( 1997, 1999 ) has shown in detail, signification by way of translation or semantic transference (not from one language into another, but from one sense into another) was introduced in order to handle

cases of metaphorical language.

(...)

As Abelard notes, there is only a conflict of meaning ( oppositio vocis ) if the expression is interpreted according to the way the terms were originally imposed, but not according to the way it is accepted in a given context of use (1927, 478, 28–479, 2). The doctrine of semantic transference was of great use for hermeneutics, specifically for the interpretation of theological language: given that imposition is a human act, names were ‘instituted in order to designate the creatures that humans were able to conceive’ (Abelard, 1983 , II § 70–78). Accordingly, when human words are used to talk about God and God’s nature, they ‘necessarily exceed their proper institution (or imposition)’ (ibid.)" (p. 353, a note omitted)

References

Peter Abelard 1927. Glossae super Periermeneias Aristotelis, ed. B. Geyer. Vol. 3 of Peter Abaelards philosophische Schrift en: Die Logica ‘Ingredientibus’. Münster, Germany: Aschendorff (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 21.3).

Rosier-Catach, Irène. 1997. ‘Prata rident’. In Langages et philosophie: hommage à Jean Jolivet, ed. A. De Libera, A. Elamrani-Jamal and A. Galonnier, 155–76. Paris: Vrin.

———. 1999. ‘La notion de translation, le principe de compositionalité, et l’analyse de la prédication accidentelle chez Abélard’. In Langage, science et philosophie au XII e siècle, ed. J. Biard, 125–64. Paris: Vrin.
———. 2015. "On What is Said: The Stoics and Peter Abelard." In Linguistic Content: New Essays on the History of Philosophy of Language, edited by Cameron, Margaret and Stainton, Robert, 55–73. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

"A novel kind of meaning shows up, apparently independently, in the philosophy of the Stoics and of Peter Abelard (1079–1142). For the Stoics it is the lekton, or ‘sayable’ (or, more precisely, the axioma, or ‘assertible’, which is one type of lekton), and for Abelard it is the dictum. The extent of similarity between their doctrines is surprising, especially because there is no evidence of a historical connection between them: as far as we know, Abelard did not have access to any Stoic writings, or reports of Stoic views, on the topic of linguistic content. (1) The similarity is more surprising still, given that Abelard was working within the context of Aristotle’s logic, which contains no comparable doctrine. Historians of philosophy have noticed this similarity.(2) When the comparison is drawn it is with reference to the fact of their shared recognition of this new type of content—propositional content. But there are other remarkable points of similarity in their views. First, both seem to have been motivated, at least in part, by the need to disambiguate the notion of predication in the ancient philosophical tradition. Second, both the Stoics (at least beginning with Chrysippus, the third head of the school) and Abelard were driven by a commitment to anti-realism, and by the need to present an anti-realist, or at least deflationary, metaphysics. After a brief outline of each of their doctrines, I will compare their views on the points mentioned here." (p. 55)

(...)

"Conclusion. In conclusion, what happens to this new type of linguistic content after Abelard? Theories of propositional content emerge, disappear, and re-emerge throughout the medieval and scholastic periods. The interest is preserved in the continuation of the logical tradition, still rooted in Aristotelian logic, beginning in the twelfth century. Some theorists seemed to have been entirely unconcerned with the ontological implications and underpinnings of these sorts of linguistic content. For example, the author(s) of a thirteenth-century logical textbook called the Ars Burana explain(s) that it is best considered to be an extrapredicamental thing (that is, not countenanced in what exists in an Aristotelian ontology of substances and accidents): Note that whether it is called a dictum propositionis or the significatum propositionis or the enuntiabile, it is the same. The enuntiable is that which is signified by the proposition . . . If you inquire what kind of thing it is, whether it is a substance or an accident, it must be said regarding the enuntiable, just as regarding the predicable, that it is neither a substance nor an accident nor is it of any other category. For it has its own per se mode of existing. And it is called ‘extrapredicamental’, not for the reason that it does not belong to any category, but because it does not belong to any of the ten categories that Aristotle distinguished. It is therefore of a certain category which can be called the ‘enuntiable category’. (53) Later, some philosophers attempted to defend a view that took the opposite tack— that is, to defend a view of propositional realism, only to encounter some of the same sorts of anti-realist challenges.(54)" (p. 71)

(1) While Augustine’s De dialectica contains some version of the Stoic doctrine, his treatise does not appear to have circulated until the thirteenth century. Another possible source might have been Cicero, but I know of no evidence to support such a transmission.

(2) Martin (2004), who cites Nuchelmans (1973) and Schenkeveld (1984). See also Jacobi (1983) and Lenz (2005). But see Nuchelmans (1973: 152): it is hardly necessary to add that the Abelardian term dictum has nothing to do with the Stoic term lekton.’

(53) Ars Burana (1967: 208). See De Libera (1981); Martin (2004).

(54) The best study of this topic is Cesalli (2007).

References

Ars Burana (1967). Anon., Ars Burana, in L. M. de Rijk (ed.), Logica modernorum: A Contribution to the History of Terminist Logic. Assen: Van Gorcum, 175–213.

Cesalli, L. (2007). Le Réalisme propositionnel: Sémantique et ontologie des propositions chez Jean Duns Scot, Gauthier Burley, Richard Brinkley, et Jean Wyclif. Paris: J. Vrin.

De Libera, A. (1981) ‘Abélard et le dictisme’, Cahiers de la revue de théologie et de philosophie, 6: 59–92.

Jacobi, K. (1983).‘Abelard and Frege: The Semantics of Words and Propositions’, in Atti del convegno internazionale di storia della logica, ed. V. M. Abrusci (San Gimignano: CLUEB), 81–96.

Lenz, M. (2005).‘Peculiar Perfection: Peter Abelard on Propositional Attitudes’, Journal of the History of Philosophy, 43/4: 377–86.

Martin, C. (2004).‘Propositionality and Logic in the Ars Meliduna’, in A. Maierù and L. Valente (eds), Medieval Theories on Assertive and Non-Assertive Language. Florence: Olschki, 111–28.

Nuchelmans, G. (1973). Theories of the Proposition: Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity. Dordrecht: North-Holland.

Schenkeveld, D. M. (1984).‘Stoic and Peripatetic Kinds of Speech Act and the Distinction of Grammatical Moods’, Mnemosyne, 37: 291–351.
———. 2015. "The Logic of Dead Humans: Abelard and the transformation of the Porphyrian Tree." Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy no. 3:32–63.

"Is a dead human still a human? Is it the same human, or even the same body? What is the correct meaning of the sentence, “Humans die”? These sorts of problems, which are being actively debated today, were also recognized in the early twelfth century in Paris by Peter Abelard and others who adhered to the classical definition of man, or human, as ‘rational mortal animal.’ Their concerns were not, as far as I know, ethical, although they were likely to an extent theological.(1)

Instead, they recognized a problem with the logic of living and dead humans based on the doctrine of substance found in Aristotle’s Categories and in the division of substance, as outlined by Porphyry to exemplify the logic of genus and species relations in the Isagoge. Abelard (1079–1142) held the view that there is no such thing as a dead human, and this provoked an intense response from his contemporaries.

(...)

I will first outline the reasons for Abelard’s claim that there are no dead humans, as well as his theory of what a human being is. There is plenty of evidence that Abelard’s view was faced with criticism, and in section 1 I will run through some of those criticisms. This period is best known for the debates over the status of universals, which were presented to us by Abelard himself in his commentary on Isagoge, and as it turns out, the debates over the implications of Abelard’s view that there are no dead humans were tightly bound up with the debates over the status of universals. The debates found in the anonymous commentaries have to do with how to understand the so-called Porphyrian tree, which was regarded as a fixed and inviolable structure of the category of substance. Specifically, the anonymous commentators try to defend the view known as Material Essence Realism (or MERealism), or at least a version of realism very similar to it, against Abelard’s criticisms of it. By tracking the problems generated by Abelard’s view that there are no dead humans we acquire greater insight into these early twelfth-century debates over the status of genera and species, especially those prompted by the difficulty of trying to make sense of the logic of dead humans." (pp. 33-34)

(1) The theological implications of the substantial status of human beings are, obviously, far reaching. In addition to debates over the Trinity, there are also implications for the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist and the endurance of Christ’s body in the tomb.
———. 2019. "Peter Abelard on mental perception." In Philosophy of Mind in the Early and High Middlle Ages, edited by Cameron, Margaret, 18–34. New York: Routledge.

The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 2.

"My primary interest in this chapter is to identify the ancient sources that inspired Abelard’s own theory, and more narrowly to investigate the language of mental perception that lies at its foundation. Abelard turned to three well-known ancient writings available to him in the early twelfth century:

Boethius’ Commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge and his Consolation of Philosophy, as well as Augustine’s On the Trinity. King (1982) first emphasized the importance of acts of attention in Abelard’s philosophy. The explicit link with Augustine’s theory was elaborated by Rosier-Catach (2004). Their interpretations of Abelard on attention differ considerably from one another, and my own differs from both of theirs. Without access to Aristotle’s De Anima, which was first translated into Latin in the late twelfth century (and even then it took a number of years before it began to be seriously studied), Abelard is left to come up with a theory of mind, ultimately rooted in sense experience, that can account for our true understanding of things that have no correlates or denotata in the reality that we presently sense." (p. 19)

References

King, P. (1982). Peter Abailard and the Problem of Universals, 2 vols. PhD thesis, Princeton University.

Rosier-Catach, I. (2004). “Les discussions sur le signifié des propositions chez Abélard et ses contemporains,” in (eds.) A. Maierù and L. Valente, Medieval Theories on Assertive and Non-assertive Language (Acts of the 14th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Rome, June 11–15, 2002), Florence: Leo Olschki, 1–24.
———. 2020. "The Constraints of Nature(s): Abelard on Modality, Understanding and Linguistic Meaning." In The Origin and Nature of Language and Logic: Perspectives in Medieval Islamic, Jewish, and Christian Thought, edited by Germann, Nadja and Harvey, Steven, 369–386. Turnhout: Brepols.

"According to Peter Abelard (1079-1142), the nature of things (natura rerum) imposes strict constraints on what is possible, impossible and necessary: the possible is what nature allows, the impossible what is contrary to nature, and the necessary what nature demands.(1) Species, which are natural kinds, have natures; for example, humans by nature are rational, mortal animals. These natures constrain modal parameters for individuals of those species by determining those individuals’ capacities and incapacities. What is possible, impossible or necessary for individuals is thereby broadly determined by their species-level capacities.

This aspect of Abelard’s modal theory has been acknowledged by recent scholars. What has not been noticed is the remarkable extent to which Abelard’s views on the constraints of nature for modality are consistent with his views on the ways nature constrains both understanding and linguistic meaning. In other words, Abelard’s modal theory is complemented by a psychological theory about how we come to know these modalities as well as by a theory of linguistic meaning that explains how names come to be. In what follows I will outline how nature constrains modality, understanding and linguistic meaning according to Abelard. To appreciate the consistency of his views, we will need to investigate what Abelard means by “nature”, and how it is able to effect the constraints at each level: reality, understanding and linguistic meaning. As a result, it will become perfectly clear, contrary to some earlier interpretations of Abelard’s philosophy (see below, section II of this paper), that while Abelard is a non-realist about many things (e.g., universals, causes), he is a realist about natural kinds and is committed to a one-world theory of modality, rendering any possible-worlds-style interpretation of his philosophy inappropriate." (pp. 369-370, notes omitted)
Courtenay, William J. 1991. "Nominales and Nominalism in the Twelfth Century." In Lectionum Varietates. Hommage à Paul Vignaux, edited by Jolivet, Jean, Kaluza, Zénon and Libera, Alain de, 11–48. Paris: Vrin.

Reprinted as Chapter Four in: W. J. Courtenay, Ockham and Ockhamism: Studies in the Dissemination and Impact of His Thought, Leiden: Brill, 2008, pp. 39-80.

"Since the Nominales are first mentioned as active in Abelard’s last years or shortly after his death and the application of the theory of the nomen to the problem of the object of faith does not appear before Abelard, it seems plausible that his teaching was, at the very least, influential in the development of the positions of that group. At the same time it must be noted that (1) Abelard made use of a theory of nouns and enuntiabilia that was already in circulation and that the label Nominales was first and foremost tied to a theory of the nomen that Abelard shared with many others; that (2) it is unclear how many of these positions were original or unique to Abelard; and that (3) several of the positions attributed to the Nominales were attributed variously to several other groups or schools as well, such as the Parvipontani, Melidunenses, Montani, and Cappauces. Abelard had considerable sympathy for a theory of nomina and a technique of problem solving that his colleague, Alberic, found objectionable. This is another illustration of the Platonic current within Abelard’s thought that has not received sufficient attention.

Alberic could well have included Abelard among the secta Nominalium, but the latter is probably a larger category and not identical with Abelard or his disciples. If the first major twist in this problem requires us to acknowledge the Platonic background of the nominalist theory, the second major twist is that Abelard was a Nominalist or proto-Nominalist, but on a far different set of issues and viewpoints than previously imagined. And if we include Abelard among the Nominales, then we should include Peter Lombard and his closest followers.

On the basis of our present knowledge, however, it might be more accurate simply to describe Abelard as a major source and Lombard as heavily influenced by nominalist theory." (pp. 78-79 of the reprint)
———. 1993. "Nominales and Rules of Inference." In Argumentationstheorie. Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln korrekte Folgerns, edited by Jacobi, Klaus, 153–160. Leiden: Brill.

Reprinted as Chapter Five in: W. J. Courtenay, Ockham and Ockhamism. Studies in the Dissemination and Impact of His Thought, Leiden: Brill, 2008, pp. 81-87.

"Among the positions attributed to the Nominales in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries are several that can be categorized as rules of inference or are related to theories of entailment. A list of these along with other nominalist opinions was recently assembled by Calvin Normore in a very stimulating and perceptive article(1) Although the entire list of positions attributed to the Nominales seemed initially to Normore to be quite disparate and unrelated, he concluded that the positions had two things in common. First, that they were all positions held by Peter Abelard who, on the basis of this and other long-known evidence, was credited with the establishment of the Nominalist school. And second, that the principal issue that linked most of the nominalist theses was not the issue of universals but rather the question: what makes propositions true?" (p, 81 of the reprint)

(1) C. Normore, “The Tradition of Mediaeval Nominalism,” in Studies in Medieval Philosophy, ed. J.F. Wippel (Washington, 1987), pp. 201–217.
Cranz, Edward F. 2006. "Boethius and Abelard." In Reorientations of Western Thought from Antiquity to the Renaissance, edited by Struever, Nancy, 1–20. Aldershot: Ashgate.

"Let me conclude with two brief general addenda. First, I have tried to outline the main development of Abelard's logic and the one most dependent upon Boethius. What we have seen may be summarized by saying that, where Boethius closely connects, sometimes even identifies, intellections, universals and propositions with 'res' or beings, Abelard shifts all these relationships to a new context and then denies them all: intellections, universals and propositions are not 'res'' as physical things. To repeat a phrase; he desubstantializes them all.

But Abelard never stops thinking. Sometimes his conclusions are more new questions than new answers, and his second treatment of a problem is sometimes very different from his first. Some scholars have described the last stage of his thought as a 'return to Platonism': but I think he is more creative and original. He has changed Boethius' res into 'physical things,' and he has denied that intellections or meanings were 'physical things' and turned them into 'nothings.' But there are hints, and there is no time to analyze them here, that at the end he began to move to another new solution in which meanings from having been nothings turn into the ultimate realities. If I had to suggest parallels to his last stage, Petrarch, Lorenzo Valla and Nicholas of Cusa come to mind. So if I have tried to describe Abelard's transformation of Boethius, what was left, and I don't believe it was ever completed, might be called Abelard's transformation of Abelard.

Second, while Abelard's writings had no wide dispersion and while he was not followed by any school or even by very many pupils, I believe his diffuse influence was greater than one might expect. The reorientations of thought one finds in his logic and elsewhere often spread more widely in his own time than did his specific ideas; they were not destroyed by the reception of Aristotle and in some ways provided a context within which Aristotle was received. So in concluding I cannot resist noting that, while I have characterized what happened as a transformation of Boethius, let us not in this group forget that it was a transformation of Boethius." (p. 20)
Donato, Enrico. 2022. "Abelard on Eternal Truths." Vivarium no. 60:226–247.

Abstract: "This article reconstructs Abelard’s account of eternal truths as it is presented in the Dialectica, in the so-called Sententiae Parisienses, and in the Theologia “Scholarium.”

It first shows how in the Dialectica Abelard had to transform the traditional account of topical inferences in order to make sense of the idea that true conditional propositions express eternal truths. It clarifies Abelard’s claim that eternal truths are grounded on the “nature of things” and explains why Abelard thought that these truths hold even when there are no things. The article then considers Abelard’s reply to an objection according to which eternal truths have in fact been false in the past. It examines Abelard’s mature views on eternal truths as we find them in the Sententiae Parisienses and Theologia “Scholarium.” Here, Abelard grants the status of eternal truth also to what is expressed by contingently true categorical propositions. These truths are grounded on the “events of things” that exist eternally as the proposition-like objects of God’s will and foreknowledge."
———. 2025. "Alberic the Logician." Journal of the History of Philosophy no. 63:357–377.

Abstract: "Alberic of Paris (fl. 1130s) was one of the most prominent philosophers of the twelfth century, and Peter Abelard’s main rival. In this paper, I argue that the aim of Alberic’s logical program was to propound a realist conception of logic. That is, Alberic rejected the nominalistic theorem according to which logic deals only with names, and argued that logic also deals with things, both particular and universal. In this regard, Alberic’s logic hinges on a clear commitment to the existence of universals.

To show this, I examine the core elements of Alberic’s logic and contrast them with their nominalistic counterparts. My analysis shows that Alberic, unlike Abelard and the Nominales, systematically construed logical relations and operations with reference to things and their universal natures. Moreover, I demonstrate that Alberic’s realism was in many ways an attempt to recover the original spirit of Boethius’s logic from the unorthodox and profound transformations that had been introduced by Abelard in the 1110s."
Dutilh Novaes, Catarina, and Bosman, Bianca. 2017. "Formal, Material, and Hybrid Grounding for Consequence: Peter Abelard and John Buridan." In Miroir de l'amitié. Mélanges offerts à Joël Biard à l'occasion de ses 65 ans, edited by Grellard, Christophe, 229–242. Paris: Vrin.
Eco, Umberto. 1984. "Signification and Denotation from Boethius to Ockham." Franciscan Studies no. 44:1–29.

Section IV. Abelard, pp. 7-9.

"It has been remarked that in Abelard the logical terminology is not definitely assested and that he frequently uses the same terms in an equivocal sense. Nevertheless Abelard is the first author in which the distinction between the intensional and the extensional aspects of semantics is substantially (if not always terminologically) posited with a great care. It is true that he speaks indifferently of "significado de rebus" and "significatio de intellectibus," but it is equally true that for him the primary sense of "significatio" is an intensional one, on the Augustinián line of thought- where "significare" is "constituere" or "generare" a concept of the mind." (p. 7)
Fredborg, Karin Margareta. 2003. "Abelard on Rhetoric." In Rhetoric and Renewal in the Latin West 1100-1540: Essays in Honour of John O. Ward, edited by Mews, Constant J., Nederman, Cary J. and Thomson, Rodney M., 55–80. Turnhout: Brepols.

"The only time we hear about the famous dialectician and theologian Peter Abelard being engaged in studying rhetoric is when he resumed his studies with William of Champeaux some time between 1108 and 1113 in Paris. As in other situations, Abelard started an argument and came out victorious:(1)

(...)

Why a dispute about the universals should come up during a disputation in a course of rhetoric, we are never told. Early twelfth-century French rhetorical commentaries, however, including those by William of Champeaux, do deal with philosophical matters. Three times in his commentaries we find phrases like ‘res universalis’ or ‘invincible reasons for saying genus est res’(3) which could have sparked off such a dispute over the universals. Unfortunately, no extant Ciceronian commentary or traces of Abelard’s own teaching on, for instance, the De inventione or the Rhetorica ad Herennium exist today, but we know that Abelard was interested in Cicero.(4( We also possess an interesting twelve-page digression on rhetorical argumentation in his glosses to Boethius’ De differentiis topicis which I intend to re-edit here.[*]" (pp. 55-56, two notes oitted)

(1) Historia calamitatum, ed. by Jacques Monfrin (Paris: Vrin, 1967), p. 65.(...)

(3) Fredborg, [‘The Commentaries on Cicero’s De Inventione and Rhetorica ad Herennium by William of Champeaux’, CIMAGL, 17 (1976), 1-39] p. 13, 29, 30.

(4) Gabriella d’Anna, ‘Abelardo e Cicerone’, Studi Medievali, Ser. 3a, 10 (1969), 333-419; David Luscombe, ‘The School of Abelard Revisited’, Vivarium, 30.1 (1992), 127-38 (p. 132).

[*] <De questione circumstantiis implicita et de locis>, pp. 62-890
Freddoso, Alfred J. 1978. "Abailard on Collective Realism." Journal of Philosophy no. 75:527–538.

Comments by Eileen Serene, pp. 539-540.

Abstract: "In the "Logica ingredientibus" Abailard attacks the theory according to which universals are collections of individuals. I argue that Abailard's principal objection to this 'collective realism', viz, that it conflates universals with integral wholes, is actually quite strong, though it is generally overlooked by recent commentators. For implicit in this objection is the claim that the collective realist cannot provide a satisfactory account of predication. The reason for this is that integral wholes are not uniquely decomposable. In support of my thesis I first explicate the medieval distinction between integral and subjective parts and then discuss its application to collective realism."
Gill, Harjeet Singh. 1989. "The Abelardian Semiotics." In Abelardian Semiotics and Other Essays, 1–29. New Dehli: Bahri Publications.

"The linguistic theory of Abelard is centred around the correlation or correspondence between the "word" and the "thing" or the signifiant and the signifié as we would have them today. According to Abelard, if a word or a sound signifies, it is because something is added to its physical being. essentia; this something is the significative function, officium significandi. The sound, just like the thing that it represents in a give language, remains the same from one community of speakers to another, it belongs to the sphere of things, which is natural; the significance, on the other hand, changes due to the diversity of languages, it depends upon institution, upon a human convention, positio hominum, voluntas hominum.(1) We have already the distinction between the sphere of significance and the sphere of things. The sound or the physically pronounced utterance is of the order of nature while significance is created when "something" is added to its being, and, this "something" is due to human intervention in a human, social institution. For Abelard, words give birth to or "generate" intellection which then correspond to things. Thus, argues Abelard, there is a double series of correspondence between words and intellections, and between intellections and things, and consequently, between words and things. These are three distinct but related spheres.(2)" (pp. 4-5).

(1) Glossae super Peri Ermenias, 320, 12, 27, ed. B. Geyer, Munster i.W. 1919-23.

(2) Glossae super Prophyrium III, 524, 3-10, ed. B. Geyer, Munster, i.W. 1919-23.
———. 1996. The Semiotics of Conceptual Structures. New Delhi: Bahri Publications.

Second edition Jawaharlal Nehru University 2016.

First part: Abelardian Discourse: Pierre Abélard 19; Abélardian Theory of Mental Images 37; Abélardian Discourse 46; Abéelardian Tradition 55-71.

"We can summarise Abélardian reflections on the nature and function of language as a human institution where the words are imposed on things by human will, by human convention. At this stage they may be considered arbitrary but in the evolutionary process, the words not only refer to things, but also, and at times primarily, to their concepts, hence, they are not so ·arbitrary. Their semantic ranges are extended on the basis of analysis and analogy. These analogies are based on our perception of similarities as "soft" in soft wood, soft iron, soft cotton, soft drink, soft colour etc. We always begin from a physical sensuous experience which is then reorganised, rearranged in the domain of imagination. It is this imaginatively reconstituted concept of the thing (experience) that is the object of our intellection. Our expressions have three levels of articulation: the physical, the grammatical and the conceptual. We first proceed from the physical to the conceptual as we call "mother" Ganges on the basis of a certain perception of our own mother, then reciprocally, our mother acquires the characteristics of mother Ganges.

Furthermore, all conceptual relations are reciprocal as father and son derive their "fatherhood" and "son-hood" from each other, or metonymic and metaphoric relations, where chronological, syntagmatic, sequential and non-sequential, metaphorical concepts play a major role. Finally, language is a vehicle of communication between thinking beings where the interlocutors exchange words or expressions which are the resultants of their mental activity. They represent conceptual realities which are different from both Platonic universal realism and Aristotelian individual nominalism. (pp. 54-55)
———. 1999. "The Abelardian Tradition of Semiotics." In Signs and Signification. Vol. I, edited by Gill, Harjeet Singh and Manetti, Giovanni, 35–67. New Delhi: Bahri Publications.
———. 2023. Abelardian Theory of Mental Images And Pure Forms. Delhi: Aakar Books.

Second edition. First edition with the title Mental Images and Pure Forms: Study in Abelardian Theory New Delhi: Bahri Publications 1991.

"4.3. The controversy over universals or mental images common to a number of individuals in the Middle Ages presents two opposing propositions. The realists, following Plato, believed that these universals like rationality and mortality have an intrinsic existence outside our bodies. They have a separate, real existence. The nominalists, following Aristotle, insisted that the universals subsist always in the sensible. It is a question of substance in act. This nature of animal that is designated by a universal word, which due to a certain transfer, is called universal, is found nowhere other than within a sensible body. For the realists, this universal conserves its being even outside all sensible substance.

Abélard says that we have to assign to these universal terms a third signification, other than the one which is based on the real thing and the one that is based on its intellection. This reality that Abélard assigns to these universals is a conceptual reality. It has neither the Platonic independent existence nor the Aristotelian reality confined only to the individual, sensible beings.

4.4. Abélard then explains the process of abstraction. Matter and form do not exist in isolation from each other but our esprit has the faculty to consider either one or the other in itself, paying attention, at times, to form only, at others, to matter, and even if it so desires, to consider them both in a certain combination. In the first two cases, it is an affair of an abstractive operation, an act with which our esprit abstracts an element from a synthesis to consider it in its own nature. In the third case, it is an operation of synthesis. For example, we have the substance of man. It is body, animal, man, it is covered with indefinite number of forms. When we pay attention to this substance in its material essence avoiding all forms, this operation is abstractive. Inversely, when we pay attention only to the corporeality that we relate with the substance, our operation of comprehension is synthetic with rapport to the one that consists of considering only the nature of the substance, but it is at the same time, abstractive with rapport to other forms of corporeality like animation, sensibility, rationality etc., to which now we do not pay any attention. These abstractive intellections could be considered false and empty for they conceive things in a manner other than they really are. Paying attention to either form or matter in isolation when neither form nor matter subsists in isolation, we conceive things different from the way they really are, and consequently, they are completely false." (pp. 54-55)
Gracia, Jorge J. E. 1984. Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages. München: Philosophia Verlag.

Chapter IV. The Tradition Based on Boethius' Logical Works: Peter Abailard and John of Salisbury, pp. 196-254.

I. Peter Abailard 196. A. The Accidental Theory of Substantial Individuation 196; 1. Abailard's Criticism 198; B. The Essential Theory of Individuation 210; 1. Abailard's Response 212; C. The Formalist Theory of Individuality and Its Criticism 212; D. Word View of Individuality 215; E. Numerical Diversity in the Theologia christiana 227; II. John of Salisbury 236; Notes 241-254.

"Abailard, like most medieval writers before the thirteenth century, does not give separate consideration to the problem of individuality. He raises it in the context of his treatment of universals, contenting himself with only occasional and always incidental comments; the notion of individuality comes up when it can be used to shed light on the more controversial notion of universality. Moreover, the impact of his comments is mainly negative, given their critical character. The positive view of individuality he proposes is largely restricted to a logical dimension of the problem of individuality, as we shall see, and even then it is rather brief and cursory. In spite of this, and owning in particular to the sharp criticism of his opponents he presents, Abailard's discussion of individuality is in some ways more subtle and interesting than much of what had been done before him.

There are only two works in which individuality is discussed to any serious degree.(6) The most developed view is contained in the Logica ingredientibus, a logical treatise written for beginners. A less complete account is given in the Logica nostrorum, of later date. Both works consist of commentaries on Porphyry and, as it should be expected, make extensive use of Boethius' Commentary on the "Isagoge". (p. 196, a note omitted)

(6) The existing books of the Dialectica contain very little of interest about individuality. In the lost books, however, most likely Abailard dealt with this issue, particularly in the book on genus and species, where he certainly must have raised the question of universality.

Moreover, there are other works of Abailard which are now lost and which may have contained matter relevant to the problem of individuality. See A. Van den Eynde, "Les ecrits perdus d'Abelard", Antonianum 14 (1975), 263-272 and N. M Häring, "Abailard Yesterday and Today", in Pierre Abelard-Pierre le Vénérable (Paris: CNRS, 1975), pp. 341-403. One of these reputed lost works was called De universalibus et singularibus ad Oliviarum filium suum tractatus, listed in Histoire litteraire de France, vol. 12 (Pans, 1763), p. 130.
———. 1999. "Metaphysical, epistemological and linguistic approaches to universals: Porphyry, Boethius, and Abailard." In Medieval Masters: Essays in Memory of Msgr. E. A. Synan, edited by Houser, Rollen Edward, 1–24. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.
Greene, Virginie. 2014. Logical Fictions in Medieval Literature and Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 1: Abelard’s donkey: the nonexistent particular, pp. 13-32.

"In this chapter I will examine Abelard’s thoughts about imagination and the status of its products in the soul. This will be a little dry for a while, but the appearance of Browny the Donkey in Abelard’s commentary of Porphyry’s Isagoge will bring comic relief while introducing my own theory about fiction as a mental process of creating imaginary particulars. I will then return to the Roman de Renart and a chivalric romance involving animals: Chrétien de Troyes’s Yvain or The Knight with the Lion, in order to underscore their way of imagining particulars. I will also use Bernard de Clairvaux’s astute criticism of chivalric fictions to compare his understanding of imagination with Abelard’s theory and Chrétien’s practice." (p. 14)
Guilfoy, Kevin. 1999. Abelard's Theory of the Proposition, University of Washington.

Available at ProQuest Dissertation Express. Order number: 9936410.

Abstract: "In Peter Abelard's writings, the dictum performs the role a twentieth-century philosopher would assign to a proposition. A dictum is what is said or asserted by a sentence. We are able to call a sentence "true" or "false", "possible" or "necessary", if the dictum asserted by the sentence is true, false, possible, or necessary. It is clear that the dictum is the central element in Abelard's theory of the proposition. Nonetheless, that the dictum performs an important role, is perhaps the only claim about Abelard's theory of the proposition to which there is general agreement among current thinkers. There is a good deal of dispute and confusion with regard to the proper interpretation of Abelard's theory of the proposition. Much of this dispute centers on the fundamental question: What is the dictum? This dissertation is an extended attempt to answer this question. There are three parts to the dissertation. In part one the dissertation disputes the common assumption that dicta are composed of status. This discussion serves to separate Abelard's theory of the proposition from his theory of universals. The second part of the dissertation argues that Abelard, at different times, advanced two distinct theories of the proposition, one in his Dialectica the other in his Logica Ingredientibus. The dissertation contends that Abelard's more mature view is found in his Logica lngredientibus. The remainder of the dissertation is an account of Abelard's theory of the proposition as it is found in the Logica Ingredientibus."
———. 2002. "Abelard's Rejection of the Tarski Biconditional." Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy no. 5:143–158.

Abstract: "In a fairly opaque passage in his commentary on Aristotle's Categories Peter Abelard denies both directions of a biconditional sentence very much like a Tarski biconditional: "A man exists" is true iff a man exists. "A man exists" is taken to be a sentence token and the right hand element is taken to be the existence of a man. Neither Abelard's argument nor his reason for making the argument is clear. It at first appears that Abelard may be claiming that each of the corresponding conditionals is false. Such a claim could amount to a rejection of the correspondence theory of truth and would naturally have serious repercussions for the study of Abelard's logic. In this paper I argue that Abelard does not deny the truth of the biconditional only its necessity. Abelard makes this argument in response to Boethius and certain twelfth-century masters (I suggest Thierry of Chartres), who argue that there is a logically necessary connection between words and things, and hence between sentence tokens and what is the case in the world. Abelard is not expressing any serious reservations about the correspondence theory of truth. He is demonstrating the logical importance of the conventionality of language. Arguing against authorities, and twelfth-century peers, he shows that there is no logically necessary connection between words and things, hence the Tarski biconditional is not necessarily true."
———. 2004. "Peter Abelard's Two Theories of the Proposition." In Medieval Theories on Assertive and Non-Assertive Language, edited by Maierù, Alfonso and Valente, Luisa, 35–57. Firenze: Olschki.
———. 2004. "Mind and Cognition." In The Cambridge Companion to Abelard, edited by Brower, Jeffrey E. and Guilfoy, Kevin, 200–222. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"In this chapter I provide a systematic introduction to the central elements of Abelard’s account of cognition and philosophy of mind.

I begin with a brief assessment of Abelard’s place in the Aristotelian tradition (§ i). Following this, I discuss Abelard’s account of sensation, imagination, and understanding (§ ii); it is in this section that I develop Abelard’s account of cognition. I turn next to a discussion of abstraction and universal understandings (§ iii). Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion of opinion, knowledge, and intelligence – the epistemic issues involved in Abelard’s account of mind (§ iv)." (p. 201)
———. 2006. "Imagination and Cognition of Insensibles in Peter Abelard." In Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale / Intellect and imagination in medieval philosophy / Intelecto e imaginação na filosofia medieval / Actes du XIe Congrès international de philosophie médiévale de la Société internationale pour l'Étude de la philosophie médiévale (S.I.E.P.M.): Porto, du 26 au 31 août 2002, edited by Pacheco, Maria Cândida and Meirinhos, José F., 895–902. Turnhout: Brepols.

"Cognition, especially the cognition of insensibles is a key element in Abelard’s semantics: words signify items by generating understandings of these items. If we could not form an act of understanding an item we could not use a word to signify the item. Each of Abelard’s discussions of the semantics of universal terms are accompanied by an account of the cognition of insensibles. In brief, the cognition of a particular insensible nature or property is a necessary intermediate step to the formation of a universal understanding. We must understand the particular insensible nature, this-humanity, before having the pure universal act of understanding humanity. To use Abelard’s own terms an understanding must be sola and nuda before it can be pura. Abelard made at least two attempts to explain the initial cognition of particular insensibles. But, ultimately he was not content with either. His final pronouncement on the topic is to claim that, whatever the cognitive process, our cognition of insensibles is sufficient to provide a semantics for universal terms. Abelard expresses little confidence in this claim and even this slight confidence may be unwarranted. Abelard is committed to 3 theses, which I will explain below and that present a seemingly insurmountable obstacle to the initial cognition of particular insensibles." (p. 895)
Guilfoy, Kevin Stephen. 1999. Peter Abelard's Theory of the Proposition, University of Washington.

Abstract: "In Peter Abelard's writings, the dictum performs the role a twentieth-century philosopher would assign to a proposition. A dictum is what is said or asserted by a sentence. We are able to call a sentence "true" or "false", "possible" or "necessary", if the dictum asserted by the sentence is true, false, possible, or necessary. It is clear that the dictum is the central element in Abelard's theory of the proposition. Nonetheless, that the dictum performs an important role, is perhaps the only claim about Abelard's theory of the proposition to which there is general agreement among current thinkers. There is a good deal of dispute and confusion with regard to the proper interpretation of Abelard's theory of the proposition. Much of this dispute centers on the fundamental question: What is the dictum? This dissertation is an extended attempt to answer this question. ;There are three parts to the dissertation. In part one the dissertation disputes the common assumption that dicta are composed of status. This discussion serves to separate Abelard's theory of the proposition from his theory of universals. The second part of the dissertation argues that Abelard, at different times, advanced two distinct theories of the proposition, one in his Dialectica the other in his Logica Ingredientibus. The dissertation contends that Abelard's more mature view is found in his Logica lngredientibus. The remainder of the dissertation is an account of Abelard's theory of the proposition as it is found in the Logica Ingredientibus."

Skip to the top